Tractate Shabbat, Chapter 1 – Lesson 9

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] At the first stage I want to finish Rav Chaim, as I said. We’ll try to do it quickly so we can move on to our topic for today. A summary of previous chapters: basically, what Rav Chaim argues is that there are two kinds of unintended action. There’s unintended action in the regular sense that applies throughout the Torah, and there’s the law of purposeful labor on the Sabbath. And there’s a difference between these two laws. Unintended action in the whole Torah means someone for whom this is not the motivation for the act, meaning this is not what he wants to achieve. We’re talking about directed intention, or about what a person wants, the motivation. And the purposeful labor of the Sabbath depends on awareness, not on intention. Meaning, the question is what you know is going to happen, not what you want to happen or what you intended to happen. Okay, these are two different things. For the purposeful labor of the Sabbath he doesn’t call it unintended action at all; he calls it purposeful labor, a different law, that his thought has to be realized, meaning that he has to know what is going to happen and bring it about. That’s called the law of purposeful labor.

Now his claim is that because of this difference between the unintended action of the Sabbath and the unintended action of the whole Torah—or purposeful labor, let’s call it purposeful labor and unintended action instead of saying two types of unintended action. Again, in the Talmud they’re both called unintended action, so yes, these are two laws of unintended action, but for simplicity here we’ll call them purposeful labor and unintended action. So he says: since on the Sabbath the law of purposeful labor depends only on knowledge, then once there is an inevitable result, that neutralizes the lack of knowledge, because you do know that this thing will happen—it will definitely happen. Since that’s so, you’re called intentional, okay? And therefore it makes no difference at all whether it is beneficial to him or not beneficial to him, because on the Sabbath there is no need at all for it to be beneficial to him. All that is needed is that he know. And therefore it doesn’t depend on whether it is beneficial or not beneficial to him. If it is an inevitable result, that neutralizes the claim that you didn’t know, because you did know—it is certainly going to happen. And therefore purposeful labor is fulfilled the moment this is an inevitable result, regardless of whether it is beneficial or not beneficial to him.

By contrast, in regular unintended action, what is needed there is intention, not just knowledge. In that case—there are some noises here, maybe I’ll mute for a moment, and if anyone wants to jump in— in regular unintended action, basically the more important parameter there is whether it is beneficial to him. Meaning, if it is beneficial to me, then there is room to say that this was indeed my motivation when I did it, and then that seemingly turns me into someone who acted intentionally if it is beneficial to me. So what role does the inevitable result play? And this is an important point, because he says it quickly. What the inevitable result does is basically this: only in a place where there is an inevitable result can the benefit be considered intention. Because I explained in the previous lecture that there is a difference between benefit and intention. Intention is the question of what my plan was from the outset, and benefit is the question of whether, once it happened in practice, it suits you or not—two different questions. Meaning, there can be a case where it is good for me, but that’s not what I intended in advance to do for that purpose. If it happened, excellent, but I didn’t do it for that.

Say I dragged the bench. I brought it because I needed the bench there. The fact that a furrow got made here—very nice, that helps me—but that is not the reason I dragged the bench. So that is called a case of unintended action, but one where the result is beneficial to him. So Rav Chaim says: in a place where it is an inevitable result, meaning if you drag the bench and automatically a furrow will definitely be made, there the benefit can be regarded as intention. That is the role the inevitable result plays. It’s a point he doesn’t really highlight, but it’s important to understand it. Because seemingly the division should have been more dichotomous. If we say that the two laws are: in the Torah generally it’s motivation, and on the Sabbath it’s knowledge, then really it should have come out that inevitable result plays a role only on the Sabbath, and benefit plays a role only in regular unintended action, right? That’s what should have been. Benefit turns you into intentional in the sense of the whole Torah—that’s what you wanted. And an inevitable result turns you into someone who knows, which is what’s required in the laws of the Sabbath. But that isn’t precise.

On the Sabbath he really does say that benefit plays no role; only inevitable result plays a role. But in the whole Torah, there you need both inevitable result and benefit. Why do you need both? Seemingly, once there is benefit, then I’m intentional. So he says no, that’s not correct. Because benefit and intention are not the same thing. Intention is the question of what my motivation was from the outset. Benefit is something de facto—it already happened. Do you want it, are you pleased with it? Great. But that doesn’t mean that from the beginning you intended it. Rav Chaim says: in a case where the furrow is beneficial to you that it happened, and it is also an inevitable result, meaning it definitely results from dragging the bench, there we are prepared to relate to it as if that was your intention from the outset. Because if this is something that will definitely happen and you’re happy that it happens, then don’t tell me you didn’t intend it. So that was the motivation for which you acted; therefore you did intend it. Okay? That’s basically Rav Chaim’s claim.

So if I summarize what emerges from his words, it comes out like this. In unintended action throughout the Torah, the basic thing is intention—what I want, what motivation lies behind my act. In order to neutralize that according to Rabbi Shimon—Rabbi Shimon is the one who permits—in order to neutralize that and bring things to the point where even Rabbi Shimon agrees that one is liable, you need both an inevitable result and benefit. Once it is both inevitable and beneficial to you, we regard you as intentional. Okay? Even though at the base, what matters more is the benefit. But benefit is not fully intention, so you also need it to be an inevitable result, and then I’m willing to treat the benefit as if it had been intention. That’s the regular law of unintended action.

In unintended action on the Sabbath—that is, in purposeful labor—what matters there is whether you know in advance that it will happen. There only inevitable result plays a role, meaning benefit is irrelevant. What difference does it make? If it’s not good for me, so what? You still knew that it would happen, and that’s what you did. That is enough to solve the problem of purposeful labor. But there is another important point. The fact that benefit plays a role only in the unintended action of the whole Torah and not in the purposeful labor of the Sabbath does not mean that in the laws of the Sabbath benefit has no significance. Since the laws of the Sabbath, besides having the law of purposeful labor, are also part of Jewish law. And everything relevant to all of Jewish law is relevant there too. Meaning, the whole law of purposeful labor is something added in the laws of the Sabbath beyond the law of unintended action that exists throughout Jewish law, including specifically in the laws of the Sabbath. That is a very important point, and again Rav Chaim doesn’t emphasize it, but that is what underlies his distinction.

Therefore in practice, at the bottom line, benefit does matter in the laws of the Sabbath too. For example, if there is unintended action and an inevitable result, but it is not beneficial to him. Okay? From the standpoint of purposeful labor, this is completely purposeful labor, right? Because if it’s an inevitable result, then I knew beforehand that it would happen. What do I care whether it was beneficial to him? Right—from the standpoint of purposeful labor, yes. But besides the requirement that this be purposeful labor, there is also the requirement that there be intention, just as intention is required throughout Jewish law. And here, if it is not beneficial to him—if it’s not an inevitable result or it’s not beneficial to him—then in that case you are not intentional. So you’ll be exempt not because of the laws of the Sabbath; you’ll be exempt because of the unintended-action law of the whole Torah, even though we are dealing here with the laws of the Sabbath.

[Speaker B] Can you go back over that example again for a second?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Again, let’s say I dragged a bench—let’s take a concrete example. I dragged a bench and made a furrow, okay? Now the case is one of inevitable result, but not beneficial to me, okay? I’m not happy that the furrow was made, but it is an inevitable result. The ground is such that this dragging would definitely create a furrow. That is clear in advance. In the laws of the Sabbath—after all, that’s what we’re dealing with here—in the laws of the Sabbath it doesn’t matter to me that it isn’t beneficial, because once it is an inevitable result, I know beforehand that it will happen, and therefore you can’t say this is not purposeful labor, right? You knew beforehand it would happen. Seemingly I should have been liable. So why is someone exempt even on the Sabbath in a case of inevitable result that is not beneficial to him? The answer is that he is exempt because of the laws that apply throughout the Torah.

[Speaker B] I didn’t understand—but if he’s liable under the laws of the Sabbath, then in the end he should be liable.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, the exemption works asymmetrically. To exempt, it is enough that he be exempt either by the laws of the Sabbath or by the exemptions that apply throughout the Torah. Meaning, if there is an exemption that applies throughout the Torah, then in the laws of the Sabbath too you won’t be liable, because after all there is a general rule throughout the Torah that if a person did not intend the prohibition, he is exempt. So what do I care that purposeful labor exists? Purposeful labor exists, but there is a more basic condition that is true throughout the Torah: if I did not intend the prohibition, I’m exempt for it.

[Speaker B] I wasn’t familiar with that rule.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Is there a hierarchy between the two rules? He writes that this is the rule of the whole Torah. What I emphasized here is that this is actually less explicit in Rav Chaim—that this rule of the whole Torah includes, and in particular applies to, the laws of the Sabbath. The laws of the Sabbath are also part of Jewish law. They have their special characteristics and their special requirements. But besides that, everything that exists in Jewish law generally also exists in the laws of the Sabbath. That too is part of Jewish law, besides being the laws of…

[Speaker C] But seemingly, purposeful labor sort of overrides it—it’s as if it makes it even stricter, or narrows the permissions even more.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no—that’s exactly the point. Not true. In order to violate the laws of the Sabbath, you have to meet two requirements. First of all, it has to be a prohibition by the definition of the whole Torah. If it isn’t a prohibition, the discussion never starts. So first of all, it has to be a prohibition. Second, even if it is a prohibition, there are additional requirements for it to count as a prohibition in the laws of the Sabbath. It also has to be purposeful labor. Now, if from the standpoint of the whole Torah you acted unintentionally, then I don’t care that it is purposeful labor, because it is not a prohibition at all. It fulfills the requirement of level two, but level one is missing.

[Speaker C] That’s exactly the question. Two levels.

[Speaker D] But it sounds a little abstract to me to say, okay, he didn’t intend it so he’s exempt. But that could apply to anything and every

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] positive commandment

[Speaker D] or prohibition.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, right, that really is true for everything. What’s the problem?

[Speaker D] But if I take that very, very, very far—okay, I didn’t intend to kill.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay. If you didn’t intend to kill, that’s unintended action. What’s the question? I don’t understand.

[Speaker D] But there’s no exemption there.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why no exemption? Why not? Full exemption.

[Speaker D] How can you prove that? Prove what? Wait, okay, maybe. But another question: if he’s exempt, then maybe you turn it into some other kind of punishment, because after all the person…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that’s a different discussion. The question whether he goes free with nothing at all or something else—that’s another story. This specific violation, since he did not intend it, he did not commit in full. How you deal with him anyway so that everyone won’t start committing killings unintentionally—that’s a technical question. It doesn’t matter to me right now. Right now I’m talking about what the halakhic truth is. How to solve practical problems that might arise from that—that’s a separate topic. Let’s leave that now. Okay?

So I’ll come back again—this is a very important point, because without it you can’t understand Rav Chaim. Meaning, the rules stated in Jewish law as a whole are relevant to the Sabbath as well. What the Sabbath has are additional requirements. Meaning, besides the requirements that exist in Jewish law generally, on the Sabbath it is also required that it be purposeful labor in order for you to violate it. Meaning that in order to be exempt in the laws of the Sabbath, it is enough for you to have one of the mechanisms of exemption. Either you are unintentional by the definitions of all of Jewish law, or it is not purposeful labor. To make one liable, both kinds of requirements have to be present: he must be intentional, and it must be purposeful labor.

And now, if I do something on the Sabbath in a case of inevitable result that is not beneficial to him—we’re talking about everything according to Rabbi Shimon, yes?—if I do something on the Sabbath in a case of inevitable result that is not beneficial to him, then from the standpoint of purposeful labor, since it is an inevitable result, this is purposeful labor. I don’t care that it is not beneficial to him. That’s it. But from the standpoint of the laws of unintended action, which apply throughout Jewish law and in particular also in the laws of the Sabbath, if it is not beneficial to me, you can’t say I intended it. So I knew, but I did not intend. Thus from the standpoint of purposeful labor there is indeed purposeful labor here, but there is a general exemption, valid throughout Jewish law and in particular in the laws of the Sabbath, that if I do not intend something, I am exempt. Okay?

[Speaker C] So it isn’t really two levels; it’s the combination of the two rules together.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Doesn’t matter. Pick whichever metaphor is clearer for you. But in principle you need both requirements in order to obligate. It is enough for one of them not to be fulfilled in order to exempt.

[Speaker D] If I knew but didn’t intend—isn’t there something there because of the inevitable result? Again—if I knew but didn’t intend. After all, in “I knew” there’s something inside inevitable result?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s not “something.” If there’s an inevitable result, then I knew, period. It’s not “something.” If there’s an inevitable result, I certainly knew. But that doesn’t mean I intended. Let’s look again at the bench so it’ll be clearer.

[Speaker D] But it’s not

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] possible that I didn’t intend if I knew? No, it definitely is possible. Exactly like on the Sabbath. The example of the bench and the furrow again, so it will be more concrete. I drag the bench in a situation where a furrow will definitely be made. Inevitable result, okay? From the standpoint of purposeful labor, is there purposeful labor? Yes. There is purposeful labor because I knew beforehand there would be a furrow here, right? Did I drag it in order for the furrow to be made? No. No. If I didn’t want the furrow, for example, then no. If I wanted the furrow, meaning if the furrow is beneficial to him, then that is also considered intentional throughout the Torah. But if it is not beneficial to him, that’s where the practical difference lies. Because if it is not beneficial to me, then the unintended-action category of the whole Torah remains in place. Therefore even regarding dragging the bench, which is a question in the laws of the Sabbath, I come out exempt. I come out exempt not because of the laws of the Sabbath; I come out exempt because of the sweeping rule of all Jewish law, which applies also—and especially—to the laws of the Sabbath. Okay? Everything all right? I think…

[Speaker D] If it isn’t clear, ask.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s Rav Chaim’s whole point.

[Speaker D] Meaning, basically if it’s not beneficial to him, that equals unintentional.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Unintentional in the sense of the whole Torah, right.

[Speaker D] Of the whole Torah? Right.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And therefore on the Sabbath too, if it isn’t beneficial to me, then from the standpoint of the Sabbath that doesn’t interfere—the fact that it isn’t beneficial to him. But the laws of the Sabbath are part of Jewish law, and if throughout Jewish law there is a requirement that the thing be beneficial to him, meaning that I intend it, that requirement is not fulfilled. If it is not fulfilled, then in the laws of the Sabbath too. Let me give you another example. Suppose I did something not by choice at all, okay? I was coerced into doing it. There is no special exemption in the laws of the Sabbath that someone who was coerced is exempt; that is an exemption that exists throughout Jewish law, right? So because of that, if I did something under coercion on the Sabbath, would I be liable? Obviously not. That exemption exists for all of Jewish law, so of course it exists in the laws of the Sabbath too. The laws of the Sabbath are part of Jewish law. And now the exemption of unintended action is a sweeping exemption for all of Jewish law, not only for the Sabbath.

[Speaker C] But the exemption of unintended action sort of makes purposeful labor unnecessary for me. Why? Because automatically it doesn’t work for me here, so I move to the second track of unintended action in the whole Torah.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I didn’t understand.

[Speaker C] If I don’t—seemingly I would have expected that I might obligate not because of unintended action but because of purposeful labor. But here we tie it down and say no, basically if it isn’t beneficial to you, then we go back to the earlier system of unintended action. When—where do I have a case that differs, where according to this in the case of the whole Torah I exempt or obligate, sorry, but in purposeful labor I obligate? Do you understand what I’m asking?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That in purposeful labor

[Speaker C] I obligate?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. No, there won’t be such a case, because if I’m exempt here…

[Speaker C] Exactly, that’s what I asked.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What’s the problem? I don’t understand.

[Speaker C] So then why do I—how and when do I use this mechanism of purposeful labor?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You don’t use this mechanism—that’s exactly the point. There are two mechanisms here and both are required. There will be a practical difference, for example, according to Rabbi Yehuda—we’ll see that in a moment—but yes. Now let’s look for a second at Rav Chaim. So far this was the introduction. Now let’s read him inside, and I hope it’ll be clearer. Here he explained this point in the passage we read—he explained this point. This is what he says. You know what, let’s read it quickly. I read this passage before, but let’s read it quickly. “And it seems to say that behold, the fact that an unintended act is prohibited only rabbinically regarding the Sabbath according to everyone, as explained in Tosafot on Yoma and in several other places, and the reason for this is because regarding the Sabbath it says ‘purposeful labor,’ and when it is unintended, it is not purposeful labor. But the main discussion”—yes—“the main dispute about unintended action throughout the whole Torah, whether it is permitted or prohibited, that is actually in the main Torah law, it is not a rabbinic law; it is a Torah law. And the one who prohibits unintended action in the rest of the Torah”—not in the laws of the Sabbath—“holds that it is prohibited by Torah law, as explained explicitly in Shabbat 133 regarding cutting off a bright spot, that according to the one who says unintended action is prohibited, it is prohibited by Torah law.” Right? “But regarding the Sabbath, its prohibition is only rabbinic for a different reason, because it is not purposeful labor.”

There, you see, that’s pretty much the answer to your question. Meaning, according to Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that in unintended action one is liable, still the exemption of purposeful labor remains. Therefore Rabbi Yehuda in the laws of the Sabbath will say that unintended action is prohibited only rabbinically. Because it is unintended action. But what happens when it is an inevitable result? Last lecture one of the women next door pointed this out, and I told her—I wrote her an email afterward—that she was right; during the lecture itself I didn’t understand. When the matter is unintended action with an inevitable result, then Rabbi Yehuda will say that even on the Sabbath it is a Torah prohibition, not a rabbinic prohibition. Because the requirement of purposeful labor is fulfilled here. That’s what he says here. Now look:

“But regarding the Sabbath, its prohibition is only rabbinic for a different reason, because it is not purposeful labor.” I’m reading here. “But regarding the Sabbath, its prohibition is only rabbinic for a different reason, because it is not purposeful labor. And these are two laws: the law of unintended action of the whole Torah, and the law of purposeful labor of the Sabbath.” So these are two laws. And now he continues, next step: “And it appears that these two laws are different from one another in the basis of their law”—yes, they differ from one another in their foundations; they are not the same law—“for in the law of unintended action,” this is the general law, “the main thing depends on his intention and desire. And even if he certainly knows that the act will be done, and he does the act with awareness, nevertheless it depends on his intention whether he intended it or not.” And he brings an explicit proof from Pesachim; we’ll skip that for the moment.

[Speaker C] “Behold, therefore, even though…” first line.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] By contrast—not here, no—that’s all part of the proof from Pesachim; it’s less important for us right now. “By contrast, in the law of purposeful…” purposeful labor, “its basis does not depend at all on intention and desire. The point there is only the awareness with which he does the act. He has to know that this result will come out, not intend it. And this is the basis of this law of purposeful labor: that he does the labor with awareness and thought. And as we find in Keritot that one who acts unawares on the Sabbath is exempt because the Torah prohibited purposeful labor,” and so on. “And in all these cases the labor is not done with his awareness at all, and that is because this is the main meaning of purposeful labor: that the labor be done with thought and awareness. If so, here too…” I’m reading here now, yes. “If so, here too, where it is unintended and therefore is not considered purposeful labor, its main law is also because the labor is not done with his awareness at all. But not because we require his intention, that he intend it.” He doesn’t have to intend it; he has to know.

“And according to this it appears, regarding inevitable result, where it is explained in the Talmud that Rabbi Shimon agrees in that case that one is liable, and the opinion of the Arukh in this is that this is only when it is beneficial to him—” When is he liable? When does Rabbi Shimon agree that he is liable? Only if it is beneficial to him. “In this, the law of purposeful labor differs from the law of unintended action. For in the law of unintended action of the whole Torah, whose essence is that his will and intention be toward this, there it depends on whether it is beneficial to him. There it is relevant whether it is beneficial to him or not beneficial to him. For otherwise”—if it is not good for him—“although it is an inevitable result and the prohibition will certainly be done, nevertheless, so long as it is not beneficial to him, at least he is not intentional. And it falls under the category of unintended action, which is permitted.” And in the middle of his words he slips in something he really should have sharpened more. But if it is an inevitable result—if it is an inevitable result and not beneficial to him—then is it unintended action?

[Speaker C] It won’t help.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Inevitable result alone won’t help. And benefit alone also won’t help. You need inevitable result plus benefit. Why? That’s what I explained in the introduction: if there is only benefit, benefit is something that happens afterward. Intention has to be from the outset. The inevitable result bridges that gap. If it definitely comes out, and you know that what comes out is good for you, then don’t tell me you didn’t intend it from the outset. And therefore in unintended action of the whole Torah, in order to obligate, you need both requirements: that it be an inevitable result and that there be benefit. All right?

By contrast: “But in the law of purposeful labor”—I’m reading here now—“where we do not at all require his desire and intention, but only that the labor be done with his awareness and thought, then its law does not depend at all on whether it is beneficial to him. Rather, whenever it is an inevitable result and the labor is known to him as something that must necessarily be done, it is called that the labor is done with his awareness, and it is included in the category of purposeful labor.” Inevitable result alone—I don’t care whether it is beneficial to him or not beneficial to him. But notice: I emphasized that I don’t care from the standpoint of purposeful labor, but the benefit still plays a role because the laws of the Sabbath are also subject to the general principle in Jewish law that intention is required. All right?

“And according to this it follows”—I’m reading here now—“that unintended action in the case of inevitable result that is not beneficial to him, according to the opinion of the Arukh, the Sabbath has the same law as the whole Torah.” What does he mean? In inevitable result that is not beneficial to him, the benefit plays a role exactly on the Sabbath too, even though from the standpoint of purposeful labor it changes nothing at all. But from the standpoint of the exemption of unintended action in the whole Torah, if in a case of inevitable result that is not beneficial to him you are exempt because of the unintended-action rule of the whole Torah, then in the laws of the Sabbath too you will be exempt. Not because it is not purposeful labor—it is purposeful labor, because inevitable result turns it into purposeful labor—but the fact that it is not beneficial to you still activates here the exemption of unintended action of the whole Torah. That’s what he says. It’s a short sentence and very easy to miss, but it’s the center of his entire move. This center—that says that despite the distinction I’m making, the Sabbath too is subject to the laws of unintended action of the whole Torah.

And now he says: “And only the law of a matter that is not…” That’s what he says: “also on the Sabbath it is prohibited and one is liable for it because after all it is included…” Wait, sorry… “In the case of inevitable result that is not beneficial to him, according to the opinion of the Arukh, the Sabbath too has the same law as the whole Torah. And according to Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that unintended action is prohibited by Torah law throughout the whole Torah”—even without inevitable result and without benefit, just unintended action is also prohibited—“on the Sabbath too it is prohibited and one is liable for it.” What will happen in a case of inevitable result that is not beneficial to him on the Sabbath? According to Rabbi Yehuda, both inevitable result that is not beneficial to him and even without inevitable result at all. According to Rabbi Yehuda—okay, sorry, let’s see. Let’s work it out according to Rabbi Yehuda on the Sabbath. What happens if I did plain unintended action? Without inevitable result, without benefit. And one is liable for it. What happens in the case of inevitable result that is not beneficial to him on the Sabbath? According to Rabbi Yehuda, both inevitable result that is not beneficial to him and even without inevitable result בכלל? According to Rabbi Yehuda—sorry. Let’s see, let’s work out the calculation according to Rabbi Yehuda on the Sabbath. What happens if I did plain unintended action? Without inevitable result, without benefit? According to Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbinically prohibited, right?

[Speaker F] Even though in the whole

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Torah, unintended action is prohibited by Torah law, on the Sabbath it is only rabbinic. Why? According to Rabbi Yehuda. It is rabbinically prohibited, right? Even though throughout the Torah unintended action is prohibited by Torah law, on the Sabbath it is only rabbinic. Why? Because Rabbi Yehuda does not disagree about the law of unintended action. About the law of purposeful labor, Rabbi Yehuda also does not disagree. Rabbi Yehuda says yes—in order to be liable on the Sabbath, it has to be purposeful labor. Therefore the prohibition that exists on the Sabbath is only a rabbinic prohibition. What happens if it is an inevitable result? That brings us back to Torah law.

[Speaker F] Brings us back to Torah law.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Also from the standpoint of purposeful labor. Because from the standpoint of unintended action, it was liable anyway. He doesn’t need inevitable result, because according to Rabbi Yehuda even unintended action is liable, right? Throughout the Torah. It’s just that on the Sabbath there is an additional requirement in order to be liable, namely purposeful labor. So if that’s so, once it is an inevitable result, the requirement of purposeful labor is also fulfilled. What happens with unintended action plus inevitable result according to Rabbi Yehuda? What will the law be on the Sabbath? Liable by Torah law.

[Speaker G] Liable by Torah law.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] On the Sabbath too, not only on a weekday. On the Sabbath too, because there is purposeful labor here, and according to Rabbi Yehuda intention isn’t needed—no need. So it will be a Torah prohibition. That’s Rav Chaim’s novelty. The unintended action of Rabbi Yehuda that is prohibited only rabbinically on the Sabbath—that is only in regular unintended action. But unintended action with inevitable result, Rabbi Yehuda says that on the Sabbath this will be a Torah prohibition. Even though in the Talmud inevitable result is always brought only in the context of Rabbi Shimon, and seemingly it isn’t relevant to Rabbi Yehuda, because Rabbi Yehuda obligates even without inevitable result—he obligates even in unintended action. Rav Chaim says no, that’s not true. In the laws of the Sabbath, inevitable result is a parameter relevant also to Rabbi Yehuda, not only to Rabbi Shimon. Because it turns the prohibition from a rabbinic prohibition—because it wasn’t purposeful labor—into a Torah prohibition, because the inevitable result solves the problem of purposeful labor.

What happens if it is beneficial to him or not beneficial to him? Not relevant according to Rabbi Yehuda. Right. According to Rabbi Yehuda that doesn’t play a role; only inevitable result plays a role. Let’s see according to—so we’ve summarized all the laws according to Rabbi Yehuda. Let’s summarize all the laws according to Rabbi Shimon. According to Rabbi Shimon, throughout the whole Torah, unintended action is permitted. What happens if there is an inevitable result? It depends. If it is beneficial to him, then he is liable, right? If it is not beneficial to him, it is permitted, right? Because inevitable result that is not beneficial to him is like unintended action. And according to Rabbi Shimon, unintended action is permitted.

What happens in the laws of the Sabbath, in purposeful labor? If it is an inevitable result—if it is an inevitable result, then purposeful labor exists whether it is beneficial or not beneficial. Now if someone performed unintended action with an inevitable result on the Sabbath according to Rabbi Shimon, then if it is beneficial, it is a Torah prohibition, and if it is not beneficial, then it is permitted. Wait—permitted, but permitted while still forbidden rabbinically, or

[Speaker D] permitted?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Permitted because of the whole Torah, not because of purposeful labor. Purposeful labor does exist here because it is an inevitable result, but there is the requirement of the whole Torah that he be intentional, and when it is not beneficial to him he is considered unintentional, so it will be permitted. But that is according to the Arukh, the distinction of whether it is beneficial or not—yes, yes, I’m speaking according to the Arukh. Everything here is according to the Arukh. Rav Chaim assumes that Maimonides follows the Arukh.

[Speaker D] Fine. So then—meaning permitted, or exempt but forbidden rabbinically, or fully permitted?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no—seemingly fully permitted. There are medieval authorities who identify this with labor not needed for its own sake, but that is a whole separate story. Seemingly it is fully permitted. All right? Now he says like this.

[Speaker B] Didn’t we say that Rabbi Shimon says that if it’s unintended and not an inevitable result, then it is permitted? But if it’s unintended and not beneficial to him, when it is an inevitable result, then from Rabbi Shimon’s standpoint it is forbidden—it’s a rabbinic prohibition.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, wait. Rabbi Chaim claims that purposeful labor is in fact present here, right? But there’s also a requirement that there be intention, from the standpoint of all Torah law. And an inevitable result that he does not want is considered unintentional in all Torah law. And according to Rabbi Shimon, an unintentional act is permitted. I’m not going with the identification with labor not needed for its own sake; leave that aside for the moment. In the case of an unintentional act with an inevitable result that he does not want, it goes back to being unintentional because there is no benefit for him in it. So according to Rabbi Shimon it’s permitted, and then on the Sabbath too it would be permitted. True, from the standpoint of purposeful labor the problem was solved, but from the standpoint of the exemption of an unintentional act in all Torah law, on the Sabbath too it becomes permitted. And then he says: “And now the passage in Keritot is nicely resolved”—I’m reading here now—“And now the passage in Keritot is nicely resolved, in the case where one intended to extinguish and they ignited on their own, for it says there”—we found there—“that according to Rabbi Yehuda, who says that an unintentional act is forbidden, one is fully liable.” That is forbidden by Torah law. “And there is no longer any difficulty from the fact that on the Sabbath an unintentional act, even according to Rabbi Yehuda, is forbidden only rabbinically.” Because there we asked, Rabbi Chaim asked above: after all, on the Sabbath even according to Rabbi Yehuda this is only a rabbinic prohibition, not a Torah prohibition. So how can they say here that he is actually liable? “Because here it is different, since it was an inevitable result; if so, it is indeed included under purposeful labor, and even though he does not want it”—because according to Rabbi Yehuda it’s irrelevant that he does not want it. You just have to solve the purposeful-labor problem. So if it’s an inevitable result, the purposeful-labor problem is solved. And then it comes out that an unintentional act with an inevitable result, even on the Sabbath, will be Torah-level liability according to Rabbi Yehuda. Only an unintentional act without an inevitable result on the Sabbath is a rabbinic prohibition; but an unintentional act with an inevitable result on the Sabbath is a Torah prohibition. Meaning, an inevitable result plays a role even on Rabbi Yehuda’s field, not only on Rabbi Shimon’s field.

[Speaker B] I understand, but the Arukh does say that according to Rabbi Shimon, an unintentional act with an inevitable result that he does not want is rabbinically forbidden.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why? Where do you see that?

[Speaker B] Didn’t we say that at the beginning about the Arukh?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I said that there are views that identify an inevitable result that he does not want with labor not needed for its own sake. Rabbi Chaim here assumes that it goes back to being a regular unintentional act. If you don’t want it, then it’s unintentional, no matter what sort of inevitable result it is, and therefore it’s permitted. Okay? And that’s what he says. So therefore, according to Rabbi Yehuda, since there is an inevitable result here, I don’t care that he does not want it, because according to Rabbi Yehuda whether he wants it or not plays no role at all. But the inevitable result does play a role even according to Rabbi Yehuda, because in the laws of Sabbath it solves the problem of purposeful labor—the inevitable result does that—and then Rabbi Yehuda, who imposes liability, imposes liability by Torah law, not rabbinically. Okay? And that’s why the difficulty from that Talmudic passage there about “the upper ones ignited” is not difficult. “And only according to Rabbi Shimon is he exempt”—only according to Rabbi Shimon is he exempt. Why? Because in the case of an inevitable result that he does not want, you are exempt because it goes back to being unintentional according to Rabbi Shimon, but according to Rabbi Yehuda it is Torah-level liability, not rabbinic. So according to Rabbi Shimon it is completely permitted, and according to Rabbi Yehuda it is Torah-level liability, not rabbinic. And that’s how the difficulty on the Talmudic passage there is solved. “And the view of Maimonides is also resolved”—I’m continuing to read here. “And the view of Maimonides is also resolved”—wait, sorry, one line above—“And the view of Maimonides is also resolved, for he ruled in the case where one intended to extinguish and they ignited on their own, that he is exempt.” He ruled exempt, even though labor not needed for its own sake incurs liability. After all, Maimonides ruled like Rabbi Yehuda that labor not needed for its own sake is liable. “Since here this is not labor not needed for its own sake, but rather it is an unintentional act, as in the passage in Keritot; and regarding an unintentional act we rule like Rabbi Shimon, that it is permitted, as explained in tractate Shabbat; and all the more so he is exempt.” Here “exempt” means exempt and permitted, of course, yes? This is one of those exemptions that are exempt and permitted. Okay? And according to this, he says, “it is also well resolved that Shmuel permits lancing an abscess and trapping a snake, as we wrote above, because this falls entirely under the category of an unintentional act, for the inevitable result involved in it is one he does not want.” Right? That is an inevitable result that he does not want. And then he says this: “And Shmuel is consistent with his reasoning, for he holds in Zevachim that an unintentional act in all Torah law is permitted. And also in the case of an inevitable result that he does not want, as explained in the Arukh”—in this respect he holds like Rabbi Shimon, Shmuel does. “Only regarding labor not needed for its own sake does he hold like Rabbi Yehuda,” and that is also what Maimonides holds, yes? We saw that Maimonides rules like Shmuel. So he says: “as explained in the Arukh in explaining the passage in Zevachim there. And as for the fact that the passage in Shabbat 107 ties it to the law of labor not needed for its own sake”—after all, we asked that the passage on page 107 hangs these laws of lancing an abscess and trapping a snake on the law of labor not needed for its own sake and not on unintentional action—so he says that’s not difficult. Why? “Because there it is Rav who says it”—the author of the statement there is Rav, not Shmuel—“and Rav holds in Shabbat 42 that an unintentional act is forbidden.” He holds like Rabbi Yehuda regarding an unintentional act, while Shmuel, regarding an unintentional act, holds like Rabbi Shimon. So the passage on page 107, which goes according to Rav’s view, sees this as labor not needed for its own sake. An unintentional act is forbidden, and therefore in the case of an inevitable result that he does not want there is liability even on the Sabbath, as explained in the passage, and he is not exempt. So why is he exempt there? Only because it is labor not needed for its own sake. Rav—after all, this case of lancing an abscess and trapping a snake comes out to be both an unintentional act with an inevitable result that he does not want and also labor not needed for its own sake. All right? That is basically his claim. He does not identify the two things, but the case has both exemptions in it. And then he says this: Rav and Shmuel disagree by 180 degrees, from one extreme to the other, because Rav holds like Rabbi Yehuda regarding an unintentional act and like Rabbi Shimon regarding labor not needed for its own sake, and Shmuel is the reverse. So let’s do the accounting. According to Rav—Rav, after all, holds regarding an unintentional act like Rabbi Yehuda, right? But on the other hand he holds regarding labor not needed for its own sake like Rabbi Shimon—so according to his view, what will lancing an abscess and trapping a snake be? Labor not needed for its own sake, which is rabbinically forbidden. From the standpoint of unintentional action it will be permitted, but from the standpoint of labor not needed for its own sake it will be forbidden. He holds like Rabbi Yehuda regarding labor not needed for its own sake and like Rabbi Shimon regarding an unintentional act. So according to his view, from the standpoint of unintentional action it is completely permitted in these situations, because it’s an inevitable result that he does not want. So what do I care that there is labor not needed for its own sake here? From the standpoint of unintentional action it is permitted. And Maimonides holds like Shmuel, and therefore he rules that it is completely permitted, even though he rules regarding labor not needed for its own sake like Rabbi Yehuda. Because it is permitted due to the unintentional element in it, not due to labor not needed for its own sake. From the standpoint of labor not needed for its own sake, it should have been forbidden, but for there to be exemption one exemption is enough. If I have the exemption of unintentional action, that is enough to exempt. I don’t care that it is also labor not needed for its own sake. And that is what he says: “And Maimonides—his view,” I’m reading here, “and Maimonides, whose view is like the view of the Arukh, that an inevitable result that he does not want is included under the category of an unintentional act, which we hold is permitted in all Torah law, and as is indeed proven from his words in chapter 7 of Errors, which we brought”—he showed that Maimonides holds like the Arukh—“therefore he properly ruled like Shmuel that lancing an abscess and trapping a snake are permitted from the outset.” Because our Talmudic passage, which speaks according to Shmuel, sees this as a case that is both labor not needed for its own sake and also an unintentional act with an inevitable result that he does not want. So from the standpoint of the inevitable result that he does not want, it should be permitted. What do I care that from the standpoint of labor not needed for its own sake there is no permission? There is permission from the standpoint of unintentional action; one permission is enough for it to be permitted. That is Shmuel’s view. But according to Rav’s view—after all, regarding an unintentional act, this is the passage on page 107 that hangs it on labor not needed for its own sake. The passage there—the one who states the teaching is Rav, not Shmuel. Rav, after all, holds like Rabbi Yehuda regarding an unintentional act, so from the standpoint of unintentional action there is no exemption in these situations, because it is an inevitable result that he does not want. So then what? From the standpoint of labor not needed for its own sake there is an exemption, because there he holds like Rabbi Shimon. Therefore there the Talmud hangs it on labor not needed for its own sake, where there is only a rabbinic prohibition.

[Speaker G] Honestly, how can the same case be both this and that? I feel like I missed something here.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, you didn’t miss anything. That’s what Rabbi Chaim is claiming, and this is an issue that grows out of that same ambiguity we talked about earlier. He does not identify the two things. Because someone who does identify the two things—then it comes out that an inevitable result that he does not want, as Chani asked before, if someone identifies the two things then they always come together, so in the case of an inevitable result that he does not want there will be a rabbinic prohibition like labor not needed for its own sake, because it’s the same thing. Rabbi Chaim says no: this case falls under both categories. They are not identical, but it falls under both categories. What’s the problem? From the standpoint of the category, he is not intending the labor, and besides that it is labor not needed for its own sake. He does not want the result, and he also does not intend the labor. So both things are present here. So now one exemption is enough for him to be exempt. Right? So if from the standpoint of unintentional action it is permitted, I don’t care what happens with labor not needed for its own sake. The unintentional element makes it permitted for me. If from the standpoint of unintentional action it is forbidden because I hold like Rabbi Yehuda regarding unintentional action, then let’s check from the standpoint of labor not needed for its own sake. If I hold like Rabbi Shimon regarding labor not needed for its own sake, then there will only be a rabbinic prohibition because it is also labor not needed for its own sake. One exemption is enough to exempt—permissions or exemptions.

[Speaker G] I don’t understand that. Since when can the same case become both this and that?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Here, from exactly here. What do you mean, since when? The same case falls under both of these categories.

[Speaker G] And when does it not fall under both categories?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] When you intend it. Digging a hole and needing only the dirt—that is not an inevitable result that he does not want. That is pure labor not needed for its own sake. Because it is just one action with two results, and I don’t want the second one. An inevitable result that he does not want is a situation where there are two actions. When there are two actions, then really the question is whether I intend the forbidden action, and the question is whether I want the forbidden result. So here it can be discussed both from the angle of unintentional action and from the angle of labor not needed for its own sake.

[Speaker G] But when they make an opening in order to drain the pus, that’s one labor. It’s one action too.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why is that not—

[Speaker G] —labor not needed for its own sake?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He claims it’s two. I’m saying again: we talked about this last time.

[Speaker G] Right, but then we said, okay, it’s hard for us to distinguish, but there is always a distinction. It’s either this or that; you can’t say it’s both.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no—that’s what Rabbi Chaim is claiming. You can distinguish, and if it’s two actions then it belongs to the category of unintentional action, but that does not mean that the category of labor not needed for its own sake does not also apply here. Because even if it is two actions, once there is an inevitable result connecting them, then it is as though it were one action, and then it comes out that there is also an element of labor not needed for its own sake here, in addition to its being unintentional action. That is Rabbi Chaim’s novelty at the beginning of the section we read last time. Okay, think about it, because I also want us to get to the lesson for… today. I think by now at least you have the tools to read Rabbi Chaim and understand him. So whoever still needs sharpening—by all means, read him again. I think this is such a classic Rabbi Chaim move, with analysis—yes, a brilliant analytical move. Meaning, you can agree or disagree, but to be impressed by the logic and by the form of the analysis—this is a tremendous lesson in conceptual Talmudic learning. That’s why it was important to me to go through Rabbi Chaim this way and explain exactly how this whole thing is built. It’s a classic analysis that you can see in many places, and it solves questions with a knife-edge distinction between two things that look to us the same, and immediately maps them: every passage goes into a different channel, two laws, he breaks the two things apart, and all the difficulties disappear. A wonderful move. So it’s worth knowing. Whoever—

[Speaker G] But not all the difficulties disappear.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What?

[Speaker G] Maybe it’s wonderful, but not all the difficulties disappear.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Difficulties disappear; questions remain, not difficulties.

[Speaker C] A few new difficulties too.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, questions remain. There are questions. You can say: why is lancing an abscess two actions and not one? Okay, but that’s true even without Rabbi Chaim. This definition—between two actions and one action—is ambiguous in any case. So I’m saying: yes, you can ask questions, that’s true, but the difficulties that he raised—he solved them. Okay, we’ll leave that there… go over it afterward. I think it will definitely help a lot anyone who can review it afterward and make sure she really understands his move. Okay, I’m moving on to our passage. Just one preliminary question: where are you up to on the page? Have you finished it? No. Okay, about how far did you get, so we have some sense of the scale?

[Speaker E] Aside from the last question that Rav asked to discuss—whether each of the explanations there about hand and body—that’s already almost everything.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We got to six.

[Speaker B] We’re on seven.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, let’s see. I hope I’ll manage to finish it today; I’m not sure. We’ll see. All right, so let’s begin. We saw the… already at the beginning of lesson three, as I wrote to you, I already commented very briefly on the question of the movement of his hand and his body. There is a dispute between Rashi and Tosafot there. We made a certain inference in Rashi in the Mishnah, and I directed you back to that Rashi again today, and today I want to get into it in more detail. Basically, in order to be liable for carrying out, a person has to remove from one domain and place in the other domain. Right? That we’ve already seen. Now the question our Talmudic passage deals with is: what exactly is called removal for this purpose, and what is called placing? Does classic removal require, obviously, taking something and lifting it—then I’ve removed it. I placed it down—that’s called placing it. But the Talmud says there could be a situation where, let’s say, I am holding something in my hand, and now I begin to walk with it. Can that also count as removal? Or if I stop walking, can that count as placing? That is what is called removal and placing of his body. Besides that there is also removal and placing of his hand. What does that mean? I begin… the thing is resting in my hand and I begin to move my hand. Not moving with the body, but with the hand. Or I stop the movement of the hand. And that is called removal and placing of his hand. Okay? That is the discussion in our passage. So the Talmud asks—I’m sharing the file—the Talmud asks: “Rav asked Rabbi.” By the way, that’s an interesting note: Rav is first generation among the Babylonian Amoraim.

[Speaker F] How does that happen?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Rav is first generation among the Babylonian Amoraim; Rabbi is a Tanna, the editor of the Mishnah. Now Rav himself—the Talmud says in several places: “Rav is a Tanna and may dispute.”

[Speaker H] Rav—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He is actually considered to stand at the seam between the Tannaim and the Amoraim, and there are situations in which you can find a dispute between Rav and one of the Tannaim. And biographically, historically, Rav sat in Rabbi’s court in the Land of Israel, and afterward he went down to Babylonia, where he essentially established the Torah world of Babylonia together with Shmuel. That is the first generation of the Babylonian Amoraim. And about this the Talmud in Sanhedrin tells that Rabbi Chiya—who, by the way, was Rav’s uncle, a note here—the Talmud says Rabbi Chiya was Rav’s uncle, who sat together with Rabbi in the court, and he says to Rabbi: “My nephew is going down to Babylonia; let him judge, let him judge; let him permit firstborns, let him permit them.” He asks him to authorize Rav to issue Jewish law rulings in Babylonia. Meaning, Rav sat there with them; he was Rabbi Chiya’s nephew, younger than they were, and he really stands at the seam between the generations of the Tannaim and the generations of the Amoraim. Here there is a question that Rav asked Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi—Rabbi. Apparently this was still during his period in the Land of Israel, or perhaps he sent him a question in a letter, I don’t know exactly. But Rav asks Rabbi: “If his fellow loaded him with food and drink and he took them outside”—my friend put food and drink on me and I walk. So there is a question here, yes? What exactly is called removal? In principle, the same question could also be asked about placing, right? The Talmud here speaks only about removal, and therefore Tosafot here on the spot indeed says: “Is removal of his body like removal of an object, or not? It seems to Ri that the same question could also be asked regarding placing—for example, if he carried an object out into the public domain and stopped there to rest, but did not place it on the ground. So his body came to a stop. Can that be considered placing, if the placing of his body is like the placing of the object, or not?” So says Tosafot. So the same question that the Talmud has regarding removal is the same question regarding placing, and apparently Tosafot will also say that the conclusion, the Talmud’s resolution regarding removal of his body, is also true regarding placing of his body. Yes, not only is the question the same question, but also the conclusion—it is the same question. Okay? And then he continues and says as follows: “And from our Mishnah, which teaches: or if he took from within it and brought it out, the poor man is liable—from that one cannot resolve it.” He says: ostensibly, one could have resolved this question from a line in the Mishnah. Why? Because the Mishnah says that one of the cases where the poor man is liable is when the poor man is standing outside, stretches his hand into the house, picks up the object from the hand of the homeowner, brings it out into the public domain, and does not put it down—ostensibly does not put it on the ground, right? And about that it says that the poor man is liable. What does it mean that he is liable? That he did both removal and placing. Okay? Now, this thing is removal in the fullest sense. Regarding the removal there is no question; this is classic removal: I took something and removed it. But regarding placing—

[Speaker C] He took it in that same domain, inside the homeowner’s domain.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So what?

[Speaker C] Why do you say that that’s removal and there’s no question about it?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What is called removal? I take my hand and remove something—that is classic removal.

[Speaker C] And if he leaves his hand there the entire Sabbath inside the house?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then he did only removal without placing. What’s the problem?

[Speaker C] Then there wasn’t removal here. Why not? If we relate only to the hand and not to the body.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean? He removed the thing; that’s what is called removal. Removal isn’t transfer. There is removal even without transfer. We saw a dispute between Rashi and Tosafot. Tosafot claims that such a thing is not even removal. Exactly. Fine, that’s what Tosafot says; Rashi says not so. But it’s not important for our purposes. For our purposes, such a thing is considered removal. It may be that this removal does not create liability as long as you haven’t crossed domains, or doesn’t create liability, isn’t even forbidden rabbinically. Fine. But that is what is called removal. What other removal is there? You always remove with the hand. This is not what is called removal of his hand. Here the hand isn’t the issue. The point is not that the hand moved. The hand took something from another place and lifted it. That is full-fledged removal; there is no question here. The question is only about placing, right? That’s why Tosafot first said that the same uncertainty that exists regarding removal of his body also exists regarding placing of his body. And only now Tosafot comes and says: let’s resolve that uncertainty from the Mishnah. Because from the Mishnah what you could resolve is the question of placing of his body, not the question of removal of his body. Why? Because in this case where the poor man inserted his hand, took something from the homeowner, and brought it into the public domain to himself—now here he does not put it down; here it is in his hand, and it says the poor man is liable. Why is he liable? There was no placing here. The hand stopped, but he didn’t place it somewhere else. We see that stopping of the hand is considered placing. So ostensibly one could resolve from the Mishnah that placing of his hand is placing, and consequently removal of his hand is also removal. Right? So Tosafot says: you can’t resolve it. Because if you could resolve it, then what is the question in the Talmud? The Talmud raises a question, so this is not an explicit law in the Mishnah. If it is an explicit law in the Mishnah, there is no reason for the Talmud to raise a question about it. Therefore it is not resolved from the Mishnah. Okay? That does not mean the law is the opposite; it only means that you can’t prove it from the Mishnah. Why not? “Because one can interpret it as speaking of a case where he placed it on the ground.” It could be that the poor man took the object from the private domain, and when he brought it into the public domain he put it on the ground next to him, or on a table next to him. It did not remain in his hand. And only in such a case does the Mishnah say that the poor man is liable. But perhaps in truth, if the poor man leaves it in his hand, he would not be liable. That is what our Talmudic passage is uncertain about: whether placing of his hand is placing or not. In the conclusion it is, yes. We’ll talk more—I’m ignoring for the moment hand and body, we’ll get to that in a second—but as for placing, in the conclusion, removal of his body is removal, and then placing of his body is placing, and then you don’t need to say that he put it down somewhere else. But since in principle the Mishnah could be interpreted as speaking of a case where he put it somewhere else, you cannot resolve it from the Mishnah. Placing. Troubling silence.

[Speaker D] No, we said—as if—is placing enough if he merely brought it from one domain to another, that’s called placing? Meaning, even if he didn’t… What? So then I have a question. If, say, he just put it in his mouth, put it in his pocket, is that called placing?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s the same question. That’s placing of his body.

[Speaker D] But if—if we say that that same placing—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If someone else puts it in my mouth, that is definitely placing.

[Speaker D] But if I took it—the poor man—I took it from the homeowner, brought it into the public domain where I am, and I put it in my mouth, is that placing?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That is the question: whether placing of his body is placing or not. That is the Talmud’s question.

[Speaker D] Okay. But the Talmud says that for removal it’s like that.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Also for placing. Tosafot says removal and placing are the same. Everything that applies to removal also applies to placing.

[Speaker D] So from the standpoint of… right now we’re only at the question stage. What? We’re only at the question stage at this point.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, yes. The conclusion is that it is indeed removal and indeed placing, but right now we are at the stage of the question, okay? The uncertainty. Tosafot says: “And if you ask, why not resolve it from our Mishnah.” Fine, they want to resolve it from another Mishnah and say it’s not… it can’t be resolved from there. We’ll skip that; it’s not important for us right now. The old Tosafot on the spot—did you find the old Tosafot? It’s found on the page… on the page of the regular Talmud, there on the side at letter bet. He brings it in the name of the Rashba.

[Speaker E] That the Rashba… not every edition has it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Of course—in the regular Talmud. In the Vilna edition.

[Speaker H] It’s on page… side a and not side b. Could be I looked for… side a, I think, on the lower right.

[Speaker C] Yes, on the inside margin.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, yes. Lower right, letter bet. All right? So the old Tosafot brings in the name of the Rashba. Note: this Rashba here is of course not Rabbi Shlomo ben Aderet from the sages of Spain, who lived later. Rather, this is Rabbi Shimshon of Shantz. And his father too was named something Abraham, I don’t know, Rabbi… Rabbi Shimshon ben Avraham, or ben… apparently Avraham. So he too is called Rashba, but it’s not the Rashba we usually call Rashba. This is one of the Tosafists. Rabbi Shimshon of Shantz—when the word Rashba appears in Tosafot, it means Rabbi Shimshon of Shantz. All right? Because the Tosafists lived in France, in Provence, and the Rashba was active in Spain. Okay? And also later. In any event, Rabbi Shimshon of Shantz, who is brought in more detail in the Tosafot of the Rosh—so I prefer to bring it from there. So the Tosafot of the Rosh says as follows. “Do we say that removal of his body is like removal of an object?” “The same question could indeed be asked regarding placing.” He repeats everything Tosafot said. Now he says this: “And Rabbenu Shimshon explained that the question is specifically about removal.” The Talmud’s uncertainty is only regarding removal, not regarding placing. “But regarding placing, it is obvious to him that it is like the placing of an object, as is implied by the plain sense of the Mishnah.” That is what comes out from the plain sense of the Mishnah, and therefore it is clear that regarding placing, it is obvious that placing of his body is like placing of the object. Regarding placing it is certain. The whole uncertainty in the Talmud is only about removal of his body, not about placing. Which part of the Mishnah is he referring to, from which this is proven by the plain sense of the Mishnah?

[Speaker B] The poor man takes his hand outside and he is liable. If he is liable, that means it doesn’t matter whether he placed the object down or not; it is considered placing. Therefore just as a hand with an object resting in it is considered placing, so too if an object rests on the body, that is considered placing. Exactly.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Basically, his proof is the same proof that Tosafot and the Tosafot of the Rosh in the first section, where he cites Tosafot, brought. Right? After all, that is the proof they brought from the Mishnah. How did they reject it? They said: this is not a necessary proof, because it could be speaking of a case where he did place it down in the end. There could be a forced interpretation of the Mishnah. Wait—but he says: but the plain sense of the Mishnah is not like that. It doesn’t say that he put it down. Therefore Rabbi Shimshon of Shantz says: no, you have to say that regarding placing there is no uncertainty. And why? Because this is the plain sense of the Mishnah. The straightforward reading of the Mishnah is that he did not put it down, and nevertheless the poor man is liable. So we see that placing of his body is placing. So now he continues and says this: “Even so, regarding removal he was uncertain.” What is the hidden question here, what is he trying to answer? The very same question as Tosafot. Ah—you accept Tosafot’s proof? You think the Mishnah should indeed be read in its plain sense, that he did not put it down? Fine. Then just as placing of his body is placing, resolve from there that removal of his body is also removal. So what room is there for the Talmud’s uncertainty? It’s not enough to say that you read the Mishnah in its plain sense. If you read the Mishnah in its plain sense, then the question Tosafot asked comes back. So then why is there any room in the Talmud to wonder whether removal of his body is removal or not? It is explicit in the Mishnah that it is removal. Just as one sees in the Mishnah regarding placing, and after all placing and removal are the same thing.

[Speaker E] The Rashba says: maybe he thinks no—it isn’t the same thing.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. Rabbi Shimshon of Shantz says: no, not true. “Even so, regarding removal he was uncertain, because we require removal to be more significant than placing, as we say later regarding removal and placing from atop a place four by four.” We’ll talk more when we get there. All right? And then he goes back to that Mishnah about the tailor not going out.

[Speaker B] I didn’t understand how the Rashba doesn’t reject this answer.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He says: what you can prove from the Mishnah is that placing of his body is placing, but that still does not mean there is no room to wonder about removal of his body. The Talmud itself wonders about removal of his body, right? True, in the conclusion removal of his body is removal, so it works out. But there was room to wonder. Why? Because we found elsewhere that placing is something more trivial than removal. There are more requirements for removal than there are for placing. And therefore it may be that even though placing of his body counts as placing, regarding removal of his body the Talmud wonders—perhaps that will not count as removal. In the conclusion it does, but there is room to wonder. The Mishnah does not force us not to wonder. That’s what he wants to claim. What seems to stand behind this is what I talked about in that lesson, where I said—I brought it from several medieval authorities (Rishonim) who discuss the question of how to define the labor of carrying out: is the main thing in it the placing, or is the main thing the removal, or is the main thing the whole mechanism, the transfer? He apparently understands what? That removal is the significant thing. Because in fact the maximalist requirements are demanded regarding removal. Placing is something more trivial. Placing—even placing of his body is fine. But regarding removal, there I have to be precise. It may be that removal of his body is not enough to incur liability. Which means that in his view removal is the essence of the labor of carrying out, not placing.

[Speaker B] Why? But if in placing he’ll be liable in any event, then the essence is placing. And in removal we have hesitation; he’s not always liable.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why? If the essence is placing, then the opposite. If the essence is placing, then even with removal of his body, why should I care that the removal was done with his body? So long as the placing was done, the main element was carried out—I should be liable. So why is removal of his body not removal? Or what is the possibility that removal of his body would not be removal? We see that the removal determines whether you violated the prohibition or not. Placing is trivial. Let him place it with his body, let him place it not with his body—everything is fine; that doesn’t trouble me. The important question is what happened in the removal. Which means that the essential part of carrying out is the removal, not the placing. We saw in the Rashba, by the way—the Spanish Rashba, not the French one—that there one of the views he brought was that the main thing is the placing. But here in the French Rashba we see that the main thing is the removal. Okay, what is the Talmud’s conclusion? The Talmud’s conclusion: “He said to him: liable, and it is not similar to his hand. What is the reason? His body is at rest; his hand is not at rest.” Right? So he answers—who was it there? Rabbi, yes, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. He answers Rav, who asked him this question. He says to him: know that he is liable also for removal of his body. Removal of his body is also removal. And of course placing of his body is also placing. All right? Same thing. Now let’s try—maybe I’ll sharpen it a bit more. Removal of his body and placing of his body: in the conclusion both entail liability, right? Both according to Rabbi Shimshon of Shantz and according to Tosafot. The difference between them is only in the uncertainty. For on the side that removal of his body would not be removal, Rabbi Shimshon of Shantz says: that possibility applied only to removal, not to placing. But in the conclusion there is no dispute. In the conclusion both removal and placing—placing of his body and removal of his body—are removal and placing. Okay. Meaning, all the difference between them is ostensibly—we’ll soon see that maybe there are other differences too—but ostensibly the difference between them concerns only the initial thought, only the stage where the Talmud was unsure. In the answer at the end, the body too is regular placing and removal. Why does he add this phrase, “and it is not similar to his hand”?

[Speaker G] Because a hand is part of the body, no?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, but who asked about his hand? I mean, why is that addition necessary? Why is that interesting? Who was talking about it at all? Why are you dragging it in here?

[Speaker E] To show when there is exemption. What?

[Speaker B] It’s because the situation in the Mishnah and the situation here are not the same. Because in the Mishnah his body is on one side.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, we’ll get to that afterward. That’s Tosafot’s distinction. I’m talking before that, even before that. Why does this comment about his hand enter here at all?

[Speaker E] Because what can he rely on? He relies on the Mishnah. So the question is whether we rely on that Mishnah, which talks about the hand, or whether his body is something else.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In other words, what Nechama is saying is this: Rabbi had a difficulty. Because Rabbi said to him “liable,” meaning that removal and placing of his body are removal and placing that incur liability, right? But he had a difficulty, because in the Mishnah you see otherwise, and in the Mishnah you see otherwise. He doesn’t spell all that out here, but it’s clear that that is what stood in the background. And then he explains: what you see in the Mishnah otherwise is regarding his hand. What I told you is regarding his body, and his hand and his body are not the same thing. Regarding his hand, that really is not placing and not removal, but regarding his body it is removal and placing. Meaning, the reason he found it necessary to add that note about his hand is that his answer is ostensibly contradicted by the Mishnah. Therefore he comes to reconcile the Mishnah. Let’s try to examine the Mishnah and see where this came from.

[Speaker D] Wait, didn’t we talk at the beginning about his hand—of the homeowner and the poor man—and not about his body?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What again?

[Speaker D] When we talked about the homeowner and the poor man, we talked about his hand, not about his body.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s exactly what Rabbi says. Therefore Rabbi says: don’t prove to me from the Mishnah that removal and placing of his body are not removal and placing—sorry, are removal and placing—because the Mishnah is talking about his hand, not his body. Okay, now let’s see. Let’s go over the cases of the Mishnah for a moment. First of all, look at Rashi. Do you see Rashi, beginning with the words “and it is not similar to his hand”? He says: “And it is not similar to his hand”—this is the quoted part of Rabbi’s answer—“to his hand extended inward while his body is outside, that of the poor man, and the homeowner placed something into it, for in that case the Tanna of our Mishnah exempts him, even the poor man who brought it out.” What is he talking about? He’s talking about a case where the poor man is standing outside, stretches his hand inward into the house, and the homeowner puts—the homeowner places in the poor man’s hand, and the poor man takes it outside. All right? And the homeowner exempts—sorry, the Mishnah exempts—even the poor man. Why does it exempt the poor man?

[Speaker B] Because his body didn’t move.

[Speaker D] Because he didn’t do removal, basically.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What didn’t he do—removal or placing?

[Speaker G] Removal.

[Speaker B] Placing we don’t know.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Placing we don’t know, because it could be that afterward he put it down. And indeed Rashi says that he did put it down afterward; we’ll see that shortly. So here we’re talking about removal. After all, what happened there? The homeowner put it into the poor man’s hand, which was stretched into the house, right? So who removed it? The homeowner. But now the poor man takes the object that was in his hand, that was resting in his hand, and begins moving the hand outward toward himself, right? The beginning of that hand movement is ostensibly removal of the body. And if it says here that the poor man is exempt, it says here that the poor man is—

[Speaker B] exempt—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —then we see that removal of his body is not removal, right? So how can you tell me, Rabbi, that removal of his body is indeed removal? Rabbi says: no, there the Mishnah is talking about his hand, not removal of his body. That is the motivation that caused Rabbi to insert that note about his hand. Because Rabbi understood that what he says is ostensibly contradicted by the Mishnah. Therefore he says: don’t worry; in the Mishnah it’s talking about his hand. Regarding his hand, I too agree that removal of his hand is not removal. What I told you is that removal of his body is removal, not removal of his hand. In other words, Rabbi’s motivation for adding this note is because of the difficulty that could be raised against his statement from the Mishnah. That is what Rashi writes here. Rashi sensed this difficulty: why are you adding this “and it is not similar to his hand”? So Rashi says he adds it so that the Mishnah should not be difficult for him. Now if we look at the different laws in the Mishnah, you’ll see that one can try to infer this from all of them. Look, I divided it into four parts. In each part there are two laws. So let’s take the first one: “The poor man stretched his hand inward and placed into the hand of the homeowner.” What happens in that case? There is no removal—it is movement of the hand, right? And “he placed into the hand of the homeowner”—with that there is no problem, because that is classic placing. It isn’t that my hand stopped; rather, I placed it into the hand of the other. Liable. Why is the poor man liable?

[Speaker G] Because he transferred—or he transferred his basket into the house—or he took it. There is removal here.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Or we say—or we say—that removal of his hand is removal. But Rabbi told us that it is not. Only removal of his body and not removal of his hand, right? So either we make a forced interpretation that he also moved, and his body also effected the removal, or that he took it from somewhere else, the poor man, and transferred it to the homeowner, just as Rashi says about the placing, that he placed it somewhere else. So that could be—but that is how we have to explain it, right?

[Speaker D] But no, wait, question: but if there is transfer here in any case—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So what? Without removal and placing, transfer does not create liability.

[Speaker D] But transfer and placing I do have, just as we said that removal and transfer—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There is no removal. We said that Tosafot said removal is important only if it also includes transfer.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but that was regarding rabbinic prohibition. Torah liability exists only if there is also removal and also placing and also transfer. Tosafot only says that if you did removal alone, that’s like a partial measure—all those discussions we had about partial measures. Tosafot says even where removal alone is said to involve a rabbinic prohibition, that is only a removal that is followed by transfer. A plain removal within the same domain—you did nothing; that’s just ordinary moving around, Tosafot says.

[Speaker D] Can’t we also take that regarding placing? Transfer with placing, that’s—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Same thing: there would be a rabbinic prohibition. But we are talking here about Torah liability. It says that the poor man is liable. Why is the poor man liable? After all, he did not remove. So what are you telling me? This is removal of his hand—but it’s removal of his hand, not removal of his body. Removal of his body is removal, but removal of his hand, Rabbi says, is not removal.

[Speaker G] It’s not removal of his hand; it’s removal of the object. Otherwise this is someone putting something on my hand. It’s like the case of the question.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I didn’t understand.

[Speaker G] The poor man takes the object from the public domain, his basket, and transfers it to the homeowner.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Meaning, he takes it from somewhere else in the public domain, so there is removal here.

[Speaker G] But otherwise this is the case of the question—that it was already on him from before dark, or someone else put it on him—that’s a problem.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s his hand. That’s his hand, not his body. In the question it is his body; here it’s his hand. And regarding his hand, Rabbi says that this is not removal.

[Speaker B] You just have to fill in the gap here that he really lifted it from somewhere.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, right, there’s no choice. “Or if he took from within it and brought it out.” What does “he took from within it and brought it out” mean? The poor man inserts his hand, takes from the homeowner’s hand—so there was removal—and brought it out. What happens when he brought it out? Again, that is placing of his hand. Placing of his hand is not placing unless he put it somewhere else, right? So here too we have to explain that he apparently put it somewhere else, and that is indeed how Rashi explains it. And so on—go through the other sections of the Mishnah too. For each such case you have to discuss whether there was removal of his hand, placing of his hand, of the poor man, of the homeowner, all these calculations.

[Speaker G] Wait, but if he had it in his hand from before the Sabbath and he only transfers it, that’s not removal? What did I understand? If the basket was already in the poor man’s hand from before the Sabbath and he transfers it, that’s not removal?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Clearly not. It’s the hand; it’s the movement of the hand, not the body. The one who performed the lifting is the same person who placed it into the poor man’s hand before the Sabbath; he is the one who did the lifting. Just as Tosafot says regarding a child asleep and liquids from before the Sabbath. Rashi also explains there why it says from before the Sabbath, because if it had been on the Sabbath, then the one who loaded it would be considered the one from whom it was lifted, the one who did the lifting. What’s the difference between his hand and his body? So here Rashi says: his hand is not at rest, therefore when he takes it out he has not lifted anything from a place of rest, and carrying is not done without lifting up and setting down. So Rashi says the hand is not considered at rest, and therefore if you move the hand, that is not considered lifting up. It’s not like moving the body. The body is something at rest; the hand is not something at rest. And therefore when the hand begins to move, that is not a lifting up. When the body begins to move, that is a lifting up. And his body is at rest on the ground, and that constitutes lifting up. Then he brings the version “his hand is drawn after his body,” and he says we do not read that, because that is Talmudic wording. So in Rashi, this is how most of the medieval authorities and later authorities understand it: that Rashi holds that the distinction between his body and his hand is that his hand is not something considered at rest, because it is not resting on the ground. His body rests on the ground; that is considered a place, that is considered something stationary. And therefore lifting his hand is not considered a lifting up, because with the hand you did not take it from a stationary place; it was in the hand the whole time, there was no act of lifting up here. That is Rashi’s explanation. Tosafot…

[Speaker B] Wait, wait, I want to ask a question about that for a second. What’s the difference between… I want to try to understand the fine point of the explanation…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “His hand is drawn after his body” — you don’t need to get to that. It says the same thing, not that he rejects it, he says “drawn after.” It’s an unnecessary explanation; we already explained it. Why is his hand not at rest? Because it is drawn after his body. His hand rests on his body, his hand does not rest on the ground, his body rests on the ground. So Rashi says: why add these words? They just repeat the same thing again; it’s unnecessary.

[Speaker E] How do we know that? Maybe he thinks it has some different meaning? It’s just that you don’t need to add it — you only need one reason, and not the second.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, if there are two reasons, then why not add it? If there are two reasons, what do you mean?

[Speaker E] Maybe he doesn’t think that reason is significant, or—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Important, or really not.

[Speaker E] But he writes that it’s unnecessary,

[Speaker C] He writes that it’s unnecessary, not that it isn’t true.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He says: if this explanation is correct, then it isn’t unnecessary, because there are the practical implications Tosafot mentions. It isn’t true — it does have a practical implication, so clearly he means no, these are unnecessary words; we do not read them; it’s superfluous. It just repeats the same thing again. But Tosafot does include it. Tosafot says: what is the reason his hand is not at rest?

[Speaker E] So Tosafot explains that it’s supposedly the same meaning, and yet you still need it?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. It’s not the same meaning — not that it’s the same meaning; we’ll see in a moment. “It appears to the Ri in the other version, which reads: his hand is drawn after his body.” He does include those words. “It requires lifting up, but his body does not require lifting up.” And what does that mean? He says that in fact we do read this explanation, though he still hasn’t explained exactly what it means. “And according to the version that also reads ‘his hand is not at rest,’” meaning one who reads like Rashi, who does not include those words but only the words “his hand is not at rest,” the Ri explains that this is because it is drawn after his body. What does that mean? Basically, the hand is not at rest — the Ri says why? Because the hand is dragged after the body. Or in other words, even if you read like Rashi, the explanation is the second explanation, that his hand follows his body, okay? “And Rashi explained: his hand is not at rest on the ground — implying that even if he and his hand are in one domain and his fellow put something into his hand and he took it out, he is exempt; that is what Rashi implies. And this does not seem right,” says Tosafot, “for in every case where his fellow loaded him, whether onto his shoulder or into his hand, and he took it out, he is liable. And didn’t the Mishnah teach: ‘or if he took from it and carried it out, he is liable’? So clearly, the placing of an object in the homeowner’s hand, when he and his hand are in one domain, is considered a setting down, since the poor man is liable when he lifted it from the homeowner’s hand. And once it is considered a setting down, then when he lifts his body together with what is in his hand, he is lifting it from a place where it was set down.” Tosafot says: I disagree with Rashi. In my view, the difference between hand and body is not an essential difference, that the hand is not considered stationary and the body is. The difference exists only in a case where the hand is in a different domain from the body; only there do we say this rule. If the hand is in the same domain as the body, then hand and body are the same thing, there is no difference. And here he disagrees with Rashi on this point, because Rashi says there is a difference even in such a case.

[Speaker E] Tosafot says — well then, that’s why these are different explanations, which is what I said…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait a second, Nechama, let me finish for a moment. When the Ri says there is a difference between his hand and his body, the Ri is speaking only about a case where his hand is in a different domain from his body. There there is a difference. Why? Because his hand is drawn after his body; the hand is considered to be in the place where his body is. And so there is really a dispute between Rashi and the Ri about what happens when his hand is in the same domain as his body. In that case, is lifting his hand considered lifting up, or is it not considered lifting up? According to Rashi, no; according to the Ri, yes. According to the Ri, his hand is different from his body only when his hand stands in a separate domain from his body. If it is in the same domain as his body, then his hand and body are the same thing. And the Ri brings proof for his position. Why? What is his proof? He says: when the poor man takes from the homeowner’s hand and carries it outside, then the poor man is liable, right? Why is the poor man liable? Because his taking it from the homeowner’s hand is considered lifting up. We said that is a full-fledged lifting up, right? There is no problem with that, because the poor man lifts the item from somewhere else. Tosafot says yes, but when it was in the homeowner’s hand, before the poor man lifted it from there — when it was resting in the homeowner’s hand — was that considered at rest? If it is not considered at rest, then the poor man’s lifting the object from the homeowner’s hand should not count as lifting up, because when the object is not at rest, if I remove it from there that is not called lifting up. Lifting up is only from a place where the object is considered at rest. So if the Mishnah says that when the poor man puts in his hand and lifts it from the homeowner’s hand this is considered lifting up, then that means that when it was resting in the homeowner’s hand it was considered a setting down. Because then it follows that the hand is considered as though it were resting on the ground, right? So how can Rashi say that the hand is not considered at rest? That is Tosafot’s argument. Rashi will say, in my opinion there is no choice except to say that if the body moves, then the hand — if—

[Speaker G] If the body does not move together with the hand, then it is considered stationary, and the hand is stationary too.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Meaning, basically, that when I take the hand and bring it toward me and it stops here, that is the setting down of his body, that is the setting down of his hand according to Rashi even though his hand and body are in the same place, yes? But that does not mean that when an object is in someone’s hand it is not considered at rest. It is considered at rest. It is just not considered that I set it down if I did that, but the object is considered to be resting somewhere; so whether on the ground or not, I don’t care, but at the moment it is considered that the object is at rest. When I lift the object from there, it is considered that I lifted it from some place — so I lifted it from the homeowner’s body, not from the homeowner’s hand. What difference does it make? Bottom line, I lifted it. But when I stop the hand, that according to Rashi is not considered a setting down, even if the hand is in the location of the body, because in the end I did not set it down in a place. This is a distinction that is not simple; it still needs explanation, what exactly the difference is. Tosafot is apparently right in the straightforward sense, but according to Rashi there is no choice but to make this distinction, and this distinction actually appears in Nachmanides. Nachmanides basically says this distinction explicitly. Fine, I’m not going to read the Nachmanides now because it’s late, but I’ll just make one comment here. Tosafot’s proof is based on the view that the question we had about lifting up was also said about setting down, right? Because if the question was only about lifting up and not about setting down, then what is the problem? Rashi would answer us much more simply. Rashi would say that the object resting in the homeowner’s hand is considered at rest — why? Because with respect to setting down, both setting down by his body and setting down by his hand count as setting down. The whole question was only regarding lifting up, so what are you proving to me from settings down to liftings up? Clearly Tosafot is following his own approach. Tosafot, after all, disagrees with Rabbi Shimshon of Shantz, right? Tosafot says that the same question that exists about lifting up also exists about setting down. So if we see that setting down in his hand is a valid setting down, then clearly setting down by his body is also a valid setting down.

[Speaker C] No,

[Speaker F] In setting down and lifting up—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s the same thing; according to Tosafot there’s no difference. Just note that according to Rabbi Shimshon of Shantz, Tosafot’s proof collapses, because according to Rabbi Shimshon of Shantz one can prove that setting down in his hand is a valid setting down, but I was asking about lifting his hand, and lifting his hand is not lifting up. And if so, notice that we have come out with a practical legal difference between Rabbi Shimshon of Shantz and Tosafot. I said that the difference between them was only in how they understand the Talmud’s question; in the conclusion there is no difference between them, right? Now you see that there is a difference between them even in the conclusion. And therefore it is important to clarify the initial assumption very, very well. What is the difference? According to Rabbi Shimshon of Shantz, setting down in his hand is a valid setting down. The whole question was about lifting up, and with lifting up what I say is that lifting his body is considered lifting up, while lifting his hand is not considered lifting up — but setting down in his hand will be a valid setting down, because in settings down I am not concerned; with setting down, what you did not actively do does not matter at all, the main thing is the lifting up, right? That is how we explained it according to Rabbi Shimshon of Shantz. According to Tosafot, it comes out otherwise. As the practical law now, I’m saying this is a practical difference: according to Tosafot it comes out that setting down in his hand… excuse me, no — setting down in his hand is not a valid setting down. Because there is no difference between lifting his hand and setting down in his hand. If his hand is not like his body and that does not count as lifting up, then his hand is not like his body with respect to setting down either, and setting down in his hand will also not be a valid setting down. According to Rabbi Shimshon of Shantz, setting down in his hand is a valid setting down. And I go back to what Rabbi Shimshon of Shantz said, that he reads the Mishnah in its plain sense, and the plain sense of the Mishnah comes out according to his view. That is exactly what we see here, because when you read the Mishnah straightforwardly, then Tosafot makes a correct point. What does he note? That from the plain sense of the Mishnah we see that setting down in his hand does count as setting down, right? Because the poor man who takes from the homeowner’s hand — that is considered lifting up. Meaning that when the object was resting in the homeowner’s hand, it was considered an object at rest.

[Speaker F] That

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] means that setting down in his hand is a valid setting down. That is the plain meaning of the Mishnah. And that is another proof from the Mishnah for Rabbi Shimshon of Shantz. Rabbi Shimshon of Shantz reads the Mishnah straightforwardly, without forced reinterpretations, without distinctions, and then there really does emerge a practical difference in law: that setting down in his hand is a valid setting down even in the final conclusion, even after the Ri distinguished between his hand and his body. This whole distinction applies only to liftings up. With settings down there is no distinction. Rashi in the straightforward sense — and one need not say like Tosafot that this is only in different domains and not in the same domain — Rabbi Shimshon of Shantz will learn like Rashi even in the same domain; only with respect to setting down, don’t bring me proofs from the Mishnah, because setting down in his hand is a valid setting down, that is obvious. My question is only regarding lifting up. Okay? Now, I’m going to skip the Rashba and Nachmanides here; they all basically discuss the dispute between Rashi and Tosafot. In the passage on the Mishnah, we saw there in lesson three, we saw Rashi. Rashi says: “or if he took from it and carried out an object and set it down in the public domain.” Right? Rashi adds that after the poor man carries the object out, he also sets it down. Meaning, he is not satisfied with the poor man merely stopping his hand. Why? Because according to his own approach he thinks setting down in his hand is not a valid setting down, right? You have to put it down to the side. According to Tosafot, what would the law be? Since when the hand and body are in the same domain, there is no problem — his hand is like his body, right? And if setting down of his body is a valid setting down, then setting down of his hand will also be a valid setting down. The only case where setting down in his hand is not a valid setting down is when I set it down with the hand in a different domain from where the body is, but here the poor man brought the hand to himself. In the end, when the hand stopped, it stopped in the same domain where the body is. So according to Tosafot this is not called setting down in his hand; it is called setting down by his body. And therefore there is no problem at all; there is no need to explain that he set it down somewhere else. Right? What would it be according to Rabbi Shimshon of Shantz? He also would not need to set it down in the public—

[Speaker C] domain,

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] but not because of Tosafot’s reasoning. That is a third view. I want to show you that there are three views here. Notice: according to Tosafot, in this case of the poor man taking from the homeowner and carrying it outside, there is no need to explain that he set it down somewhere else, right? It is enough that he stopped the hand; the poor man is liable even without that. Why? Because when the hand is in the same domain as the body, then setting down in his hand is like setting down by his body; it is a full-fledged setting down. That is Tosafot’s view. According to Rashi, you have to explain that he set it down somewhere else. Why? Because setting down in his hand is not like setting down by his body; setting down in his hand does not help. Therefore it has to be set down somewhere else so that it will count as a setting down, right? According to Rabbi Shimshon of Shantz, Rabbi Shimshon of Shantz learned like Rashi that his hand and body in the same place is called setting down in his hand, not setting down by his body. Rather, Rabbi Shimshon of Shantz claims that with setting down there is no problem of setting down in his hand. Therefore Rabbi Shimshon of Shantz, although he learned like Rashi, will explain the Mishnah like Tosafot. He learned like Rashi, not—

[Speaker B] I didn’t understand Rabbi Shimshon of Shantz for a second.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Again: Rabbi Shimshon of Shantz learned like Rashi that setting down in his hand and lifting in his hand applies even when the hand is in the same domain as the body. There is no difference.

[Speaker B] Again, I didn’t understand. His hand and body in the same place — what is that considered?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It is considered his hand, not his body, and therefore it does not help. As Rashi learned, not like Tosafot. Tosafot said that if they are in the same place, then his hand and body are the same thing. The only case where his hand is inferior to his body is when his hand is in a different place from his body. But according to Rashi, no — a hand is always inferior to a body, even if it is in the same place. So how does he reach the conclusion? One second. In that sense Rabbi Shimshon of Shantz learned like Rashi, but Rabbi Shimshon of Shantz differs from Rashi in another sense, because Rabbi Shimshon of Shantz learned that the question in the Talmud concerns only liftings up, not settings down. In that sense Rashi is like Tosafot. Rashi and Tosafot both learned that the question concerns both lifting up and setting down. Rabbi Shimshon of Shantz learned that the question concerns only lifting up. As for setting down, there is no problem at all — do whatever you want. And then what? When the poor man carries the object out and stops his hand by himself, okay? So the hand stopped here; that is called setting down in his hand. In principle, setting down in his hand is problematic, but according to Rabbi Shimshon of Shantz, no. According to Rabbi Shimshon of Shantz, the question was never about setting down; for setting down, whether in his hand or in his body, everything is fine. The whole problem is only with lifting up. Therefore, although he learns like Rashi on the question of what is called setting down in his hand, he explains the Mishnah like Tosafot, that there is no need to explain that he set it down somewhere else, because he claims that the Talmud’s question concerns only lifting up and not setting down. This sharpens the fact that we are dealing here with three different views. Notice, there are really two questions here; I’ll summarize it better because it’s a little complicated. There are two questions here. One question is whether the Talmud’s question was said only about lifting up or also about setting down, right? That is one question. And on that question, Rabbi Shimshon of Shantz disagrees with Rashi and Tosafot. Rabbi Shimshon of Shantz says the question concerns only liftings up; Rashi and Tosafot say the question concerns both liftings up and settings down. A second question: what counts as setting down in his hand? Only when the hand is in a different domain — separate from the body — as Tosafot learned, or also when the hand is in the same domain as the body, as Rashi and Rabbi Shimshon of Shantz learned? Okay? So notice that there are really three different views here. Rashi, on the first question, learns like Tosafot, that the question concerns setting down as well. On the second question he follows his own view, that it applies even when the hand is in the same domain as the body. Tosafot learns that the question concerns both lifting up and setting down. In that sense he is like Rashi, and unlike Rabbi Shimshon of Shantz — sorry, yes, he is like Rashi and against Rabbi Shimshon of Shantz. But he is not like Rashi on the question of whether, when the hand is in the same place as the body, that is called setting down in his hand. He says no — that is called setting down by his body. Rabbi Shimshon of Shantz learns like Rashi on the question whether hand together with body is like setting down in his hand or like setting down by his body. He says it is like setting down in his hand, and in that he is like Rashi. But he is against Rashi and Tosafot on the question whether the Talmud’s question applies only to lifting up or also to setting down. He argues that it applies only to lifting up and not to setting down. And now you see that each of these views has a different implication in the scenario Rashi writes here. What happens when the poor man takes the object from the homeowner and brings it to himself? It says the poor man is liable. Do we have to assume that the poor man also set it down on the table beside him, or is it enough that he stopped his hand by himself? Let’s work it out. According to Rashi, we have to say — Rashi says it explicitly — that we are talking about a case where he also set it down somewhere else, right? Why?

[Speaker C] Because according to Rashi, setting down in his hand is not a valid—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] setting down, and he would not be liable. Right, because it is setting down in his hand. And the Talmud was talking both about setting down and about lifting up. So if lifting his hand is not lifting up, then setting down in his hand is also not a valid setting down. There is no choice: you have to say that he set it down somewhere else. That is indeed what Rashi writes: “and set it down in the public domain.” Rashi says it has to be set down somewhere else. Tosafot does not learn like Rashi. Tosafot says that setting down in his hand, when the hand is in the same place as the body, is like setting down by his body; it counts as a valid setting down. Therefore what would Tosafot say here? That there is no need to set it down somewhere else, right? He would disagree with Rashi. What comes out according to Rabbi Shimshon of Shantz? Rabbi Shimshon of Shantz argues like Rashi that when his hand is like his body, this is not called a valid setting down. Seemingly I would expect him to require an actual setting down in the public domain, right? But no. Why not? Because he is not like Rashi in that respect, since in his opinion, with setting down, even if it is setting down in his hand, that is perfectly fine. Setting down can take any form. Therefore, even though the setting down here is a problematic kind of setting down, with settings down it does not bother me that the setting down is problematic; only with liftings up was there a question. Therefore he will rule like Tosafot in practice, that there is no need for him to set it down in the public domain. Are you with me? Yes. I’ll stop here. Review this section. At the beginning of the next lesson I’ll still continue with the additional part that you probably also didn’t get to on the page, but now I’ve given you the tools to understand better the difference between the various views, and then you’ll understand Rabbi Akiva Eiger and the Sefat Emet and the Pnei Yehoshua, all the comments on Rashi — it will already be simple. If you understand the summary I just gave of these three views, you’ll see where the problems are there and who is right and what is going on there. So we’ll do that part in the next lesson. I hope it won’t take us more than half the next lesson, and then we’ll also be able to start the next passage. But first you should continue with this page, and I’ll add a bit more for you toward next time. Okay? Yes, okay, thank you.

[Speaker D] Thank you very much. Thank you very much. Okay, goodbye.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Thank you.