Tractate Shabbat, Chapter 1, Lesson 8, Part A
This transcription was produced automatically using artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.
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Table of Contents
- Definitions and the distinction between an unintended act and a labor not needed for its own purpose
- Pesik reisha, whether the result is beneficial, and the connection to the dispute among the medieval authorities (Rishonim)
- The Arukh, Tosafot, and the proofs from sprinkling wine and from the myrtle branch
- The Chazon Ish and an act that happens on its own
Summary
General Overview
The discussion goes back over and summarizes the distinction between an unintended act and a labor not needed for its own purpose, and the dispute between Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda as to whether these involve a Torah prohibition, a rabbinic prohibition, or full permission. From there it also addresses pesik reisha, especially the question whether a pesik reisha whose prohibited result is not beneficial to him is considered equivalent to a labor not needed for its own purpose, or whether it is a completely different kind of case. Along the way, the views of the Arukh, Tosafot, Kovetz Shiurim, and the Chazon Ish are examined, and the sugya is developed toward the study of Rabbi Chaim.
Definitions and the distinction between an unintended act and a labor not needed for its own purpose
The classic case of an unintended act is dragging a bench and making a furrow, where he intends to move the bench and does not intend to make the furrow. The classic case of a labor not needed for its own purpose is digging a hole when he only needs the dirt, meaning he performs the act of digging but is interested only in a different result. An unintended act is a general category that appears throughout the Torah, whereas a labor not needed for its own purpose is a special category specific to the laws of the Sabbath.
According to Rabbi Shimon, an unintended act is completely permitted, whereas a labor not needed for its own purpose is exempt from liability but still prohibited, meaning it is a rabbinic prohibition. According to Rabbi Yehuda, an unintended act is prohibited by Torah law, and in the case of a labor not needed for its own purpose he imposes liability. It was also mentioned that some medieval authorities (Rishonim) want to say that according to Rabbi Shimon, a labor not needed for its own purpose is a Torah prohibition without karet or stoning, but that point was not explored in depth here.
Pesik reisha, whether the result is beneficial, and the connection to the dispute among the medieval authorities (Rishonim)
When an unintended act is a pesik reisha, Rabbi Shimon concedes, and the question becomes whether this is treated like actual intent or like some other kind of prohibited case. One possibility presented was that a pesik reisha whose prohibited result is not beneficial to him is equivalent to a labor not needed for its own purpose, because pesik reisha joins the two acts into one act, and then if he does not want the prohibited result, it becomes once again a labor not needed for its own purpose. According to this approach, if the result is beneficial to him, it becomes like an intentional act; and if it is not beneficial to him, it becomes a labor not needed for its own purpose.
On the other hand, another understanding was also raised, according to which pesik reisha does not unify the acts in a way that produces a labor not needed for its own purpose, but only creates a situation in which intending one act necessarily includes the other as well. On that basis one can explain the view attributed in Tosafot to the Ri, who concedes in every case of pesik reisha regardless of whether the result is beneficial or not, whereas the Arukh distinguishes between whether it is beneficial or not beneficial. This distinction keeps coming back as a central axis of the sugya.
The Arukh, Tosafot, and the proofs from sprinkling wine and from the myrtle branch
The Arukh brings proof from a case of one who volunteers wine and sprinkles it over the fire on the altar, even though that involves extinguishing, and also from the sugya about removing berries from a myrtle branch on a Jewish holiday. From both sugyot he learns that a pesik reisha whose prohibited result is not beneficial to him is permitted, because Rabbi Shimon does not concede there. Tosafot in Ketubot reject the Arukh and argue that the permission to sprinkle the wine is because of a commandment, and that in the case of the myrtle branch this is not a pesik reisha whose prohibited result is not beneficial to him at all, because there is no act of improvement there, since he has another hoshana available.
Kovetz Shiurim explains that the dispute between the Arukh and the Ri depends on the question of why Rabbi Shimon concedes in pesik reisha. According to one approach, pesik reisha turns the person into someone acting intentionally, and therefore if the result is not beneficial to him, there is no intent here. According to another approach, pesik reisha unifies the acts, and therefore the intent for one act also applies to the accompanying result, regardless of whether it is convenient or beneficial to him. From there he also addresses Tosafot’s difficulty: if a pesik reisha whose prohibited result is not beneficial to him is prohibited by Torah law, it is hard to understand how a commandment could permit it.
The Chazon Ish and an act that happens on its own
The Chazon Ish writes that if a person drags a bench and a furrow is made, the furrow is not considered his act of labor but something that happened on its own. According to this line of thought, there would seemingly be room to permit even a pesik reisha, because there too one could say that the unintended act happened on its own, and the distinction between certainty and doubt does not change the essence of the matter. This creates a further difficulty for the previous approaches, and it sets the stage for the continuation of the discussion in Rabbi Chaim.
Full Transcript
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So what I want to do today is finish up a few points from last time, and in the end we’ll move on to Rabbi Chaim. To read Rabbi Chaim—but first, a preliminary question: did you more or less manage to cope with him? Was it more possible? Or how did it go today with Rabbi Chaim?
[Speaker B] I think it was more understandable.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] More understandable?
[Speaker B] I’m not saying completely, but more than last
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] time.
[Speaker C] I understood the first part of it; the second part, I felt like I was entering some kind of loop that I couldn’t get out of.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, fine, let’s get to that, God willing. At the first stage I just want to once again summarize a bit and fill in a few gaps, things I also added on the sheet and maybe a little beyond that. We talked about the cases the Talmud brings on page 3a regarding a labor not needed for its own purpose—at least two of them, maybe even all three, are connected to the exemption of a labor not needed for its own purpose. The Talmud says that it is exempt and permitted. The Talmud ties this to that principle; the Talmud ties it to the dispute between Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda whether a labor not needed for its own purpose is exempt or liable. Because according to Rabbi Yehuda, who says liable, then you don’t permit it ab initio even in a place of bodily discomfort; and according to Rabbi Shimon, where it’s only a rabbinic prohibition, then they permit it in a place of bodily discomfort. First of all, what exactly are the definitions? Yesterday we talked about the definitions of an unintended act and a labor not needed for its own purpose. The classic case of an unintended act is dragging a bench and creating a furrow, where he intends to move the bench and does not intend to create the furrow. Notice that.
[Speaker D] An unintended act—that’s a labor not needed for its own purpose?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s an unintended act. Did I say a labor not needed for its own purpose? Then that was a mistake. The classic case of an unintended act is dragging a bench and not intending the furrow. If he does intend the furrow, by the way, then he’s simply plowing; that’s not… there’s no issue there. But if he doesn’t intend the furrow, then it’s an unintended act. And a labor not needed for its own purpose—the classic case is digging a hole and needing only its dirt. Meaning, he is actually doing the act of digging, but the result he wants is the dirt; he needs the dirt and not the hole. Whereas the prohibition—or the need “for its own purpose,” as defined in the Tabernacle—is basically digging in order to produce the hole itself. That’s the difference between the two things. I said that a labor not needed for its own purpose—those are cases; not yet the difference. I said that a labor not needed for its own purpose is a category that exists only in the laws of the Sabbath, as opposed to an unintended act, which is a category that exists throughout the Torah, not specifically in Sabbath laws. And another thing: regarding a labor not needed for its own purpose, the dispute is whether it is a Torah prohibition according to Rabbi Yehuda, or a rabbinic prohibition according to Rabbi Shimon. In the case of an unintended act, according to Rabbi Shimon it is completely permitted, both on the Sabbath and throughout the Torah. According to Rabbi Yehuda, plainly speaking it is a Torah prohibition; there are views that in the laws of the Sabbath, according to Rabbi Yehuda, it is only a rabbinic prohibition. Okay, because there is this issue of intentional labor; we’ll still see that.
[Speaker C] Wait, so is a labor not needed for its own purpose also a rabbinic prohibition according to Rabbi Yehuda?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, according to Rabbi Yehuda it’s a Torah prohibition. According to Rabbi Shimon it’s a rabbinic prohibition. And not permitted—that’s another difference. Again: the difference is between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon. In a labor not needed for its own purpose, according to Rabbi Yehuda one is liable—that’s a Torah prohibition. According to Rabbi Shimon, one is exempt but it is prohibited—that’s a rabbinic prohibition. What they permitted in our case is only because there is bodily discomfort, but in principle a labor not needed for its own purpose is a rabbinic prohibition. In the case of an unintended act, we go down one level. According to Rabbi Shimon, who is more lenient, it is completely permitted—not a rabbinic prohibition, but completely permitted. And according to Rabbi Yehuda, then it depends: throughout the Torah it is liable, a Torah prohibition. On the Sabbath there are many opinions that it is only a rabbinic prohibition.
[Speaker C] Yes, that I understood. Just regarding Rabbi Shimon: in a labor not needed for its own purpose, it’s exempt, prohibited rabbinically, not by Torah law.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct. There is the view of the Pnei Yehoshua and the sefer Kovetz on Maimonides—they want to argue, we won’t have time to get into it now, but they want to claim that according to Rabbi Shimon, a labor not needed for its own purpose is a Torah prohibition, only one is not liable for karet or stoning for it. Like the prohibition of letting one’s animal rest—we saw examples of such prohibitions, prohibitions of cessation, where there are Torah prohibitions but no punishment. What is written here, “exempt,” means exempt from punishment, but the prohibition itself is a Torah prohibition. We talked about a half-measure; we talked about all kinds of prohibitions of this sort that are Torah-level but carry no stated punishment. That’s the general point. Now beyond that, we saw that according to Rabbi Shimon, if it’s an unintended act but also a pesik reisha, then he concedes.
[Speaker B] And it basically becomes like intentional.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Like intentional. Of course that raises the question: what does “like intentional” mean? Is it like intentional in the sense that one is actually liable by Torah law, or like an unintended act according to Rabbi Yehuda, where on the Sabbath it is exempt but prohibited? Okay, we won’t get into that—I’m just saying, there are different views about it, but it’s certainly a question that comes up in this context. The example we saw of an unintended act throughout the Torah, not on the Sabbath, is for example cutting off a leprous mark in circumcision. When I perform the circumcision, I am in fact also cutting off the leprous mark, and that is prohibited, but I am doing the cutting for the circumcision, not for the leprous mark. So that’s an unintended act in a prohibition that is not from the Sabbath prohibitions but from ordinary prohibitions. Now we saw the definition brought by the Kesef Mishneh for the difference between an unintended act and a labor not needed for its own purpose, in the name of Rabbi Abraham ben HaRambam. And I said that the accepted explanation of this difference is that in an unintended act, you do two actions, one of which—the permitted action—you intend, and the prohibited action you do not intend. That’s not what you were doing it for. In a labor not needed for its own purpose, you do only one action, and that is the one you intend—you just are not interested in the usual result of that action. It has two results. It’s one action with two results, and you are not interested in the labor in that second result. “Not interested” means it really is not beneficial to you. That’s not an unintended act; rather, it’s a case where it is not beneficial to you. Okay? And therefore a labor not needed for its own purpose is different from an unintended act, because in a labor not needed for its own purpose you intend what you are doing; you just are not interested in the ordinary result but in some other result. True, as a definition, in that wording it sounds very nice, but when you want to apply it and test different cases—whether they are classified as a labor not needed for its own purpose or as an unintended act—that is a very, very subtle and difficult question. Because exactly when is an action defined as two actions, each with its own result? And when is it one action with two results? Even in digging a hole versus dragging a bench, it’s not unequivocal. But if you compare digging a hole to cutting off a chicken’s head, for example, it’s much harder. Because digging a hole and cutting off a chicken’s head are both local, momentary acts; seemingly you did only one act, just one that has two results. And even so, in cutting off a chicken’s head that is considered two actions: doing the act of removing the head, and doing the act of killing the chicken. True, you did that in one act; you do it in one physical deed—but it’s always like that. The whole idea of an unintended act and a labor not needed for its own purpose is that you do the two actions in one deed. When you drag a bench and create a furrow, what you do is one deed. You simply drag the bench. The only question is how we relate to that deed. Do we relate to it as one action with two results, or as two different actions? There are questions here that it’s very hard to give a clear criterion for that distinguishes between them sharply. Okay, but in any case, that is the…
[Speaker E] Wait, not every action can be split in two, so to speak. Some can, some can’t.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Either you divide the action or you divide the results. The question is whether the division is in the action or in the results—that is what determines whether it is an unintended act or a labor not needed for its own purpose. I said that when we talk about pesik reisha, that basically means that the prohibited action is a necessary result of what I’m doing. Okay? Pesik reisha is said only with respect to an unintended act. In a labor not needed for its own purpose, it is usually a case of pesik reisha. And pesik reisha is not an exemption in this context. When you dig a hole, surely there will be a hole, even if what you want is the dirt. Meaning, there is a pesik reisha there, but pesik reisha does not impose liability in a labor not needed for its own purpose. You remain exempt. Okay? Pesik reisha joins the two actions to one another, but pesik reisha does not make the result into one that is beneficial to him; therefore it doesn’t work on the level of a labor not needed for its own purpose. Even so, Tosafot in Yoma 34, as brought there by Kovetz Shiurim I think, says—and other medieval authorities (Rishonim) say this too—that a pesik reisha where the result is not beneficial to him is like a labor not needed for its own purpose. How can that be?
[Speaker B] Rabbi, on Tuesday you said that the definition of “not beneficial to him” is from the Arukh HaShulchan. How are you now saying it’s from Tosafot?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] From the Arukh, not the Arukh HaShulchan. The Arukh. The Arukh is Rabbi Natan of Rome. He’s before Tosafot. One of the medieval authorities (Rishonim), yes. From the sages of Italy in the tenth century, I think, or at most the eleventh. Really from the very earliest medieval authorities (Rishonim). In any case, a pesik reisha where the result is not beneficial to him is understood by many medieval authorities (Rishonim) as completely equivalent to a labor not needed for its own purpose. What is the idea behind that? Notice: if I treat pesik reisha as though it joins the two actions to one another, such that one of them is a necessary consequence of the other, then let’s think of them as one action. Once they are one action, and the result is not beneficial to me, then it really turns back into a labor not needed for its own purpose. That is why many medieval authorities (Rishonim) argue that a pesik reisha where the result is not beneficial to him is the same thing as a labor not needed for its own purpose. And therefore what the Arukh writes—that in a pesik reisha where the result is not beneficial to him, the rule of pesik reisha does not apply, and you are not liable, and Rabbi Shimon does not concede there that one is liable—that is correct, but it does not go back to being permitted like an ordinary unintended act; rather, it goes back to being a rabbinic prohibition like a labor not needed for its own purpose. Okay?
[Speaker D] That’s basically looking at it in reverse, no?
[Speaker B] Yes, that’s really right.
[Speaker D] It came up in Rabbi Chaim—when I read Rabbi Chaim, I sort of thought, this is basically looking at it as though I don’t really want to move the bench from place to place, but rather the action I am doing is making a furrow. In practice, that’s the action I’m doing, that’s the labor, and really I don’t need the furrow; I need to move the bench from place to place.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s a possible analysis. I’d even say maybe an even different formulation. It could be that whether the result is beneficial is actually the important thing, not the pesik reisha. Meaning, usually we do this according to the following ranking: we have an unintended act, then we check whether it is a pesik reisha or not, and if it is a pesik reisha then we check whether it is beneficial to him or not beneficial to him. But it may very well be—and this seems to appear in Rabbi Chaim—it may very well be that the order of examination should be reversed. Meaning, it’s an unintended act. Now I say: let’s first check whether it is beneficial to him. If it is beneficial to him, then he really does intend it; it just depends on whether it is a pesik reisha or not.
[Speaker D] And “unintended” here means the regular kind of unintended, not the kind Rabbi Chaim adds at the end? The one of awareness? Of awareness, rather than of my intention?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. So that’s why I said we’ll address this in Rabbi Chaim after he distinguishes between those two kinds of unintendedness. Okay. But in any case, for our purposes, that is basically the explanation of why many medieval authorities (Rishonim) say that a pesik reisha where the result is not beneficial to him is like a labor not needed for its own purpose. They probably understand that pesik reisha joins the two actions that I am doing in an unintended act—say, dragging the bench and making the furrow. Once I see it as one action, because it is joined together, because it is a pesik reisha, then now I basically have one action that I did, not two. Except what? I am not interested in the furrow if it’s not beneficial to me, right? So I’m not interested in the furrow, only in moving the bench. You see that we are really getting exactly a labor not needed for its own purpose. Meaning, I have one action with two results; in the prohibited result I am not interested, and in the permitted result I am interested. That is exactly the definition of a labor not needed for its own purpose. Okay, of course not all of the medieval authorities (Rishonim) who discuss this identification agree. The medieval authorities (Rishonim) who do make this identification probably assume that the two actions done in an unintended act in the case of pesik reisha simply become one. And if you remember the Kovetz Shiurim—which we haven’t yet seen—that is basically what he says. Okay? So now let’s just look for a moment; I’ll complete something I didn’t do yesterday. Maybe before that: in Maimonides we saw that Maimonides says, “the difference between a labor not needed for its own purpose and a pesik reisha where it will not die.” Yes, that’s in the Kesef Mishneh, not Maimonides, sorry. Kesef Mishneh on halakhah 7. So we read that yesterday. So he says—maybe, you know what, I’ll share it here. This is the halakhah we read yesterday. “The difference between a labor not needed for its own purpose and a pesik reisha and it will not die”—and here I stopped. Afterwards he explains what he explains. Why does he make the distinction between a labor not needed for its own purpose and pesik reisha? He should have said a labor not needed for its own purpose versus an unintended act.
[Speaker B] Because with an unintended act you don’t need to distinguish between them, like the…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. Exactly. Because between an unintended act and a labor not needed for its own purpose, the difference is clear. In an unintended act, the prohibited thing is not a necessary result of what I’m doing. In a labor not needed for its own purpose, it is a necessary result. When I dig a pit for the sake of the sand, a hole will necessarily come out. By definition that is a pesik reisha. That’s a simple difference. The big question that Rabbi Abraham ben HaRambam and the Kesef Mishneh are dealing with is what happens in an unintended act when there is a pesik reisha. Meaning, what is the difference between that and a labor not needed for its own purpose? And in truth, according to what I explained earlier, there is no difference. There is no difference. Because once it is a pesik reisha, it really does become one action, because it joins the two actions. The whole question is only whether it is beneficial to him or not beneficial to him. So a pesik reisha that is beneficial to him is an unintended act with pesik reisha. A pesik reisha that is not beneficial to him is a labor not needed for its own purpose. Do you understand what I’m saying? Wait, I didn’t understand: a pesik reisha that is beneficial
[Speaker C] to him—what is that called according to this? Is that called that he…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That is an unintended act with pesik reisha; it goes back to being intentional.
[Speaker C] It goes back to being intentional.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. And a pesik reisha that is not beneficial to him is simply a labor not needed for its own purpose. Whether it is beneficial determines whether you’re in the category of unintended act or labor not needed for its own purpose. Do you understand that that is basically what comes out according to the medieval authorities (Rishonim) I just described?
[Speaker C] Wait, but why what you said? You said that if it is beneficial to him, then he intends it; he is not unintended.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, it’s an unintended act with pesik reisha; he is considered intentional and therefore liable. But if it is not beneficial to him, then that moves us into the category of a labor not needed for its own purpose, even though it is pesik reisha.
[Speaker C] So then there’s no such thing as an unintended act, there’s no such thing as an unintended act, because we said this is pesik…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If it’s pesik reisha, there’s no such thing as an unintended act.
[Speaker C] Exactly. And an unintended act with pesik reisha—there’s no such thing as an unintended act. Because if it is beneficial to him, then it’s intentional, and if it is not beneficial to him, then it is a labor not needed for its own purpose.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly right, exactly right. And that is why Rabbi Shimon concedes in pesik reisha. Because Rabbi Shimon says: once it is pesik reisha, then it is not an unintended act—that’s not what I was talking about. It’s either intentional, or it’s a labor not needed for its own purpose. That is basically what comes out.
[Speaker E] I’m a little confused here. Let’s say that because of pesik reisha these actions are joined together. Then immediately, regardless of whether it is beneficial or not beneficial, it turns into a labor not needed for its own purpose or one that is needed for its own purpose, I don’t know.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no—that’s exactly the point. If it is needed for its own purpose, then one is liable. Only if it is not needed for its own purpose is it a labor not
[Speaker E] needed for its own purpose. Yes, that’s exactly the point. Right, but it’s not only that if it is a pesik reisha and also beneficial to him, then you can’t even talk about it as unintended or as not needed for its own purpose—it becomes liable according to everyone.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I didn’t understand. Is labor needed for its own purpose and intentional the same thing? No, that’s an ordinary labor.
[Speaker E] No, no. If he intends it, and it’s pesik reisha, and it is beneficial to him, then why does it stop being—not only does it stop being unintended, it also doesn’t enter the category of labor not needed for its own purpose; it is just labor in every respect.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. Right, that’s exactly the point. That is why Rabbi Shimon concedes in pesik reisha.
[Speaker E] Only not just that it is prohibited, but that it is also liable.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Of course. A pesik reisha that is beneficial to him is intentional.
[Speaker E] Intentional, and not a labor not needed for its own purpose—it’s labor…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And a pesik reisha that is not beneficial to him is a labor not needed for its own purpose. Meaning, the background idea here, again, is that the whole question of Rabbi Abraham ben HaRambam and the Kesef Mishneh is about the difference between a labor not needed for its own purpose and an unintended act with pesik reisha. Because an unintended act without pesik reisha—the difference is clear; that belongs to the category of unintended act. But an unintended act with pesik reisha—here he asks what the difference is. And apparently, according to these medieval authorities (Rishonim), the difference is only the question of whether it is beneficial. Meaning, if it is beneficial to you, then it is an unintended act with pesik reisha, and that is basically intentional and you are liable. If it is not beneficial to you, that is a labor not needed for its own purpose, and you are exempt but it is prohibited.
[Speaker F] There is no such thing as unintended in pesik reisha.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If it is pesik reisha and beneficial to you, then you are intentional. You are considered intentional—again.
[Speaker F] Yes, no, but there is no state of unintended with pesik reisha. It can’t be.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean it can’t be? Of course it can. If I drag a bench…
[Speaker E] No, it’s either a labor not needed for its own purpose or it’s intentional.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No. If I drag a bench—dragging a bench for the sake of the bench and not for the sake of the furrow, okay? That is an unintended act. What happens if the ground is such a ground that a furrow will necessarily be made? That is pesik reisha. It is still an unintended act with pesik reisha. His intention…
[Speaker E] But that’s a labor not needed for its own purpose…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, it depends on whether it is beneficial. If the furrow is beneficial to me, then that is intentional… then it is liable altogether. And if the furrow is not beneficial to me, then it is a labor not needed for its own purpose.
[Speaker E] Fine.
[Speaker C] So then how do you divide this in prohibitions throughout the Torah? After all, in prohibitions throughout the Torah there is no issue there of labor needed for its own purpose. Right? And therefore? And therefore there is no issue here of whether it is beneficial to him or not beneficial to him.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I didn’t understand.
[Speaker C] When we talked about this throughout the Torah, what happens with something unintended? In every case it is prohibited.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] According to Rabbi Shimon it is permitted.
[Speaker C] According to Rabbi Shimon it is permitted. So then doesn’t the Arukh distinguish here between beneficial to him and not beneficial to him?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s a question, that’s a big question. In the Arukh itself it says yes. Because his proof is from sprinkling wine on the fire on the altar, if you saw it in Kovetz Shiurim, and that is a prohibition from the rest of the Torah. There are medieval authorities (Rishonim) who quote in the name of the Arukh that he really does not say this regarding the whole Torah. Almost everything I say here has disputes among the medieval authorities (Rishonim). I can’t get into all these sources and all the branches. I’m trying somehow to sketch the basic map. But it’s true—there is no position that doesn’t exist somewhere on this map.
[Speaker C] But we saw then in the Talmud regarding the leprous mark that it needed an additional verse. So does that mean that in every case an unintended act is prohibited by Torah law?
[Speaker D] According to Rabbi Yehuda.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But that is according to Rabbi Yehuda.
[Speaker C] And according to Rabbi Shimon it is permitted? Is it prohibited rabbinically?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] According to Rabbi Shimon, an unintended act is permitted. The only question is that there it is pesik reisha. Ah, and because of that—yes—you have to check: is it pesik reisha, beneficial to him, not beneficial to him—that’s already another discussion.
[Speaker C] Okay.
[Speaker D] How can one see it differently—without taking an unintended act that is not beneficial to him and bringing it back into the category of a labor not needed for its own purpose?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, you can see it differently. Because if I see pesik reisha—I don’t see pesik reisha as something that joins the two actions. It doesn’t work that way; that’s not how I understand what pesik reisha does. Then it still remains two actions, at least one of which I did not intend, even if it is pesik reisha. Okay? In just a moment we’ll see that.
[Speaker D] But I can always look at it in reverse. That’s the point. Like, how can you not? In Rabbi Chaim it’s really striking, because there it’s basically two prohibited labors: extinguishing and kindling. So sometimes he looks at it from the side of extinguishing and sometimes from the side of kindling. But why—how can you not look at the opposite side, that really I am dragging, the action I am doing is dragging, and that is the prohibited action, but I don’t need the…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not a prohibited action. Dragging is not a prohibited action.
[Speaker D] Making a furrow, sorry—the action I am doing is making a furrow, that is the labor I am doing, and I don’t need the furrow; rather, I am doing it in order to move the table.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, you are not doing the action of making a furrow; you are doing the action of dragging the bench. What do you mean?
[Speaker D] But in practice my action also—I don’t see—I’m not taking out, I’m not digging a pit, I’m only taking out dirt.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, here you are returning to the question with which I began. When is this defined as two actions, and when is it defined as one action with two results? Good question. But in digging a pit for the sake of the dirt, it is defined as one action with two results. In dragging a bench and making a furrow, it is defined as two actions, not one action with two results.
[Speaker D] But that’s because we’re looking at the dragging of the bench. But in practice you can look at the making of the furrow as the action that I’m doing.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But that’s not… and it has to be a labor, no? I am doing both actions. What do you mean? I am doing two actions here: both dragging the bench and making a furrow.
[Speaker D] Right, but we always start with what I’m doing, and that is basically what I’m…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, there’s no difference. I’m doing both. The whole question is only what my purpose was, which of the two was my motivation. But I do both. That’s the definition of an unintended act: whether my motivation is for the prohibited action or the permitted one.
[Speaker D] In a labor not needed for its own purpose, we say that the action is a prohibited action, only I don’t mean it and don’t want it—it’s a prohibited action. So why can’t I say that here too?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, you do mean it; you just don’t want
[Speaker D] the result. That’s something else. I intend to do it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But here too, I intend to drag the bench… no, you don’t intend—no. You intend to drag the bench, not to make a furrow. The furrow is not necessary; in the pit it is necessary. No, regardless of necessity—I’m not talking now about necessity—but rather: I move the bench from here to there because I want to move a bench. So the fact that I also make a furrow—so what? My intention in the action is only to move a bench. Therefore that’s unrelated. I do both actions, but I intend only one of them, the permitted one. In a labor not needed for its own purpose there is only one action. It’s not a question of what I intend; rather, there is only one action that I do.
[Speaker D] But here too I do only one action.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, you do two.
[Speaker D] You do one deed…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The deed I do is taking the bench and moving it, and that…
[Speaker D] That’s what I said before: you do one deed…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] One labor. No—one deed. You do one deed, but that deed is interpreted as two actions in parallel: dragging a bench and making a furrow. You have to remember: in all these situations, the deed is one deed. There is no example you’ll find where the deed is not one deed, because otherwise it’s just two separate things and each one needs to be discussed on its own—what does that have to do with anything? All the discussions of a labor not needed for its own purpose and unintended act are always when the deed that I perform is one. The question still is whether I interpret that deed as two actions, or whether I interpret that deed as one action with two results. But the deed is always one deed. Physically I do one deed. That is clear.
[Speaker F] I have a question,
[Speaker B] But in a labor not needed for its own purpose, the deed is one, and the action too… the action itself is a labor. And in dragging… in moving a bench…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If it were not
[Speaker B] a labor,
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] then there would be no discussion, Ruti. Right? There would be no discussion. If I do one action that is not a labor, then what is the discussion about?
[Speaker B] Right, but in an unintended act it
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] splits into one prohibited labor and one permitted action. Right. Fine. If in a labor not needed for its own purpose I were not doing a prohibited action, then there wouldn’t even begin to be a discussion whether he is liable for the result or not. I didn’t do the prohibition at all.
[Speaker B] Right,
[Speaker D] But in an unintended act too, in the end I do a prohibited action when it’s pesik reisha.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Of course—I just don’t intend it. That’s exactly the point. Right, I do it, but I don’t intend it.
[Speaker D] The deed itself you do intend.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The deed yes, not the action. There are three stages here. There is my deed—that is defined physically. Then there are my actions—that is the interpretation of what the meaning of the deed is. And here it is one in a labor not needed for its own purpose, two actions in an unintended act. And after that there are the results. The results are the question of what is left in my hand at the end after I’m done. Am I left with a furrow? Left with a pit?
[Speaker D] What is the difference between a deed and an action?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I said: the deed is defined as the physical deed that I perform. And here it is always one deed. In all the situations we are talking about, the thing is done in one deed, otherwise the question does not even begin whether it is a labor not needed for its own purpose or an unintended act. The difference between a labor not needed for its own purpose and an unintended act is when the interpretation we give to my one deed sees it as two actions done in parallel. In one deed I did two things. Okay? For now that is “an unintended act.” In a labor not needed for its own purpose, what is meant is that in this deed I did only one action, only it has two results. That’s why I said, for example, think about cutting off a chicken’s head—that’s the clearest example, but it’s true in all the cases. There it is really one deed: I simply cut the head off from the body. How can you say that that is two deeds? It is completely one deed. One momentary deed, one-tenth of a second, one instant in time. Right—but I view it essentially as two actions done in one deed.
[Speaker G] Like the Nazirite—maybe that’s more tangible.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There are—you know, in many places in the Talmud the Talmud talks about this—there is someone who does one deed and is liable for it on account of five prohibitions or five sin-offerings. You can do one action of plowing a field, but it’s in the Sabbatical year, on a Jewish holiday, on the Sabbath, and I don’t know what else, and on top of that with an ox and a donkey together. Okay? So what? Then you violate four or five prohibitions here, but your deed is one deed. You simply perform a deed, that’s all.
[Speaker E] So if we don’t even try to divide deeds at all, we could say that only pesik reisha determines whether it is two deeds or one deed.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I’m saying: that is one of the possibilities. One of the possibilities for understanding why in pesik reisha…
[Speaker E] But on the other hand, in most cases it’s terribly hard to divide whether it’s two actions or one action, because usually we relate to it as just one action overall.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But in an unintended act it is two actions—that’s exactly the claim.
[Speaker E] One deed but two actions. But is that really so? The rabbi himself said that it is very subtle and hard to distinguish. What do you mean, two actions? All in all I dragged a bench, I didn’t do something else. Something that happened on its own.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Nechama, you’re repeating the question that I asked. So I asked that question and I said: right.
[Speaker E] So that’s why I’m saying, maybe not to struggle to divide, but rather to say
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] that here you can’t. So then what is the difference between an unintended act and a labor not needed for its own purpose?
[Speaker E] In pesik reisha—the difference.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, in an unintended act without pesik reisha, what is the difference between an unintended act and a labor not needed for its own purpose?
[Speaker E] Because there is no pesik reisha there, and in a labor not needed for its own purpose there is pesik reisha.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And that is the result. I’m asking you why—what is the difference? Let’s assume there is a difference between the two, and then you say: as a result of that difference, the rule of pesik reisha will apply in an unintended act but not in a labor not needed for its own purpose. But I’m asking: what is that difference? What causes pesik reisha not to be relevant except in an unintended act, and not in a labor not needed for its own purpose? You gave me a consequence, but I’m asking what the difference is that causes the consequence.
[Speaker E] No, but the rabbi himself said that if there is pesik reisha then it already turns into a labor not needed for its own purpose.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But that’s only because this is halakhic / of Jewish law, only because I see the two actions as connected through a case of inevitable result. According to that approach, which sees an inevitable result that is not beneficial to him as a labor not needed for its own sake, right? But that’s not necessary. So this has to be presented in some kind of order, otherwise we’re mixing everything together here. According to that approach, right? But that approach depends on the idea that the whole point of an inevitable result is that it connects the actions. It basically turns them into one action. And therefore Rabbi Shimon says: so in effect you did intend it, because it’s one action. But if I understand differently—no, an inevitable result is not doing that. Rabbi Shimon concedes in a case of inevitable result not because it joins the two actions into one, but for a different reason, which we’ll see in a moment. Okay? Then we’re already in a different discussion. So it’s not correct that an inevitable result that is not beneficial to him is identified with a labor not needed for its own sake. All right? That is probably the root of the dispute among the medieval authorities (Rishonim). So now let’s actually look at the issue of “not beneficial to him,” which we didn’t do yesterday. The Talmud / Talmudic text actually says—the Talmud / Talmudic text in the topic / passage in Zevachim 91b, I didn’t bring it for you because I didn’t want you getting too tangled up, it’s actually already mentioned indirectly in Kovetz Shiurim. Shmuel said: one who volunteers wine—someone who donates wine to the Temple—brings it and sprinkles it over the fires on the altar. You sprinkle it over the fire, you pour the wine libation, yes? What is the reason? Scripture says: “And you shall offer wine for a libation, half a hin, a fire-offering of pleasing aroma to the Lord.” But isn’t he extinguishing? After all, he is extinguishing the fire on the altar—so what then? There is a prohibition against extinguishing the fire on the altar: “A perpetual fire shall burn on the altar; it shall not be extinguished.” It is forbidden to extinguish the fire burning on the altar. Notice: this is not about the Sabbath, it’s an ordinary weekday. It is forbidden to extinguish the fire burning on the altar. So there is a prohibition of extinguishing here. So in the end the Talmud / Talmudic text says—it doesn’t matter—this is extinguishing for the sake of a commandment. In short, there is a whole discussion there. Later the Talmud / Talmudic text links it to the dispute between Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda, because he intends to sprinkle but does not intend to extinguish, so the extinguishing is unintentional. So the Arukh asks about that: very nice that it’s unintentional, but it’s an inevitable result. When you sprinkle wine on the fire, you necessarily extinguish some of it. So what do I care that you didn’t intend to extinguish? This is one of the proofs the Arukh brings that apparently here it is not beneficial to him to extinguish, and therefore it is an inevitable result that is not beneficial to him, and in such a case Rabbi Shimon does not obligate. Okay? That’s one of the Arukh’s proofs. Now Tosafot in Ketubot—and again I didn’t bring it because that gets a bit tangled in the topic / passage there, so we’ll just go through it briefly here. Tosafot in Ketubot 6a has a discussion of inevitable result: “And so the Arukh explained that every inevitable result that is not beneficial to him is permitted”—permitted, an inevitable result that is not beneficial to him. By the way, “permitted” means permitted, not a labor not needed for its own sake, not exempt yet forbidden. “And his main proof is from the chapter ‘Whatever is more frequent,’ and according to Rabbi Shimon they sprinkle wine over the fires, even though it is an inevitable result, for he certainly does extinguish; since he does not benefit from this extinguishing, it is permitted.” So there you have it: he has proof from the Talmud / Talmudic text that not every inevitable result is something for which Rabbi Shimon obligates. There, even though it is an inevitable result, the Talmud / Talmudic text says that according to Rabbi Shimon he is exempt. There’s no choice but to say that apparently there is some type of inevitable result in which Rabbi Shimon does not concede—Rabbi Shimon still exempts. And the Arukh suggests: that is apparently an inevitable result that is not beneficial to him; there it simply was not beneficial for him to extinguish the fire. “And he also brings proof from Lulav HaGazul”—the Arukh has another proof, from the Talmud / Talmudic text in Sukkah, where Rabbi אלעזר son of Rabbi Shimon says: “One may reduce the berries on a myrtle branch on a Jewish holiday.” On the hadas used for the four species, there are little fruits—these are called the berries of the hadas. Okay? So one removes them on a Jewish holiday, cuts them off on a Jewish holiday, because having those berries can invalidate the hadas. So it is possible to pluck them off on the Jewish holiday itself even though it is a prohibition. And it asks: “But isn’t he fixing a vessel?” Isn’t this forbidden—you’re repairing the hadas? And it explains that the case is where he intends it for eating. He intended to cut them off in order to eat them, not in order to repair the hadas; so it is unintentional. All right? And it asks: “But Rabbi Shimon concedes in a case of inevitable result!” After all, Rabbi Shimon concedes—this is an inevitable result. You intend to eat them, but once you removed those berries, you necessarily repaired the hadas. There’s no way around it, like the chicken, right? It’s an inevitable result. And it answers: “No, it is needed only for a case where he has another hoshana”—meaning another hadas. The case is that he has another hadas, so he does not need this one. Okay? So what do we see from here, says the author of the Arukh? That if he does not benefit from that repair, then it is an inevitable result that is not beneficial to him, and that is permitted. This is another proof from the Arukh that in a case of inevitable result that is not beneficial to him, Rabbi Shimon does not concede. Okay? “Therefore, since he does not benefit from it and is not concerned with this repair, it is permitted, even though it is an inevitable result.” “And Rabbeinu Isaac appears to hold that there is no difficulty at all”—Rabbeinu Isaac disagrees with the Arukh. Rabbeinu Isaac claims that whether it is beneficial to him or not is irrelevant. Rabbi Shimon concedes in every case of inevitable result. And then of course he has to reject the proofs brought by the Arukh, both from sprinkling wine on the altar fires and from the hadas. So later on here he rejects them. He says: sprinkling wine on the altar fires—maybe that is a commandment, and in principle it really is forbidden, but for the sake of the commandment to pour it on the altar they permitted it. And regarding the hadas, he says that if he has another hadas then this is not an inevitable result that is not beneficial to him; rather, there is no repair here at all. Because you only repair this hadas in a case where this hadas is designated for use as a hadas for the commandment—only then does it count as repair. If I just take a hadas in Cheshvan, not during the festival of Sukkot, and remove the berries from it, is that called repairing the hadas? It is called repairing the hadas only because on Sukkot I need a hadas without berries. Okay, meaning only if it is a hadas designated for the commandment does removing the berries count as repair. Now if I have another hadas designated for the commandment, and this hadas I am removing the berries from only in order to eat them, then this is an unintentional act in the context of an inevitable result that is not beneficial to him—but in fact I did not repair anything at all. There is no repair here, because this is not the hadas designated by me for the commandment; I have another hadas. In a hadas not designated for the commandment, removing the berries is not repair at all. That is what Rabbeinu Isaac claims, and therefore there is no proof from here for the Arukh’s position that an inevitable result that is not beneficial to him is permitted. His claim here is that this is not an inevitable result at all; it has nothing to do with that. It is permitted because he did not repair anything, not because the inevitable result here is not beneficial to him. Okay? So here you see the dispute among the medieval authorities (Rishonim) that I mentioned: according to the Arukh, what Rabbi Shimon concedes in a case of inevitable result is only when it is beneficial, but if it is not beneficial then he does not concede; and according to Rabbeinu Isaac, in every case of inevitable result he concedes. It makes no difference whether it is beneficial or not beneficial. That is the dispute among the medieval authorities (Rishonim). Now let’s summarize for a moment what I said yesterday as well. What comes out is this: in an unintentional act, in a case of inevitable result Rabbi Shimon concedes; according to the Arukh this depends on whether it is beneficial or not beneficial, and according to Rabbeinu Isaac it makes no difference whether it is beneficial or not beneficial—in every case he concedes. Okay? Now Kovetz Shiurim in Ketubot, section 18—I mentioned it last time, but only this time did I send it to you on the page. Kovetz Shiurim in Ketubot there on 6a says as follows: “In the dispute between the Arukh and Tosafot regarding an inevitable result that is not beneficial to him, it would seem that the reason for this dispute depends on the reason Rabbi Shimon concedes in a case of inevitable result.” Yes, he is talking about this Tosafot that I just read with the Arukh and Rabbeinu Isaac. Okay? So he says: it would seem that the reason for this dispute depends on the reason Rabbi Shimon concedes in a case of inevitable result. In other words, the dispute between Tosafot and the Arukh depends on the question of why Rabbi Shimon really concedes in a case of inevitable result. The fact that he concedes in a case of inevitable result is written explicitly in the Talmud / Talmudic text; that is clear. The whole question is only why—meaning, why does an inevitable result change the situation and take you out of the category of unintentional act? So he says that this can be explained in two ways. A: for example, in the case of a nazirite who may wash his hair but not comb it, because combing is an inevitable result. We are talking about a nazirite. Since he is forbidden to cut his hair, he is also forbidden to pull out hairs. So what if he washes his head? Okay? He may wash it, but he may not comb it, because if he combs, he will pull out hairs, and pulling out the hairs is an inevitable result. He intends to comb, not to pull out hairs, but pulling out the hairs is an inevitable result, and therefore he is forbidden to do so. So he said—continuing the quote—“one can say that since he knows that by his combing he will pull out hairs, this is called intending to pull them out.” Okay? “But where it is not beneficial to him, then necessarily he is not intending it.” What is he basically saying? If it is beneficial to him, then he intends it; if it is not beneficial to him, then he does not intend it. Okay? Meaning, the point is that an inevitable result obligates because the inevitable result turns me into someone who intended it—that’s the meaning. That’s why Rabbi Shimon concedes in a case of inevitable result. That is the first possibility raised by Kovetz Shiurim. And then it depends: if it is beneficial to you, then you really do intend it—say, the nazirite who actually wants the hairs pulled out. He is basically doing it in order to comb, not in order to pull out the hairs. Okay? But since it is beneficial for him that the hairs be pulled out, don’t tell me stories—you also intend to pull out the hairs. Okay? That is one possibility. B.
[Speaker E] So it could be beneficial to pull out hairs? Why is that the starting assumption?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It doesn’t matter for what reason it is beneficial for him to pull out the hairs—maybe it’s too crowded there, whatever.
[Speaker E] But here he’s talking about a case where it isn’t beneficial to him.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I’m saying: if it isn’t beneficial to him, then he doesn’t intend it; if it is beneficial to him, then he does intend it. That’s his explanation. Meaning, his claim is that the Arukh’s approach, which distinguishes between beneficial and not beneficial, is because the Arukh understands that the reason Rabbi Shimon concedes in a case of inevitable result is that… an inevitable result turns him into someone who intended it. So if an inevitable result turns you into someone who intended it, that works only if it is beneficial to you. But you can’t say that he intended to pull out hairs if in fact that pulling out is not beneficial to him at all. Right? So that is the Arukh’s approach. That is why the Arukh distinguishes between beneficial and not beneficial. What is Rabbeinu Isaac’s approach? Rabbeinu Isaac says that he doesn’t care whether it is beneficial to you or not beneficial to you. He apparently understood Rabbi Shimon’s concession in a case of inevitable result differently. It’s not because it turns you into someone who intended it, not because it turns you into someone who intended it.
[Speaker C] This Rabbeinu Isaac who is opposite the Arukh? Again—this Rabbeinu Isaac, who is he?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Rabbi Isaac—it’s Rashi’s grandson.
[Speaker C] Okay, because until now here “Rabbi Isaac” looked like Rabbi Yehuda, so I didn’t understand.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, no, no. In Tosafot, Rabbeinu Isaac is one of the Tosafists. Yes, but we don’t pronounce Rabbi Yehuda that way. Rabbi Yehuda is abbreviated in writing, but you never actually say it as a word. “Rabbeinu Isaac” here is one of the Tosafists, one of the early Tosafists. Rabbeinu Isaac and the Rashbam and the Rivam—they are all grandsons of Rashi. They are among the earliest Tosafists. In any case, so that is the first explanation. And that explanation accounts for the Arukh’s approach. Now B—what is B? That is the explanation of Rabbeinu Isaac’s approach. Why does Rabbeinu Isaac not care whether it is beneficial to you or not beneficial to you? Apparently because Rabbeinu Isaac does not think that an inevitable result turns you into someone who intended it. That is not why Rabbi Shimon concedes. Because if it were because it turns you into someone who intended it, then that would apply only if it is beneficial to you. If it is not beneficial to you, then certainly you did not intend it. Apparently Rabbeinu Isaac understood Rabbi Shimon differently. How? B: “Since combing is an inevitable result of pulling out”—right? If you comb, then as an inevitable result it will also pull out hairs. “It follows that pulling out is included within combing.” This is the idea I mentioned earlier. What does that mean? “Pulling out is included within combing” means that it is one action. Exactly—it is one action. “And it is enough that he intends the combing, even though he does not intend the pulling out.” It is not that the inevitable result… wait, wait, wait. It is not that the inevitable result turns you into someone who intended it. No—that was the first approach. You do not intend the pulling out, but since the combing and the pulling out are joined into a single action, your intention for the combing also counts as intention for the pulling out, because it is one action—you can no longer separate them. And because of that, Rabbi Shimon concedes even though you did not intend it. Not because you are considered to have intended the pulling out. You are not considered to have intended the pulling out, but halakhically your intention for the combing applies also to the pulling out, because the combing and the pulling out have become joined into one action. Wait, wait, wait, just a second, let me finish. And then he says: “And if so, even if the pulling out is not beneficial to him, one cannot exempt him on the grounds that it was unintentional, because one who intends the combing—and pulling out is included in the combing—since one cannot happen without the other.” What is he basically saying? According to Rabbeinu Isaac, since this is how he understands Rabbi Shimon’s position in conceding a case of inevitable result, he really does not distinguish between whether it is beneficial or not beneficial. Why? Because why should I care whether it is beneficial to you? Whether it is beneficial is relevant only for determining whether you intend the pulling out. But Rabbeinu Isaac says: you do not need to intend the pulling out in order to be liable. You intend only the combing. But since the pulling out and the combing are considered one action, because one cannot happen without the other, then your intention for the combing counts as intention for the pulling out. Therefore you are liable whether the pulling out is beneficial to you or not. That is how he explains the dispute between the Arukh and Rabbeinu Isaac. “And this means that one does not require intention for the body of the labor itself; rather, it is enough that he intends the act in which the labor is necessarily included.”
[Speaker B] Wait—why shouldn’t we treat this as a labor not needed for its own sake?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Great question.
[Speaker B] Why not, really? Then Rabbi Shimon would exempt there too.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] According to this, there really is room to discuss why we shouldn’t turn this into a labor not needed for its own sake. He says that apparently Rabbeinu Isaac, according to Kovetz Shiurim, would say: this is considered one action only in the sense that you cannot say you did not intend the second part. But it is not considered one action in the full sense that would make it into a labor not needed for its own sake. That’s the distinction one would have to make here—there’s no choice.
[Speaker D] But doesn’t he say that this is simple because it’s not about the Sabbath, and outside the Sabbath there is no category of labor not needed for its own sake?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What’s the problem on the Sabbath? Yes, but on the Sabbath itself it would be the same thing. True, this example isn’t relevant there, but what would happen if I did that combing on the Sabbath—not in the case of a nazirite? A person combing his hair, not a nazirite, on the Sabbath. On the Sabbath it is forbidden to pull out hairs because of the Sabbath prohibitions. Now here too Kovetz Shiurim would say the same thing. Here too Rabbi Shimon would concede in a case of inevitable result, and according to Rabbeinu Isaac it makes no difference at all whether it is beneficial or not beneficial. And here there already is the exemption of a labor not needed for its own sake. That’s in the laws of the Sabbath.
[Speaker D] Right, but then, because Rabbeinu Isaac can’t say…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, Rabbeinu Isaac did not mean to say that this is in all of Torah law as one uniform category—well, actually he says it generally; he doesn’t make a distinction here. He would say the same reasoning: Rabbi Shimon concedes in a case of inevitable result, both in all other areas of Torah law and in cases of inevitable result on the Sabbath. And if that is his explanation of why Rabbi Shimon concedes in a case of inevitable result, then that should also be the explanation in the laws of the Sabbath for why he concedes in an inevitable result. And once again it comes out that it does not matter whether it is beneficial or not beneficial. All right? So basically, as I told you earlier, the approach that sees an inevitable result that is not beneficial to him as a labor not needed for its own sake follows direction B here in Kovetz Shiurim. Even though direction B here does not agree with that approach. The connection is one-way. Meaning, someone who follows that other approach apparently sees these two actions as entirely one action. Rabbeinu Isaac says it is one action only in the sense that intention for one counts also as intention for the other, but it is not really considered a fully merged action in the sense that it thereby becomes a labor not needed for its own sake. All right? And according to this, says Kovetz Shiurim—continuing to read—“it is obvious that according to this approach it is forbidden by Torah law in all prohibitions other than the Sabbath, for there is no distinction between beneficial to him and not beneficial to him.” An inevitable result that is not beneficial to him is forbidden by Torah law, because it is not similar to a labor not needed for its own sake; it has nothing to do with that. In all of Torah law it is a Torah-level prohibition. “And it is difficult, then, what Tosafot wrote in rejecting the Arukh’s proof from sprinkling wine over the altar fires, that a commandment is different.” Remember, we just read that Tosafot. He rejects the Arukh’s proof from sprinkling the wine. How did he reject it? He said: don’t bring proofs from there that it is permitted because it is an inevitable result that is not beneficial to him. It is permitted because it is for the sake of a commandment. Even though it is a regular inevitable result, in principle it should have been forbidden, but because it is for the sake of a commandment they permitted it. Kovetz Shiurim asks: what does that have to do with anything? “Since it is forbidden by Torah law, what power does the commandment have to permit the prohibition?” You want to tell me that it is a Torah-level prohibition that was permitted only because of the commandment? There is no such thing. We do not permit Torah prohibitions because of a commandment. “And if one says that a positive commandment overrides a prohibition”—what, are you going to tell me that it was permitted because of the rule that a positive commandment overrides a prohibition, and therefore they permitted this Torah prohibition? “If so, then according to Rabbi Yehuda as well it should be permitted.” So then what does this have to do with the dispute between Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda? It is permitted because a positive commandment overrides a prohibition. “But the Talmud / Talmudic text makes it depend on the dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon, and this requires further study.” “Necessarily, then, it must be that even according to those who disagree with the Arukh, it is permitted by Torah law when it is not beneficial to him; rather, they hold that at least rabbinically it is forbidden.” He argues that even Rabbeinu Isaac, who disagrees with the Arukh and says that an inevitable result that is not beneficial to him is not permitted—that is true, but it is not a Torah-level prohibition; it is a rabbinic prohibition. And then he asks himself: where would we get such a rabbinic prohibition from? We don’t find it anywhere. Fine—on the Sabbath you can say there is a rabbinic prohibition because it is a labor not needed for its own sake, and that we do find; there is such a prohibition on the Sabbath. But here this is a prohibition unrelated to the Sabbath—sprinkling wine on the fire of the altar. So if it is not on the Sabbath, where do we find this kind of rabbinic prohibition? Where are we supposed to invent such a rabbinic prohibition from? Okay, so that is his difficulty. In any case, now look at the Chazon Ish…
[Speaker C] Wait, but we said that if it is a prohibition in all of Torah law, then according to Rabbi Yehuda it is forbidden.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. So he says: then how did they permit it in a place of commandment? If it is truly a Torah-level prohibition, then you cannot permit it for the sake of a commandment. Rather, necessarily, Rabbi Yehuda must hold that in the case of a labor not needed for its own sake… sorry… in the case of an unintentional act where it is not beneficial to him… this is a rabbinic prohibition, not a Torah-level prohibition. And then he says: but where… where are you supposed to invent this rabbinic prohibition from? Either it is permitted, or according to Rabbi Yehuda it is a Torah-level prohibition. Where are you supposed to invent a rabbinic prohibition from? So he leaves it as requiring further study; he doesn’t understand. But that is less important for our purposes. Come look now at the Chazon Ish. The Chazon Ish also writes and addresses the same issue. I asked you on the page whether he says the same thing as Kovetz Shiurim or not.
[Speaker B] No, he didn’t say the same thing.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Let’s see: “And even if he makes a furrow, this is not his labor”—it is not his labor. “Rather, it happens on its own.” The furrow is considered as though it happened on its own. I dragged a bench. Who made the furrow? It happened on its own. Halakhically, of course. “And according to this it would have been appropriate to permit even an inevitable result. For what difference is there between certainty and doubt? After all, even a doubt concerning a Torah prohibition is treated stringently.” What difference does it make whether this is doubtful or certain? Why is inevitable result relevant? If you say that there is an exemption because a labor I did not intend is considered as though I did not do it, but rather it happened by itself, then in a case of inevitable result it is the same thing. What’s the difference? This should remind you that this is exactly Rav Chaim’s question; in a moment we’ll get to him and then we’ll see.