Chapter One of Tractate Shabbat – Lesson 52
This transcription was produced automatically using artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.
🔗 Link to the original lecture
🔗 Link to the transcript on Sofer.AI
Table of Contents
- From the concepts of creating something new and kindling to the concept of building
- The method of grounding the discussion in the thirty-nine categories of labor and their derivatives
- The definition of the labor of building and its derivatives
- No building and demolition in utensils, and the dispute among medieval authorities (Rishonim)
- Demolishing, extinguishing, and purposeful labor
- The final hammer blow, fixing a vessel, and the definition of completing a utensil
- Electricity in an appliance versus electricity in a house, and attachment to the ground
- The Chazon Ish: heating metal, cooking/kindling, and fixing a vessel under the category of building
- Three formulations in the Chazon Ish: restoring it to its function, forcing current through, from death to life
- The plasterers’ reed and the distinction between use and creative assembly
- Rabbi Shlomo Zalman Auerbach: rejecting building and proposing a framework of using a utensil
- Letters and formulation of the dispute: current as an external force versus “a force embedded in the wire”
Summary
General Overview
The text presents a lecture on the issue of electricity on the Sabbath and shifts the focus of the discussion from conceptions of creating current and kindling to the concept of building, identified mainly with the approach of the Chazon Ish, as against the critique of Rabbi Shlomo Zalman Auerbach. The lecture explains that the motivation to prohibit turning on electricity stems from the sense that it is a “significant act of creation,” but the halakhic decision requires grounding within the thirty-nine categories of labor or their derivatives; it is not enough just to claim that “it should be prohibited.” In that context, a method is developed for approaching the issue: identify a relevant primary category or derivative, clarify the basic definitions of building, demolishing, the final hammer blow, and their relation to utensils, and understand how the Chazon Ish describes closing an electric circuit as creating a utensil or “restoring it to its function.”
From the concepts of creating something new and kindling to the concept of building
The lecturer states that the concept of building in the activation of electricity was first proposed by the Chazon Ish, and that Rabbi Shlomo Zalman had also thought of it before seeing it in the Chazon Ish, but rejected it on the grounds that it could not be prohibited under the categories of building or the final hammer blow. Rabbi Shmuel Auerbach is quoted with a historical note that an entire chapter was omitted from the book Me’orei Esh because it seemed pointless to prohibit it under the category of building, and after the Chazon Ish’s ruling was published, the discussion was restored in a new edition with additions and correspondence with the Chazon Ish. The lecturer notes that the details of the labors of building, the final hammer blow, and demolishing will not be discussed at length because of time constraints, but that the basic definition of building and the rule “there is no building or demolition in utensils” are essential for understanding the prohibition of electricity.
The method of grounding the discussion in the thirty-nine categories of labor and their derivatives
The lecturer reads the Mishnah on page 73a listing the thirty-nine primary categories of labor and emphasizes that this is the basis for searching for a halakhic “anchor” for prohibiting activation of an electric circuit. The lecturer says there is no closed, centralized list of derivatives, because a derivative is defined as anything similar to the primary category, even if it was not stated explicitly in the Talmud. The lecturer frames the discussion as follows: when seeking a Torah-level prohibition for turning on electricity, the main possibilities are to connect it to kindling, building, and the final hammer blow, while creating something new does not appear on the list and is therefore viewed as rabbinic.
The definition of the labor of building and its derivatives
The lecturer defines the archetypal primary category of building as constructing a structure attached to the ground and joining part to part “so that the structure becomes one,” and notes that this part of the definition is an important focus for the discussion. The lecturer gives examples of derivatives such as setting up a tent and making cheese, and notes that making cheese on the Sabbath is a Torah-level prohibition according to most opinions. The question “what does that have to do with cheese?” is answered with the claim that there is also building in food, and the lecturer postpones an orderly expansion of that point to the next lecture.
No building and demolition in utensils, and the dispute among medieval authorities (Rishonim)
The lecturer presents the Talmudic rule “there is no building and demolition in utensils” as a basic rule for discussing electricity in movable appliances, and defines “utensils” as movable items intended for use, including clothes and kitchenware. The lecturer adds that the Talmud and halakhic decisors discuss the possibility that a very large utensil (holding forty se’ah) may take on the status of a structure because of its fixed nature, even though it is not attached to the ground, since it is not meant to be moved regularly. The lecturer notes that many medieval authorities (Rishonim) bring distinctions that limit the rule and prove from Talmudic passages that there is building in utensils in certain cases, such as making the utensil from the outset, strong attachment called “fastening firmly,” and sometimes also expert craftsmanship, whereas Rashi and the Ran on the Rif interpret the rule literally, that there is no building in utensils, and connect parallel prohibitions to the final hammer blow or some other prohibition.
Demolishing, extinguishing, and purposeful labor
The lecturer defines demolishing as the labor of destruction, which on the Sabbath is prohibited only when it is “demolishing in order to build in the same place,” similar to erasing in order to write and extinguishing for the sake of creating charcoal. From that, the lecturer says it is not simple to determine that turning off an electric appliance is demolishing even if turning it on is building, because turning it off is not aimed at a positive result, and he notes that the Chazon Ish wrote about this too, though the discussion is not straightforward.
The final hammer blow, fixing a vessel, and the definition of completing a utensil
The lecturer describes the final hammer blow as a complex labor whose source is the last hammer strike in completing the making of a utensil, but which was expanded into the category of “any completion of a utensil’s production,” without dependence on an actual hammer, and this is Torah-level, not a later rabbinic addition. The lecturer cites the Jerusalem Talmud, which attributes to the final hammer blow the role of “any labor where we do not know from which angle to prohibit it,” but rejects the need for that vague expansion in the discussion of electricity, arguing that one who links turning on electricity to the final hammer blow means the ordinary completion of a utensil. The lecturer formulates the dispute in terms of perspective: is turning on a fan using a utensil, or completing its making? He emphasizes that this difference can turn an act from a capital Sabbath violation into something permitted, and that these are “mountains hanging by a hair.”
Electricity in an appliance versus electricity in a house, and attachment to the ground
The lecturer distinguishes between activating a circuit in a movable appliance and the electricity of a house, arguing that in a house there is no issue of “no building in utensils,” so if it is building, it is ordinary building. The lecturer notes the possibility that an appliance connected to a socket may in some sense be considered attached to the ground through the wire and therefore move from the status of utensil to structure, unlike a battery-powered appliance. He adds a note about set-aside items: a common view sees a lamp and a fan as utensils whose primary function is prohibited, but he tends to say that since the purpose of the utensil is light and ventilation, which are permitted in themselves, the utensil is not inherently set aside, tying the discussion to the question of whether turning it on is use or completion of labor.
The Chazon Ish: heating metal, cooking/kindling, and fixing a vessel under the category of building
The lecturer reads in the Chazon Ish that he reconciles Maimonides regarding heating metal by saying that intention determines whether the act is a derivative of cooking or a derivative of kindling, and comments that he himself does not need that, because one can see the act as belonging to both without contradiction. The Chazon Ish concludes that lighting an electric lamp involves heating metal, which contains an element of cooking, and at times even a concern of kindling if it makes a live coal, but the lecturer focuses on the main novelty: “there is also in this the fixing of a vessel… and it is very likely that this is building by Torah law, like making a utensil,” because activating the current “restores” the utensil to its function of operating continuously. The Chazon Ish adds that in house wiring attached to the house, “there is no issue here of no building in utensils,” and its law is like something attached to the ground, but even in utensils this act “is considered building” because of its significance, and the lecturer presents this as an attempt to deal with the rule that there is no building in utensils by seeing activation as making a utensil from the outset.
Three formulations in the Chazon Ish: restoring it to its function, forcing current through, from death to life
The lecturer points to three ways the Chazon Ish formulates the matter: turning on electricity as “restoring the utensil to its function,” as “forcing the electricity into the wires,” by analogy to firm fastening, which is a strong connection in building utensils, and as “awakening the wire from death to life,” by analogy to infusing life into a utensil. The lecturer rejects the claim that this is merely poetic writing and argues that it is a description of the act meant to explain the similarity to building, and not only the significance of the creation. The lecturer marks the main question as “why is this similar to building?” and not “why is this significant?”, and sets the dispute against Rabbi Shlomo Zalman on the very possibility of fitting electricity into the categories of building.
The plasterers’ reed and the distinction between use and creative assembly
The lecturer brings from the Chazon Ish the Talmudic discussion in Sabbath 47a of the plasterers’ reed as compared with a segmented lamp, and explains the distinction according to which, with the reed, there are two uses (long and short), so the assembly is not perceived as creating a new utensil but as changing the mode of use, unlike the lamp, whose primary use is when it is assembled. The Chazon Ish concludes that in “turning on the electricity,” introducing current into the wires “is always considered like firm fastening,” and distinguishes between connecting two physical objects and “correcting the form of the object,” where the wire itself changes in its property and becomes a useful utensil in a new way.
Rabbi Shlomo Zalman Auerbach: rejecting building and proposing a framework of using a utensil
The lecturer describes Rabbi Shlomo Zalman as inclined to see connecting a fan or refrigerator to current as easier than setting a clock, because that is their regular way of being used: one connects them for use and then stops them afterward, and therefore, at least at first glance, there is no prohibition in that. Rabbi Shlomo Zalman argues that a fan that cannot be turned off is “a major defect,” and suggests that if there were a fan powered by a spring, it would likely be permitted to use it on the Sabbath. From this he develops a framework that treats activating electricity as use and not as completing the making of a utensil. Later, however, he writes that in practice there is room to be concerned for a Torah prohibition under the category of fixing a vessel, and explains that the current is not merely an external pushing force, but that the electrons inside the wires flow and slightly change the wires and the property of the metal in the machine, so that one could view this as making a utensil each time current is introduced.
Letters and formulation of the dispute: current as an external force versus “a force embedded in the wire”
The lecturer quotes Rabbi Shlomo Zalman’s remark that the words of the Chazon Ish are a great novelty, and that earlier authorities who dealt with electricity were not concerned with the categories of building and demolishing. He also brings a report according to which even closing a circuit without current is prohibited because of building, and he objects to that as inconsistent with the language of the Chazon Ish. In a letter, the Chazon Ish says that the matter depends on judgment, and he distinguishes between heating iron, where the heat “dwells temporarily” and is then expelled, and connecting electricity, which awakens “the force of electricity embedded in the wire itself,” making the wire “one body” with the machine. From here comes the concern for building, both from the side of “assembly of parts” and from the side of “repairing the wire itself from death to life.” The lecturer concludes by pointing ahead to the next lecture through a source from Kehillot Yaakov, in order to return to the precise definition of building and clarify the Chazon Ish’s approach to the parameters of the labor.
Full Transcript
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, we’re in the topic of electricity on the Sabbath. We saw the approaches that view activating an electric circuit as creating current. We saw the kindling approach briefly, and now I want to move to the building approach, which, as I already told you, was first proposed by the Chazon Ish, even though Rabbi Shlomo Zalman had thought about it even before he saw it from the Chazon Ish and rejected it. Meaning, he argued that this cannot be prohibited under the category of building or the final hammer blow or anything like that. And I referred you to the note by Rabbi Shmuel Auerbach, his son, who says that in fact this chapter was even omitted from the book after he basically thought there was no point to it at all—who would think to prohibit this under the category of building? And right after that, the Chazon Ish’s ruling came out that it is prohibited because of building, and then in Me’orei Esh, part two, they put back the whole discussion with additions from correspondence with the Chazon Ish. Meaning, that edition from which I photographed the book for you, Me’orei Esh, is a new edition from Machon Yerushalayim, something with notes and a more organized font, and there too they inserted various additions that were not in the original edition. That’s why it’s called Me’orei Esh HaShalem, as distinct from Me’orei Esh. That’s generally the custom in Torah editions: when they do something with additions they call it “complete,” with commentaries, additions, and so on. Okay, so that’s the general picture. As I pointed out to you on the sheet, I’m not going to go into detail about the labor of building, the final hammer blow, and demolishing, because we really don’t have time for that, and the truth is that most of the discussions there also aren’t essential for our discussion about the Sabbath. What is essential is mainly the basic definition of the labor of building and this rule that there is no building and demolition in utensils—or whether there is. There is a dispute among medieval authorities (Rishonim) about how, when there is, when there isn’t, if at all. That bears on the prohibition of electricity, although I think from a didactic standpoint I’d prefer to get to the parameters of building specifically in the next lecture. There there’s a certain statement that I think will summarize the dispute and the position of the Chazon Ish well, and that’s actually the one I personally identify with in the end. So we’ll get to that later, and as for your preparation, on the sheet, how far did you get—that is, those who finished it, or where are you up to?
[Speaker B] We finished the Chazon Ish; in Me’orei Esh we read the two letters.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay. Others too, more or less the same?
[Speaker B] I have to say, it seems that building, according to what the Chazon Ish writes, is most similar to the creation of man—when a soul is blown into him. Those are his poetic descriptions. There’s no more significant act of creation than that. If anything is significant, it’s blowing a soul into a person—so sending current into a machine so that it comes to life.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The question is whether that’s called building. The creation of man was in the six days of creation, but we’re looking for something in the Tabernacle.
[Speaker B] No, no, I didn’t say it isn’t under the category of building. It’s obviously his poetic language, but I think behind it there stands…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, this isn’t poetic writing. It’s entirely halakhic writing, dry, no poetry at all.
[Speaker B] No, the use of the phrase “putting a soul into a machine” is poetic writing.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I don’t think so. He’s really trying to describe the act itself.
[Speaker B] I think that from the outset, after all, his motivation is that it has to be prohibited, like you said.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, we talked about that, yes.
[Speaker B] And then, when he wrote those expressions, I thought to myself that there’s something enormously, enormously significant here, even if the act itself can be as small as possible—just pressing a button—the significance is enormous. That’s why he really uses the expression of a soul. Meaning, there’s a very significant act here; it’s hard to define exactly what it is, but the significance is impossible to miss.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, so that really is what accompanies us throughout the whole discussion. The basic motivation to prohibit comes exactly from that line of reasoning: there’s something here that you can’t say is not a significant act of creation. On the other hand, you see that all the halakhic decisors try to plant it in some existing primary category, derivative, or Torah-level principle, because the fact that it deserves to be prohibited—that’s how I started in the first lecture—the very fact that it deserves to be prohibited is not enough to prohibit it.
[Speaker B] Meaning, we don’t have the authority. Right, I’m just saying that the significance he puts into it, when he says it’s like blowing a soul in, I see that as his way of explaining why it’s so significant.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s clear, but I think that “blowing a soul into it”—the point I want to focus on is not the question of why it’s significant, but why it is similar to building. Meaning, the Chazon Ish brings that not as a reason why it should be prohibited; he brings it as a reason why it is like building. And that’s the interesting question here, the one Rabbi Shlomo Zalman argues with him about. Shlomo Zalman doesn’t argue that this is a significant act of creation, I assume, but he says, fine—but you can’t fit this into the parameters of building. So what can you do? We don’t have any labor category under which this whole business can fall. And I said this in the first lecture: that possibility—that if they were writing the list of the thirty-nine today, electricity would go in there as a primary category in its own right—none of the halakhic decisors says that. Therefore, once we reject that idea, it isn’t enough for us to say that this thing is significant; we have to see how it fits under one of the primary categories or derivatives of the listed labors. And here the important point is not how significant it is. And that’s the point I want to focus on too.
[Speaker B] Yes, I agree with that. It just seemed to me that he used that phrase—and besides that, he also talked there, regarding the labor of building, about whether you need an expert craftsman in order to activate it. Meaning, there are two elements here: one, what abilities you use to activate it, and on the other hand he also does relate to what the result is.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He relates to both elements.
[Speaker B] Fine, we’ll talk about that.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] An expert craftsman isn’t needed here at all. That’s one of the difficulties raised against him: you’re activating a switch—every child knows how to do that, there’s no craftsmanship here. But we’ll get to that. By the way, craftsmanship is usually required for building in utensils. For ordinary building you don’t need craftsmanship. Leveling holes in the ground, which is also considered building, isn’t an act of craftsmanship. So it’s a condition in building with utensils, but we’ll get there. So that’s basically the background to the discussion. Now, I referred you to Wikipedia so you could see the background of the labor of building in principle, maybe just to get an impression, because we’re dealing with tractate Sabbath but somehow until now we haven’t even looked at the list of the primary categories of labor. At least once, let’s have some encounter with them. So just a second, let me just show you that.
[Speaker B] I think we learned it in Maimonides at the beginning of the year.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, but in the Talmud—the Talmud, that’s on page 73a, and there there’s a Mishnah in the chapter Kelal Gadol. Not the first Mishnah, I think the second in the chapter. “The primary categories of labor are forty less one: sowing, plowing, reaping, gathering into sheaves, threshing, winnowing, selecting, grinding, sifting, kneading, baking; shearing wool, whitening it, beating it, dyeing it, spinning, stretching the threads, making two loops, weaving two threads, separating two threads; tying and untying, sewing two stitches, tearing in order to sew two stitches; trapping a deer, slaughtering it, flaying it, salting it, tanning its hide, smoothing it, cutting it; writing two letters and erasing in order to write two letters; building and demolishing, extinguishing and kindling, the final hammer blow, carrying from one domain to another. These are the primary categories of labor, forty less one.” So here you have the whole list. I’m obviously not going to define all of these primary categories; some of them are not so easy to define.
[Speaker C] We said that carrying is a labor that isn’t a very good one.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s an inferior labor, but it appears among the thirty-nine labors. It appears—on the contrary, that’s exactly what the medieval authorities (Rishonim) struggle with: if it’s an inferior labor, why is it considered a primary category of labor? Why is it on the list? So we talked about that at the beginning of the year. In any case, this is just an encounter so that you can see that this is the source of the whole story. When we’re now looking for an anchor on which to hang the prohibition of electricity, the prohibition of activating an electric circuit, we’re supposed to find it either among the thirty-nine primary categories listed here in the Mishnah or among their derivatives, and there is no orderly list of derivatives. There’s nowhere a centralized, orderly list of derivatives. It appears in the Talmud from this Mishnah onward over the course of dozens of pages. The Talmud goes through each of the primary categories of labor and discusses it, sometimes at length, sometimes briefly, but it discusses every one of the primary categories, and within those discussions the derivatives also appear. So if someone wants to gather all the derivatives, they have to do it by going through the Talmud. I don’t know of a place that gathers them all, because it really also isn’t a closed list, since anything found today that resembles one of the primary categories can also be a derivative. Derivatives are not a closed list that appears in some defined place. There’s no need to put them in a defined place, because the derivatives are sorted under the primary categories. The primary categories are basically the basic categories. Under them you can insert everything—anything similar. There are derivatives that appear in the Talmud because the Talmud already thought of them, and there are derivatives that did not appear in the Talmud, but they are still derivatives because they resemble the primary categories. Okay? So in that sense this Mishnah is the basis of the whole story. Now, we come to prohibit electricity, and we’re supposed to go through this Mishnah and see which of these primary categories can do the job. I’m already presenting it as though we basically want to prohibit it, and now the only question is just how to do it in practice. So we’re looking here, and as I said, in the end there are those who stop at kindling, right? That’s one. And there are those who stop at building. Those are the two primary categories—or categories under which you can place it as a Torah prohibition, and of course there’s the final hammer blow too, yes? The final hammer blow. Those are the three Torah-level sources into which activating an electric circuit can be placed. Everything else would be rabbinic. Maybe before that—things of that sort.
[Speaker C] A question for a second—so for example cooking, is that rabbinic or is it a derivative of…?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, cooking is Torah-level. Here, look. Wait—oh no, sorry, this is baking, yes, but—
[Speaker C] It’s a derivative.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Baking—cooking, according to most opinions, is a primary category, not a derivative. Baking and cooking are the same thing. Again, it makes no practical difference.
[Speaker E] Like carrying out and bringing in, did you hear? Like carrying out and bringing in, they’re the same thing.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s similar to carrying out and bringing in. There too there’s a bit of a dispute, but there too the accepted approaches are that it’s a primary category. Both are a primary category. Again I say, it makes no practical difference—or almost none.
[Speaker C] And creating something new also isn’t on the list here. Can’t hear?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Creating something new. No, that is rabbinic. That’s why I said: from this list it can be either building, or kindling, or the final hammer blow. Okay? Baking—you know what? Cooking too maybe—they cook the wire; there’s some discussion of that too. In any case, that’s about the method of how exactly one should approach such a topic. You simply have to identify in the list of primary categories which ones can do the job.
[Speaker F] So now, derivatives too are Torah-level, right? What?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Derivatives? Of course, of course. Ah—derivatives and primary categories are all Torah-level. That’s why I say there’s no practical difference between them. For both one is liable to stoning if done intentionally, or a sin offering if done unintentionally. There’s no difference. Now, one more note—actually maybe two more notes—I also wrote them on your sheet. So, in the labor of building, basically the definition is to build a structure, right? The accepted definition really is what appears here in Wikipedia.
[Speaker E] To build something attached to the ground.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Connection and assembly of something anew. The labor—wait, yes—the labor is the construction of a permanent structure intended to endure for many days, caused by joining part to part so that the structure becomes one. By the way, that second part, which may look to you like some unnecessary or empty elaboration, is the focal point of the matter—but we’ll get to that next time. “Joining part to part so that the structure becomes one.” But for our purposes, you should remember it. Sometimes people forget it because it sounds so obvious. You have to remember that the labor of building, first and foremost, is building a structure. That is the primary category of building. Now we have to see what resembles it, what is a derivative, what is a primary category, what is rabbinic—but that is basically the fundamental building. Under that come all sorts of things—for example, setting up a tent, that too is building, or even making cheese—that too is building. Because I am, so to speak, joining the different parts of the cheese and creating a structure out of them. So in that sense that too is building, Torah-level building. Making cheese on the Sabbath is a Torah prohibition according to most opinions in any case. That’s what Maimonides writes, for example. So those are the derivatives. But you have to remember first and foremost that the primary category, right, the archetypal labor, is basically building a structure. Taking bricks, connecting them, making some kind of structure out of all those parts—that’s what’s called building. Making cheese, making cheese, yes. What did you say? I didn’t understand. Making cheese—preparing cheese. So that is the primary category of building. The second rule I wanted you to have here is that there is no building and demolition in utensils. There is a rule in the Talmud that says there is no building and demolition in utensils. What are utensils? Utensils are movable things. A structure is something attached to the ground. Utensils are movable things intended for use. Clothing too counts as utensils; kitchen utensils and things like that—all of those are utensils. Even the hive that we talked about, if you remember, where they throw the hive—the hive is movable, so it is a utensil. And in fact from the discussion of the hive and from other places there are those who learn that when the utensil is very, very large, holding at least forty se’ah, it basically becomes a structure. It no longer has the status of a utensil even though it is detached from the ground. Why? Because something so large that sits on the ground is basically attached. Nobody moves it; it’s not meant for regular moving. True, there’s no glue there, but its weight attaches it to the ground, so it’s basically some kind of permanent structure. So size here plays a role only in the sense of permanence. It’s not that utensils have to be small. Utensils have to be movable. Something large is not movable. That’s the point. Now the basic rule written in the Talmud is that with utensils there is neither building nor demolition. This is of course very important for our purposes if we’re talking about the labor of building in electrical devices, movable things. Now of course, as you saw in Wikipedia, there are many qualifications to this. The medieval authorities (Rishonim) prove from various Talmudic discussions that we see in various places that there is building in utensils. And that contradicts this rule that says there is no building and demolition in utensils. And that brings me back again to what I once told you about how to relate to rules in the Talmud. So this is another example of that. The Talmud writes very decisively: there is no building and demolition in utensils, and then a whole lot of passages come back and say there is building in utensils. So the medieval authorities (Rishonim) begin making distinctions as to when building in utensils is indeed considered building. For example, there are those who say when I make the utensil from the outset—not when I add something to it, but when I build a utensil from scratch, which is very significant building—then even though I built a utensil, that is called building. Or when I fasten firmly. What does that mean? When I connect the parts of the utensil and create a utensil here, but the parts are connected to each other with a strong connection, a connection that doesn’t just come apart—that’s what is called fastening firmly. There too there is building and demolition in utensils. They also bring craftsmanship into this context. Meaning, something that has to be done not just by some ordinary act that anyone can do, but something requiring some kind of skill, thought, craftsmanship.
[Speaker B] What does that have to do with cheese? Cheese is neither a house nor a utensil.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Cheese is not a utensil. Cheese is food.
[Speaker B] So why is making cheese prohibited? What, is there building in food?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, there is building. That’s the claim. There is building in food. Okay, I’ll say something about that in the next lecture, because it’ll enter our discussion next time.
[Speaker F] Does that approach parallel in any way which utensils can receive impurity, or is that irrelevant?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. The Talmud says—Eruvin 123 or something like that—the Talmud says: since it is a utensil for impurity, it is a utensil for the Sabbath. Now true, there it’s discussed, I think, with regard to the laws of set-aside, that utensils don’t have the law of set-aside, but in the simple reading the rule is that what defines a utensil defines it for every context, unless there are exceptions. We already saw also regarding domains that there are differences between the Sabbath and impurity. It may be that here too there will be some differences. But as a starting point, it’s the same thing—unless we have proof that there is nevertheless some sort of difference. In any case, that’s about building in utensils, with all the qualifications, and you should always remember that the qualifications appear in the medieval authorities (Rishonim). It’s not in the Talmud. In fact Rashi and the Ran on the Rif write that there is no building in utensils at all, with no qualifications. And all the places where the Talmud says it is prohibited, they attribute it to the final hammer blow or some other prohibition, but not to the prohibition of building. They take the rule in the Talmud literally: there is no building and demolition in utensils. Okay? So there is, in short, a dispute among medieval authorities (Rishonim). I’m saying this only so that it should be in the background. We won’t go into the details of that. Now, the second primary category—or really building, maybe demolishing—that is of course what? Since the labor of demolishing is a labor of destruction, of damage, and on the Sabbath the labors that were done are purposeful labor, therefore the Sages say that demolishing applies only if you demolish in order to build in its place. Meaning, if for example you erase—that too—if you erase so that you can write in the same place where you erased two letters, then you transgress the labor of erasing. The same thing with extinguishing. Extinguishing too is a destructive labor: you’re destroying the fire. Why is that considered a creative labor? Because you are creating charcoal. Exactly. The same thing with demolishing: demolishing is so that you can build in its place. You need the place, so you demolish the structure in order to build in that place, and maybe also in order to use the stones or the parts you dismantled for renewed building. And with extinguishing?
[Speaker E] What? In the list of the Mishnah, extinguishing actually appears before kindling.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Hear? What? I can’t hear you well.
[Speaker F] There’s a problem with the microphone of—
[Speaker E] Chuti.
[Speaker F] Okay, never mind.
[Speaker E] She says that in the list of the thirty-nine labors in the Mishnah—can you hear? Yes—extinguishing actually appears before kindling because here it is the more important one, because it makes charcoal.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t know. We’d have to check whether any of the commentators says something; I don’t remember at the moment. In any case, extinguishing has to be in order to make charcoal. Extinguishing is in principle considered a destructive labor, like demolishing, like erasing. Okay? So all those labors have to be done for some positive purpose, some positive result. The same applies to demolishing. Therefore, in the context of an electrical device for example, it’s not so simple that even if I say that turning it on is under the category of building, it’s not so simple to say that turning it off is under the category of demolishing. There are those who wanted to argue that—the Chazon Ish, for example, writes that—but that is a discussion in its own right. It’s really not simple, because turning off the electric device is not intended to achieve any positive result. So maybe we’ll talk about that too. That’s regarding building and demolishing. The final hammer blow—that’s an extremely complicated and undefined labor. In principle the Talmud explains that it is striking with a hammer to complete the making of a utensil. When you strike with the hammer the final blows in order to set the shape of the utensil, that is called the labor of the final hammer blow. And there they make distinctions between the striking with the hammer and lifting it and all sorts of things like that. Those are all formalities that are secondary. After the Sages explained the matter, they basically expanded the labor of the final hammer blow, and they say that any completion of a utensil—not necessarily with a hammer—any completion, finishing the labor of a utensil, is called the primary category of the final hammer blow. Meaning, if I have some utensil that is almost finished and I do some act here that completes it and turns it into a ready utensil, then I have transgressed the labor of the final hammer blow with no connection to hammers or blows. Okay? Now maybe this wasn’t clear from Wikipedia, because they say that the Sages interpreted it—but all the labors, after all, were interpreted by the Sages; that’s not anything special. It’s not rabbinic. The definition of the final hammer blow as completing the preparation of a utensil is the definition of the Torah-level labor; it’s not a rabbinic addition. That is the definition of the labor of the final hammer blow. Okay? So that labor too is a candidate to play on this field of electricity. I’ll just note: in Wikipedia, if you saw, they bring that the Jerusalem Talmud writes that any labor where we don’t know from which angle to prohibit it should be attributed to the final hammer blow. It’s a strange kind of statement—what, it almost tells us: friends, you’re getting stuck with electricity, you can’t find what to hang it on, what hook to hang your hanger on? No problem—the final hammer blow. What, is this a labor that requires no similarity at all in order to prohibit something because of it? It’s a very strange statement. After all, it’s brought there as some specific labor; it has some interpretation. What do you mean that I can hang anything on the final hammer blow? Okay, all sorts of interpretations have already been said about that. I’m not getting into it here, because for our purposes I don’t really need that expansion of the final hammer blow. One who puts activating an electric circuit under the final hammer blow means the ordinary final hammer blow, not all those vague expansions from the Jerusalem Talmud. Rather, the idea really is that you are finishing the formation of the electric circuit here. The utensil—when you turn on the fan, say—then the fan starts operating; only now is it really a utensil that ventilates. So in fact, that turning on makes it become a fan; until now it only had the potential to ventilate. Now it actually ventilates. And there are those who want to argue that turning on the fan is basically the final hammer blow. To me that seems quite doubtful, but that is how some want to argue.
[Speaker F] But that—it mixes concepts a bit. Hear? It mixes concepts. It says that using the utensil is actually part of building it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That is exactly the whole dispute in electricity. You saw it in Rabbi Shlomo Zalman, in the question whether turning it on is using the utensil or completing the making of the utensil. That’s exactly the difference. If it’s using the utensil, then there’s no final hammer blow here at all. If it’s completion, then it is the final hammer blow, it’s a Torah prohibition. And how to define when it is completion of the labor and when it is only use—you see again what I told you also in previous times: it’s a matter of reasoning. One sees it this way, another sees it that way. It’s very hard to bring clear proofs here, to cut it one way with some very sharp criterion. It’s very much a matter of perspective. And notice: that perspective can take me from a Torah prohibition to a permission. Are you using the utensil or finishing preparing the utensil? That is the difference between a capital prohibition and something permitted to do. And these are matters that are all “mountains hanging by a hair,” as the Mishnah says.
[Speaker C] But electrical appliances—I don’t make them, I buy them. Meaning, true, someone made them, but I personally had no hand in it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Doesn’t matter. You completed it. When you finish the making of the utensil, it doesn’t have to be that you also started it. Even if you take from me a utensil that I made, and now you only do the hammer strike, the completion, then you have transgressed the labor of the final hammer blow.
[Speaker F] Rabbi, you know what? Here too I keep having comparisons in my head to the issue of ritual purity of utensils. Final completion by a Jew, so that the utensil doesn’t require immersion—that isn’t achieved by plugging it into electricity; nobody claimed that.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I didn’t understand. Again.
[Speaker F] Suppose I have an electrical device manufactured abroad. So in order that it not require immersion, there has to be final completion by a Jew. Nobody claimed that plugging it into electricity counts as final completion.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Whoever says here that this is the final hammer blow—that’s a good question, why there he doesn’t say it is exempt from immersion. I don’t know, good question.
[Speaker C] In that context—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait. I think it’s not the final hammer blow, so there’s no question. But one who says that it is the final hammer blow—it really is a good question. Yes, sorry, Yael.
[Speaker C] Following what Idit said—fine, so the first time she did it and made the product fit for use, right, the product that was made by non-Jews abroad. Now every time she activates it or connects it to electricity, what happens then?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Again—it’s again. When I took it out of the electricity, or disconnected it, or turned off the device, it went back to being an unready device. And now I do the final hammer blow again. You understand? That’s the claim. I say again: that’s why in my eyes it really is a strained claim. It creates a contradiction.
[Speaker F] The moment I turned off the device, I demolished the utensil.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, right. Okay, even though this is demolition, it’s not demolition for the sake of building something. Rabbi Shlomo Zalman points this out, after all. It’s demolition only in order not to pay the electric bill. It’s not something that actually creates anything for me, so it’s hard to see this as the prohibited labor of demolishing. But in principle, yes. Meaning, someone who… By the way, another important point: the prohibited labor of building has an opposite, namely demolishing. The prohibited labor of the final hammer blow has no opposite. Because you can’t do something that is the opposite of a hammer blow—there’s no primary category of labor like that. So here there will be a difference. If I see turning on a device as the final hammer blow, then turning it off is certainly not demolition. If I see turning on a device as building it, then there is room to say that turning it off would be demolition. So here too there’s another practical difference depending on whether I go in the direction of building or in the direction of the final hammer blow. The question will be about turning it off, although as I said, even if I see it as building, it’s not certain that turning it off here would count as extinguishing, okay? But it would be demolition. Still, you could say that it’s demolition only if turning on the device is building. If turning on the device is the final hammer blow, then it’s irrelevant. Okay, so that really is a quick survey of these primary categories. And now I want to get into the Chazon Ish. Ah, one more note—actually two more notes. First note: when we say repairing a vessel, “vessel” is “kli” in Aramaic. “Repairing a vessel” means repairing a utensil. Sometimes they mean the final hammer blow; sometimes they mean building with utensils when the construction is complete. It depends on the different approaches of the medieval authorities (Rishonim), whether there is building with utensils or there is no building with utensils. But when people say “repairing a vessel,” they mean a Torah-level prohibited labor. Sometimes some medieval authorities (Rishonim) will say this is the final hammer blow, some will say this is building with utensils—those are already different views among the medieval authorities (Rishonim)—but when people say “repairing a vessel,” that is not an additional primary category of labor. It’s a Torah prohibition that falls under the final hammer blow or under building with utensils. Okay, that’s a linguistic note. And another note relevant to us: when we talk about activating an electrical circuit on the Sabbath, I think I already mentioned this on the sheet, when we talk about activating an electrical circuit on the Sabbath, it depends whether it’s the circuit of a device or the circuit of the house, the house electricity. Because if it’s a device, then we enter the problem of building with utensils—whether there is building with utensils, whether there isn’t, when this is called building with utensils, and so on. If it’s the house electricity, then it’s not utensils, so if it’s building, it’s ordinary building. It doesn’t depend on the various views about building with utensils or not. There is some room to discuss, for example, if I activate a fan—I’m going back to the fan. If I plug the fan into the socket and now turn it on, or I plug it into the socket and that’s how I activate it, it could be that this itself is considered attaching it to the ground.
[Speaker C] Right, why not?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Even though the fan is still movable, the cord connects it to the ground, and in that sense you really can’t move it significantly. You can take it from here to there, but you can’t move it significantly, and there is room to say that this stops being building with utensils and starts being ordinary building, building of a regular structure. Now that’s unlike, say, a battery-powered fan, where it’s not like that. Turning it on there is at most building with utensils. Meaning, there’s no fixed structure here. Another note I’m remembering in this context: in the laws of muktzeh there is a discussion among halakhic decisors about moving a fan on the Sabbath or a lamp on the Sabbath. I mean not activating—moving. If I move a lamp or move a fan, have I moved muktzeh? Most opinions say yes. Why? Because it is a utensil whose function is for a prohibited use. There is a prohibition to activate it—you press a switch. Since there is a prohibition to activate it, it is a utensil whose function is for a prohibited use, which is one of the categories of muktzeh, and therefore it is forbidden to move it, although a utensil whose function is for a prohibited use is a lighter kind of muktzeh. Because you may move it for its own use or for its place, unlike a stone or something that is muktzeh and not a utensil at all. But still there is a prohibition to move it for no reason. I claim—can’t hear me?
[Speaker F] You can direct the fan, turn it toward me.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, by turning I mean that, not turning it off.
[Speaker F] No, oh, of course, turning it. Yes, you’re talking about muktzeh.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So that’s one opinion. I tend to think that it isn’t muktzeh at all. It isn’t muktzeh at all, because there is no prohibition against enjoying ventilation on the Sabbath, and there is also no prohibition against using light on the Sabbath. There is a prohibition against activating light, but the lamp is not… “a utensil whose function is for…” means: what is the utensil intended for? The utensil is intended to provide ventilation or to give light. There is no prohibition on being ventilated or illuminated on the Sabbath. There is a prohibition against activating an electrical circuit, but the utensil is not intended for activating an electrical circuit; activating an electrical circuit is just the mode of use. But the purpose of the use—“a utensil whose function is for…” —the purpose of the use is a completely permitted purpose. It is permitted to use light and permitted to enjoy ventilation, and therefore in my view this is not a utensil whose function is for a prohibited use; it is a utensil whose use is permitted, and it may be moved freely. Even from sun to shade, not only for its own use or for its place. Meaning, it can be moved entirely freely. This is somewhat connected to our discussions about what counts as use of a utensil and what counts as completing the labor of a utensil. In this case it comes out the other way around. If I understand activating the fan as its final hammer blow, then that means that before I turned it on, it wasn’t really a fan at all. Okay? So basically, once the fan is activated, it is something different from what it was when it wasn’t activated. And then you tell me that the activation is basically the final hammer blow. So when I ask what the activated utensil is intended for, I say: it is intended to ventilate. But what is the unactivated utensil intended for? There maybe there is room to say that it is intended to be activated and become a fan. And then maybe you could say that this is a utensil whose function is for a prohibited use. But a fan that is on—its function is not to be turned on by pressing a button; its function is to ventilate. Therefore if we are talking about moving a fan that is off, then perhaps there is some basis for the reasoning that it is muktzeh. It is muktzeh more than just because it’s forbidden to activate it; rather, it is muktzeh because it truly has no use at all. It is almost muktzeh due to its own nature, not a utensil whose function is for a prohibited use. It has no use at all, because its only activation is by pressing the switch, and that is forbidden. But a fan that was already turned on before the Sabbath—therefore even if I accept this regarding a fan that is off, regarding a fan that is operating, it seems to me incorrect to say that it is muktzeh; it is not muktzeh.
[Speaker C] If it’s a battery-powered fan? What? I didn’t hear. If it’s a battery-powered fan, and it was turned on before the Sabbath, then there’s no problem with it and also no problem moving it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right now we’re discussing not the question of moving but the question of activating. I only noted parenthetically that there is also a question of moving, and I said that it is connected to our discussion about activation. Because if activation is the final hammer blow, then it follows that the fan when off is not yet really a fan at all. When I ask what this device called an off fan serves for, the answer is: it serves for pressing a button to become a fan—and then you can say it is a utensil whose function is for a prohibited use. But the fan when on is a fan that serves for ventilation; it does not serve to be turned on. It is a utensil whose function is for a permitted use. All this is if I understand turning it on as an act of the final hammer blow. But if I understand turning it on as an act of building—or certainly if I understand it as use—then the fan is a fan even before I turned it on. It is intended for ventilation, not for turning on. And then it may be that even an off fan may be moved. Maybe. There is room to discuss that. Fine, that really is just a side note. I now want to get into the Chazon Ish. I’m sharing it. Okay, this is the Chazon Ish. This is basically the main source in the Chazon Ish for the prohibition on activating electricity on the Sabbath—it’s here. Beyond that, there is his correspondence with Rabbi Shlomo Zalman, which is also used quite a lot to understand his view. But in terms of the Chazon Ish’s own books, the main source is here. So let’s read it quickly. Maimonides wrote, chapter 9, law 6—you see section 9, right?—that one who melts metal, we saw this Maimonides, or heats it until it becomes a coal, this is a derivative of cooking. And in chapter 12, law 1, he wrote that one who heats iron in order to temper it in water, this is a derivative of kindling. It would seem—so is it cooking or kindling? So we already discussed that there is no contradiction; it is both cooking and kindling, and it is not necessarily required to distinguish between them. But the Chazon Ish does distinguish. He says: it appears that here the intention changes the root category of the labor. What does he mean? There is a whole collection of labors on the Sabbath—or let’s put it differently, before getting to the complete collection: in general, intention does not change the character of the labor. Intention might exempt me because of labor not needed for its own purpose, or an unintended act, or something like that, but it’s not that if you do the labor with one intention it is building, and if you do the labor with another intention it is trapping. Intention cannot move you from one labor category to another. But both medieval and later authorities write in several places that there are some labors that are exceptions, where intention plays a role in defining the labor itself. If you do it for a different intention, it becomes a different primary category of labor. Not that you are exempt because it is not needed for its own purpose or because it is unintended, but rather that it is a different primary category. The intention here is not incidental; it is part of the very definition of the labor. The Chazon Ish says that with heating metal, the intention determines the nature of the labor. There are intentions for which it will be the labor of cooking, and there are intentions such that if you do the same thing but with a different intention, it will be the labor of kindling. That’s unusual; usually intention does not change the definition of the primary category.
[Speaker C] No, Maimonides says that, not the Chazon Ish. What did you hear? Maimonides says that.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no—the Chazon Ish says it. Maimonides says—Maimonides says in one place that it is kindling, and in another place he says it is cooking. Didn’t I say in the class where we discussed this that the later authorities ask about a contradiction? I think there is no contradiction here at all. It is both cooking and kindling. In the laws of cooking he brings it as an example of the prohibition of cooking, and in the laws of kindling he brings it as an example in the laws of kindling, but there is no contradiction at all—it can be both.
[Speaker D] The one who distinguishes says that it depends on intention, how you define the labor. He disagrees. But if the Rabbi says it is both this and that, then intention does not necessarily affect it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That is exactly what I’m saying.
[Speaker B] But—
[Speaker D] Didn’t we say earlier—the emphasis was also that this reasoning that…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, I emphasized it, I emphasized it. I brought what I said in the previous class precisely in order to say this—that the entire distinction of the Chazon Ish, where he makes it depend on intention, stems from his basic conception that there are not two primary categories here, but rather every intention tells you which primary category you are violating. But if I say there are two primary categories here and no need to distinguish…
[Speaker D] Could it be that these are unrelated things? You could accept this and that; it could be that there are two labors at once, and it could also be that intention…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But you don’t have to, you don’t have to distinguish by intention. Maybe there will be a distinction, but you don’t have to.
[Speaker B] But didn’t we say that with building—we didn’t say that with demolition you do need intention?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You hear? With demolition, if you don’t do it for the normal purpose, then it is labor not needed for its own purpose or destructive action, but it does not become a different primary category. Okay? Meaning, this exists in all the labors. If you don’t do it with the usual intention or for the goal for which it was done in the Tabernacle, but for a different goal—for example, digging a pit, we talked about this: if one digs a pit and needs only its dirt. I’m doing the same action, digging the pit, but I don’t need the pit; I need the dirt I remove from it. So here it is only a difference in my intentions, not a difference in the action I am doing. And nevertheless this exempts me, according to Rabbi Shimon, who says that labor not needed for its own purpose is exempt. So it exempts me, but it does not move me into a different primary category; rather, it is an exemption: if one does a labor in a way that is not needed for its own purpose, one is exempt. That is true in all the labors. What is special here, according to the Chazon Ish—and I’m saying in a few other labors according to other medieval and later authorities—is that there are places where the intention is not a matter of exemption, but rather the intention defines which primary category of labor you are violating. In any case you are violating something.
[Speaker D] And would the Rabbi say that there too there are also two labors in one? Right? In other cases too, Rabbi, would you say that there too there are two labors at the same time?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In which case?
[Speaker D] You just said that there are other later authorities who in other labors also distinguish according to intention, and there too…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no. What I’m saying is not about all those places. Where they say this in order to resolve a difficulty, as they ask here on Maimonides, there I say that there is no need—there is no difficulty, so there is no need to get to that. There are places where they say it for other reasons, and there I might agree.
[Speaker D] Right, that’s why I said these are unrelated things. It could be that there really is a case where intention changes it. That’s all I was asking. Fine.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct. I have no principled problem with the idea that intention changes things. I’m only claiming that here there is no need to get to that. What forces the Chazon Ish into that conception is the idea that there is a contradiction in Maimonides, but there is no contradiction in Maimonides. Fine, so let’s see how intention changes the type of labor at all. I’ll keep reading. And if one melts or makes a coal and wants the coal itself—for example, if he wants to make a hammered form, yes?—and when it is a coal, it is only in order to soften it and imprint a form in it, then the labor is classified as a derivative of cooking and there is no kindling here. Because if he softens the metal in order to hammer it out, to create a form from it, then in essence he has no interest in kindling the metal so that it burn; he only wants to cook the metal so that he can shape it. That would not be kindling, only cooking. And when his intention is not to soften it but only to temper it, and he heats it white-hot in order to temper it, then there is no cooking here, only kindling. Okay? “To temper,” we already discussed this: when I heat the metal and then throw it into water, the conception was that this tempers the metal, hardens it, stiffens it. Okay? So since here I basically have some objective that the metal burn, and then by being put into water it will be tempered, in such a situation this is the labor of kindling. Although here there is room to hesitate, because I am not really interested in the fire created in the metal; in the end I want to extinguish it so that it hardens. But here the Chazon Ish claims that it is still called kindling. And according to the Raavad there, heating iron is always cooking and not… and this requires further examination. And we must consider the case where he intends neither to temper nor to soften, whether there is cooking involved, etc. Okay? So he says that… well, here he goes into cooking to the level of Ben Derosai’s food; I’ll leave that part. I’m moving here—now he starts with electricity. From what has been said, we learn that one who turns on an electric lamp on the Sabbath is liable because of heating iron, which involves cooking. But since it is an inevitable result that he does not desire, nevertheless it is forbidden—rabbinically forbidden. And perhaps that is so… Why does he not desire it?
[Speaker D] I didn’t understand. What? I didn’t understand why he does not desire it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because I do not need the heating of the iron.
[Speaker E] You don’t want it to…
[Speaker D] I only need the light.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The light, yes—but not the softening of the iron. The softening of the iron, on the contrary, I don’t want; it ruins the bulb for me.
[Speaker E] Exactly.
[Speaker D] Meaning, if there are bulbs that shine without heating up, that’s only better for me.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I didn’t understand.
[Speaker D] It is preferable to me that there be no heating, only light. Fine.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You know, this really reminds me of… I once wrote a column on the website—I’m turning this off just so I can see you from time to time, I told you. I once wrote a column on the site. I once saw an advertisement by a factory, I think a German one, from there… about incandescent bulbs, right. Once incandescent bulbs were prohibited because they waste energy, and everyone was required a few years ago to use LED bulbs. He started advertising the incandescent bulbs he was selling as heaters. Now you can’t prohibit someone from selling heaters, right? That’s allowed. It’s forbidden to sell wasteful bulbs, because their energy is wasted on heating even though they’re meant for illumination, so they don’t want you wasting energy; they say, you want light? Take an LED bulb. He said, no, I want a heater. So here, this lamp is the heater that I’m selling. And he sold all the bulbs to whoever wanted them as heaters. And that was just an amazing bit—I was literally rolling on the floor laughing. He was making fun of the whole thing, but it’s very hard to get around the argument; on the face of it, it’s an argument that holds water. He was joking about it, making fun of the whole issue, but he really did sell them—seriously sold them. He kept selling incandescent bulbs, which were prohibited by law, and instead of selling them as lamps with low efficiency, he sold them as heaters with high efficiency. Meaning, the energy that is being wasted is only the energy going to light, which is a small amount. The energy going to heat is exactly what I want, so it’s a heater with high efficiency, not a bulb with low efficiency.
[Speaker D] Actually, in Russia I stored potatoes like that, with all kinds of shortages there, and I made a box outside and put a bulb inside it so it would heat, so the cold wouldn’t ruin the potatoes. It was a box with insulation, but inside there was heating from the bulb.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, so for you it really was a heater.
[Speaker B] Apparently now we understand why he managed to sell it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A huge market in Russia. Plenty of it in Russia. Fine, the point is that his market was Germany, not Russia.
[Speaker B] There are a lot of immigrants from Russia there.
[Speaker D] Not only that, over there in general there were all kinds of tricks like that.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You know, that reminds me of more stories, if we’re already telling stories. I got this source from my father-in-law. And he told me about his father, I think—or actually his grandfather. He was from London. So his grandfather had a furniture store there, and the law in England was that on Sunday you weren’t allowed to open stores that didn’t sell food. On Sunday stores had to close; only food sales were permitted. So he opened his furniture store and said: anyone who buys a kilo of tomatoes will get a living room set for 2,000 shekels. So in other words, on Sunday he opened a vegetable store.
[Speaker B] That was also during COVID—all the non-essential businesses put fruit stands outside.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, exactly. So it’s funny when you look at it from a distance, but sometimes people do this and it even seems natural to us. Okay, in any event, back to our topic. I’m sharing the Chazon Ish again. We’ve done the jokes. So that’s regarding cooking. He says it is an inevitable result that he does not desire, etc., so it is only a rabbinic prohibition. But the heating is needed for transmitting the current, and therefore it is considered desirable. Yet all this is only if part of the wire reaches the degree called “the hand recoils from it.” Meaning, some of the wire reaches a temperature so hot that you can’t touch it because it burns the hand. Then it counts as cooking, because cooking applies only when you bring the item being cooked to substantial heat, and the indication is that the hand recoils from it. And regarding kindling, says the Chazon Ish—I continue reading—and regarding kindling…
[Speaker F] If someone touches “the hand recoils from it,” right? You hear? If someone touches a weak electric current—gets an electric shock—is that considered “the hand recoils from it,” or is that not called heat?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no. If you touch something with a one-and-a-half-volt battery, there’s no heat at all, it’s not…
[Speaker F] But why does he—
[Speaker E] prohibit it if it’s an inevitable result…
[Speaker F] I can’t hear. Is an electric shock defined as heat? Like “the hand recoils from it”?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If it’s an incandescent bulb, that is definitely “the hand recoils from it.”
[Speaker E] No, an electric shock.
[Speaker F] I’m talking about electric wires—if I connect plus and minus through my hand and touch it, is that called “the hand recoils from it,” or is that something else, not heat?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t recommend that you touch it. In a wall socket…
[Speaker F] The body recoils.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In a wall socket that’s not “the hand recoils from it”; that’s “the hand gets charred.”
[Speaker F] Right, so the question is whether that counts as heat.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Of course it does. The hand gets charred from the heat. It gets charred from the heat, not from the electricity.
[Speaker E] It fries you. Yes. So maybe it’s forbidden because of kindling? I can’t hear. Maybe it’s forbidden because of kindling, because it makes charcoal?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait—it’s forbidden first of all because of danger to life. Fine.
[Speaker B] I wanted to ask about that sentence, “but since it is an inevitable result that he does not desire, nevertheless it is forbidden.” Why is it forbidden?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s less important for our purposes. The point is that when a person does not intend the labor, then according to Rabbi Shimon it is permitted. But if it is an inevitable result—meaning it will necessarily happen—then if it will necessarily happen, it is an inevitable result, and then one is liable. But if it is an inevitable result that he does not desire, according to some views among the medieval authorities (Rishonim), that is a rabbinic prohibition.
[Speaker B] And in any case he says about it that nevertheless it is forbidden.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Rabbinically forbidden, yes. And regarding kindling: if part of the wire becomes a coal, then perhaps there is liability for kindling according to Maimonides. Yes, if it actually becomes a coal, then that’s the dispute between Maimonides and the Raavad that we saw, and then there is liability for kindling. At the moment we are still not in the realm of building, so that’s less important for our purposes. However, if it does not become a coal, even though sparks of light scatter, etc.—moving on. What is important for us is the next section. “There is also in this…” here: “There is also in this the issue of repairing a vessel, since he now sets it into its condition to allow the electric current to flow continuously, and it is close to saying that this is building by Torah law, as one who makes a utensil.” Up to here—let’s stop here for a moment. What does he mean here?
[Speaker E] That here it’s because of building. Here it’s because of building, because the flowing of the current establishes this utensil in the condition for which it was created.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why does he need all these explanations? What is he trying to say here?
[Speaker E] Because he wants to explain why this is because of building. He needs to say that something new has been built here, something that didn’t exist when the utensil wasn’t operating.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The basic problem is that there is no building with utensils. Therefore we have to see how this can nevertheless be prohibited under building. And at this point we are talking about something movable; in a moment he’ll get to something fixed. But an electrical device that is movable—he says, “since he sets it into its condition to allow the electric current to flow continuously,” yes? That is basically called taking something that was not a fan and turning it into a fan. And now this is basically called “it is close to saying that this is building by Torah law, as one who makes a utensil.” Because with utensils there is no building—unless you make the utensil from the outset. And if you make the utensil from the outset, then there is building even with utensils. The Chazon Ish claims—and this is a novel reasoning—that running electricity through a ready-made fan is called building the utensil from the outset. Why? Because this is such a dramatic change. It’s not that you added another part and thereby the utensil is complete. You simply turned it from a lump of plastic into a functioning fan. That means building a utensil from beginning to end, producing a utensil out of raw materials.
[Speaker E] Rabbi, this is a bit similar to creating a fragrance.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I can’t hear you well, I don’t know, maybe on my end something is…
[Speaker E] It’s a bit similar to creating a fragrance—when they infused fragrance into a garment, it was as though they built a new utensil.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why? Because even with building in utensils there is a Torah prohibition if you build the utensil from the outset. And I said that the reasoning we saw regarding generating current will return here when we discuss the Chazon Ish under the laws of building. That’s true, the reasoning is similar. Only there it is on the rabbinic level, and here it is said on the Torah level. And next time I’ll sharpen that even more in the next class. But this is a key sentence in the Chazon Ish. His claim is that there is building with utensils here, but it is building a utensil from the outset. You turn it from raw material into a functioning utensil, into something new. And from the perspective of the Chazon Ish, according to his reasoning, this says that it is such a significant kind of building that this kind of building exists even with utensils. That is basically his claim. He is coming to deal with the problem that there is no building with utensils; that is why he has this whole sentence. Now we need to understand exactly what it means—what is called “setting it into its condition.” He is, as it were, turning the utensil into something entirely different. It was a lump of plastic and now it is a fan. It’s something else. Even though in the utensil itself you won’t see that it changed, aside from the fact that it just moves. But he says: functionally, it is something completely different. It’s not like, say, a hammer, where you see a hammer and I add another piece to it, say a handle. Then that is not called building the utensil from the outset, because there was already a hammer there and I only added something that could help me use it. In principle I could have used it even without the handle. But here you are making something from zero. Again, conceptually—even though the whole fan was already built in terms of the material it consists of—but by turning on the fan you are making something from zero, and that is called making a utensil from the outset, repairing a vessel. Okay? “And all the more so,” I continue reading, “here, where all the wires are connected to the house.” That’s all with a movable utensil. What happens when the wires are in the house? “And here there is no issue of there being no building with utensils, but rather its law is like something attached to the ground, and there is in it building and demolishing.” Okay? Meaning, his claim is that everything he said before referred to a movable device. But if you do this by turning on electricity in the house, that is certainly building. There you don’t even need to get to this reasoning that you are setting the thing into its condition. Why? Because that reasoning was meant to deal with the rule that there is no building with utensils, but in a house there is building. You don’t need special reasoning to explain why there is a prohibition of building here. Therefore in a house, even without that reasoning, you violate building. And he concludes: “But here there is no practical difference in this, for even with utensils in such a case it is considered building.” As he said above, even if this were a movable utensil, the creation is so significant that it is Torah-level building. So there is no need even to get into this point that it is attached building rather than a movable utensil, because even on the assumption that it is a movable utensil, there is Torah-level building here. That is what the Chazon Ish claims.
[Speaker B] I want to understand for a moment where he gets this from the labor of building. After all, with the labor of building we said that it is joining parts together. Right. The fact that something was created here—that’s creation. Why is this creation considered building?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s a very good question. I’ll get to it in the next class. But you are right, it’s a good question. And the Chazon Ish basically claims—say, if I were to create a utensil by hocus-pocus, would that be the labor of building? One might say no. I didn’t join parts together and create a utensil. On the other hand, the Chazon Ish says, surely it makes no sense that if I both produce the parts and connect them, that should be more permitted than taking prepared parts and connecting them. In the end what I did here was create something from nothing. So if I had managed to assemble it from parts, that would be forbidden; if I created it from nothing, all the more so it should be forbidden. And in the next class we’ll explain why this is closer to the labor of building. But for now that’s just an initial answer.
[Speaker E] Wait, but here you did connect two parts. You connected—can you hear me?—you connected two parts here, because you connected the utensil with the electrical mechanism.
[Speaker B] But that’s not—
[Speaker E] what he’s saying.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The electrical mechanism is already inside it. I didn’t connect anything. What do you mean? It’s not the fan’s cord to the socket; there’s a battery inside it. The whole utensil is there already connected; you’re just flipping the switch.
[Speaker D] No, but I always innocently thought that when he talks about building, he means an electrical system to which he adds some piece that connects two parts and then it starts working. As if that whole electrical scheme somehow…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, no, he’s not connecting anything.
[Speaker D] Take a flashlight and turn it on—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] the switch of the flashlight.
[Speaker D] Exactly, there is an electrical connection there between one part and another part.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He is only closing the circuit; he’s not connecting any part to any part. Those parts were already connected on one side, but not on the other side. He is only closing the circuit.
[Speaker D] Closing the circuit—he is adding a connection.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What did I connect to what? What did I connect to what?
[Speaker E] One end to the other.
[Speaker D] A wire to a wire.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But the wire to the wire was also connected before. After all, how does it exist without a circuit? The circuit closes like this: it was like this, and the switch closed it like this. So they are already connected on this side—they were connected earlier too.
[Speaker D] True, but it’s like—you made one wall, say; it still isn’t a house. You made another wall, something like that.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But I didn’t connect anything here. In a house I really do connect things. When I added the wall to the house, I connected the new wall to the house; before, it wasn’t connected. Here, everything that is connected now was connected already beforehand.
[Speaker D] I don’t know—say a sukkah that is standing there completely open, it doesn’t constitute any kind of house, and I closed it on two sides, and then an interior space was formed.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s only because of making a tent, which is a derivative of building—we’ll talk about that next time. There is no ordinary building here.
[Speaker D] I’m just saying what I always had in mind all these years when I…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, but there is no ordinary building here; there is a tent. A tent is a derivative of building, and we need to understand why in the next class. Okay, so that’s an initial answer. Now I’ll already say here, because I don’t know how much more we’ll manage—we’re running short on time—this is just one formulation of the Chazon Ish. He has two more formulations in different places, partly in letters and partly later here. One formulation is that he wedges the electricity into the wires. He wedges the electricity into the wire by means of the connection. Here there is already an attempt to make it truly parallel to connecting one thing into another, wedging one thing into another, except that this still requires a certain kind of abstraction.
[Speaker D] So it’s not connecting an electrical circuit, but connecting a current that starts…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. I insert the current into the wire and make them connected. The current is now inside the wire. And this is “wedging the electricity into the wire.” The term “wedging” is of course borrowed from the laws of building with utensils. In building with utensils, when you wedge one thing into another, you violate building even though it’s with utensils. The Chazon Ish says: wedging the electricity into the wire counts as wedging—there is building with utensils here. That is a second formulation of the Chazon Ish. A third formulation of the Chazon Ish is that he awakens the wire from death to life. And that reminds us of what Chani said earlier, yes? Like creating a human being, “and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life.” Okay? That is a third formulation. These are three different formulations of the Chazon Ish, and we need to understand whether there is a connection between them, or whether they are three alternatives, or what exactly—how to understand the Chazon Ish’s conception here, what exactly the labor of building is. And again, for now I’m only drawing your attention to it; I’ll give the answer in the next class. Okay, so let’s keep reading now. This is basically the picture in the Chazon Ish. I completed it so we wouldn’t be limited by time. That’s what I wanted us to manage regarding the Chazon Ish. Now Rabbi Shlomo Zalman, of course, argues with him on many points. He says: what do you mean, he wedges the electricity into the wires? What kind of… There aren’t really two things here that existed separately and that you connected. It’s simply giving form to the wire. And then he says—and Rabbi Shlomo Zalman himself feels that there is this formulation that he moves the wire from death to life, which is exactly giving another form to the wire; it is not connecting one thing to another. He says yes, but even there too he doesn’t understand. So what? Why is that the labor of building? What does that have to do with the labor of… You can say this is creation from nothing, a very significant act of creation, but why is it building? Building means joining parts and making a structure from them. So in short, Rabbi Shlomo Zalman in principle seems not to accept any of these formulations. He even distinguishes between them, but he does not accept any of them. The Chazon Ish then continues and says—this is also an important distinction; let’s see how much of it we can manage—he says: “And behold, they said,” Sabbath 47a, “one may not reinsert the pole of a plasterer’s brush.” Yes—a plasterer’s brush where one inserts a stick into the brush, and then plasters the wall. So if I insert the pole, the stick, into the brush, I may not insert it. And if he did reinsert it, he is exempt but it is forbidden—it is only a rabbinic prohibition if he reinserted it. And apparently the pole of a plasterer’s brush is taught parallel to the lamp in the earlier clause, which deals with wedging. And in the case of the lamp—there it is a segmented lamp; segmented means these sections that I connect—there it says that if he wedges it firmly, he is liable. That is building with utensils, and that is what the medieval authorities (Rishonim) say. There too it is speaking when he wedged it firmly. So why is that there only a rabbinic prohibition, while in the lamp it is a Torah prohibition? So he says as follows. And the reason… can’t hear?
[Speaker E] When you take it apart, is that also for the sake of its use?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. So he says: “And the reason is that with the lamp, its main usage is when assembled, and taking it apart is not for use but for some other reason. But the plasterer’s pole has two uses: in a low place a long pole is not suitable, and in a high place a short pole is not suitable. Therefore when he lengthens it temporarily, even if he wedged it, it is considered like placing one utensil on top of another utensil in order to reach a high place, and the status of ‘long pole’ has not truly come to rest upon it.” What is he saying? This is a basic distinction that he continues with afterward, so it’s important to see it here.
[Speaker F] That the distinction is… whether it’s a permanent use.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] With the lamp, when I take it apart I have simply stopped using it; it’s not another kind of use. When I assemble it, that’s in order to use it. Therefore, with the lamp, taking it apart is demolition and assembling it is building.
[Speaker E] But with the pole—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] of the plasterer, when it is wedged firmly, of course, because otherwise it’s not building with utensils. But if I wedged it firmly, then I’m building. However, with the plasterer’s pole, both disassembly and assembly are for the sake of use. It is not stopping the use.
[Speaker E] And also when you assemble it, it’s still considered two utensils, one utensil on top of another; it’s not…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I think that’s not his main point. What he is basically saying is that whether it has a long pole or a short pole, these are just two different ways of using this thing. Therefore…
[Speaker E] I think it’s because it still counts as two utensils, so a new utensil was not created.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, but that’s not important. Because with a short utensil and a long utensil, it was a utensil when it was short and when it is long it is the same utensil, only now it is long. So it follows that attaching and removing the extra pole, adding the extension pole—it’s like a vacuum cleaner where you insert another segment or another extension piece. Fine? So if I insert another extension piece, that is simply another way of using the same plasterer’s pole. Therefore when I took it apart, that was not to destroy the pole, because the pole still exists, and when I connected it, that was not to create a new pole; it’s the same pole. Therefore even if it was wedged firmly, it is only a rabbinic prohibition. And if it wasn’t wedged firmly, then there isn’t even a rabbinic prohibition here.
[Speaker E] But he says, “and whenever he wedged it firmly, he is liable to bring a sin-offering.” Can’t hear? But he says, “and whenever he wedged it firmly, he is liable to bring a sin-offering,” so that’s Torah-level.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, that’s Nachmanides. That’s the wording of Nachmanides and the Ritva. So he is bringing an additional opinion there—that’s not his own view.
[Speaker E] Got it.
[Speaker B] I didn’t understand: with the plasterer’s pole, assembling it is building, and taking it apart is also building? Demolition?
[Speaker C] No, there’s no problem here.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Neither taking it apart nor assembling it is building or demolition. It is only a rabbinic prohibition. Since it was a plasterer’s pole both when it was short and when it was long, it is the same plasterer’s pole. Only sometimes I use it when I need it long, and sometimes I use it short. Not like a lamp, where taking it apart is stopping the use, not another mode of use. It is simply stopping the use. Then there is no lamp. When I reassembled it, I created a lamp from nothing. But with the plasterer’s pole, when I inserted the pole, it was already a plasterer’s pole before—I simply lengthened it in order to use it on a high wall.
[Speaker F] I didn’t build anything. Yes.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay. So this now, in “turning on electricity,” the Chazon Ish says—that’s the conclusion—that in “turning on electricity,” when you introduce the current into the wires, it is always considered like fastening firmly. And also—you see here?—”one who drives current into the wires,” that’s another formulation. And even if you would say that the case of the hunters’ rods, even when fastening them, is only rabbinically prohibited, that is specifically when assembling two physical entities, which can be viewed as two things participating in one action; the fastening does not determine them to be one physical object. “Physical object” here means one object, yes? When he takes two physical objects and fastens them together, then both of them participate together in the act and become one entity. Okay? So that’s all true in the case of the hunters’ rods. But with electricity—”but wherever taking them apart is necessary for the use of the lower part… but giving form to the object, and through this making it usable, certainly counts as building.” Right? What do I do when I turn on electricity? I’m not taking two parts, two physical objects, physical components, and making a structure out of them. Rather, I take one physical thing, which is the wire or the device, and a new form is created for it. Now current passes through it and it becomes active, so that means taking one thing and giving it a different form. That already starts getting closer to that phrase, “driving electricity into the wires,” but it’s even more like moving it from death to life. Basically turning the wire from a dead wire into a live wire. I don’t remember whether that formulation appears here or only in his letters to Rabbi Shlomo Zalman. But that formulation appears too.
[Speaker E] So the difference between the rod and the electrical device is that the rod is functional even when it’s taken apart. But the device becomes functional only at the moment that…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, more than that. He says more than that. That’s not just the earlier distinction—though that is one distinction—but he says more than that. In electricity, you don’t have two parts that you connect to each other. There’s only the wire. There isn’t some other object that I attached to the wire. I created a new form for the wire. Now the wire is a live wire; it’s not a dead wire. I turned the wire into something else. The moment I turned the wire into something else, that’s another difference between this and the case of the painters’ rod. He gives two differences here. One difference is what he said earlier: the painters’ rod is usable both this way and that way, whereas the electrical circuit is not. The second difference is that the electrical circuit is not the joining of two physical entities into one object. Rather, there is only one physical object here—just the wire. Electricity is a different form for that same object that I have. Okay? That’s basically the… that’s it. At the end he brings the Chayei Adam about setting a clock and so on; that’s less important for our purposes. One second. Now we have to look at Rabbi Shlomo Zalman’s critique; I already mentioned it a bit. So he starts with setting a clock—I’m not going into that right now, that’s just kind of an introduction. Here, look, I’m sharing it: section 2 is factors for leniency, section 3 is factors for stringency, right? Meaning the factors for leniency in activating an electrical device compared to winding a clock spring. So he says: “And it appears to me that connecting a fan or refrigerator to the current on the Sabbath is easier”—more lenient—”than winding a clock. And seemingly there is no prohibition in it at all, since that is their regular use: one only introduces current into them when one wants to use them, and immediately afterward one stops the connection.” What is he basically saying? That introducing the current is just the normal way of using the thing. Therefore it is not—whereas winding a clock is preparing the thing for use. So if you don’t… winding means tensioning, right? Those old clocks where they wound the spring so it could work. So he says that with winding a clock, you can still say there is some kind of prohibition there, but with electricity it is simply using an already existing utensil; it is not building anything in it. That’s the lenient side. “On the contrary, such a fan that cannot be stopped and prevented from moving, and just keeps spinning all the time—there is no greater defect than that.” That’s a broken fan—a fan you can’t turn off and on. And since that is so, it makes perfect sense that if there were a properly functioning fan designed in such a way that its movement happened not by electric current but by means of a spring, it would seem that it would be permitted to operate it on the Sabbath, even according to those who prohibit winding a clock. Right, the comparison he makes is methodologically interesting. He asks what would happen if I operated the fan with a spring. And that he compares to winding the spring of a clock. And then he says that turning on the electricity is like winding the spring of a fan. So this comparison is made in two steps.
[Speaker C] No, he also says there’s a hand fan. You could fan yourself with a hand fan somewhere. Can’t hear? He also says somewhere that I could make wind for myself with a fan.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, exactly. That’s also what I said earlier—that one is allowed to cool oneself on the Sabbath, and therefore a fan is not set aside. Here he says the same reasoning, not from the laws of set-aside, though.
[Speaker B] I didn’t really understand his logic. It seems contradictory—I’m not really managing to understand. In his view, you can operate a fan with a spring?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. And therefore with electricity too, you can.
[Speaker B] But why? He said a clock you can’t.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, that’s what he said. A clock—that’s the… this whole section, section 2 of Rabbi Shlomo Zalman—you see here it’s section 2—what’s the heading? Factors for leniency.
[Speaker B] But I’m asking what’s different from a clock?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, now I’m explaining. In section 2 there are factors for leniency in activating an electrical device compared to winding a clock spring. So here he explains why, even though a clock spring is prohibited, a fan spring and the electricity of a fan are permitted. So he says: with the spring of a clock, the fact that the clock requires a spring is a problematic thing in a clock; winding… winding the clock turns it into a working clock. But with a fan, if the fan required a spring, that would be an advantage of the fan. I don’t want to be cooled all the time. Okay? That’s, for example, the distinction he makes here. Therefore even if I were using a fan by means of a spring, that would be easier than winding the spring of a clock. So now, if I activate it by an electrical circuit, it’s the same thing. It’s like a spring—what’s the difference? All I’m doing is activating it by means of current.
[Speaker C] Today there are, today there are timer clocks that are spring-loaded to activate air conditioners. Do you know that? They have them in classrooms. Meaning, the air conditioner is on, but it turns off by itself. If I want to turn it on, I turn a clock.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You know that? We’d have to look at that. Okay, it’s not important for our purposes; I want to understand the principles.
[Speaker E] But Rabbi, here in a certain sense he’s only referring to activating the device itself; he’s not addressing the issue of the current inside, in this connection.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why does he need to address the issue of the current? I’m talking about activating the device. The current flows—what does that have to do with me? The question is whether I’m allowed to activate the device.
[Speaker E] But the Chazon Ish also addressed the issue of bringing the current into existence, not only whether the utensil functions or not.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? I didn’t understand. He’s not talking about generating current; he’s talking about building and demolishing.
[Speaker E] Right, but the Chazon Ish wasn’t only addressing whether the utensil works or not, but also the issue of the current.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? Generating current?
[Speaker E] No, not generating—I don’t know—that a utensil is created here.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, he says there’s an argument—just a moment, we’ll see it. He says there’s a factor for leniency compared to winding a clock spring. Fine? Yes. Then he continues and says, “I saw in the Chazon Ish”—here he continues—”that he wrote concerning setting a clock,” and so on. Yes, do you see this? This. Right, so here he brings the Chazon Ish, which he added after he had written his booklet. And then he continues with the implications of the Chazon Ish’s approach, that according to the Chazon Ish it is prohibited to press the button on the Sabbath—and he writes “and thereby remove the barrier,” it doesn’t matter, he has various implications of the Chazon Ish’s position. And then he moves on—yes, he goes on here, and at the end he says, “it also seems to me.” Do you see? Yes. “It also seems to me, in my humble opinion.” Yes, “it also seems to me that one should not say that it is in any event prohibited because of creating something new”—because of generating, like generating fragrance. He rejects the whole issue of generating too. So all this is on the lenient side. Okay? You have to recognize this style of writing of halakhic decisors. These are factors for leniency; that’s chapter 2. Chapter 3, the heading is: factors for stringency in activating an electrical device on the Sabbath and a Jewish holiday under the law of repairing a utensil. Right, these are factors for stringency. And now he enters into the arguments of the Chazon Ish. So he says: “Indeed, it appears that although, on the face of it, those arguments are reasonable”—what he said in the previous chapter—”nevertheless, in practice it may well be that one should indeed be concerned that introducing current into a fan or refrigerator involves a Torah prohibition. On the contrary, even if we were to hold that there is no prohibition at all in setting a clock on the Sabbath”—these are the arguments that even if we say setting a clock is permitted, with a refrigerator and fan it would still be prohibited—”nevertheless, one can say that there it is different, for the renewal of the clock’s movement is not accomplished at all by adding something new from outside, but only by winding a spring that was already present inside the clock beforehand, which turns the gears. And since the winding is not skilled labor and is done without any effort,” see the Rashba and so on, “therefore it would not involve the prohibited labor of building or the final hammer blow,” and so on.
[Speaker C] Wait, but with electricity the current is already inside.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The current is not already inside. I introduce current from outside.
[Speaker C] From where? By closing a circuit?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s a question—an interesting question—whether we’re talking about the charges or the current. The charges are inside; the current is not there. Okay? So that’s an interesting question. But he sees it as bringing something in from outside. “Whereas introducing current into a machine”—here I’m reading the continuation—”the current is not at all like the force of a waterfall or some other force that is merely a pushing force, such that one could say that just as a person is allowed to push and turn it with his own hands, so too it is permitted by means of something else. Rather, the current performs its action by the electrons within the wires flowing very rapidly through the circuit and slightly changing the wires, and also the quality of the metal within the machine, magnetizing it or producing other changes that cause the force of motion. Therefore it may be that introducing the current is not considered merely using an already-made machine, but rather it is similar to the current now making it into a utensil, since without the current the machine has no quality of a machine at all.” Fine—this is basically the reasoning of the Chazon Ish, that you are introducing something here that turns the… “whereas here,” where the current changes the essential property of the utensil and gives it a different capacity, “therefore it may be that every time one introduces current into the machine, it is considered as though he thereby also completes it and makes it into a utensil.” So he discusses whether this is a temporary connection or not a temporary connection. I just still want to manage to glance at the third file.
[Speaker C] We didn’t get to—what? Can’t hear. Did we get to the third file? I don’t know. Oh, that’s the first one.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The third file is the correspondence, his correspondence with Rabbi Shlomo Zalman.
[Speaker B] Yes, we got to the correspondence and read the two letters. Yes.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So here he says—you see—”the words of our master the Chazon Ish in his book and in his letter.” Wait, did I share? Yes. “That closing an electrical circuit is prohibited because of building.” So here below there’s the note of Rabbi Shmuel Auerbach, right, that this whole chapter was omitted from the regular edition of the book because he thought there was no point fighting windmills that don’t exist—until it became clear that they do exist. So he’s talking about the Chazon Ish, and he says like this: against the Chazon Ish. What? I can’t hear.
[Speaker E] Even when they do exist there’s no point. Can’t hear. Even when they do exist there’s no point fighting windmills; people say there’s no…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Ah, okay. He really does relate to the Chazon Ish a little bit like a windmill, yes. He says that he did not continue the argument out of fear and respect. “In the book Chazon Ish, after explaining the matter of the prohibited labors of kindling and cooking involved in turning on electricity, he wrote: ‘There is also in this an issue of repairing a utensil’”—that’s exactly the sentence we read—”because he sets it up”—you see, this is the passage from the Chazon Ish that we read earlier. He also wrote there—you see, on the last line—”and in turning on electricity, when introducing current into the wires, it is always considered like fastening firmly. For even if you would say that in the case of the painters’ rod,” etc.—we saw that. “And it is well known that his words are a very great novelty”—here you see down below—”and all those who discussed matters of electricity did not mention at all any concern here for the prohibited labors of building and demolishing. More than that, I heard that even when there is no current at all in the wires, if one closes it, that is the prohibited labor of building.” And Rabbi Shlomo Zalman says: not true. Even according to the Chazon Ish that cannot be correct, and it is quite clear that the Chazon Ish did not mean that. He is not turning the wire from dead to alive; he is not driving the current into the wires. It’s only the conception that sees closing the circuit as a kind of building. But I don’t think there is such a statement in the Chazon Ish. Therefore, in my opinion, this report is incorrect even according to the Chazon Ish. And now…
[Speaker B] But he did say that, didn’t he?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, he says that it’s because of the building—when I drive the current into the wires or bring them from death to life—but all that is only when current is actually flowing inside. If I merely close the circuit, but then there is no… no current flowing there, then I am not liable. For example, someone whose Sabbath timer is disconnected in the electrical panel, but he flips a switch in the house—so he closes the circuit in the house but there is no current. So he claims there are people who say in the name of the Chazon Ish that such a thing would be prohibited because of building, since in the end you built the circuit. In light of the formulations we saw earlier in the Chazon Ish, it’s quite clear that this is not correct. Because there has to be current within this setup for it to count as building; it is not just the bare act of closing the circuit, the way people usually understand the Chazon Ish, but that’s not right. Anyone who reads him inside sees that it’s not right. Now in section 3 he brings the points he argued against the Chazon Ish, and these are the points I mentioned. It’s like using a flow of water. What is the difference between electric current and a stream of water? If I open a flow of water and let it in and it performs some action, how is that different from opening a switch and letting electricity flow? We also discussed that under generating; the same reasoning came up there against seeing electricity as generating something. The argument is that it is like water and does not generate anything new; you only let the water flow. So here too, you let the electrons flow. What’s the difference? What is answered here will also be the correct answer there. So the Chazon Ish says about this—you see—”I think it proper to preface that I do not intend at all to argue with them or respond to them, because the righteous, even in death, are called alive,” and this was already written after the Chazon Ish’s death. “And if during his lifetime I was afraid to argue, all the more so now.” Fine. The body of the Chazon Ish’s letter, which he sent back to Rabbi Shlomo Zalman—you see—”the matter depends on judgment.” He starts with that because, as you see, everything begins with conceptual reasoning, with how one views things. There is no forced conclusion here. “The matter depends on judgment. Heating iron does not create a new nature in the iron; rather, the heat resides in it temporarily, within the iron, and the iron continually expels it, for if you do not continue heating, it will stop. Connecting an electric wire arouses the power of electricity embedded in the wire itself, and it comes from the composite constitution at the root of its creation.” In other words, the electricity merges with the wire and they become one entity—not like heat in iron. Hot iron is not a different entity from cold iron. The heat is something external, and it will also leave the iron the moment you stop heating. The electricity, however, as long as you do not disconnect the current, continues to flow within it. That’s what he says. “And this use is frequent, and restoring it to its proper state by means of the connection—whereby the interrupted wire becomes one body with the electrical machine—gives rise to concern because of building: first, because of assembling the parts one from another; second”—here is the formulation, you see, point two, an important point here—”repairing the wire itself from death to life is considered building.” He both drives the electricity into the wires and transforms the wire itself from death to life. That is the Chazon Ish’s explanation. Then he goes into why this is not temporary but permanent. We saw this also under generating. If you remember, when we discussed generating current, there were those who argued that if something does not last, then it is temporary—it is not really generating current. And I argued that it does last; you have to turn it off to stop it. You have to do an action; if you do nothing, it will continue forever. That is exactly the distinction Rabbi Shlomo Zalman makes here in this letter—or the Chazon Ish, sorry, in this letter. He basically says: this is not a temporary thing. A temporary thing is something that disappears on its own. Here you can disconnect it, but you have to disconnect it in order to stop it. The heat of iron will disappear on its own if you do not keep heating it; the iron will cool off in a short time. Therefore there it is temporary. But the current—you have to disconnect the switch for the current to stop flowing in the wire. Therefore here it is permanent; it is not temporary. Exactly what I said about generating current. I said that the discussions about generating current would return when we discuss the prohibited labor of building. Okay, I’ll stop here, because that is more or less what I wanted to show from this, and it gives me an opening to speak in the next class and explain the Chazon Ish properly according to the actual parameters of building—not all these general statements—and to see various implications these points have. So as far as the handout is concerned, maybe I’ll add one more source for you to look at, for whoever has time. But in any case, look at the Kehillot Yaakov that I sent you; that’s intended for the next class. It will bring us back to the definition of the prohibited labor of building itself. I said we’d get to that next class. Okay, does anyone else want to say something?
[Speaker B] Thank you very much, more power to you, thank you so, so much,
[Speaker C] Be well, goodbye, goodbye.