Tractate Shabbat, Chapter 1 – Lesson 27
This transcript was produced automatically using artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.
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Table of Contents
- The conclusion of the passage about a place of four by four and the hand as a significant place
- If he stood in place and received it, he is liable; if he moved from his place and received it, he is exempt
- Rabbi Yohanan’s question: if someone threw an object, then moved from his place and came back and caught it
- An explanation of “two forces” and the uniqueness of throwing as opposed to ordinary passing
- Maimonides’ ruling and the Maggid Mishneh’s explanation of an unresolved question
- The explanatory dispute between Rashi and Maimonides and its practical difference in the Meiri
- The Sefat Emet: does one need actual removal, or is extending the hand enough?
- Tosafot and Rabbeinu Hananel: two versions of the doubt and the move of “his intention was carried out”
Summary
General overview
The passage concludes that a place of four by four is needed both for removal and for placement, and the hand is considered a significant place, so it can serve as a legitimate place both for removal and for placement. It then discusses the law of someone throwing an object and another person receiving it in his hand: if the receiver stands in place, the thrower is liable, and if the receiver moves from his place, the thrower is exempt. The basis of that distinction is examined through Rashi’s interpretation and the idea of “two people who performed it” in a kind of longitudinal sense. Then Rabbi Yohanan raises a doubt about a case where the thrower himself runs and catches the object, and the doubt is defined as “two forces in one person”: do we treat him as one person and make him liable, or like two people and exempt him? The Talmud leaves the matter unresolved. Maimonides rules exempt, and explains that there is no “complete placement” unless the object comes to rest in the place where it was supposed to come to rest at the time of the original removal. The Meiri presents different interpretations and a practical difference depending on whether he intended this from the outset. Finally, the Maggid Mishneh discusses Maimonides’ ruling in an unresolved case, the Sefat Emet asks whether actual removal is necessary or whether merely extending one’s hand is enough to count as “he moved,” and Tosafot bring one text while Rabbeinu Hananel has another version that reverses the two sides of the doubt.
The conclusion of the passage about a place of four by four and the hand as a significant place
Up to this point, the discussion looked for a source for waiving the requirement of a place of four by four for removal and placement, and concluded that there is no such source and no need for one. Maimonides rules that a place of four by four is required both for removal and for placement, and the hand serves as a legitimate place for removal and placement because a person’s hand is considered a significant place. The conclusion is that a place of four by four is required—and we have one, because the hand counts as a place of four by four by virtue of its significance. That conclusion continues to guide the later discussion as well, dealing with removal and placement from and into a person’s hand.
If he stood in place and received it, he is liable; if he moved from his place and received it, he is exempt
Rabbi Avin said in the name of Rabbi Ila’a in the name of Rabbi Yohanan that if another person stands in place and receives the object into his hand, the thrower is liable; and if the receiver moved from his place and received it, the thrower is exempt. A parallel teaching is also brought in the name of “Others.” The distinction does not depend on waiving the requirement of a place of four by four, nor on the basic significance of the hand itself, but on whether the receiver stood still or moved. Rashi explains that the thrower is exempt because he did not perform the placement. The meaning is that the placement is attributed to the receiver, not to the thrower, so this resembles “two people who performed it,” in the sense that one did the removal and the other did the placement. When the receiver remains standing, both the removal and the placement are attributed to the thrower’s force, and the receiver contributes nothing to the act of placement, so the thrower is liable.
Rabbi Yohanan’s question: if someone threw an object, then moved from his place and came back and caught it
Rabbi Yohanan is uncertain about a case where a person throws an object, leaves his place, runs, and catches the object in his own hands. In other words, the same person is playing both the role of the thrower and the role of the receiver. The Talmud asks, “What exactly is his question?” and Rashi explains that the difficulty is: what room is there for doubt, since he performed both the removal and the placement? Rav Adda bar Ahava defines the basis of the doubt: “two forces in one person”—do we say he is like one person and therefore liable, or like two people and therefore exempt? Rashi explains that the side that sees him as like two people is connected to the fact that “he did not let the object continue to the place of its motion and come to rest; rather, he ran after it and intercepted it.” So the initial removal is without a placement attributable to the force of the throw, and this is understood as a second force being applied, which breaks the attribution of the placement to the first force.
An explanation of “two forces” and the uniqueness of throwing as opposed to ordinary passing
The explanation makes the law depend on the uniqueness of throwing, where the placement is done “by his force” when the object reaches the natural destination of its trajectory. That is why the placement can be attributed to the thrower even though it was not done by his hand directly. But when the receiver moves toward the object and catches it before it reaches its intended destination, an additional “force” enters the picture and prevents the object from reaching the place of its motion. In that case the placement is no longer attributed to the force of the throw, but to the force of the receiver. In the case of one person who runs and catches his own object, the doubt is whether we follow the one operating the forces, who is one person, or the number of forces involved, which are two. In that kind of case, perhaps it is judged like “two people who performed it” in a longitudinal sense, where removal and placement are split between two agents even though they are both within one person.
Maimonides’ ruling and the Maggid Mishneh’s explanation of an unresolved question
Maimonides rules: “If one throws and it comes to rest in the hand of another, if the other stood in his place and received it, the thrower is liable, since he removed and placed; but if the other moved from his place and received it, he is exempt.” Maimonides adds regarding the case where the thrower himself runs and receives it: “He is exempt, as though another had moved and received it, for there is no complete placement until the object comes to rest in the place where it was supposed to come to rest at the time of removal.” The Maggid Mishneh explains that our teacher writes “exempt” in place of an unresolved Talmudic question, because that is his general method in such doubtful cases, and it is necessary, since a definite punishment cannot be imposed in a case of doubt. And according to Maimonides, the obligation to be stringent in a Torah-level doubt is rabbinic. In the lecture it is argued that the doubt here is not between permitted and forbidden, but between a rabbinic prohibition and a Torah prohibition, so the unresolved result is translated into exemption from a sin-offering and stoning, while the act remains practically forbidden.
The explanatory dispute between Rashi and Maimonides and its practical difference in the Meiri
It was explained that according to Rashi, the exemption comes from the rule of “two people who performed it,” because the thrower did not perform the placement and the placement is attributed to the receiver. But according to Maimonides, it sounds as though the problem is that there is no placement here at all, because “there is no complete placement” except in the place where the object was supposed to come to rest at the time of removal. It was suggested that according to Maimonides, the receiver may not be considered someone who performs a “placement” at all, but rather someone who prevents the placement, and therefore the wording “he is exempt” refers only to the thrower, while the receiver is not really the focus of liability. The Meiri states that the hand is an important place of four handbreadths, “whether his own hand or another person’s hand,” and rules that if the other person moved and received it, even the thrower is exempt. He then presents two methods: one explanation sees “two forces in one person as like two people,” and therefore even if he intended it that way from the outset he is exempt; the other explanation makes the exemption depend on the fact that “it did not come to rest in the place he had in mind from the outset,” and therefore “if he intended this from the outset, he is liable.” The Meiri adds, “and so it seems proper to decide, since the Talmud left it in doubt,” and it was explained that this could be understood either as a practical ruling because of the doubt or as a ruling between the approaches of Rashi and Maimonides by way of the ordinary rules governing doubts.
The Sefat Emet: does one need actual removal, or is extending the hand enough?
The Sefat Emet is uncertain whether “we require actual movement” or whether “even extending the hand counts as movement.” He infers from Maimonides that “even moving the hand in order to receive exempts the first one,” because the main reason is that he received it in a place where it was not going to fall on its own. He notes the Meiri, who distinguishes that if “from the outset he intended to receive it immediately in the second hand,” he is liable. From this it emerges that there is a discussion whether the distinction depends on prior planning or on the structure of the act and the trajectory itself.
Tosafot and Rabbeinu Hananel: two versions of the doubt and the move of “his intention was carried out”
Tosafot present the doubt with one side saying he is exempt “because he is like two people,” since the first one “did not perform any placement at all” when “it was snatched from its course,” and “it did not come to rest by the force of the thrower”; opposite that is the side to make him liable, “because he is like one person,” since “he performed both removal and placement.” Rabbeinu Hananel has the opposite reading: “he is like two people and liable,” by virtue of “his intention was carried out,” and opposite that, “he is like one person and exempt,” by comparison to “someone who transfers an object from his right hand to his left hand,” who is exempt even though he moved it four cubits. It was suggested that Rabbeinu Hananel’s text fits an approach in which liability depends on the realization of the thought and intended destination, as opposed to the framing that grounds the exemption solely in “two people who performed it.”
Full Transcript
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, so in the passage up to now we were basically looking for a source for this rule that waives the requirement of a place of four by four for removal and placement, and in the end the conclusion was that there is no such source, and none is needed. As a matter of Jewish law, as we saw, Maimonides rules that you need a place of four by four both for removal and for placement, and in the Mishnah the reason the hand serves as a legitimate place for removal and placement is that a hand is a significant place. In other words, a person’s hand is a significant place, and that is basically the conclusion of the passage. Meaning, you need a place of four by four, and you have one—the hand is considered like a place of four by four; it is a significant place. That’s the conclusion. So we’ve basically finished the whole line of discussion we were dealing with in the last few lectures, and now we move on, and what comes next also uses that same conclusion we talked about, that a person’s hand is considered a significant place. In other words, that conclusion from the whole discussion up to now stays with us in this part of the passage too. And we’re still talking about removal and placement done from and into a person’s hand. So let’s start with the Talmudic text; I’m sharing the file. Rabbi Avin said that Rabbi Ila’a said that Rabbi Yohanan said: If he stood in his place and received it, he is liable; if he moved from his place and received it, he is exempt. This is talking about someone who throws an object from a private domain to a public domain, or within the public domain—four cubits in the public domain is also a Torah-level liability. Someone throws this object and another person receives it. So if the other person is standing still and the object comes to his hand and he catches it, then the thrower is liable. If the person receiving it moves toward the object, meaning he goes toward the object in order to catch it, then the thrower is exempt. Of course the receiver is exempt too, but the thrower, who is the focus of the discussion, is exempt. A parallel teaching was also taught: Others say, if he stood in his place and received it, he is liable; if he moved from his place and received it, he is exempt. Actually, we already saw this in the previous section when we dealt with the opinion of Others. It really starts from here. From here the Talmud wanted to infer that Others is the Tanna who does not require a place of four by four, because apparently one can remove from and place into a hand. Okay, but now we’re past that. We already know that in fact Others also does not waive the requirement of a place of four by four, but rather holds—and not just according to him, but as a matter of Jewish law—that a hand is a significant place. So what then is the novelty in Others? You could say that the novelty is the very fact that a hand is a significant place, but that does not seem to be the case, because the Talmud discusses it there—the novelty here is not dealing with the question of what happens when one receives into a hand. That seems like a first assumption, right? It’s obvious that receiving into a hand is a Torah prohibition. The whole question is what happens if he moved or did not move—that’s the point this statement is dealing with. In other words, the novelty does not concern the question of a place of four by four, or the hand being considered a significant place, but rather the difference between someone who stood still and someone who moved. That is really the novelty of the passage. So what is the basis for this difference? Why, if he stood still, is the thrower liable, but if not, he is exempt? So Rashi says: the thrower is exempt, because he did not perform a placement. Since there was no placement, therefore the thrower is exempt. We are talking here about a case where the receiver moved. Okay, when the receiver stands still, then the thrower is liable, and then there was both a removal and a placement, otherwise he would not be liable. But if the receiver moved from his place or went toward the object in order to catch it in his hand, then the thrower is exempt because he did not perform a placement. Now on the face of it, it sounds as though what Rashi means is that there was no placement here, but we can see both from what follows and from the context that that is clearly not what Rashi means. “He did not perform a placement” means the thrower was not the one who performed the placement. Not that there was no placement; there was a placement, only it was done by the receiver and not by the thrower. And so there is here a kind of “two people who performed it,” even though in the discussion of “two people who performed it” we already talked about the fact that this is not the standard case. The standard case is two people who, say, take an object from a private domain and transfer it to a public domain—they remove it together and place it together. Together. Here we are talking about a case where each one did a different half of the labor, not a quantitative half but a qualitative half: one did the removal and the other did the placement. Okay? So this is a different kind of “two people who performed it,” but we saw that this is also what appears in the Mishnah, when the homeowner removes and the poor person places, and when the poor person removes and the homeowner places. There too we saw that this is basically some type of “two people who performed it,” and there too they are exempt. Okay? So Rashi is basically telling us here—if I now translate what he is saying—Rashi is really saying not that there was no placement, but that there was a placement, only it was done by the receiver, and therefore there is here “two people who performed it,” and therefore the thrower is exempt, and of course the receiver is exempt too. Which means that, basically, what happens when the receiver did not move from his place, but the object came directly to his hand? There the thrower is liable. Why? Because there both the removal and the placement were done by his force. The receiver made no contribution to the act of placement. The act of placement is done by the force of the thrower, the one who removed it. Okay? And therefore the placement is credited to him as well: he did both the removal and the placement. Now the Talmud asks—and this is the second half of the passage. This is the first half. I’ll keep referring to it as the first law and the second law. In Maimonides too this is the first law and the second law in the halakhah, and in the passage as well it’s the first part and the second part. So the first part is what happens when this is done by two different people. One case: the second person stands in place, so the first is liable. If the second moves in order to receive the object, they are both exempt. Now Rabbi Yohanan raises the question—that’s the second half. If he threw an object, and then he himself moved from his place and came back and received it, what is the law? In other words, if a person throws an object and he himself leaves the place, runs, say, five cubits forward, and receives the object in his hands, catches it in his hands—what is the law in that case? Meaning this is the same case as in the first law, only that the one playing both roles is the same actor—a one-man show. Basically one actor is playing all the roles here, both the thrower and the receiver. Except that here, of course, only the second case of the first part exists, because the first case of the first part is where both of them are standing still: the thrower stands in one place and the receiver, they’re tossing back and forth, and the receiver stands in the other place. The second case of the first part is where the receiver moves in order to catch the object. In the second law there is only that second version, because you obviously cannot stand still and receive the object when it is four cubits away—you have to move. So the whole question in the second case is really only that second law.
[Speaker B] Or he’s riding on a train.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? I can’t hear.
[Speaker B] Or he’s riding on a train. If he’s on a train, he can stand still and receive it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That raises the question whether that counts as having moved or not—whether it’s measured relative to the train or relative to the planet Earth. Okay, but that’s true. Fine.
[Speaker C] But if he’s moving at the same speed, he can really receive the object where he was, as if he were standing still. I mean, if the person who threw moved and receives the object where the object was going to land anyway, doesn’t that count as the first case?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, what are you talking about? It’s always like that. The object always gets to the place it’s meant to go. The whole question is who got to that place in order to receive the object.
[Speaker C] Why? But if I catch it before it lands at all?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, but I mean, he leaves and catches it from above. But that’s in the same—do you mean it’s not the same place because it’s not on the ground? Well, in any case it’s not on the ground.
[Speaker D] It sounded like there might be a distinction there, like she’s saying—a distinction between whether it landed in the place he already planned for it to land, or whether he caught it before the place where—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You’re already bringing in things from the medieval authorities (Rishonim). At this point nothing like that is written here. What’s written here is just the question whether the person moved or didn’t move. When we’re talking about a person who himself plays both roles, then by definition he always moves. He can’t, without moving, get there and be the one who receives the object, the one who performs the placement. Okay? As for the reasoning, in a minute we’ll see Maimonides and everything I referred you to—we’ll talk about all that later. So now the Talmud says—
[Speaker E] If he stands still and throws upward? I didn’t understand. If he stands still and throws upward—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Suppose so.
[Speaker E] Within the public domain?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? I understand. The object didn’t travel four cubits in the public domain. Not relevant. The labor is defined as moving the object four cubits in that domain.
[Speaker E] What if he’s standing under a balcony which is a private domain and throws up to it and it comes back down to him?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So what? What did it pass through?
[Speaker E] So he’s transferring it, right. Okay, it didn’t pass.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He didn’t move it four cubits in the public domain and he didn’t place it in the private domain, so there’s no—he didn’t do anything. There’s no taking out, no bringing in, no carrying, nothing at all. The Talmud asks: what exactly is his question? Meaning, what is the basis of Rabbi Yohanan’s problem? So I asked you what is bothering the Talmud—why is the Talmud bothered here and asking what the root of the problem is. Was it so simple? So Rashi says: what exactly is his question—what doubt is there? For what reason would he be exempt? He performed both a removal and a placement. What kind of question is this of Rabbi Yohanan’s? That’s really what the Talmud is asking, and that’s how Rashi explains it. What kind of question is it when a person threw something and then ran and caught the object? If so, the whole exemption above was because one person performed the removal and another performed the placement. But here the same person performs both the removal and the placement. So what room is there for doubt? Why should Rabbi Yohanan even have a side to exempt him? Because a doubt means Rabbi Yohanan doesn’t know whether he is liable or exempt. The Talmud says: what side is there to exempt? Here we are dealing with one and the same person who did both the removal and the placement. The whole exemption above was because one did the removal and the other did the placement. But here, if it’s the same person, then what difference does it make whether he moved from his place or not? When he himself is playing both roles, there seems to be no reason at all to exempt him. Okay? So the Talmud answers: Rav Adda bar Ahava said, the question is about two forces within one person. Two forces in one person: is he like one person and liable, or perhaps like two people and exempt? Now on the face of it, before I go into the explanations, this is very puzzling. Because as Rashi explained correctly, when the Talmud asked “what exactly is his question,” the Talmud was trying to understand what basis there is here for exemption. After all, this same person does both the removal and the placement, right? Now Rav Adda bar Ahava comes and, seemingly, doesn’t answer at all. What does he say? What does “two forces in one person” mean—whether he’s like one person or like two people? Why should he be like two people? This is the same person who removed and placed. Why is a person who removes in one place, goes to another place, and places there not also called “two forces in one person”? Do you understand what I’m saying? After all, in the end, if a person, let’s say, takes an object from a private domain, removes it, crosses into the public domain, and places it there—you could ask exactly the same question there too. If two people had done it, he would be exempt, right? That’s “two people who performed it”—one removed and one placed. Now I say: the same person performs both roles. Why over there is there no doubt that maybe he should be exempt? There it’s obvious he’s not exempt. If he were exempt, then when would anyone ever be liable? How can a person be liable when he transfers from a private domain to a public domain, or the reverse? It’s always two forces in one person. So what is there here that isn’t there? It’s puzzling. So Rashi says: if he is like two people, then he is exempt, because it would be like “two people who performed it.” I’m reading here. It would be like two people—“two people who performed it.” Meaning, if these are two forces considered like two people, then we are back to the first situation; basically this is “two people who performed it,” and he is exempt. Because since he did not let the object continue to the place of its motion and come to rest there, but instead ran after it and intercepted it, the first removal exists without a placement. Now here Rashi introduces something a little different from before, because as I said, he senses the difficulty here. There’s a real difficulty here; the Talmud here is far from clear. What does “two forces in one person” mean? This is the same person who removed and placed. That’s what always happens—whenever a person removes in a private domain and places in a public domain or vice versa, or in the public domain when he removes and carries four cubits—always one person performs the removal and that same person performs the placement. Why in all those cases don’t I wonder whether maybe he should be exempt because it’s two forces in one person? So Rashi says: because he did not let the object continue to the place of its motion and come to rest there, but rather ran after it and intercepted it. Meaning Rashi is really saying that this whole discussion in the Talmud is only in a case of throwing. But in a case where I place—okay? In a case where I place, this question does not arise. I’ll say more than that. Let’s go back to the first diagram. In the first diagram, a person takes an object from a private domain, removes it, and places it into the hand of a person in the public domain. Fine? Not throwing. I take the object and place it, like the homeowner and the poor person. Is there a difference—suppose I’m the homeowner, I take the object, remove it from the private domain, transfer it to the public domain, and place it in the poor man’s hand. Is there a difference between a case where the poor man moves toward me in order to receive the object, and a case where the poor man stands still the whole time and I place it in his hand? Is there a difference there?
[Speaker E] No, because there’s no throwing here; it’s a direct hand-to-hand transfer.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It seems that there there would be no difference. The whole discussion in the Talmud—even in the first part, we now suddenly realize—is also only about throwing, not just the second part. If we’re talking about an ordinary transfer, meaning a normal removal and placement, I don’t care whether the receiver moved from his place or didn’t move from his place. And why? Because in the end I did the removal and I did the placement. The whole discussion begins only because in throwing—whether within the public domain or from a private domain to a public domain—a throw has some destination. And the destination is basically some place the object is supposed to reach. If it had reached that place, that target, then of course I would be liable. Suppose it wasn’t a person at all—suppose it reached the ground or some static place of some sort, okay? Then I would be liable. Why? Because that is considered that I removed it and placed it. Now someone comes toward me and catches the object before it gets to the target place. Okay? In that situation, that other person has performed the placement. But only because we are talking about throwing. Because if it were ordinary removal and placement, I wouldn’t care whether the receiver moved or didn’t move. And that is what Rashi is explaining here: he did not let the object go to the place of its motion and come to rest, but instead ran after it and intercepted it. In that situation the question arises—I’m speaking now about the first part. Rashi explains it regarding the second part, but I’ve now gone back to the first part because the second part sheds a different light on the first. In the first part we suddenly realize that once the receiver moves toward the object and interrupts it and does not let it reach its original target place, a question of two forces really arises. In that case they are two different people, not just two forces. And then I am exempt. And now the Talmud says: if that is so, then perhaps even in one person he would be exempt.
[Speaker F] I want to understand what the two forces are here. I didn’t understand what two forces there are here.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So that’s exactly it. That’s why I’m saying: you have to start the discussion from the first part of the passage. Rashi here explains the question in the second part, but it really gives us a new understanding of the first part of the passage. Why? Because now—
[Speaker F] That’s what I want to understand in the first part.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay. I’m saying: in the first part, really, I could have asked myself, apparently, the same question not about throwing, but about someone who removes from a private domain and places in a public domain. An ordinary act of taking out, or an ordinary act of bringing in, or an ordinary carrying of four cubits in the public domain, right? You could have asked the same question there. If the poor man moves toward me and I place it in his hand, but his hand came toward me and caught the object, you could have asked the same question there too. But it’s quite clear that there they don’t ask this question. Only about throwing. And why? Because what happens when I remove and then place is that I place it in the very place where I intend to place it. In throwing there is something unique. Because in throwing the placement is actually done without me. Right? In throwing, I threw it and the object landed on the ground there in the public domain. In what sense am I considered the one who placed it? Because what I intended is what happened. The object got there, was placed there, and therefore it is considered my placement. That’s what—one second, and that’s not—
[Speaker B] Isn’t this “caught as though it were placed”?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, I’m talking about the object landing on the floor. I threw the object, and the object landed on the floor.
[Speaker B] Okay, and also if—even if it’s not the place I intended, like where there was an issue of eight and four, meaning I intended eight and in the end it was four?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, no, no. I’m not going into those minefields now. Slowly, slowly.
[Speaker B] No, I’m saying even if it’s not the exact place?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean not the exact place? By definition that is the exact place. When I threw it, the object will land where it is supposed to land. What do you mean? Maybe I didn’t aim at that place, but my throw brought the object to that place. By definition it always lands where my throw dictates that it land. Right? As long as nothing interferes with it, that’s what will happen. Now what is unique here is that the placement is done by my force and not actually by me; it is done only by my force. Because in the end the object is thrown and gets there and comes to rest by itself; I don’t place it there. It is considered my placement because it reaches the target place toward which I directed it. Okay? And only about that does the Talmud discuss—or make the distinction—when what is standing opposite me is a person. So if he is static and I threw it there, then this is just a regular throw. What difference does it make whether it’s a person or the ground or whatever? I am the remover and I am the placer. But if the person moves, why there does it make a difference, unlike in ordinary removal and placement? Because there, if the person moves, then it’s no longer clear that I can attribute the placement to myself. After all, I don’t really perform the placement even if he doesn’t move; we only attribute the placement to me because it was done by my force.
[Speaker F] All that I understood. I also understood why it wouldn’t apply when it’s not throwing. I understood the whole discussion. I just couldn’t understand what the two forces are. What exactly are the two forces here?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, so that’s what—
[Speaker F] That’s what I can’t understand.
[Speaker E] One is the thrower and one is the one who catches it during its flight?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There is the first force, which is the force of the throw. The thrower invested force and set a certain trajectory for the object—that is the first force. Now if the person at the destination point stands still and doesn’t move, then what remains in the picture is only the force of the thrower, and that’s it; there is only one force in the picture. But if the person at the destination moves in order to catch the object, then another force enters the picture. A different force. And that means the placement can no longer be attributed to the first force; instead it is attributed to the force of the second person. All of this I’m talking about in the first part of the passage. And that is the difference between a situation where he stands and one where he moved from his place.
[Speaker F] Then wait—according to that, if we say that in one person there are two forces, then according to that—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You’re getting ahead of me, Hani, hold on. So I’ve finished the first part of the passage. Now I’m moving to the second part. In the second part, the claim is this: since we are talking about a person who moved—it’s that very same person; he threw, ran, and caught the object—the catching of the object was not done by the force of the thrower, right? Because he moved from the place. The object did not reach the destination that was there when I threw it. It did not reach the ground; I ran quickly and stopped it before it got to the ground. Which means that there were really two different forces here—two different forces—except that both were operated by the same person. But they are still two different forces. And that is the Talmud’s doubt. The Talmud’s doubt is whether, when there are two different forces—true, they are operated by one person, but still there are two different forces here—can this be viewed as one act of removal and placement? Or perhaps, where two different forces are involved, one cannot speak of one removal and placement, because force A removed and force B placed. True, the same person activated both forces, but that is the Talmud’s doubt: do we go after the one operating the forces, or after the number of forces? If the number of forces is two, then you cannot say this is one act; there are two half-acts here. But if I don’t care how many forces there are—the same person did both the removal and the placement—then he would be liable. Okay?
[Speaker F] Can you repeat that once more? If the number of forces is two—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If the number of forces is two, then it could be that I am exempt even though the same person activated both of those forces, because the problem is that there are two forces, not that they have two different owners. One act cannot be done by two forces—a throwing act. An act of removal and placement, by definition, is done by two forces; that’s always how it is done. So if the Torah defines the act of taking out, bringing in, and carrying as removal and placement, then it does not bother me that these are two forces, because that is how the act is defined. But the act of throwing is defined as an act of one force, not an act of two. And now suddenly you are changing the throwing act and introducing another force. So if that force belongs to someone else, I am certainly exempt. If the second force is also mine—that is Rabbi Yohanan’s doubt. And this is only with respect to throwing, because in throwing, by definition, the act is defined as an act of one force. And once a second force gets involved, this is no longer a throwing act—it’s just half a throwing act and half a placing act. You can’t impose liability for such a thing. Maybe. That’s Rabbi Yohanan’s doubt. Okay? In ordinary removal and placement, in a regular act of taking out, every act of taking out and bringing in involves two forces. I remove and afterward I place, but that is how the act is defined. I have no problem with the fact that it’s two forces. But in throwing, the whole reason I am willing to hold a person liable for throwing is only because even the placement is done by the thrower’s force. One force does the whole thing, and therefore I’m willing to attribute the placement to the thrower as well. But where the placement is done by another force, who says that the novelty was extended to make one liable even for such a throw? The whole novelty in throwing is that the whole thing is done by one force, and therefore even if I did not literally perform the placement, it is still attributed to me. Because nobody else is involved. Once someone else is involved—or if another force is involved, even if it is I myself—then maybe I cannot be liable at all. Because the whole novelty of throwing wasn’t realized here: no ordinary act of transfer was done, but neither was a proper act of throwing done. So for what would they make me liable? Okay? And really you can ask a whole family of such questions. For example, there is a section in Atvan DeOraita where Rabbi Yosef Engel writes all sorts of conceptual investigations like this, in several books—Atvan DeOraita and also Lekach Tov, various books that are all built on conceptual analyses. One of the sections there is devoted to the question—you know there is a prohibition against rounding the corners of the head, meaning removing the sideburns entirely, shaving, yes—basically uprooting the hair from the whole circumference of the head. Okay? Now there is a prohibition on the one who rounds and a prohibition on the one rounded. It is forbidden for this to be done to me, and it is forbidden for someone else to do it to me. There is a prohibition to round and a prohibition to be rounded. Okay? Now what happens if I do it to myself? Have I violated two prohibitions? I am both the one who rounds and the one rounded. Or perhaps the one who rounds violates a prohibition when he does it to the one rounded because the act of rounding is attributed to him. But there are not really two prohibitions here; rather, if I do it to someone else and he is, say, unwitting or something, then the act of rounding done to him is attributed to me, so I am the offender. But if I did it to myself, maybe you cannot say that I am the offender from both sides, both the one who rounds and the one rounded. It’s a long discussion there whether yes or no. And many times we’ve run into—I think—similar examples. When we learned Bava Kamma, for example, I talked about a case there where a person incites—a man causes Shimon’s dog to bite Levi’s chicken. Okay? Then he is exempt. Why? The one who incites is exempt because it’s not his dog, and the owner of the dog is exempt because he is not at fault—the other guy incited the dog. Okay? What if I incited my own dog against Levi’s chicken—not Shimon’s dog, my own dog? Some later authorities (Acharonim) wanted to claim that I am exempt. Wow. You understand, that is complete absurdity, complete absurdity. Because if I failed to guard my dog properly and my dog went out and bit the chicken, I’m liable. It’s enough that I didn’t guard it properly. Now here I not only failed to guard it properly, I actively incited it. I performed an active act, not merely passive negligence. I am the one who caused the whole story, and I would be exempt. Again, this is two forces in one person. True, there is the owner of the dog and there is the one who incites it, and since the responsibility is split between the two, both are exempt. But what if both of them are me? I am both the owner of the dog and the one who incited it. Still exempt. Or another example: also in Bava Kamma, there is someone who throws—again—an object off a roof, a vessel, and the vessel is about to break. Now someone comes a meter before the vessel, still a meter above the ground, before it reaches the ground, and smashes the vessel. Then the question is who is liable, and there is an opinion in the Talmud that both are exempt. Okay? The first is exempt because he didn’t break the vessel; in the end the vessel broke because of the second one. And the second is exempt because he smashed a vessel that was already effectively broken, because if he hadn’t touched it, the vessel would have broken anyway. So it turns out both are exempt. Now the later authorities discuss: what if someone threw the vessel from above, ran quickly down, and smashed it a moment before it hit the ground? He himself. And there too there is a side that says perhaps he would still be exempt. Again: two forces in one person. Now each such case has to be discussed as to whether it really is similar or not. I’m only trying to illustrate for you the rationale of this problem. The question is really: let’s try to look at it as though these were two different people, and now say: okay, there is one person playing both roles—does that change the law or not? That is really what the Talmud is asking here. Okay? But—
[Speaker F] It doesn’t fit all that well with Rashi, because you said that maybe there is half an act of throwing and half an act of placement. But that’s not what Rashi is saying. Rashi talks about “two people who performed it,” meaning there definitely was an act of removal and there definitely was an act of placement; it’s just that maybe they weren’t done by the same force, but clearly they were done.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That is why it is “two people who performed it.” Exactly—that’s precisely what I’m saying. It’s “two people who performed it,” not two people but two forces. Two forces that performed it.
[Speaker F] But it’s not that there is half a throwing act and half a removal act here.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There is a complete act: an act of removal done by force A, and an act of placement done by force B. Again, this is “two people who performed it” longitudinally, not laterally. We already talked about “two people who performed it” back in that lecture. There is a case where two people take an object, remove it together and place it together—that is lateral “two people who performed it.” I am talking about longitudinal “two people who performed it.” Meaning, one removes and the other places. Except that in this case, the remover and the placer are the same person; it’s just two forces. He does this by force A and that by force B. And in Rashi there is a side of Rabbi Yohanan’s question that even this counts as “two people who performed it.” Because even two forces can count as “two people who performed it,” not only two people. That of course means that the exemption here is not because—as we discussed there—it is impossible to hold anyone liable. Because if that were the reason for the exemption, then what’s the problem? I have one person here on whom all the responsibility rests; there is someone to hold liable. All the responsibility sits on one person. Clearly the exemption here is not because there is no one to hold liable. Rather, the question is whether this can be treated as one act that was done here. If it’s two forces, then these are really two separate acts. True, they are performed by one person, but the act of throwing is supposed to be one act, not two acts of half-throws. Fine? Therefore Rashi on the second part of the passage sheds new light on what happened in the first part of the passage. Because it’s easy not to notice that in the first part of the passage, in principle, one could have learned it as though it was also talking about ordinary removal and placement, not only throwing. But that’s not correct. According to Rashi here, it is very clear that that’s not correct. The whole discussion is only about throwing. Fine? Now here, pay attention—you see here? Rabbi Avin said that Rabbi Ila’a—
[Speaker C] Rabbi Yohanan said: if he threw an object and got there first and received it. It doesn’t say there was any active motion here. He just stands there, and then suddenly it arrives and—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I didn’t hear. Is that Baty? Who just asked? Who asked?
[Speaker C] I wanted to ask. I didn’t hear. If the person who receives it didn’t really perform an active act—meaning he didn’t intercept it, the way Rashi writes—but simply stood in place and received the object, only he wasn’t there at the time of the throw, then according to Rashi, apparently, he would be exempt? Is that considered an active act?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean he wasn’t there at the time of the throw—so how did he get there?
[Speaker C] No, the object made its path, and he just came and caught it where the object was supposed to fall. He didn’t delay anything and he didn’t do any—why?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He caught the object, and the object didn’t fall to the ground; it was stopped in his hand. That’s the case being discussed. What do you mean?
[Speaker C] Meaning, as long as it didn’t come to rest on the ground…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s called the interruption. “Interruption” means only from the air to the ground; it’s not that he moved the object somewhere else. The object gets to where it gets to through the throw.
[Speaker C] You caught it before it was set down on the ground.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, he always catches it before the ground. That’s the interruption being discussed. So basically, notice that in the first segment of the Talmudic text, throwing isn’t mentioned. “If he stood in his place and received it, he is liable; if he moved from his place and received it, he is exempt.” In principle, you could have said that this is also not a case of throwing—I stretch out my hand, and the question is whether he was already standing there or whether he came there in order to receive the object I extended. But Rashi writes there, on “exempt,” Rashi says: “the thrower, because he did not perform a placing down.” How does Rashi know that this is specifically about a thrower? Why not just an ordinary uprooting and placing down?
[Speaker C] Because of the earlier part—the previous case talks about throwing, with the law—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Now.
[Speaker C] “And Rabbi Avina said in the name of Rabbi Ilai in the name of Rabbi Yohanan: if one threw an object and it came to rest in his fellow’s hand, he is liable.” That’s the law there, and then it continues on the same principle.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “Rabbi Avina said in the name of Rabbi Ilai in the name of Rabbi Yohanan: if he stood in his place and received it, he is liable; if he moved—”
[Speaker C] “—from his place and received it—”
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “—he is exempt.”
[Speaker F] When you told us to do this, I also started earlier because you wrote to read the statement of Rabbi Avina, and that appears earlier too. The same line appears earlier, in the story about whether the hand counts or not.
[Speaker C] In the previous paragraph there it does explicitly say—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —that he threw.
[Speaker F] That’s why it was also obvious to me that it’s talking about throwing.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s obvious that it’s talking about throwing. The question is how we know.
[Speaker F] Look at the previous paragraph of the Talmudic text. Because it appears in the previous paragraph—the two begin with exactly the same sentence.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I didn’t even notice that. Yes, there it says “threw,” “Rabbi Ilai said.” But that’s a different statement.
[Speaker F] At first, when I studied it, I actually thought they were connected to each other, because here in the conclusion he says it depends on whether the one who uproots counts in the placing down when he places it—whether he considers the hand significant or not. And that’s exactly the issue when a person stands in place.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The conclusion is not that it depends on that. We thought it would depend on that, but it doesn’t.
[Speaker F] That’s why at first I couldn’t understand why, because it looked like they contradicted one another.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] They don’t contradict. Once I understand that the second statement is also talking about throwing, then it definitely can be understood as a continuation of the first statement. But for that, I need to decide that this statement really deals with a thrower. But here it doesn’t say that he threw. “If he stood in his place and received it, he is liable; if he moved from his place and received it, he is exempt.” It doesn’t say it’s talking about a thrower. But for Rashi it’s self-evident that this is talking about a thrower, right? Rashi says “exempt”—the thrower is exempt. Why? Because it’s clear to him that this whole discussion, in terms of its content, can only be about a thrower. In the case of an ordinary uprooting and placing down, there would be no such discussion in light of what we saw in the second part of the passage. So that’s the Talmudic text. In the end, that’s how Rashi explains Rabbi Yohanan’s doubt, and it remains unresolved. The Talmud leaves it unresolved. What happens in Jewish law? Maimonides writes as follows: “If one throws and it comes to rest in his fellow’s hand—if his fellow stood in place and received it, the thrower is liable, since he uprooted and placed down. But if his fellow moved from his place and received it, he is exempt.” Why? The reasoning isn’t mentioned here, but the reasoning is mentioned at the stage of liability: “he is liable, since he uprooted and placed down.” So automatically we understand why he’s exempt: because he uprooted, but did not place down. Basically, this is the exemption of “two people who did it,” because the one who threw only uprooted but he is not the one who placed down. “Two people who did it,” as we saw in Rashi. “If he threw and the thrower himself ran after the object and received it in his hand in another domain or outside the four cubits, he is exempt, as though another person had moved and received it, for there is no complete placing down until the object comes to rest in the place where it was meant to come to rest at the time of the uprooting.” So here, first of all, a few comments. In the second part of the law, it seems that Maimonides decides the unresolved doubt. Right? After all, the Talmud remained unresolved, and Maimonides writes that he is exempt. How did he decide that he is exempt? The Talmud remained unresolved. We don’t know whether he’s exempt or liable; it’s a doubt. How did you understand it? So the Maggid Mishneh there says—
[Speaker F] Like this. I understood—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —that there are two possibilities. The Maggid Mishneh says: “And our teacher of blessed memory writes ‘exempt’ in a case left unresolved, and this is his way in such doubts, and it is necessary.” What does that mean? The Maggid Mishneh says like this: Suppose we are dealing with an unresolved doubt. What does that mean? It means that this law remains doubtful. And just for general knowledge, of course—when the Talmud ends with an unresolved doubt, no halakhic decisor can decide it, because the Talmud established that there is no decision. That is the decision. The decision is that it remains unresolved. Okay? As opposed to a situation in which the Talmud simply does not decide at all, leaves two opinions standing and does not decide. In such a case a halakhic decisor can come and say: I rule like Abaye, or I rule like Rava. But here, when the Talmud itself establishes “unresolved,” that is called a ruling. The ruling is that it is unresolved. So what does that mean now? Let’s see. In practice, what are we supposed to do now? Suppose Maimonides had ruled on the unresolved doubt—had not decided—what should come out? After all, it’s obvious that I can’t impose liability.
[Speaker F] If it’s a Torah-level doubt then stringently, and if it’s a rabbinic-level doubt then leniently.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait. It’s obvious that you can’t—
[Speaker F] —hold him liable—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —for stoning or a sin-offering, because it’s only a doubt about a Torah-level prohibition, right? He doesn’t get punishment. Okay? So the whole discussion is about what kind of prohibition he violated. Did he violate a doubtful prohibition, or did he not violate anything at all? Okay? The Maggid Mishneh says: but even a doubtful prohibition, according to Maimonides—a doubtful Torah-level prohibition, according to Maimonides—the obligation to be stringent is only rabbinic. There is a dispute among the medieval authorities (Rishonim). The rule appears in the Talmud: with a rabbinic-level doubt one is lenient; with a Torah-level doubt one is stringent. If there is doubt in a Torah-level law, one must be stringent. If there is doubt in a rabbinic law, one may be lenient. But this very rule—that in a Torah-level doubt one must be stringent—is itself, according to Maimonides, a rabbinic rule. According to Rashba, for example, it is a Torah-level rule. The Torah itself requires stringency in a case of doubt. According to Maimonides, the Torah does not require stringency. The Sages decided that one must be stringent. It is a rabbinic law. And then, basically, the Maggid Mishneh says that the result is as follows. A double doubt?
[Speaker E] What? That makes it a double doubt?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, not a double doubt. Rather, the Maggid Mishneh says this: even if we had ruled on the unresolved doubt, Maimonides would still have written the same thing: exempt. Why exempt? Because it’s only a rabbinic prohibition. Why? Because a doubtful Torah-level prohibition, according to Maimonides, is itself a rabbinic prohibition, right? The obligation to be stringent with a doubtful Torah-level prohibition is a rabbinic obligation. Basically, what Maimonides is ruling here is that there is a rabbinic prohibition. Why? Because there is doubt whether there is a Torah-level prohibition or not. And in such a doubt, the obligation to be stringent is rabbinic. That’s what Maimonides means by “exempt.” Maimonides did not decide.
[Speaker C] So then is it always going to be exempt? I can’t hear. A Torah-level doubt is treated stringently.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, and therefore he will be exempt, but that is because it’s only a doubt. There will be no punishment. He is exempt—“exempt” means exempt from stoning and from a sin-offering.
[Speaker C] But whenever there’s a Torah-level doubt treated stringently, then basically there’s no difference here, so I don’t understand that.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “A Torah-level doubt is treated stringently” means that there is a rabbinic prohibition if you are not stringent. I didn’t hear. I didn’t hear. If I have a doubtful piece of meat and I don’t know whether it is pork or beef, okay? Then I’m in doubt. Am I allowed to eat it on the Torah level? According to Maimonides, yes. Only rabbinically am I forbidden to eat it. The obligation to be stringent in cases of doubt is rabbinic. Now here, since the Talmud ended unresolved, there is an obligation to be stringent. There is an obligation not to do it. But the obligation is rabbinic, because it is only doubtful whether it is permitted or forbidden. Therefore Maimonides says: exempt.
[Speaker C] So what is the meaning, then, of “a Torah-level doubt is treated stringently”? I don’t understand.
[Speaker D] It’s the true rule, but it’s rabbinic.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It simply means you have to be stringent and not do it.
[Speaker D] But Maimonides—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] After all, he doesn’t say “permitted.” Maimonides does not say permitted; he says exempt. Why doesn’t he say permitted? If he decided, then it’s permitted, not exempt. “Exempt” is exempt.
[Speaker C] Okay, he means exempt from punishment; it already happened.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but why? Why doesn’t he say permitted? Is a person allowed to throw an object if the other person moved in order to receive it? If he himself—sorry—moved in order to receive it. He doesn’t say that. It is forbidden.
[Speaker E] It’s still forbidden, still forbidden.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why is it forbidden?
[Speaker F] Because there’s uprooting here in any case, and in uprooting that’s… for us it’s exempt but still forbidden in any case. Even if there was only uprooting.
[Speaker E] And on the Torah level, it’s forbidden because there’s doubt here. Okay, so wait.
[Speaker F] There’s no doubt about the uprooting. According to Maimonides there’s no doubt about the uprooting; there’s only doubt about the placing down, and therefore in any case he is exempt, and he doesn’t even address whether it’s… whether it’s two forces, one force—that doesn’t matter at all.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Both Hani and Idit are right. In principle, what the Maggid Mishneh explains is that Maimonides writes “exempt” because a Torah-level doubt treated stringently is a rabbinic prohibition. On the side where we would say it is permitted, then it is permitted. On the side where we say it is forbidden, it is Torah-forbidden. Since we have doubt, the obligation to be stringent is only rabbinic, so whoever violated it is exempt, but it is forbidden. But Hani correctly points out that this isn’t right. I assumed that if we rule leniently, then it is really permitted, not just rabbinically forbidden. And if we rule stringently, then it is a rabbinic prohibition. But that’s not true, because even on the side where I rule leniently there would still be a rabbinic prohibition here. Even if I resolve the doubt, there is still a rabbinic prohibition here. Why? Because we saw that in the Mishnah. Right? What did we see in the Mishnah? That if the poor person uproots and the homeowner places down, or the reverse, each of them violates a rabbinic prohibition. It is not Torah liability, but there is a rabbinic prohibition of “two people who did it.” That means there is no side in the Talmud where this is permitted. There is one side in the Talmud where it is a rabbinic prohibition, and one side where it is a Torah-level prohibition. Right? If it is like one force, if it is like one person, like one force, then it is a Torah-level prohibition. There is uprooting and placing down here, and he is liable on the Torah level. If it is like two forces, then it is like two people, one uprooting and one placing down, and each one violated a rabbinic prohibition. Now, since I have doubt whether this is a rabbinic prohibition or a Torah-level prohibition, you can’t say there is certainly a Torah-level prohibition here. This is not a doubt between a Torah-level prohibition and permission. It is a doubt between a rabbinic prohibition and a Torah-level prohibition. The Maggid Mishneh says: still, the obligation to be stringent in such a matter is only rabbinic. Because in the Torah-level plane, at the end of the day, I still have a doubt here, not certainty of a Torah prohibition. And therefore there is no practical difference between whether you decided or whether you remained in doubt. He is exempt; he violated a rabbinic prohibition. That is what the Maggid Mishneh says.
[Speaker F] I’m only saying that the Maggid Mishneh doesn’t… it fits less well for me with Maimonides. Why? Because Maimonides explicitly says that there was uprooting here but no placing down. Therefore… Maimonides isn’t addressing the unresolved doubt at all. Maimonides rules because there was uprooting and no placing down.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maimonides doesn’t need to address the unresolved doubt.
[Speaker F] That’s what he writes—he doesn’t address the unresolved doubt.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maimonides doesn’t address the unresolved doubt, and he doesn’t need to address the unresolved doubt. Maimonides is not a commentator on the Talmud. Maimonides rules Jewish law. And in this law Maimonides says: one who did such-and-such is exempt but it is forbidden, that’s all. Why is he exempt but it is forbidden? Maimonides doesn’t go into the question of why. Either because there is only uprooting without placing down and he decided the doubt, he decided leniently, and there is a rabbinic prohibition because after all you did do the uprooting; or because he held that it remains a doubt, as the Talmud said, that it is unresolved, and then also—
[Speaker C] But he does give a reason.
[Speaker F] But Maimonides does take a position.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? I can’t hear.
[Speaker F] Maimonides takes a position here—that’s what I saw as the difference. The Maggid Mishneh says that Maimonides was stringent in an unresolved case and that it’s rabbinic to be stringent in an unresolved case, but that’s not what Maimonides says. Maimonides takes a position here on the unresolved doubt from the Talmud: he takes the position that there is uprooting here and no placing down, and therefore it is exempt. Meaning, I feel—that’s how I understand it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I understand, and I’m telling you that it is not necessary. Since Maimonides gives a reason… I’ll explain. Maimonides says: “because the placing down is not complete until the object comes to rest in the place where it was meant to come to rest at the time of the uprooting.” And if it is not so, then we are in doubt. That’s what he says. A complete placing down, regarding which I have not even the slightest doubt, is only when it rests in the place to which it was directed. If it does not rest in the place to which it was directed, that is not complete placing down. Why? Because I have doubt about it and I did not resolve it. Not because it is certainly not placing down, but because it is doubtfully not placing down. Maimonides is a law book; Maimonides does not address the Talmud. He is not a commentator on the Talmud. And from a halakhic standpoint, what he wrote here is that in fact he is exempt, and it is true that he is exempt in Jewish law. Okay? Therefore there is no necessity to say that Maimonides decided the issue. It’s also not likely—once there is an unresolved doubt, we do not decide—but rather Maimonides stated the law that follows from the doubt. It is true that the doubt here, unlike every other Torah-level doubt, is not a doubt between a Torah-level prohibition and permission, but between a Torah-level prohibition and a rabbinic prohibition. Even on the lenient side there is still a rabbinic prohibition here. Fine. But in any case, all there is here is only a rabbinic prohibition. If it had been a doubt between permission and a Torah prohibition, by the way, then Maimonides really would have been more difficult. Because then, basically, there would be no rabbinic prohibition on the side where the doubt is resolved. Right—then the exemption would be only because of the doubt, not because there is uprooting without placing down. But once the other side is also a rabbinic prohibition, then Maimonides says, leave it—there is no complete placing down here in any event, because as a matter of Jewish law I cannot rule that such a placing down is complete placing down; the Talmud has doubt about it. Okay. Now, the reasoning that Maimonides gives—but—
[Speaker C] Still, wait, still—I really agree with Hani because, wow, he won’t rule—hello?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I lost you, Noa.
[Speaker C] Can I say one more thing? I think there’s a delay in the broadcast.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, yes, no, I—
[Speaker E] There are transmission problems.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It cut out, it cut out. I heard nothing. Again.
[Speaker C] I want to say that I really agree with Hani because Maimonides literally writes, “as though another person had moved and received it.” He really accepts the side of the Talmud that says we are talking about two people and not one person—two forces in one person, in which case he would be liable.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I explained that.
[Speaker C] And it doesn’t look like he exempts because of this whole arrangement of doubts.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I explained it again, I explained it. Maimonides’ claim is that for us this is considered as though another person had moved and received it, because in the Talmud there is no ruling that it does not count as though another received it. And it is enough for me that in Jewish law it is considered as though another had moved and received it, because in fact in Jewish law that is how it is. Not because I decided that that’s what it is, but because from a halakhic standpoint I need to behave as though that is what it is, since I am exempt and I have no opposite ruling. It isn’t because he decided the doubt, but because in Jewish law, for me, in such a case it is as though another moved and received it. Right, that’s how I have to treat it. Why? Not because it is definitely so, but because as long as it has not been proven otherwise, I am supposed to behave that way, because there is no obligation to be stringent. Fine, think about it. In any case, notice the reasoning Maimonides gives. The reasoning Maimonides gives is that “the placing down is not complete until the object comes to rest in the place where it was meant to come to rest at the time of the uprooting.” In Maimonides it does not sound like this is a case of “two people who did it.” Maimonides claims that there is no placing down here at all. At least that is what his wording seems to imply.
[Speaker B] There is a placing down—only if it happened without someone catching it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The claim is that from Maimonides it sounds as though the issue is not whether two people did it or not, but rather that there is some requirement that the object is supposed to come to rest in the place where from the outset I planned that it would come to rest, or where it was supposed to come to rest.
[Speaker E] And that’s also in the Talmud too, what it says.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean?
[Speaker E] In the Talmud, meaning: I threw, and then you caught it—or it doesn’t matter, someone else caught it—it didn’t come to rest in the place where I designated it to go with the throw.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Halakhically, it’s clear that that’s what happens there. But the question is: what is the reasoning because of which they exempt? In the Talmud that isn’t written. And Rashi explained it because of “two people who did it.” In Maimonides it sounds like it is not “two people who did it.” The problem is not “two people who did it.” The problem is that there is only uprooting and no placing down. Such a placing down isn’t considered placing down at all. It’s not that the second person did the placing down—no one did any placing down. Because in the case of throwing, placing down means that it has to be in the place planned in advance. That’s what is called placing down. If it’s not in the planned place, then there was no placing down here.
[Speaker E] So Rashi says that the thrower did not place it down, and Maimonides says there is no placing down here.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct. That is what his wording implies. It seems that for him there is some requirement in the labor of throwing: the placing down has to be in the place designated in advance for resting, and if it didn’t rest there then there was no placing down.
[Speaker F] But from Rashi too, you can understand it that way. And that’s why Rashi seemed self-contradictory to me, because Rashi too brings the point that if a person ran and basically didn’t let the object come to rest but caught it in the middle, then there was no placing down here—he brings exactly that same claim—and on the other hand he still says that it’s “two people who did it.” So I couldn’t understand Rashi.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s what I noted when I read Rashi. That’s why I said that since Rashi does bring in “two people who did it,” we need to read Rashi as follows: there was no placing down by the thrower, but there was placing down by someone else. That’s what Rashi means. Because otherwise, what does this have to do with “two people who did it”? Once Rashi introduces “two people who did it,” then clearly—factually—it’s obvious that the one who received the object really did stop it and did not let it come to rest in the planned place. Factually that is certainly what happens here. It’s just that according to Rashi, that is not what exempts him. What exempts him is not that there was no placing down, but that someone else did the placing down. This is a case of “two people who did it.” And according to Maimonides, it seems that the exemption is because there was no placing down. Because there is such a rule: in the labor of throwing, placing down exists only when it is carried out in the place planned in advance. Otherwise it is not the placing down of throwing. And there is, for example, a practical difference. According to Rashi, if this is “two people who did it,” then both would be under a rabbinic prohibition, right? Both the thrower and the receiver. According to Maimonides, my claim is that there would be a rabbinic prohibition on the thrower but not on the receiver. Because there was throwing here without any placing down at all—not throwing by one and placing down by another. There was only throwing. Someone did half of the labor. There are, by the way, opinions that on that there is not even a rabbinic prohibition—on uprooting where there is no placing down at all, not where someone else does the placing down. You simply did half the labor; it’s not that the labor was done, just by two people together, but that it wasn’t done at all. So what do you want? But the simple view is—we accepted this when we discussed “two people who did it”—the simple view is that there is a rabbinic prohibition here, but only on the thrower. Because the thrower uprooted but did not place down, and the receiver also did not place down. Nothing. The receiver has no rabbinic prohibition; only the thrower does. Okay? And in fact, look at Maimonides’ wording: “if his fellow moved from his place and received it, he is exempt.” Who is exempt?
[Speaker G] The thrower, apparently. The thrower is exempt. And the receiver? Obviously exempt.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The receiver is completely permitted. The receiver did nothing. That’s why he writes “he is exempt” and not “they are exempt.” He writes “he is exempt” because the thrower is exempt, and as for the receiver, there’s nothing to talk about—he isn’t even in the game. Because apparently there is a contradiction in Maimonides, and I noted this to you on the page as well: apparently there is a contradiction in Maimonides. Because in the first part of the law Maimonides phrases it as though the problem is “two people who did it.” Because he essentially says: “the thrower is liable, since he uprooted and placed down,” right? From that, I infer that if his fellow moved from his place and received it, he is exempt—why exempt? Because the second person placed it down. It wasn’t that he uprooted and placed down; rather he uprooted and the second person placed down. But later, in the second part of Maimonides, the reasoning is that there was no placing down at all. It is not an exemption of “two people who did it.” But now, in light of what I said, it appears that even at the beginning Maimonides is not talking about “two people who did it.” Maimonides means to say: if his fellow moved from his place and received it, he is exempt because there was no placing down. Not because the second person did the placing down, but because there was no placing down at all.
[Speaker H] And you can’t say that maybe there are two explanations for each one, meaning that each one of them is enough to exempt: that two people did the labor, and also in a case where it didn’t come to rest in the place that was originally planned?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In principle, yes—there could be two explanations, and the first law could be one explanation and the second law another explanation. In the Talmud itself, though, that doesn’t seem to be the case, because the Talmud itself says: what is the doubt in the second situation, when the person himself ran and received the object? Is it like two people, which we dealt with in the previous part, or is it considered one person doing everything, right? In other words, the Talmud itself says that on the side where it is like two people, that is the same law I told you above. I just don’t know whether it is like two people or like one. Meaning, the Talmud itself says that it is the same reasoning for both laws. Are you with me? In the Talmud it seems to be the same reasoning for both laws. There is no principled obstacle to saying that there are different reasons for two different laws, but in the Talmud itself it ties the second question to the first law. After I had the first law, where one threw and the other received and they are exempt, now I ask: what happens if it is the same person filling both roles? Is it the same as above, or here is he liable? But that means that the Talmud itself says it is the same reasoning for both laws. On the side that it is the same as above, then here too he will be exempt just as he was exempt there, for the same reason. And the reason is apparently “two people who did it.” Therefore, for example, according to Rashi, I think that the side in Rashi where the same person threw and received—not just think, I believe Rashi writes this—what is the reason to exempt in the second case? Rashi says: “it is comparable to two people, and he is exempt.” What’s the reasoning? “Because it becomes a case of two people who did it.” Even in the second case, the exemption is because it is considered “two people who did it.” It is not an exemption because there was no placing down. There was placing down, only it was not done by the one who uprooted but by the one who placed down, and therefore it is “two people who did it.” So Rashi understands that the entire flow of the Talmud is about “two people who did it.” But in the second case there is doubt whether it counts as “two people who did it” or not. But on the side where it is like two people, then the exemption is as we saw above: the exemption of “two people who did it.” There is uprooting by one person and placing down by another. According to Maimonides, at least in the second law, we see that the exemption is not the exemption of “two people who did it”; the exemption is simply because there is an act of uprooting here and no placing down at all. There is a requirement that the placing down be in the place to which it was designated in advance, and therefore there was no placing down here. The exemption is not because two people did it, but simply because only half the matter happened here. But in light of that, and in light of the Talmud linking the first part to the second part, it seems that according to Maimonides also in the first part the exemption is not “two people who did it,” but rather the exemption really is that there was no placing down. Do you understand what I’m saying? Yes. Yes. Okay. Now the Meiri: “We have already explained that the hand is considered a place of four by four, whether his own hand or his fellow’s hand, for the hand requires no intention, as we wrote. And from now on, anyone who throws and it comes to rest in his fellow’s hand is liable.” And nevertheless, “we explained that if his fellow moved from his place and received it, even the thrower is exempt.” Interesting. What does “even the thrower is exempt” mean? And the receiver is what? Apparently it seems that he too takes this as “two people who did it,” right? Meaning, “even the thrower is exempt” means the receiver is obviously exempt, and even the thrower is exempt. With some strain one could say that there is no point talking about the receiver at all because he is completely permitted, but even the thrower is not liable; rather he is exempt. Maybe. But plainly it doesn’t seem that way; plainly I would read him as “two people who did it,” like Rashi or like Maimonides. Okay? “They said something even greater than this: if one threw an object and the thrower himself ran after the object and received it in his hand in another domain, or in the public domain outside the four cubits, before the object came to rest, he is exempt. It is as though another came and received it; two forces in one person are like two people, and it did not come to rest by the force of the throw.” Again, a somewhat ambiguous expression. What does “it did not come to rest by the force of the throw” mean? You can still continue it like Rashi: “two people who did it.” Since it did not come to rest by the force of the throw, then I attribute the placing down to the receiver and not to the thrower, right? That seems to be the idea. Then basically there is placing down and uprooting here, except that it was done by two forces or two people, and the exemption is the exemption of “two people who did it,” like Rashi, not like Maimonides. Right? And here the Meiri—
[Speaker B] I think he says that too. What? He says it, just in different words. He says “like two people.”
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I could have said that if it didn’t come to rest by the force of the throw, then it doesn’t count as placing down at all. He doesn’t say that. “It did not come to rest by the force of the throw”—in the end, the fact that the placing down depends on another force and not on the force of the thrower means two forces, each of which did half the job, like Rashi. Okay. The Meiri says, by the way, that here too this is brought as a conclusion, not as a doubt. Did you notice? “They said something even greater than this: if one threw an object and the thrower himself ran after the object and received it… it is as though another had come and received it; two forces in one person are like two people, and it did not come to rest by the force of the throw.” In the Meiri, I agree with the inference you made earlier about Maimonides. The Meiri really writes as if it was decided—that this counts like two people and therefore he is exempt—not out of doubt. He does not mention that it remains unresolved at all. A bit strange, but that is how it appears in the Meiri. Maybe he did not have the reading “unresolved” here; I don’t know exactly. But in the Meiri this really looks like an actual decision, not a matter of doubt. Now the Meiri continues: “And according to this explanation, even if he intended this from the outset, he is exempt.” What does that mean? Even if the person who threw had planned in advance that he would run—whether with the receiver, or with himself, doesn’t matter—right? Then he is exempt. Even though it was planned in advance that that same person would run and receive the object, so it’s not that something unplanned happened here—this is what I planned from the outset—still he is exempt. Why? Because in the end the placing down was not done by my force; this is “two people who did it.” And therefore he is exempt. It doesn’t matter whether I planned it or didn’t plan it—it is “two people who did it.” Right? What difference does it make whether I planned it or not? If I planned from the outset that the second person would do the placing down, does that mean I did the placing down? The second person still did the placing down. It is “two people who did it.” “And nevertheless there are those who explain it,” the Meiri continues, “because it did not come to rest in the place that he had in mind from the beginning.” What does that mean? That is Maimonides’ explanation.
[Speaker C] That’s what Maimonides says.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right? So we see in the Meiri that the Meiri too understood that this explanation of Maimonides is a different explanation from Rashi’s explanation of “two people who did it.” That is why he says there are those who explain it differently: namely, that it does not depend on “two people who did it,” one uprooted and one placed down, but on whether it came to rest in the place he had in mind. If not from the beginning, then it isn’t considered placing down at all. Then he says: “And it appears that according to this view, if he intended it from the outset, he is liable.” There is the practical difference, says the Meiri. According to Maimonides, if the person intended this maneuver from the outset—not that he suddenly decided to do it, whether the second person or I myself decided to do it—then I would be liable. The whole exemption that appears in the Talmud is only when it was not planned in advance. But that is all according to Maimonides, because according to Rashi, where the exemption is “two people who did it,” what do I care whether you planned it or not? So I planned from the outset that both of us would do it together—still both of us did it, so we are exempt. According to Maimonides, the point is not at all that the second person did it; the second person did nothing. The whole question is whether what I did counts as an act of transfer or an act of throwing. So if I planned it in advance, says the Meiri, then yes. If I did not plan it in advance, then something happened here that was never planned at all, and so you cannot say that there was any placing down here at all, and therefore there is no prohibited act here at all. So I think the Meiri is the clearest place where you can see that the explanation of Maimonides and the explanation of Rashi are two different explanations. He even draws a practical difference between them. By the way, I’m not sure I agree with that practical difference. Because from Maimonides it seems that it does not necessarily depend on the thrower’s intention—what the thrower planned—but on the question of where it was supposed to arrive by the force of his throw, regardless of whether he planned it or not. Rather, there is such a condition in the labor of throwing: the placing down has to be in the same place toward which the throwing is directed. And if the placing down did not ultimately happen that way, then it is not placing down. The Meiri does not tie it to calculation of the trajectory; the Meiri ties it to the thrower’s intentions, to the person. In Maimonides, I don’t think that’s what is implied. It’s a somewhat different interpretation. Okay? “And so it is proper to rule, since the Talmud remained in doubt.” Here all of a sudden he remembers that the Talmud did indeed leave it unresolved. Now what does that mean? What does “so it is proper to rule, since the Talmud remained in doubt” mean? You can give two answers. It could be that he means the actual ruling that two forces in one person are like two people—since we are in doubt, out of doubt you cannot impose liability, and therefore he is exempt. What the Maggid Mishneh said about Maimonides, right? “So it is proper to rule” out of doubt means not that I decided that way, but that because the Talmud remained in doubt, you cannot say he is liable, because you cannot sentence someone to stoning or a sin-offering when there is doubt. All you can say is that he is exempt, meaning it is forbidden to do it, rabbinically or on the Torah level depending on the obligation to be stringent in cases of doubt, but he is exempt from punishment—from stoning or a sin-offering—which is something else. But the question is whether he perhaps means to say that “so it is proper to rule” means that if he intended it from the outset, he is liable—that one should rule like Maimonides. That is what he means to say. In other words, the ruling he justifies at the end is not the ruling that two forces are like two people—a ruling within the passage itself—but rather a ruling between the two explanations of the passage: he rules in favor of Maimonides’ explanation and against Rashi’s explanation. Do you understand what I’m saying? The question is what the Meiri is coming to… So look, it is possible to explain the Meiri also in the second way, because I asked you on the page as well: suppose we are in doubt whether Rashi is right or Maimonides is right, okay? What should the law be according to the laws of doubt? Someone intended from the outset to do this, okay? Someone intended from the outset to pass it to someone else or to himself, it doesn’t matter. Then Maimonides says he is liable, and Rashi says he is exempt. Tell me—how are we supposed to rule according to the laws of doubt? No, let’s speak now of where I myself caught it, not where someone else did. So look: this is a double doubt for stringency, not for leniency.
[Speaker H] Could there be a practical difference in how I think about it—say, whether a person’s intention matters, or only the initial state at the uprooting? If a person’s intention matters, then I have another doubt: what did he want?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right—that is the dispute between Rashi and Maimonides, whether it matters or not. Now I’m asking: how do we decide that dispute? So look, notice: what are the possibilities here? Suppose someone threw, planned in advance to run and catch it, ran and caught it. Maimonides says liable, Rashi says exempt, right? That’s the dispute. But notice—this is all on the side that it is two forces.
[Speaker H] But that’s how he understands Maimonides. If Maimonides doesn’t—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —relate—
[Speaker H] —to what a person planned in advance but to what actually happened in practice—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, but I’m talking according to how he understands him.
[Speaker H] I’m asking about the Meiri.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine. The Meiri understood Maimonides that way. So there is a dispute between Maimonides and Rashi whether he is liable in such a case or not. Why does he think one has to rule that he is liable—actually liable on the Torah level?
[Speaker H] Because his intention was fulfilled, because what he wanted is what he did.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, but there is a dispute between Rashi and Maimonides. That’s a doubt.
[Speaker E] So it’s a Torah-level doubt treated stringently.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Stringently—but that doesn’t mean liable. He is exempt; it’s a doubt.
[Speaker H] So with every dispute among halakhic decisors we also apply that same rule?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Of course. After all, the Meiri himself writes: “so it is proper to rule,” not because that’s what I think, but because it remained doubtful. A ruling by force of doubt, a ruling by force of the laws of doubt. Now apparently—why is he stringent by force of the laws of doubt? The answer is simple. Look now, this takes a bit of training in the laws of doubt. A person ran, threw, ran and caught; he planned the whole story in advance in this way. If two forces are like one person—that is one side in the Talmud that was not resolved, right? There is doubt in the Talmud whether it is like one person or like two people. On the side that it is like one person, then of course he is liable, even if he didn’t… even if he planned it, right? Liable according to all opinions. Okay? There is only one side in the Talmud, that it is like two people. And even on that side, according to Maimonides he is liable and according to Rashi he is exempt. So you have here a double doubt for stringency. Usually a double doubt is for leniency, but here the double doubt is for stringency. On the side that it is like one person, then he is definitely liable according to all opinions. And on the side that it is two people, still according to Maimonides he is liable and according to Rashi he is exempt. If you draw the possibility tree—after all, a double doubt… let’s see how you build a double doubt. I have one possibility—this is the case, okay? There was a case: he ran and caught it and planned the whole thing in advance. Now I say: is this one force or two forces, right? So is it one force or two forces. Now I say this: if it is one force, then according to both Rashi and Maimonides he is liable. Agreed? If it is one force, then it is an ordinary throw, regardless of his intention. If it is one force, then regardless of whether he intended it in advance or not, and whether that matters or not, he is always liable. Okay?
[Speaker E] If it’s two forces, then—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —according to Rashi he is exempt—
[Speaker E] —and according to Maimonides, sorry, Rashi, they both start with R—according to Maimonides he is liable.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right? Now you see that there are four endpoints to this tree, and only in one of them is he exempt. That is a double doubt for stringency. Therefore the Meiri holds that he is liable. Just as a double doubt for leniency leads to exemption, a double doubt for stringency leads to liability. Do you understand? Okay. Therefore I think that the Meiri’s novelty could relate both to the actual ruling and to the ruling in the dispute between Rashi and Maimonides. He is basically claiming that one should rule like Maimonides because of the laws of doubt. Because I have a side—
[Speaker F] I didn’t understand for a second the rule in the laws of doubt. In the laws of doubt, if it’s a double doubt and it goes to stringency then liable, and if it goes to leniency then exempt? Isn’t there a principle that with a double doubt it is always exempt? No?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What is a double doubt? A double doubt is when I have four possibilities, three of which are lenient and one stringent. One doubt means fifty percent lenient, fifty percent stringent. A double doubt means twenty-five percent stringent and seventy-five percent lenient. When you draw the possibility tree, it is one possibility out of four. That is called a double doubt. But here it is a double doubt in reverse. It is a double doubt where one possibility is lenient and three possibilities—only twenty-five percent are lenient, not seventy-five percent. So just as a double doubt for leniency should go leniently, a double doubt for stringency is considered like certainty for stringency. After all, a double doubt is considered like certainty. Just as a double doubt for leniency is considered like certainty for leniency, a double doubt for stringency is considered like certainty for stringency. Seventy-five percent lenient—
[Speaker F] Could you please put back on the screen the drawing for a moment?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? I can’t hear.
[Speaker F] Could you put back on the screen the drawing for a moment? Okay. Thank you.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay? Fine. So that is the Meiri’s ruling. Now I want us to see the Sefat Emet, and I’ve already prefaced all the discussions so it will be easy to understand what he wants. “He moved from his place and received it,” etc. “The halakhic decisors need analysis: is actual movement required—does he really have to move his body—or is extending his hand also considered moving?” Right? Even if he only moves his hand, is that also considered that he moved? “And from the words of Maimonides, chapter 13 of the laws of the Sabbath, it implies that even moving the hand in order to receive exempts the first one”—the first one, sorry. “For the main reason is that he received it in a place where it would not have fallen by itself. See there. And see in the Meiri, who distinguishes that if he had in mind from the outset to receive it with the other hand, he is liable.” Okay? Now Maimonides gives the reasoning for what happens in the first case: if I threw and the other person standing opposite me moved only his hand in order to receive it. I assume there would be the same doubt, right? There is no difference. It doesn’t matter whether I myself moved my hand or whether someone else moved his hand.
[Speaker B] On the contrary, simply speaking it seems that in every case it’s the same thing.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Sefat Emet is talking about the first case, not the second. Because in the second case it’s not reasonable that I only moved my hand and reached a distance of two meters. Who has a hand that reaches two meters? Obviously I moved.
[Speaker B] No, in the first case too I’ll always move my hand. Why? Just like that—I’m not going to stand there like this and not stretch out my hand to catch it. Why would I?
[Speaker F] I don’t want to violate placing something down on the Sabbath, so I’m not going to move my hand.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Someone throws the object.
[Speaker B] So what are you going to do? Then how will you catch it?
[Speaker F] I won’t catch it, I don’t want to. Someone threw it—do I need to violate a rabbinic prohibition of placing it down? I’m not doing anything; let it fall. The question is whether here you are catching it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Again, Yael and Devorah, in the first case we’re talking about two different people. I threw the object—wait—there could be someone standing on the other side with his hands like this and the object lands in his hand. Right? Or a situation where the person moves with his hands like this and receives the object. There could be a person who stands in place and only moves his hand and receives the object. Is that also considered that he moved, or not? That’s what the Sefat Emet is asking. But I’m saying more than that: simply speaking, the Sefat Emet is asking about the first case, not the second. Because in the second case, where that same person who threw it runs and catches it, obviously he ran and didn’t just move his hand. He has to cover more than two meters. Ah, now—
[Speaker F] I understand.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So the doubt is about the first case, not the second. But the reasoning he brings from Maimonides—that’s the reasoning Maimonides gives for the second case. After all, Maimonides says about the second case that it isn’t considered placing it down, right? It isn’t considered placing it down because it was not placed in the spot he planned in advance. And the Meiri that he cites also speaks about the second case. Clearly, the Sefat Emet assumes that Maimonides’ reasoning for the second case is also Maimonides’ reasoning for the first case. It’s not true that according to Maimonides, in the first case the exemption is because two people did it, and in the second case because there was no placing down. Once you understand that there was no placing down, then in the first case too that’s the exemption. The exemption is because there was no placing down, because the object was not placed in the place he planned, or where it was meant to arrive from the outset. Right? That’s also what we inferred from Maimonides above. Otherwise you can’t read the Sefat Emet. The Sefat Emet takes Maimonides’ reason for the second law and uses it to decide a doubt that concerns the first law. Because to him it’s obvious that Maimonides uses the same reasoning for both the first and second cases. That’s also clear from the Talmud. Because the Talmud connects the second case to the first. The Talmud says that if two forces are like two people, then we return to the first law, like two people. Whatever you say about two people you’ll say here too. So you can’t say that the exemption in the second case is based on a different principle than the exemption in the first case. It’s the same exemption. The discussion is only whether it’s two people or one, but on the side that it’s two people, it’s the same exemption as in the first case. Right? That’s what we discussed in the Talmud. So the Sefat Emet also understood Maimonides that way. And after that he says, “and see the Meiri, who distinguishes whether he intended immediately to receive it in the other hand.” What does that mean? And what does the Meiri have to do with this here?
[Speaker F] He brings the second case.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But why is that relevant to his doubt, which deals with the first case? Apparently he understands that when the Meiri makes the distinction between whether it was planned in advance or not planned in advance—true, the Meiri is speaking about the second case—but really it would also be true in the first case. And if I planned in advance to throw, and then that other person came and ran and received it into his hands, but I had planned in advance that this is what would happen, then I really would be liable. According to Rashi that isn’t true, because even if I planned it in advance, still I did the lifting and he did the placing down—it’s two people who did it. Only according to Maimonides, where there is simply such a requirement that what he planned in advance must actually occur—then here, if it was planned in advance, it did occur, so I’m liable. It has nothing to do with two people who did it; Maimonides doesn’t see this as two people who did it. Okay? Now I see this took me a long time. And regarding the unresolved question in the passage, Tosafot brings two possibilities here. One possibility: “they are like two people, and he is exempt”—that was Rabbi Yohanan’s question. Meaning: “just as with two people the first one is exempt because he did not perform any placing down at all.” And here there’s room to hesitate about how he understands what “did not perform any placing down at all” means. That he didn’t do any placing down at all, or that no placing down happened? It’s unclear. “Did not perform” means “did not do,” so I don’t know. You can read it like Rashi, you can read it like Maimonides. “Here too, since he snatched it while it was in motion and did not allow the object to continue to the place of its movement, it is not considered placing down, because it did not come to rest through the power of the thrower.” Okay. Here it already sounds a bit more like Rashi. It’s not considered placing down because it did not come to rest through the power of the thrower, but through the power of someone else. Meaning, it’s two people who did it and not Maimonides’ issue, right? That’s at least how the reasoning here appears. “Or perhaps it is like one person, and since he performed both the lifting and the placing down, he is liable, and it is not similar to two people who did it.” Here the cat is really out of the bag. Here it’s already clear that this is Rashi, right? Because he makes it depend on two people who did it. According to Maimonides, two people who did it isn’t relevant here. Okay? So therefore he probably understood the first part like Rashi. Now he brings Rabbeinu Hananel’s version. And Rabbeinu Hananel has the opposite reading; he read the opposite. “They are like two people, and he is liable”—the side that says it’s like two people is דווקא the side that obligates him. “For it says above: if he stood in his place and received it, he is liable. So too here, when he himself received it and did not snatch it while it was in motion, he should be liable, for his intention was carried out. Or perhaps it is like one person, and he is exempt, for it is like someone who transfers from his right hand to his left hand, that even though he moved it four cubits, he is exempt.” So here he reverses the reading. And that requires a lot of explanation there, because he claims that someone who transfers from one hand to the other—let’s say, for the sake of discussion, that the span of my arms is four cubits, okay? So I transfer from one hand to the other, then I moved it four cubits in the public domain, okay? I’m exempt. That is Rabbeinu Hananel’s assumption. I don’t know where he gets that so simply, but that’s what he claims.
[Speaker F] And therefore he says—I didn’t understand this. I understood that if I walk four cubits and I have an object in my hand and I transfer it from one hand to the other, that’s not considered that I carried the object four cubits? I didn’t understand that. When there’s a distance of four cubits between the hands?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s how I understand it. And then he says it’s as though nothing happened; the object didn’t change place, it’s on my body—what changed if it moved from here to there? Fine, there’s room to discuss that issue, because what do you mean? Even when I walked with the object in my hand four cubits in the public domain, then too the object was in my hand and remained in my hand; only my body changed place. That again brings us back somewhat to the difference between place and domain.
[Speaker B] What difference does it make whether the object was in my right hand or in my left hand?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I moved it from place to place, so seemingly if I’m standing in the public domain—
[Speaker B] Only if I was standing between a private domain and a public domain, no—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I’m standing—
[Speaker B] entirely in the public domain, I transferred—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] it from this hand in the public domain to that hand in the public domain, and the distance is two cubits, four cubits. It’s the same person, the same body, the same thing; it moved four cubits—
[Speaker B] in the domain—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] in the public domain, and a hand counts for lifting and placing down, so why shouldn’t he be liable? Rabbeinu Hananel assumes he isn’t liable. And therefore he says that here too it would be the same as transferring from hand to hand, and therefore the side that it is like one person is the side for exemption, not the side for liability. And on the side of two people, then he is liable. Why is he liable? “Because his intention was carried out,” that’s what he writes. What is “because his intention was carried out”? What does that mean?
[Speaker C] It’s what he planned. That it—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] actually happened, right? That’s the Meiri and the direction of Maimonides, but in the Meiri’s wording. Right? Meaning that these two formulations of the question are basically, apparently, Rashi’s formulation—Tosafot goes with Rashi—and Rabbeinu Hananel goes with the Meiri. That doesn’t mean the Meiri himself would necessarily also read the opposite version in the Talmud; the Meiri can read the Talmud like Rashi and explain it according to his own approach. But Rabbeinu Hananel, who reads the opposite version, apparently goes with the Meiri. Meaning, the reverse doesn’t have to be so. Fine, there are various difficulties that the later authorities raise against him here.
[Speaker F] Rabbeinu Hananel goes with Maimonides and Tosafot with Rashi?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Rabbeinu Hananel goes with the Meiri. As for Maimonides, whether he is like the Meiri or not, I don’t know. But like the Meiri’s wording—yes, though the direction is Maimonides’. Meaning, the issue here is not two people who did it; the issue is whether his intention was fulfilled or not fulfilled. Okay? Fine, I see our time is already up, so look at the Tosafot Rosh—you’ll be able to see it in the summary. Basically it’s just seeing the same things once again, only within the Tosafot Rosh. Okay, let’s stop here.
[Speaker E] Thank you very, very much, thank you very much, thank you very much.