Tractate Shabbat, Chapter 1 – Lesson 8, Part B

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[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Chiddushei Rav Chaim, 17 — that’s the numbering of the Jewish law in Maimonides, chapter 10, Jewish law 17. This is Maimonides’ wording: “One who lances a boil on the Sabbath” — this is a quote from the Jewish law in Maimonides — “one who lances a boil on the Sabbath in order to widen the opening of the wound, in the way physicians do, since their intention medically is to widen the opening of the wound, is liable. But if he lanced it in order to remove the pus within it, this is permitted.” Right, this is lancing an abscess, the law of Shmuel. That is the end of his wording. And in Jewish law 25 — we brought that these laws as well, also chapter 10, Jewish law 25 — this is Maimonides’ wording: “Harmful creeping creatures, such as snakes and scorpions and the like, etc., it is permitted to trap them on the Sabbath, provided that he intends to protect himself from their bite. How does he do this? He places a vessel over them, or surrounds them, or ties them up so that they will not cause harm.” And the Maggid Mishneh there asks, from what is stated in tractate Shabbat 107b: “There are those who teach it regarding this case: one who lances an abscess on the Sabbath — if to make for it an opening, he is liable; if to remove the pus from it, he is exempt. Who is the tanna?” All of this is a quote from the Talmud on page 107. “Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav: It is Rabbi Shimon, who says that one is exempt for labor not needed for its own sake. And there are those who teach it regarding this case” — and there are those who apply it to the second case — “one who traps a snake on the Sabbath: if to deal with it so that it not bite him, he is exempt; if for medicinal use, he is liable. Who is the tanna? Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav: It is Rabbi Shimon, who says that one is exempt for labor not needed for its own sake.” By the way, the “R” in “Rav Yehuda” is cut off — this is Rav Yehuda, not Rabbi Yehuda. Rav Yehuda is an amora, an amora who was a student of Rav and Shmuel, second generation of the amoraim. And if so, Maimonides, who rules there in chapter 1 that one is liable for labor not needed for its own sake — if so, how did he rule in these two cases, in these two laws, of lancing an abscess and trapping a snake, that it is permitted when he does not intend to make an opening or to trap? See there in the words of the Maggid Mishneh. The Maggid Mishneh gave some answers there that are less important for our purposes.

And now Rav Chaim continues: in tractate Shabbat 3a, “When Shmuel said…” — this is our Talmudic passage — “all exemptions of Sabbath are exempt but forbidden, except for these three, which are exempt and permitted, and these are: trapping a deer, trapping a snake, and lancing an abscess.” And Tosafot already asked there in the name of the Ba’al Halakhot Gedolot, since Shmuel himself rules on page 42 there that one is liable for labor not needed for its own sake — he rules like Rabbi Yehuda — so how can he permit lancing an abscess and trapping a snake because of suffering, since it is a full biblical labor? Right — how is it permitted, in a case of bodily suffering, to lance an abscess and trap a snake? If… if you rule like Rabbi Yehuda, then according to your view this is a Torah-level prohibition: one is liable for labor not needed for its own sake. How can it be that you permit this in a case of bodily suffering? That’s Tosafot’s question. What did he answer? That Shmuel really does not permit it. Shmuel is speaking according to Rabbi Shimon, but he himself rules like Rabbi Yehuda. But Rav Chaim does not bring this answer of Tosafot, because for Maimonides it won’t help. Because with Maimonides you can’t say that he went according to Rabbi Shimon; Maimonides here is ruling Jewish law in practice. So therefore, notice what Rav Chaim is assuming here. Rav Chaim is basically hinting to us here that our question should not really be on Maimonides. Our question is on Shmuel in the Talmud. And the fact that Tosafot found answers is very nice, but Maimonides apparently understood that Tosafot’s answers about Shmuel are not correct. And therefore one can rule like Shmuel even though one holds that one is liable for labor not needed for its own sake, just as Shmuel himself ruled in the case of lancing an abscess and trapping a snake that it is completely permitted, even though he himself holds that one is liable for labor not needed for its own sake. And Maimonides simply ruled like Shmuel. Now of course we have to understand how this works, because the Talmud said that if it is a Torah prohibition, then we do not permit it. So that is what has to be explained.

And it seems right to say as follows: in truth, in the case of lancing an abscess, the permission is when he does not intend to make an opening, only to remove the pus from it. And as it says explicitly in the Mishnah: “if to make an opening, he is liable,” and only if his intention is merely to remove the pus from it — only then is it permitted. So it turns out that this really is a case of an unintended act, for which one is exempt on the Sabbath according to everyone. Basically he says: only if his intention is to remove pus; but if he intends — if his intention is to make an opening… But if he intends to remove pus from it, that means we have here an unintended act. He intends to remove the pus and does not intend to make the opening. So really this is not labor not needed for its own sake; it’s not only labor not needed for its own sake — it is an unintended act. That is what Rav Chaim says. And even though this is an inevitable result — you’ll say: but if it’s unintended, then it’s an inevitable result, because when you remove the pus you necessarily also made an opening. So with an inevitable result it’s irrelevant that it’s unintended. So he says: indeed, the Arukh holds that an inevitable result that one does not want is permitted. And his claim is that here we have an unintended act in the form of an inevitable result that one does not want, and Maimonides follows the approach of the Arukh, that an inevitable result one does not want is permitted. And Tosafot in Shabbat 103 and in several other places say this too. And similarly in the case of trapping a snake, according to what is explained in the words of Maimonides, who wrote as follows: “It is permitted to trap them on the Sabbath, provided that he intends to protect himself from their bite.” End quote. What do we see? That he is talking here about the rule of an unintended act, not labor not needed for its own sake. And so it turns out that he has no intention at all to trap; yes, when he intends to save himself from their bite, he does not intend to trap, only to save himself. And so this too is an unintended act in the form of an inevitable result that one does not want, for which one is exempt on the Sabbath according to everyone, according to the Arukh — “according to everyone” meaning both Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda. But according to this, the Talmudic passage needs examination, because it makes these cases depend on the law of labor not needed for its own sake, whereas this is an unintended act, which on the Sabbath is Torah-permitted according to everyone, and this requires examination.

He says: first of all, from Maimonides’ wording it appears that Maimonides understood these two cases — both lancing an abscess and trapping a snake — as cases of an unintended act, not cases of labor not needed for its own sake. And if that’s so, then you already understand that there is no problem at all: the question on Maimonides falls away. Why? Because in the case of an unintended act, Maimonides rules like Rabbi Shimon, not like Rabbi Yehuda. Only with labor not needed for its own sake does he rule like Rabbi Yehuda. So if these are cases of an unintended act, then with an unintended act there is no Torah prohibition. True, it is an inevitable result, but it is one he does not want. And if it is an inevitable result he does not want, then at most there is only a rabbinic prohibition here, and in a case of bodily suffering that is completely permitted. But then — so what was the question in the first place? Because in the Talmud itself it says that these cases are labor not needed for its own sake, not unintended acts. So what — is Maimonides against the Talmud? We simply transferred the question from a halakhic question on Maimonides to a conceptual question on Maimonides. Maimonides now — I understand Maimonides. Maimonides says this is an unintended act, not labor not needed for its own sake. So now there is no difficulty at all on Maimonides, because with an unintended act he too rules like Rabbi Shimon, that it is permitted. Not that it is permitted — it is an inevitable result that he does not want. Right, correct, in a case of suffering it is permitted. But then it is clear that he does not see what we said in the view of some medieval authorities (Rishonim), that this turns it into one action and brings it back to labor not needed for its own sake, because otherwise he would have held one liable for it. No — labor not needed for its own sake, right. Right. It can’t be labor not needed for its own sake together with an inevitable result that one does not want. Apparently — at least according to Rav Chaim — he does not belong to the camp of medieval authorities (Rishonim) that identifies an unintended act in the form of an inevitable result one does not want with labor not needed for its own sake. Okay? So for now, all clear? Are you with me? Okay. I just stop the screen share every so often, because when I share I can’t see you, so okay.

So now we continue. Look how he builds this whole thing — I mean, this is a piece built magnificently. This is a classic piece of Rav Chaim, which is why it was important to me to go through it, because really you should get used to this style of writing, this style of analysis — it’s just exquisite. This is a classic, very famous piece of Rav Chaim as well, so just for general knowledge it’s worth knowing. A great many later authorities (Acharonim), by the way, follow him on this point, like Rav Aharon Kotler, whom I mentioned to you. And in tractate Keritot 20 — I continue reading — “The rabbis taught”: he brings a baraita, “One who stirs coals on the Sabbath is liable for a sin-offering. Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says in the name of Rabbi Elazar son of Rabbi Tzadok: he is liable for two, because he extinguishes the upper ones and kindles the lower ones.” Right — when you stir coals, you mix up the coals, so the upper ones, which are burning, you in effect extinguish, while the lower ones you expose to the air and thereby kindle them; so you did two things: the labor of extinguishing and the labor of kindling. Okay? So Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says he is liable for two, while the first tanna says “liable for a sin-offering,” meaning liable for only one.

So the Talmud says etc. — we’ll skip a little there — Rav Ashi said: this is a case where he intended to extinguish, and they became kindled on their own. He intended to extinguish everything, so the upper ones he extinguished, and the lower ones too he intended to extinguish, but they became kindled on their own. And the first tanna holds like Rabbi Shimon, who says that an unintended act is exempt. And Rabbi Elazar son of Rabbi Tzadok holds like Rabbi Yehuda, who says that an unintended act is liable. So this is how Rav Ashi explains the dispute between the tannaim. We are dealing with a person who stirred coals: the upper ones he extinguished, and he also intended to extinguish them, so of course he is liable for a sin-offering for that. The lower ones — the lower ones he did not intend to kindle, but they were kindled. Okay? And the first tanna, who says that he is not liable for the lower ones but only for the upper ones, because he is liable for only one sin-offering, holds that since this is unintended, he is exempt, like Rabbi Shimon. And Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar and Rabbi Elazar son of Rabbi Tzadok, who require two — for both the lower and the upper — hold like Rabbi Yehuda, because even for the lower ones, although he did not intend it, he is liable for a sin-offering for them as well. Okay? So that is what the Talmud says: it explains this tannaitic dispute by tying it to the dispute of Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda.

And Tosafot there asks: an unintended act on the Sabbath is prohibited only rabbinically. Remember, I said this — that an unintended act on the Sabbath is only rabbinic, according to Rabbi Yehuda; that is what we are talking about now. So how can it say here that he is liable for two? Here we are dealing with one who stirs coals on the Sabbath, so even if the second tanna holds like Rabbi Yehuda, and an unintended act is indeed prohibited, on the Sabbath it is “exempt but forbidden” — a rabbinic prohibition, not a Torah prohibition. So how can one say he is liable for two sin-offerings? For a rabbinic prohibition one does not bring a sin-offering, only for a Torah prohibition. In the prohibitions of the entire Torah, if it is unintended then according to Rabbi Yehuda he is liable — that is Torah law — but in the laws of the Sabbath it is only a rabbinic prohibition. So if it is only rabbinic, the Talmud is difficult: why does the Talmud say “liable for two”? All this is Tosafot’s question there in Keritot. And they answered that we are dealing with a case where it was an inevitable result. The lower ones became kindled — he did not intend to kindle them, but it was an inevitable result. And if so, on account of an unintended act he really would be liable here for kindling according to everyone, because even Rabbi Shimon says that with an inevitable result one is liable.

Right — but then that brings the question back: so why doesn’t the one who holds like Rabbi Shimon obligate here? After all, if this is an inevitable result, then Rabbi Shimon too should obligate. So the question comes back on the second tanna. You solved the problem with the tanna who goes like Rabbi Yehuda — why is he liable for two? Because it is an inevitable result. Now I say: very nice, but now Rabbi Shimon should also obligate here. So how can the tanna who holds like Rabbi Shimon not obligate? So he says: rather, since he does not need the kindling, it is labor not needed for its own sake. He says: since in the end I solved the “unintended act” issue with inevitable result, but after all he does not need the kindling, then this is labor not needed for its own sake, and it depends on the dispute of Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda concerning labor not needed for its own sake — whether one is liable for it or not. And according to this, what comes out now — we return to Rav Chaim’s wording now, Rav Chaim explains — according to this we learn that the Talmud did not use the term “unintended act” here with precision. What the Talmud said here, that this is an unintended act, is not exact; what it really means is labor not needed for its own sake. Basically the argument is over labor not needed for its own sake, not over an unintended act. Okay? That is what emerges according to Tosafot’s explanation.

So the Talmud itself isn’t using the terms precisely? Right, even though it needs understanding why that is not so serious, because according to Tosafot we identify an unintended act in the form of an inevitable result one does not want with labor not needed for its own sake. What the Talmud called an unintended act, it meant an unintended act in the form of an inevitable result one does not want — and conceptually the exemption is because of labor not needed for its own sake — but it is still correct to call it an unintended act. In other words, it is not a linguistic mistake. Okay? According to Tosafot that actually makes sense, because Tosafot identifies labor not needed for its own sake with an inevitable result one does not want.

So he says — yes, look there, I continue reading here — indeed, look there in Maimonides in chapter 7 of the Laws of Errors, Jewish law 12, where he ruled this case of stirring coals on the Sabbath — he brought this Talmudic passage as practical law — and what did he rule? That only if he intended both to extinguish and to kindle is he liable for two. That is, if they became kindled on their own, he is liable only for one. That is how Maimonides rules. Let’s make the calculation ourselves for a moment. If the exemption that leaves him liable for one were because of Rabbi Shimon, who exempts labor not needed for its own sake, Maimonides should not have ruled that way. Because Maimonides rules that one is liable for labor not needed for its own sake. So if Maimonides read the Talmud like Tosafot, then Maimonides would understand that the Talmud means a dispute about labor not needed for its own sake, not a dispute about an unintended act. But then Maimonides should have ruled that he is liable for two even when he did not intend it, since for labor not needed for its own sake he rules like Rabbi Yehuda. So Maimonides certainly did not learn like Tosafot. Right? That is what he says. “He is liable only for one.” And even though Maimonides rules that one is liable for labor not needed for its own sake. And from this we learn that he explains the Talmudic passage according to its plain meaning. Maimonides does not read the Talmud like Tosafot. Maimonides reads the passage simply: it is speaking about an unintended act, not labor not needed for its own sake. Because if it were speaking about labor not needed for its own sake, then according to Maimonides everyone would obligate. Maimonides would have had to rule that they obligate — that he is liable for two. Correct? Therefore Maimonides necessarily reads the passage not like Tosafot, but when it says here “unintended act,” it really means an unintended act. Okay? And it depends on the dispute over an unintended act. And since we rule in practice that an unintended act is permitted, that is why Maimonides ruled that he is liable for two only if he intended both to extinguish and to kindle.

So everything is wonderful except for one thing, of course. You have to keep your head straight with these calculations. After all, what forced Tosafot to explain the Talmud so awkwardly? Right? What forced Tosafot to explain the Talmud with such difficulty? That one is liable for two sin-offerings? How can one bring two sin-offerings? On the Sabbath, an unintended act is only a rabbinic prohibition according to Rabbi Yehuda, so how can one be liable for two sin-offerings? So Maimonides, who does not accept Tosafot’s answer but rather reads the Talmud simply, that it is speaking about an unintended act — Tosafot’s question returns against him. He has to explain Tosafot’s question. Again, the blanket is too short — notice. Every time we say something because there is a question. Now someone comes and does not say that thing — you always have to remember: fine, then how does he resolve the question?

Can you go over that again for a second? I didn’t understand. Again. Tosafot asked on the Talmud: how can the Talmud say that according to Rabbi Yehuda he is liable for two here because Rabbi Yehuda holds that with an unintended act one is liable? But that isn’t true. On the Sabbath, even Rabbi Yehuda does not obligate for an unintended act. It is only a rabbinic prohibition. That was Tosafot’s question, right? Therefore Tosafot said: there is no choice, one has to explain that when the Talmud says “unintended act,” it means labor not needed for its own sake, not an unintended act. And in that case one really is fully liable. It is not just a rabbinic prohibition according to Rabbi Yehuda; he is fully liable. But Maimonides — as we have now proved — read the Talmud simply. When the Talmud says “unintended act,” it means an unintended act, not labor not needed for its own sake. So how does Tosafot’s question return? Then why according to Rabbi Yehuda is he liable for two? For the lower ones it is an unintended act, so at most, even according to Rabbi Yehuda, it is only a rabbinic prohibition. So how can he be liable for two sin-offerings? Maimonides has to resolve Tosafot’s question above against himself. Okay? There’s silence in the audience. I’m… tell me if not, tell me if not, I’ll repeat. If it’s not clear, then say so. Don’t be embarrassed, because this is complicated. You have to see what this means.

But according to Rabbi Yehuda, if this is an inevitable result, he has to say that it’s not intended — there’s no choice — so he’ll be liable for two sin-offerings? So does it matter whether it’s an inevitable result or not? It’s a Torah prohibition. And according to Rabbi Yehuda, for an unintended act it’s a rabbinic prohibition on the Sabbath. It doesn’t matter if it’s an inevitable result — but we already asked this earlier, we said according to Rabbi Yehuda… According to Rabbi Yehuda it doesn’t matter if it’s an inevitable result — I didn’t understand that from before, only before we already said… You cut out, Chani, we can’t hear you. We already talked about how, according to Rabbi Yehuda, just a little earlier we said the same question, and then we said that according to Rabbi Yehuda for an unintended act he says it is rabbinically forbidden, but if it’s an inevitable result it already turns into intended, so then it’s Torah-forbidden, therefore there have to be two sin-offerings. Exactly the same thing here. I anticipated this earlier, but in another moment we’ll get to it — that’s what’s going to happen in Rav Chaim in a second. But what he is asking right now — at this stage he still says no. Once you made it an inevitable result, the inevitable result only turns you into… the inevitable result is relevant only according to Rabbi Shimon. Rabbi Shimon, who permits an unintended act — with an inevitable result he concedes to Rabbi Yehuda. But according to Rabbi Yehuda, he doesn’t need an inevitable result; even a plain unintended act is forbidden. But since that is so, the inevitable result is not relevant in Rabbi Yehuda’s view. And if that is so, then whether it is an inevitable result or not, it is only a rabbinic prohibition. You are already suggesting an answer. You are already saying: no, maybe the law of inevitable result is relevant also according to Rabbi Yehuda, because in the laws of the Sabbath Rabbi Yehuda really prohibits an unintended act only rabbinically. Maybe in a case of inevitable result he would obligate on a Torah level. That’s a great answer, but Rav Chaim is still at the stage of the question.

Again, at the stage of the question, we… But between Rava and Rav Ashi, we said this earlier about Rav Ashi, right? Said what? About Rav Ashi we said: he intended to extinguish the lower ones and they became kindled on their own, so again we said that this is a dispute according to Rav and Shmuel and Rabbi Yehuda about an unintended act, and then Tosafot asked on that and said that this is an unintended act and that is rabbinically forbidden, and then again we asked about Rabbi Yehuda how he can say that he is liable for two, since it is only a rabbinic prohibition, and then you said they answered that it is talking about an inevitable result and therefore he is liable for a sin-offering. No — they answered that it is talking about labor not needed for its own sake. Only the claim is: how is it labor not needed for its own sake? Because according to Tosafot, an inevitable result one does not want is like labor not needed for its own sake. So now it is labor not needed for its own sake. It’s not… again, let’s put it this way: suppose there is an unintended act with an inevitable result — whether he wants it or does not want it, let’s leave that aside. An unintended act with inevitable result — at least for now, the assumption is that according to Rabbi Yehuda this is only rabbinically forbidden. Because for Rabbi Yehuda inevitable result is not relevant at all. The category of inevitable result appears in the Talmud only in connection with Rabbi Shimon, because Rabbi Shimon, who permits an unintended act, concedes in the case of inevitable result. Rabbi Yehuda forbids even a plain unintended act, so he does not need inevitable result. Therefore it makes no difference whether it is inevitable result or not — it is a rabbinic prohibition. You’re raising a great answer; you’re just anticipating what comes later. It could be… It’s not that I’m raising it, I just have a bit of a mess here because we literally just said the same thing regarding Rav Ashi, that Tosafot asks on… No, we did not say the same thing. That’s what I wrote down, and that’s what I said, and I didn’t understand how it can be that Rabbi Yehuda says this requires a sin-offering — for inevitable result according to Rabbi Yehuda… I’ll explain again, Chani, I’ll explain again. I explained it before, I’ll explain again. What we said earlier was not that according to Rabbi Yehuda inevitable result turns you into intending it. What we explained earlier was that an inevitable result one does not want is identical to labor not needed for its own sake. And now you are liable on a Torah level because of the dispute over labor not needed for its own sake. But I did not say that an unintended act with inevitable result is a Torah prohibition according to Rabbi Yehuda. No. In the category of labor not needed for its own sake, it becomes a Torah prohibition. But it could be that inevitable result remains only a rabbinic prohibition even according to Rabbi Yehuda. Because in the Talmud itself — again, what you are saying is possible, I’m only saying that this is a novelty that will come later; for now it has not yet been said. That is the point. I’m not arguing with you; I’m just saying that this is a novelty that needs to come later. Because in the Talmud itself, the concession in the case of inevitable result is attributed only to Rabbi Shimon. Inevitable result is not relevant to Rabbi Yehuda. Okay? Because according to Rabbi Yehuda an unintended act is forbidden anyway. True, according to those medieval authorities (Rishonim) who hold that with inevitable result, an unintended act according to Rabbi Yehuda on the Sabbath is forbidden only rabbinically, there is room to discuss what happens with inevitable result. Right now we still don’t know. So the assumption is that it is the same as without inevitable result, because according to Rabbi Yehuda it makes no difference. In the rest of the Torah, of course, an unintended act is Torah-forbidden, and so inevitable result is not relevant at all according to Rabbi Yehuda. Yehuda. Because an unintended act in the whole Torah is Torah-forbidden anyway. The question is whether on the Sabbath the concept of inevitable result suddenly emerges as relevant also within Rabbi Yehuda’s view. For now Rav Chaim’s assumption, when he asks the question, is that it does not. Okay?

I really apologize — I’ll explain exactly what I don’t understand. If you could please go back over Tosafot’s question on Rav Ashi. I’ll explain. Tosafot — but can you maybe share the screen for a moment and just show it to me? Because according to what I wrote down, right now it doesn’t work for me. Fine, so I’ll explain it again, but I do want to move on, so I’ll do it one more time and if necessary we’ll talk afterward, okay? Tosafot asks like this: “And Tosafot there asked, since an unintended act is forbidden on the Sabbath only rabbinically, how can it say here that he is liable for two? And they answered that it is speaking of a case where it was an inevitable result. And if because of an unintended act, then indeed he would be liable here for kindling according to everyone, because Rabbi Shimon concedes in the case of inevitable result that one is liable” — according to Rabbi Shimon. What about Rabbi Yehuda? According to Rabbi Yehuda maybe it is only rabbinically forbidden, I don’t know. “But since he does not need the kindling, then this is labor not needed for its own sake.” And now we have left the unintended act and inevitable result; now this is labor not needed for its own sake. With labor not needed for its own sake, Rabbi Yehuda says one is liable even on the Sabbath — that is clear. The question is what happens with an unintended act together with inevitable result. There it is not clear that he would be liable; it could be that an unintended act with inevitable result is only rabbinically forbidden. And later it will come out that no, you’re right. But right now Rav Chaim is still asking this. Let’s just continue, because I still want to at least get to the main point.

And it seems right to say that the reason an unintended act is forbidden only rabbinically with regard to the Sabbath according to everyone, as explained in Tosafot in Yoma 34 and in several other places, is because regarding the Sabbath it says “thoughtful labor,” and when one does not intend, that is not thoughtful labor. But the main dispute over an unintended act throughout the whole Torah — whether it is permitted or forbidden — is really in Torah law, not in rabbinic law. And the one who forbids an unintended act holds that it is forbidden by Torah law, as explained earlier in Shabbat 133. We saw that passage. What is he saying? He is saying there is the category of “unintended act” in the whole Torah, and there Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon disagree. Rabbi Yehuda says liable, Rabbi Shimon says permitted. On the Sabbath, besides the general problem of unintended act, there is another problem: there is a problem of “thoughtful labor,” which of course is a problem specific only to the laws of the Sabbath. And that problem is relevant only to the laws of the Sabbath. Now if I do not intend on the Sabbath, there are basically two problems: one, it is an unintended act as in the whole Torah, and therefore according to Rabbi Shimon I am exempt or it is permitted. Two, it is also not thoughtful labor, right? But according to Rabbi Shimon that is not relevant, because it is permitted anyway even without regard to the laws of the Sabbath — it is permitted because of the general principle of unintended act in the whole Torah. But according to Rabbi Yehuda, who says that in the whole Torah an unintended act is liable, then apparently even on the Sabbath there should not be the regular exemption of unintended act; just as nowhere else, so too on the Sabbath. Rav Chaim says: yes, but there is the exemption of “thoughtful labor,” and on that Rabbi Yehuda does not disagree. Rabbi Yehuda agrees that on the Sabbath there is an additional requirement, beyond the whole Torah, that it be thoughtful labor, as in the Tabernacle. What is thoughtful labor? It is labor that I think about and plan in advance to do. Therefore if I do not intend, that means this was not what I had in mind in advance to do; that is called not thoughtful labor. And if so, Rabbi Yehuda does not disagree about that. Therefore Rabbi Yehuda says that even on the Sabbath, if you do not intend, true, it is forbidden, but only rabbinically, not as a Torah prohibition. The rabbinic prohibition comes from the fact that it is not thoughtful labor, not from the regular exemption of unintended act throughout the Torah. Do you understand what he’s saying here? This is the foundation for everything.

You know what? I can already see our time is up. I want you to understand this, and we’ll devote a little more time next meeting to wrap it up, just to finish it. But this point is important to me that you understand. What Rav Chaim is really saying here is a classic move of “two laws,” what they call in the yeshivot tsvai dinim. Rav Chaim says there are two kinds of exemption of unintended act in Jewish law. There is the regular exemption of unintended act, which applies to all areas of Jewish law, Sabbath and non-Sabbath alike, everything. When you do not intend something, according to Rabbi Shimon it is not forbidden. According to Rabbi Yehuda it is forbidden. Besides that, there is a specific exemption in the laws of the Sabbath that is not specifically connected to unintended act — it has other implications too — namely that on the Sabbath there has to be thoughtful labor in order to violate a prohibition. If you do something unintentionally, then that is not thoughtful labor, and therefore you are exempt in the laws of the Sabbath even according to Rabbi Yehuda, because Rabbi Yehuda’s dispute with Rabbi Shimon concerns the law of unintended act in the whole Torah. But on the Sabbath, he says: fine, I agree there is no exemption here of the general unintended-act type, but in the end this is not thoughtful labor, so it cannot be a Torah prohibition. Therefore, according to Rabbi Yehuda, an unintended act on the Sabbath is forbidden only rabbinically and not by Torah law. That is not because of the regular exemption of unintended act; it is a different exemption, the exemption of thoughtful labor. Okay?

Wait, sorry — so if I didn’t intend in advance to take benches and move them from place to place on the Sabbath, then the fact that I did it on the Sabbath — what? He did intend to do it, he just didn’t intend to make a furrow. But you intended… No, no, I’m saying: if it’s not thoughtful labor, then suppose that… The furrow is not thoughtful labor. The bench you intended to move, but moving benches is permitted. But the prohibited labor here is making the furrow, and you did not intend to make the furrow at all. So something like that is not called doing thoughtful labor, and so it is not Torah-forbidden on the Sabbath. Okay.

Can I ask something technical? It says there, “Rabbi Shimon concedes in the case of inevitable result that one is liable.” That’s odd — nowhere does it say that. In the Talmud everywhere it says, “Rabbi Shimon concedes in the case of ‘cut off its head and will it not die?’” Right, but what do we understand from that? That he concedes that it is forbidden, not that one is liable. He concedes to Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Yehuda said it is forbidden, not that one is liable. The rule of inevitable result exists throughout the whole Torah. “Rabbi Shimon concedes in the case of inevitable result” — that exists throughout the whole Torah. Now throughout the whole Torah Rabbi Yehuda says one is liable; it is a Torah prohibition. So if Rabbi Shimon concedes, then that too is a Torah prohibition. I understand — meaning, even though the Talmud doesn’t say… So on the Sabbath, according to Rabbi Shimon in a case of inevitable result, there is room to discuss whether his concession to Rabbi Yehuda means that it is rabbinically forbidden, or whether in a case of inevitable result it is a Torah prohibition. And that brings me back also to Rabbi Yehuda: maybe Rabbi Yehuda too would agree that an unintended act in a case of inevitable result is a Torah prohibition, even though a regular unintended act is only rabbinically forbidden on the Sabbath. What you assumed… Meaning every place in the Talmud where it says it and it doesn’t say “liable,” it really doesn’t say “liable,” but there is room to fill that in according to what Rabbi Yehuda thinks. Exactly — “concedes” means concedes to what Rabbi Yehuda says. Now the question is what Rabbi Yehuda says. Okay? Okay, so Rabbi Yehuda is more stringent in the whole Torah than on the Sabbath. Right, that is clear. Because “thoughtful labor” is an additional requirement that is actually a leniency. In other words, in order to violate a prohibition on the Sabbath you have to meet one more requirement besides the regular halakhic requirements that exist throughout the whole Torah.

Now this is the basis from which — maybe I’ll add just one more sentence, so at least this piece will be complete. Rav Chaim continues and says — allow me just two more minutes, okay? Just to at least finish the basis. So he says as follows: “And these are two laws: the law of an unintended act in the whole Torah, and the law of thoughtful labor on the Sabbath. And it appears that these two laws are distinct in their fundamental nature from one another.” They are distinct from each other; it is not the same law. “For in the law of unintended act” — that is, in the whole Torah — “the main thing depends on his intention and will, and even if he certainly knows that the thing will be done and he performs the act knowingly, nevertheless it depends on his intention — whether he intends this or not.” And then he brings a proof for this from Pesachim. Okay? But regarding the unintended-act rule of the Sabbath… Wait — it depends on knowledge. Yes. “Whereas in the law of thoughtful labor, its essence does not depend at all on intention and will, but on whether he knows that he is doing the act.” He has to know that he is doing the act. It is not a question of whether he intends it, whether that is what he wants, whether that is his motivation. That is the law of unintended act in the whole Torah. Unintended act in the whole Torah means intention — intentionality. Right? That you are in fact doing the action for the sake of that thing. That is what “intention” means in the context of unintended act in the whole Torah. In the context of the Sabbath, it depends on what you know, not on what you want, not on what your motivation is. But we said that on the Sabbath there are both… Wait, wait. Correct, but this is the law specific to the Sabbath, besides the general law that applies there too. But the law specific to the Sabbath is only about knowledge.

Now the implication is of course: what happens with inevitable result? Inevitable result solves the “unintended act” problem of the Sabbath. Right? But inevitable result does not solve the “unintended act” problem of the whole Torah, because I still do not care about the furrow — what difference does it make to me that it necessarily happens? On the Sabbath, the whole point is whether I know a furrow will be made. So if it is inevitable result, I cannot say that I don’t know, because it is obvious that it will happen. So inevitable result solves the unintended-act problem of the Sabbath, the problem of thoughtful labor. But inevitable result does not solve the unintended-act problem of the whole Torah, because with unintended act in the whole Torah you need intentionality — you need to be doing it for the sake of the furrow. The fact that the furrow will necessarily be made does not mean that making the furrow was your motivation in dragging the bench. Therefore, in principle, inevitable result apparently solves only the problem of… But everything we said at the beginning of the lesson was exactly this — that it also solves… Wait, wait. I anticipated the beginning of the lesson so that here in Rav Chaim I could show where his words are not necessary. But that is what he says. Okay. Right, you are correct: according to Kovetz Shiurim and the Chazon Ish and so on, one can show why inevitable result solves also the intentional “unintended act” problem of the whole Torah, not only the unintended-act problem of the Sabbath. But Rav Chaim for now assumes that it does not. Okay? And on that he builds his entire answer to Maimonides and all the questions he set up above.

Let’s stop here for the moment. I think I would suggest that at the beginning of next time — and I’ll write this to you too — at the beginning of next time, try in any case to read Rav Chaim and finish him now in light of what I explained; maybe it will be even clearer. I’ll devote a few minutes at the start of next time just to complete Rav Chaim, and then we’ll move on to the next topic. Okay? Just so that we gain Rav Chaim too.

Just one more question — I asked in the chat and didn’t get any answers. Did you see the chat? No. Does it not get to the breakout rooms? I sent it here this morning. Does the chat not reach the rooms? No, the chat is empty. Mine is empty. No, it didn’t come through. Okay, anyway, what I asked is: the midrasha wants to have one day of in-person study on campus, at the midrasha, in the open air, as a group of course according to the rules, but that we would physically be there, both the learning and the class. So the question is who among you cannot physically come to campus on Tuesday. Personally, I have a problem because I’m in an at-risk population. It’s too dangerous for me to come, because it’s not just being outside, it’s being several hours at the midrasha — for me that’s dangerous. I understand. Okay. Anyone else who has a problem? Wait, wait — why isn’t it only outside, actually? Yes, it’s supposed to be outside. So how does she… There’s also the travel — meaning, it’s not only that the class would be outside. Guys, there’s no point — everyone knows their own rules. If she says it’s dangerous, then it’s dangerous. End of story. Anyone else? All the others can come? Are we talking about this coming Tuesday? Yes. I also won’t be able to come. I don’t have a car that day, and I’m not taking public transportation — I mean, I’m not going to travel now. Nurit… I could do Thursday — can it be Thursday? So basically we have three: Nurit, Miriam, and Chani. Right? I don’t know whether Nurit will come — where is she? I don’t know, did she leave already? Yes, she disappeared suddenly. Okay, so I’ll pass it on to the authorities, we’ll see what the decision is, whether we’ll do it or not, we’ll see. In theory I can… if someone knows whether it’s possible to park a car there, I can come with the car. We can arrange you an entry permit. We can? Yes, just give me the number in advance and we can arrange an entry permit. Then that’s fine, because it’s hard to park there in the area, and for a long time, and… For a one-time thing there’s an entry permit for guests, that can be arranged. Fine, I’ll let you know whether this is happening at all — I need to check it again. I’d be happy if they took into account that we still need to wait a bit with the whole coronavirus situation. It seems a little early to me. In any case, whoever can’t, won’t come. No one is forcing anyone to come in any case. Meaning, whatever we can do… But then if the meeting happens, whoever can’t will simply miss a session. If anything, we’ll do something hybrid — meaning, it will also be broadcast on Zoom at the same time. You can share on Zoom even outside — what’s the problem? We’ll see. I’m not so sure, but we’ll see. We’ll think about it; I’ll update you. Problem, no problem, through the computer, what? Not so simple. Fine. Thank you very much. Thank you.