Kiddushin, Chapter 2, 5783, Lesson 5

This transcript was generated automatically using artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.

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[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And I’m saying the point is that this… I’m not sure this counts as snatching a commandment, because even if he circumcised in my place, since he isn’t commanded to see to it that my son be circumcised, then he didn’t fulfill any commandment at all. It’s not that he did the commandment in my place. He simply prevented the performance of the commandment. Prevented the performance of the commandment—that’s a practical difference. No, but the ten gold coins are when you fulfill the commandment in my place.

[Speaker E] But here he didn’t fulfill it, and I also didn’t fulfill it. Right. Because the fulfillment of this commandment is only… it has no fulfillment. Right, the opposite—you can only violate it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A prohibition derived from a positive commandment. It’s a prohibition derived from a positive commandment, yes, exactly.

[Speaker E] You can’t really fulfill it. If… even if I myself circumcised him, maybe I’m no better than another mohel. All I really did was prevent the situation in which I would nullify the positive commandment. That’s basically what happened.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] On the logical level that could be, but I don’t think anyone defines it that way.

[Speaker E] Ah, tell me, is there someone among the medieval authorities who says that?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. No, Maharach Or Zarua and Tosafot Rid—I don’t think that’s what they mean. We’d have to look at the wording again, but… to make sure that the Sabbath isn’t… not left unprepared. Logically it’s possible. Anyway, for our purposes, the claim is that in topics of this kind—preparations for the Sabbath, or circumcision, or something like that—in practice, even if I had appointed them as an agent, they still would not be agents. It’s irrelevant. There are no concepts of agency here. No law of agency was introduced here. It isn’t needed, and therefore it also wasn’t introduced here. They are not agents. But still, there is certainly no obstacle to saying that it is better to perform a commandment personally than through one’s agent, in the sense that he gets more reward, because he is occupied with it himself. In Eruvin the Talmud brings a baraita there: Rabbi Meir said, the daughters of Israel did not refrain from sending their eruvin by the hands of their little sons and little daughters in order to train them in the commandments. If he gave it to a monkey and it carried it, or placed it on an animal and it carried it, his eruv is valid. Yes, that’s the expression: an act of a monkey. Meaning, there are certain acts where all you need is to make sure that something happens. Okay? In such situations, agency is not relevant. Just make sure that something happened, and that’s it. The later authorities tend to say that in such situations, not only do you not need agency—within the Talmud itself you could just say you don’t need agency—but the later authorities say that where agency is not needed, it also does not exist. There is no agency. You are not functioning here as my agent, because the concept of agency is a legal novelty; that novelty was introduced where it was required. If it wasn’t required, then it also wasn’t introduced, so it isn’t there. The concept of agency does not exist there. So when people speak about an act of a monkey, you can interpret it in two ways. When something is an act of a monkey, the meaning is that even if you asked a monkey to cook for you for the Sabbath, as long as the monkey did it, it’s cooked—the food is cooked. Okay? You don’t need agency here. “Monkey” is an expression indicating that agency is unnecessary here. A monkey of course cannot be an agent. Rather, this is an act where in the end the main thing is that it gets done; I don’t care at the moment who did it and whether legal effect and intention were applied here. And the same is true in all sorts of things of this kind. I’m saying that among the later authorities it is accepted—and I’m not sure the proofs are that good, but this is the accepted way of thinking—that where something is an act of a monkey, not only is agency unnecessary, but agency is also not defined there. Even if you appointed him as your agent, he is not your agent. Okay. Yes, here, one second—you’re not… I’m juggling both Zoom and the screen here, so sometimes I’m… Rashi writes there in Eruvin: “Eruvei chatzerot are merely a mixing of their domains, therefore it takes effect on its own, and even though the act of the minor is of no significance, we do not care, as we learned later: if a homeowner was a partner with his neighbors, he need not make an eruv. But eruvei techumin involve acquiring residence, and a minor is not strong enough to transfer ownership.” Here, here you have this distinction between an act of a monkey and something that is not an act of a monkey. In a place where a transfer of ownership is required, then you need the action of the transferor, and if someone else does it on my behalf, he has to be my agent. There agency is defined, and there agency is needed. Okay? In a case like eruvei chatzerot, what is written here is that you don’t really need a transfer of ownership. If they are mixed, they are mixed. So in that case it is basically an act of a monkey, and that is why the Talmud says that if he placed it on an animal and it carried it, or whatever, his eruv is valid, because it happens automatically.

[Speaker B] In practice, what does it mean, “he placed it on an animal”?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] An eruv isn’t a kind of wall, or at least a wire? No, no, this is talking about eruvei techumin—that’s something else.

[Speaker B] So what is being discussed here?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, you’re talking about eruvei chatzerot. There’s that eruv—the wire—that’s another type. Here we’re talking about eruvei chatzerot and eruvei techumin. You place a piece of food, or carry the piece of food to some place, and put it on an animal that carries it. Okay? There are eruvin where you need a transfer of ownership. If you need a transfer of ownership, then whoever does it has to be my agent. There are eruvin where not, where we are already mixed automatically, and all that’s needed is for each one to send food or something like that to a certain place. I can send it on an animal and there is no significance to that. No, this is not talking about the wires. About the wires, by the way, it would be the same. With the wires it would be the same. If an animal hung those wires there around the area, everything is fine; as long as there are wires, that’s fine. No transfer of ownership is needed. Okay? This is the famous story about Napoleon—do you know it? When Napoleon returned from one of his battles to Paris, the Jews sent a delegation to him asking that the convoy not pass through a certain place because it might tear the eruv, that his convoy of soldiers and all the war equipment shouldn’t pass through a certain place so as not to tear the eruv. So he asked them, what is this thing, what is this wire? And they told him, this wire is as if there are walls around, as if the whole city is surrounded by walls. So he said to them, fine, then I’ll tear the wire and it will be as if there’s a wire here. Okay, the conclusion I want to draw from here is that, simply speaking, the rule does not speak about agency—neither about agency nor about commandments. It speaks about how the Holy One, blessed be He, values people. Now, because of that, I think all kinds of discussions—and sometimes you see this in the later authorities—all kinds of formal discussions, wait, when does this rule apply and when does it not apply, and if you do it this way then yes and if you do it that way then no—these are discussions that become empty of content. Because okay, where you deserve more credit, you deserve more credit. Everyone understands that. This isn’t something the Sages need to establish; it isn’t something there is much to discuss with formal criteria of one sort or another. If you invested more, you deserve more credit. Fine, that is obvious in every field, every topic, every situation, every act—as long as the act has value. So if the act has value, then if you do it yourself you deserve more credit, and all the pilpulim they raise here about where it does apply and where it doesn’t apply—I think that’s irrelevant. Fine, the Ran says as follows: “Some say that there is also a prohibition here; rather, when Rav Yosef’s statement was said, it was said regarding the latter clause, for from the first clause we do not learn that it is better to perform a commandment personally than through one’s agent, because perhaps there the issue is a prohibition, as explained. For whenever he can betroth her himself and he betroths through an agent, he is doing something prohibited, lest she become repulsive to him. But whenever he saw her first, so that there is no concern for this, one could say that even initially it may be done through his agent.” That is from the side of the prohibition, lest she become repulsive to him. If he saw her beforehand, then he may do it through an agent even initially; there is no problem. But from the side of the commandment—better to perform a commandment personally than through one’s agent—even if he saw her in advance, it is still preferable to do it himself and not through an agent. “But from the latter clause we can learn that in all cases it is better to perform a commandment personally than through one’s agent, for with regard to her there is no concern lest she see something repulsive in him, as Resh Lakish said: It is better to dwell as two than to dwell as a widow; and the saying of women is, better to sit with any sort of husband than to sit as a widow. ‘Tan du’ means a body and two means two persons. And even so, the Mishnah teaches us that it is better for her to do it personally than through her agent.” Yes, so therefore in the latter clause you really do see the principle that it is better for her to do it personally than through her agent. In the first clause, it could be just the prohibition. And now here is the important note for our purposes: “Even though a woman is not commanded in procreation, nevertheless she still has a commandment because she assists her husband in fulfilling his commandment.” So he senses here the point I noted earlier: the woman is not commanded in procreation and therefore apparently not in betrothal either—certainly according to the Rosh, apparently not in betrothal either. And if so, what does it mean to say “it is better for her to do it personally than through her agent”? She has no commandment, neither through an agent nor without an agent. Okay, so what does that mean? He says no, she has a commandment because she assists her husband in fulfilling his commandment. Now this is interesting, because on the face of it, in the simple formulation it looks like the Ran does insist on finding here a dimension of commandment in its formal sense.

[Speaker B] And in that sense, washing hands before the blessing over bread also involves a commandment.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, but agency is not relevant there. There is the commandment of honoring the Sabbath, delighting in the Sabbath, but agency is not relevant there.

[Speaker B] I was asking about commandment, so there is a commandment there.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] For her in the act or not? No, not for them. Not for them. There is a commandment in it because I need to honor and delight in the Sabbath. They can help me; that’s what I said earlier. At most they can be considered someone who assists me in doing a commandment.

[Speaker B] And according to this Ran it sounds like there is a commandment in its own right.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So that is the question—what does he mean? If he means an independent commandment, then in effect this Ran seems to insist that this rule applies specifically to commandments. And that would make it a formal rule. But I don’t think that’s the intention.

[Speaker E] Their language, the language of those medieval authorities—their categories of commandments—everything is in the category of commandment. Yes. No, if it’s a good deed.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I think it works the other way around. The opposite: every good deed is called a commandment, but not really a commandment in our sense.

[Speaker E] No, they’ll show you which verse it comes from.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, not necessarily. From which verse does it follow that she has to help her husband fulfill his commandment?

[Speaker E] I mean—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s a good deed.

[Speaker E] Maybe it’s from the law of mutual responsibility? I don’t know.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then any woman can help me fulfill my commandments, not only my wife. So why is this talking specifically about agency for betrothal?

[Speaker E] But here it’s talking about the woman’s agency for betrothal, not about procreating with me.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, but—

[Speaker E] This act—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —is an act that assists procreation, so it’s preferable that she do it—

[Speaker E] —herself rather than sending someone to assist. It’s very simple. The law is the commandment of the…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But again, I’m saying: if so, then any woman who helps me with procreation, regardless of betrothal—

[Speaker E] A matchmaker too, then—better for her to do the commandment personally than through her agent.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, so what you’re really saying is—and I think the more plausible formulation here is—not that everything is a commandment, but that every good deed is called a commandment in their language, though not that we are really dealing with a commandment in the halakhic sense, for the sake of the unification of fulfilling a positive commandment. I don’t think so. I think they thought the opposite. “Commandment” means a good deed, just as, by the way, even today many people will say “I did a mitzvah,” meaning I did a good deed, because from their perspective, what is a mitzvah? The Holy One, blessed be He, regards it favorably—that’s a mitzvah. But not necessarily fulfillment in the sense of a positive commandment.

[Speaker E] Like catch-all commandments, where every good thing gets included.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “Love your neighbor as yourself,” and all those things. Fine, okay. I don’t think there is—“beyond the letter of the law,” “that you may walk in the way of good men,” and things like that—I don’t think they mean to say that you are fulfilling the commandment of “that you may walk in the way of good men.” It’s just ordinary language used to say that this is a good deed.

[Speaker E] So why did they need to bring something from the Torah in order to…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because that’s how people talk, that’s how they talk.

[Speaker E] They had no problem with the category of a good deed that isn’t a commandment?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In principle? I don’t think so. I think it’s exactly the opposite. They had so little problem with that, that they also called this a commandment. Okay. In any case, for our purposes, what the Ran writes—let me tell you more than that. What I would have written in place of the Ran, if I were looking for a commandment, is that you don’t need to talk about helping her husband with procreation, because she has the commandment of “He created it to be inhabited.” A woman is obligated in “He created it to be inhabited.” And in the simple sense—there are a few disputes among the medieval authorities about this—but in the simple sense a woman is obligated in “He did not create it for chaos; He formed it to be inhabited.” So what is the problem? That is really a commandment incumbent on her. So why doesn’t the Ran resort to that? And indeed, we’ll soon see that the Makneh, for example, talks about “He created it to be inhabited.”

[Speaker E] What is “He created it to be inhabited”? How is that different from procreation?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “He did not create it for chaos”—that is a commandment from the Writings, so that even if, say, you already have a son and a daughter, you should still continue bringing children into the world in order to populate the world. So that commandment is incumbent on women as well.

[Speaker E] Procreation is much more stringent, you can—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —nullify it, yes, but there she is only assisting. That is a very problematic criterion. “He created it to be inhabited” is truly, truly fulfillment of a commandment.

[Speaker E] The woman assisting in the fulfillment of the commandment of procreation, which is really—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m saying more than that: to assist in fulfilling the commandment of procreation in the context of agency is even less relevant; it’s like merely appearing wicked. Fine, the main thing is that I help. And if you want to talk about a commandment where it might be relevant to do it through an agent or not through an agent, it would be a commandment formally incumbent on me: “He created it to be inhabited.” Okay? But he doesn’t say “He created it to be inhabited.” I think it is pretty clear that the Ran here does not really mean commandment in the formal sense, but again something more like merely appearing wicked; that is, you are doing a good deed, and if you do it yourself it is worth more. Therefore, the fact that the term he uses here is “commandment” proves nothing. But look at the Makneh. On the Talmud’s statement “it is better to perform a commandment personally than through one’s agent”—here are the Ran and the Yam Shel Shlomo, who strained to explain the reason for “better to do it personally,” even though we hold that a woman is not commanded in procreation. And it seems more correct that from here there is proof for the Tosafot’s view in Gittin, that even though we hold that a woman is not commanded in procreation, nevertheless she is commanded in “He created it to be inhabited.” And so the plain sense of the passage in Bava Batra 119 also implies, regarding the daughters of Zelophehad, as Rashbam explained there. In my novellae on Even HaEzer I elaborated on this. So he is basically commenting on the Ran: why are you getting into helping her husband with the commandment of procreation? There is the commandment of “He created it to be inhabited.” And then he says: And it further seems that even though she is not commanded in procreation, nevertheless, since she wishes to marry a man, it is forbidden for her to have relations with him without betrothal because of “she shall not be a harlot,” as Maimonides wrote. If so, the betrothal is a commandment, like the commandments of ritual slaughter, separating terumah, and sending away the nest, where one is not commanded to slaughter or to separate terumah, but if one wishes to eat, it is forbidden without slaughter and without separation. And likewise with sending away the nest: one is not commanded to send it away, but only if one wants to take the young. And there are many similar cases. And even so, we recite over them “Who has sanctified us with His commandments.” Yes, for slaughter, for example, we recite a blessing. Even though, according to him, it isn’t really a commandment. By the way, the accepted view is not like that. The accepted view is that this really is a commandment, just a commandment conditioned on something. Grace after meals is also a commandment, but only if you ate to satiety. If you ate to satiety, then you are commanded. So what, because of that it’s not a commandment? Here too, if you want to eat, then slaughter. If you don’t want to eat, don’t slaughter—no problem. But that doesn’t mean the thing is not a commandment. It is fully a commandment. It is a commandment conditioned on the existence of certain circumstances. And then he says: And even so, we recite over them “Who has sanctified us with His commandments”; accordingly, the principle “it is better to perform a commandment personally than through one’s agent” applies to them. Again, already here you can smell something, right? What does “accordingly” mean—that the principle applies here? It seems that he is aiming to say that we are really dealing here with a commandment in the formal sense. Because if a good deed were enough, you wouldn’t need all these pilpulim. Whoever is doing a good deed should do it himself and not through an agent or someone else. He understands “it is better to perform a commandment personally than through one’s agent” as speaking in a fully formal way about the concepts of agency and commandment, not about a good deed. And that is exactly the difference between him and the Ran. The Ran says: she helps her husband—that’s a good deed. If she did it herself, that is worth more than through an agent. But he keeps looking for the formal dimension, so he says: what is this helping with procreation? Say instead that there is “He created it to be inhabited”—that is really her commandment. Then it makes sense to say here “it is better to perform a commandment personally than through one’s agent.” He sees this principle as a principle that talks about agencies and commandments; it is a halakhic criterion—“it is better to perform a commandment personally than through one’s agent.” “Resting” is from the Writings, yes. Not Torah-level commandments—so what? Ethics is neither Torah-level nor rabbinic-level, and still it is a good deed, and it makes sense to say about it that doing it yourself is better than doing it through someone else. So commandments from the Writings too—what difference does it make? If you perform a commandment from the Writings yourself, that is better than doing it through an agent.

[Speaker C] But I still didn’t understand why “it is better to perform a commandment personally than through one’s agent” would apply to a commandment that has no formal dependence. I didn’t understand why. What do you mean, why?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I said at the beginning of the previous class: it doesn’t mean that the legal effect takes hold in a more valid way. The legal effect itself either takes hold or it doesn’t—though later we’ll see some reservations. But either it takes hold or it doesn’t. However, your act is worth more. In terms of reward? Yes. Rashi says yes, in terms of reward. That belongs to the world, to the halakhic sphere. If we understand that the betrothal is simply a more enhanced betrothal in the result-oriented sense—that is, the marital bond is now more enhanced, the result of the act of betrothal—then you say, fine, that’s a halakhic principle; it defines betrothal on different levels. There is level-A betrothal and level-B betrothal. But simply speaking, that isn’t it. The meaning is: if you involve yourself personally in the matter, then you deserve more credit for it. But the very concept of agency only belongs in a place where we are dealing with an act that creates legal effect. The requirement for an act that creates legal effect is not because of “it is better to perform a commandment personally than through one’s agent”; rather, the concept of agency does not apply elsewhere. Now of course, if this principle does not need the concept of agency either, then all the legal effects and all the rest fall away from here. None of that is needed. It’s simple: if you are doing a good deed, do it yourself. I’ll keep reading in the Makneh: “The first formulation only said, with regard to him, that it is better to perform the commandment personally than through one’s agent, not because of the commandment of procreation alone, for it is not always applicable if he has already fulfilled the commandment of procreation. Furthermore, because of procreation alone, betrothal is only preparation for the commandment.” And why do you care that it is preparation for a commandment? You asked earlier whether preparation for a commandment counts. Why do you care whether it is preparation for a commandment? Then I would say even about preparation for a commandment: it is better to perform the commandment personally than through one’s agent. What’s the problem? It’s also a good deed, no? No. Meaning, again, in the Makneh the overall spirit seems to be that he understands this as some sort of halakhic principle. We are speaking about agencies, commandments, formal definitions, and there is a halakhic rule that it is better to perform a commandment personally than through one’s agent. This is not about the reward the Holy One gives for good deeds. You can see this all along the way. He is in the camp you asked about earlier.

[Speaker E] But the interpretation can only be moral. What do you mean?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What is “it is better to perform a commandment personally than through one’s agent”?

[Speaker E] You don’t assume there is a difference in the legal effect.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No. First of all there are two possibilities. One possibility is what—the view you described earlier—that in his view only the halakhic world has reward above, and everything else does not. That is one possibility. But of course that is an unusual, puzzling position. That is one possibility. The second possibility—we’ll see later—there are those who claim that maybe there is a difference in the legal effect itself.

[Speaker B] But that’s the only solution if we don’t go in that direction.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Two possibilities, yes. Those are the two possibilities in the Makneh’s approach. So he says: “And it is not quite comparable to that of Rav Safra,” I’m reading here, “for the preparation of the Sabbath is an explicit commandment, as it is written: ‘And they shall prepare what they bring.’” Again, he is constantly talking about the question whether this is a commandment. Why do you care whether it is an explicit commandment, preparation for a commandment, a good deed? In other words, all along the way you see that from his perspective this is some sort of halakhic rule dealing with commandments and agency. “And according to what I wrote, it works out well, for betrothal itself is a commandment over which a blessing is recited.” Meaning, he constantly needs to show us that this thing is a commandment. And if no blessing were recited over it? Then it is not a positive commandment, but clearly the Torah wants us to perform betrothal. Meaning, the Torah wants it, even if it is only a permitting act. That makes no difference. I talked about this in the introductory classes, if you remember: even if betrothal is only a permitting act, it is still clear that marrying a woman without betrothal is against the will of the Torah. So I don’t know if that is called neglecting a positive commandment—maybe not even that. But it is clearly against the will of the Torah, since when the Torah said to do it with such a permitting act, it is saying: don’t do it without that permit. So again, all along the way you see here that he is talking about commandments. “And it is possible that the Ran and the Mishneh Shlomo hold like the opinion of those who dispute Maimonides and maintain that a concubine is permitted to an ordinary man without betrothal.” Meaning, he insists on dragging even the Ran and Maimonides into his framework. Fine? Then he really says: well, they held that this was a commandment or that it wasn’t. This whole discussion never gets off the ground according to what I said earlier. It’s not interesting. There is no dispute here connected to the question whether there is a commandment in the matter or not. The question is whether the act is a good act; if it is, then one should do it oneself. “But according to this, even for him there is no commandment because of procreation, for he could fulfill procreation through a concubine, as the Rosh wrote at the beginning of Ketubot. And the essence of the matter is as I wrote in the appendixed treatise, that even those who dispute Maimonides mean only if he takes her as a concubine, but if he takes her so that they should have all the law of husband and wife, they agree that it is forbidden for them to have relations without betrothal.” None of these conclusions is necessary. In short, because he constantly assumes that we are entering here into a struggle over the question of how the commandment is defined—whether there is a commandment here or not. In my opinion all his conclusions are incorrect, because I do not think we are dealing here with commandments. Now, what is interesting here in this matter is that he apparently understands that preparations for the Sabbath really are the commandment of “and they shall prepare what they bring.” Right? That is what he writes here: “preparation for the Sabbath is an explicit commandment in the Torah, ‘and they shall prepare what they bring.’” Incidentally, he does not write either honoring the Sabbath or delighting in the Sabbath. Soon we’ll see that the Mishnah Berurah brings that. Why?

[Speaker E] Because that can be fulfilled without preparing.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. Meaning, consistent with his view, he is looking for an obligation of action. There is an obligation on the person that you need to appoint an agent to do it in your stead, and he apparently understood that for preparations for the Sabbath you need to appoint an agent to do them on my behalf. Because otherwise I am not fulfilling the commandment “and they shall prepare what they bring.” What? No, I am not fulfilling the commandment “and they shall prepare what they bring.” It may be that no complaint will be brought against me for that, but the commandment I did not fulfill. Meaning, agency is defined there, and apparently agency is needed in order to fulfill that commandment, according to his view. And that is why he doesn’t just happen to write it that way; he ties it to the commandment of “and they shall prepare what they bring.” Look, look at the Mishnah Berurah, section 250 paragraph 3: “To prepare personally, because it is a commandment to prepare personally, for the commandment of honoring the Sabbath is incumbent on every person, as it is written: ‘And you shall call the Sabbath a delight, the holy of the Lord, honored.’ And it is better to perform a commandment personally than through one’s agent. And the same applies to all commandments—it is better to perform a commandment personally than through one’s agent. See the Biur Halakhah.” Okay, and then he says one should contemplate repentance and examine his deeds every Sabbath eve; all this is apparently part of honoring the Sabbath or something like that. But here he clearly does not go with the Makneh’s “and they shall prepare what they bring,” but with the honor and delight of the Sabbath. Now that is interesting. Why? Because with the Mishnah Berurah I would say that this is exactly the difference between him and the Makneh. For here we are really dealing with delighting in the Sabbath. Now the preparations for the Sabbath, so that I can delight in the Sabbath, are like the Makneh. Meaning, if I have them, all is fine. I do not have a commandment of action on Friday to do something for which I need to appoint an agent and say “it is better to perform a commandment personally than through one’s agent,” and so on. Rather, there is a point in making preparations so that I can delight in the Sabbath on the Sabbath itself. That is preparation for a commandment.

[Speaker B] Preparation for a commandment, exactly—preparation.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. Now, if that is preparation for a commandment, the Mishnah Berurah holds that even regarding preparation for a commandment there is “it is better to perform a commandment personally than through one’s agent.” You don’t need to define the thing as a formal commandment—exactly against the Makneh we saw. Right? And why? Because it really is not a formal discussion. We are not talking… a good deed, and preparation for a commandment is also a good deed. But I want to qualify that a bit because—

[Speaker E] There is a tannaitic dispute about what…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] About what…

[Speaker E] What… whether it is part of the commandment or not. Fine, that’s…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s a story in itself. There is also Maimonides and Nachmanides about this in the roots. Yes, a story… Is it connected to our discussion? It depends how you define what it means for something to be called part of the commandment. Yes, that’s fine, I don’t want to get into that issue; it’s a complicated story. The accepted view is no, but there is… So he says two things here: honoring the Sabbath and delighting in the Sabbath. There is a difference between them for our purposes. Because when I make preparations for the delight by which I will delight in the Sabbath tomorrow, that is preparation for a commandment. But if I understand it as honoring the Sabbath, then the actions I do on Friday honor the Sabbath—that is not preparation for a commandment, that is the commandment itself. To perform actions on Friday that show I honor the Sabbath—that is the commandment of honoring the Sabbath. It is not… with respect to delighting in the Sabbath, what I do today is preparation for a commandment; with respect to honoring the Sabbath, it is the body of the commandment itself.

[Speaker E] What is honoring the Sabbath?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Honoring the Sabbath, like making preparations.

[Speaker E] Like honoring parents, for example—the details the Sages give, what is written in the Talmud, are that honoring parents means feeding and giving drink to one’s father. It doesn’t mean writing a feature article about him in the newspaper.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, fine, but with the Sabbath it isn’t like that. No, that’s what he says. He says—that’s what he says—“for the commandment of honoring the Sabbath is incumbent on every person.”

[Speaker E] Incumbent on every person—the question is what counts as honoring the Sabbath.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He says—the deniers of the Sabbath… he talks about those who deny the Sabbath. He says this is honoring the Sabbath.

[Speaker E] Now regarding the great merit of Sabbath observance, the definition of honoring the Sabbath—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maybe, maybe, it’s—

[Speaker E] —exactly the same thing.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maybe. It could be. What’s the problem?

[Speaker E] In the Talmud it talks about those who deny the Sabbath.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The question is whether… maybe to say that honoring the Sabbath means that on the Sabbath itself you will eat—that’s delighting in the Sabbath.

[Speaker E] No, it’s not only delighting in the Sabbath, because delighting in the Sabbath is if you enjoy it; if you don’t enjoy it, then it’s only honoring the Sabbath. But speaking in praise of the Sabbath, for example, or preparing a vacation for the Sabbath—that’s no longer honoring the Sabbath. Right? For example, one could say bathing on Friday. What, bathing on Sabbath eve, which you already fulfill on Friday? Yes, a commandment. Maybe the intention is that this bathing has its result on the Sabbath. It’s like…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, look here, look at the Sha’ar HaTziyun. Sha’ar HaTziyun on that same place.

[Speaker E] If there is a difference between delight and Sabbath… honor is before; he says he fulfills it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Simply speaking, honor is beforehand. Here, look in the Sha’ar HaTziyun: “In Maimonides, with regard to this law, the language is ‘obligated,’ yes? For this is his wording in chapter 30: ‘Even if a person is of the highest status and it is not his way to buy things in the marketplace or involve himself in household labors, he is obligated to do things for the needs of the Sabbath with his own person, for that is his honor.’” Meaning, to do the actions that honor the Sabbath on Friday—that is honoring the Sabbath, and you are obligated to do that with your own body. Now do you understand? You understand that this loops back to the Makneh, because if we go with honoring the Sabbath and not delighting in the Sabbath, then that means the act itself is a commandment-act, not preparation for a commandment. I don’t know if there is any necessity that he holds like the Makneh—only that there is no necessity that he does not. In the Makneh he insists on defining it as a commandment. So in the Makneh it is quite clear that he saw this principle—“it is better to perform a commandment personally than through one’s agent”—as something that must accompany commandments. And in the Sha’ar HaTziyun or the Mishnah Berurah, he doesn’t insist on that; he simply defines this as honor and delight of the Sabbath. So it may be that he would agree that even with preparation for a commandment there is “it is better to perform a commandment personally than through one’s agent,” because in fact he also brings delighting in the Sabbath. But he also brings honoring the Sabbath, and from the standpoint of honoring the Sabbath one could still remain with the Makneh’s approach. We are performing here an act that is now a commandment-act. That is what he says: “The early Sages, among them one would split wood to cook with it, and among them one would cook or salt meat or braid wicks or light candles, and among them one would go out and buy food and drink needed for the Sabbath even though that was not his practice. And the intention is to any one of these things. And see Kiddushin 41, where it says there: ‘It is better to perform a commandment personally than through one’s agent.’ And it is possible that according to Maimonides as well this is not a complete obligation, but rather a kind of obligation because of honoring the Sabbath.” So here there is already room for some hesitation. “And Maimonides’ reasoning is that if not so, all those amoraim would not have interrupted their Torah study for this. Nevertheless, this is still not a full obligation. And know this, for we do not find in the Talmud called an obligation except Sabbath candles and the three meals.” But it is still clear that the Talmud says about this, “it is better to perform a commandment personally than through one’s agent.” So here it is already stated explicitly not like the Makneh. Right? Meaning, here it is stated explicitly that even… it may be that this is not a full obligation. When he said it was a full obligation, I might have said, okay, maybe it’s like the Makneh and maybe not—meaning, there was room to hesitate. But here he says explicitly: even though it is not a full obligation, he has no problem with the Talmud saying about it “it is better to perform a commandment personally than through one’s agent.” Since from his perspective, if this is a good act…

[Speaker E] Not a full obligation, but maybe a full commandment—maybe that’s what he means.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean?

[Speaker E] Not an obligation—he means it’s not an obligatory commandment, but maybe only an existential commandment; maybe that’s what he means.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I don’t think so. I think he means it is a good deed and not a commandment in the formal sense. It is a worthy act; you are honoring the Sabbath; all is well. Not that you are obligated to do it. Don’t do it—there’s no problem. But if you do it, you are honoring the Sabbath.

[Speaker C] Rashi also writes “for the honor of the Sabbath.” What? Rashi also writes “food and drink for the honor of the Sabbath.”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, but there it could be only a factual description. Meaning, he simply acts for the honor of the Sabbath; he makes preparations. I don’t know whether he means because of the commandment of honoring the Sabbath. That isn’t certain. I don’t know. So therefore I think that in the end, in the Mishnah Berurah it is quite clear—not like the Makneh. Now look, here there is a very great novelty in the name of the Rivash, brought in a number of books among the medieval authorities. In the responsa of the Rivash it appears in several places. It says there as follows: “You asked further: Reuven appointed an agent to betroth a woman for him in another city, and that agent betrothed her to Reuven properly and fittingly, for there is a presumption that an agent fulfills his agency, and the betrothal blessing was recited and the wording of the betrothal was spoken by the agent. And that woman came with the agent to Reuven’s place to marry him.” The agent brought the woman to the sender, and now she is standing there to marry him. “The woman and the agent say that she was betrothed to Reuven by the agent.” They tell him, listen, we already did the betrothal. By the way, this is problematic, because if the woman intends to come to him, then why does he need to betroth her there? Wait till you bring her here and then he can betroth her himself and marry her afterward.

[Speaker E] Lest another precede him—there is that law.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, so maybe he is worried that someone else will get there first. In any case, here there really could already be the issue of “it is better to perform a commandment personally than through one’s agent,” because if it’s impossible, it’s impossible, but here she does end up coming to him. So he says: “Will the husband need to betroth her a second time with his own hand, and recite the betrothal blessing another time before she enters the wedding canopy, or not?” Yes, the question of whether he needs to betroth her again could be understood in two ways. One possibility is whether they are believed that there already was a betrothal. Maybe there wasn’t, so betroth her again. Or else no—they are believed, but even so, since he didn’t do it himself, there is some value in his doing it himself.

[Speaker B] Is there some point in betrothing a second time?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There is no prohibition. The blessing could be problematic. There is no prohibition—it’s just a superfluous act; she is already betrothed.

[Speaker B] Yes, but can you acquire an object a second time? The question is whether, when there is doubt, there is reason to do it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but here there is no doubt—unless you say there is doubt whether there was a betrothal. But if you say there was a betrothal and only there is the law “it is better to perform a commandment personally than through one’s agent,” then what can you do? She is already betrothed.

[Speaker E] No, but he brings in here the matter of the presumption that an agent fulfills his agency, in order to raise the concern that maybe in fact here…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I’m saying it could be understood in two ways. And we’ll soon see. “And you said that a case exactly like this came before you in Majorca, and you wanted to recite the marriage blessing”—not to do betrothal again, “but Rabbi Vidal Ephraim, of blessed memory, did not let you until the husband betrothed her a second time with his own hand. And you said to him: but hasn’t his agent already betrothed her on his behalf? And if the husband betroths her a second time, are you not casting aspersion and doubt on the first betrothal performed by an agent, so that people will say that betrothal through an agent is not valid betrothal? And he answered you”—all this is a give-and-take between the questioner and Rabbi Ephraim Vidal, all brought before the Rivash—“and he answered you that the Raavad wrote in his halakhot that one who betroths a woman through an agent must betroth her a second time with his own hand, based on what the Sages said: it is better to perform a commandment personally than through one’s agent.” Not because he doesn’t trust that the agent betrothed her—no, she is betrothed. He must betroth her again because “it is better to perform a commandment personally than through one’s agent.” Astonishing, yes. “Now, however, in order not to utter the divine name in vain, because one who recites an unnecessary blessing violates ‘You shall not take [the name of the Lord your God in vain],’ he instructed that the divine name not be mentioned in the blessing, but only that he say ‘Blessed are You, Lord,’ without the divine name.” “And you further said that when such a case came before you, you would say that the husband should himself betroth her again, since the agent had not brought a written testimony from the place of the betrothal that she had been betrothed.” Here there is already doubt whether there was a betrothal. But above, what he brings in the name of the Raavad is because of “it is better to perform a commandment personally than through one’s agent,” not because there is doubt whether a betrothal took place. “Even though the agent and the woman said that she had been properly betrothed there by the agent on behalf of his sender, and the rest of the agency had also been performed correctly.” So here, for whatever reason, there is some doubt whether there was a betrothal—that one can understand. Do it without a blessing—doubtful blessings and so on, I’m not sure exactly. But the Raavad himself is very puzzling. The Raavad himself says no—I have no doubt, there was a betrothal, but because it is better to perform a commandment personally than through one’s agent, betroth her again. The Rivash indeed rejects this in the end. He says: “And what Rabbi Vidal Ephraim told you, that the Raavad wrote in his halakhot that one who betroths through an agent must return and betroth her himself at the time of marriage, because it is written ‘it is better to perform a commandment personally than through one’s agent’—I am astonished how so holy a mouth as the Raavad’s could say such a thing. For they only said that there, when one comes to betroth her initially, it is better to perform the commandment personally than through one’s agent. But after she has already been betrothed through his agent and there are witnesses here, what commandment is there to betroth again? She is already standing betrothed. This is nothing but idle activity and toil for nothing. It is analogous to what is brought there: Rav Safra singed the head, and Rava salted the fish. If it had already been singed or salted by others, he would not singe or salt it again.” Meaning, the result is the result. So how are we to understand this Raavad? In the Rivash’s wording you can already see that he is giving some hint as to what exactly the point is. Still, the point is novel, but what exactly is the point? The Raavad apparently understands that “it is better to perform a commandment personally than through one’s agent” is not Rashi’s reward, but that something is lacking in the betrothal itself. The commandment of betrothal was done less well—that is, the result is somehow of lower quality, I don’t even know how to formulate it—and therefore, do it again. Is that in the Makneh? No, no, that is his own claim. Now simply speaking, the difficulty is obvious. I’m only saying that the Rivash, in the course of his argument with the Raavad, says: wait a second, but this whole story—she is already betrothed. So this is toil for nothing? Meaning, in the end she is already betrothed, so what does he want? Does the Raavad think she is not fully betrothed? That is basically the rhetorical question lurking in the background.

[Speaker E] Beyond that he claims that the Raavad—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —didn’t say it.

[Speaker E] No, that I don’t know. Is that written?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, “how could so holy a mouth say such a thing”—that’s just a manner of speaking…

[Speaker E] Maybe he didn’t see it inside?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He didn’t see it. This Raavad is cited in several other places in the Rivash. It is a known Raavad. “Known” still doesn’t mean that it’s… At least there is such a Raavad view, as it is brought in several places. I haven’t seen it inside the Raavad, but there is such a Raavad position, at least as it is presented.

[Speaker B] So the question is how to understand it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Such a thing—how are we to understand this conception? So I’m saying: even after I explain that when you betroth through an agent and not by yourself, the betrothal itself is of a lower quality—not only that you’re doing… You understand that this is a continuation of what I said earlier, say according to the Mikneh. According to the Mikneh, the Mikneh claims that “it is more of a commandment when done by oneself than by one’s agent” applies only to a formal commandment carried out through formal agency. Okay? And therefore he is constantly looking for where the commandment is here, and how the agency works, or what the case of agency is, and things like that. So we asked: why is this discussion important? After all, in the end Rashi explains to us that this is about reward—the Holy One, blessed be He, gives greater reward—so surely you could say that even about something that is neither a commandment nor agency. That is already an initial hint in this Mikneh, that he apparently understands there is something in the Jewish law itself that gives preference to doing something yourself rather than through an agent. And still, of course, that still doesn’t get us to the Raavad, but it is already something moving in that direction. The Raavad takes it one step further. The bill of divorce is invalid—rabbinically invalid. Meaning, there is invalidity, and there are several levels of invalidity. There is an invalidity of the sort that in practice does not obligate you at all even to give another bill of divorce, and the children are legitimate and everything is fine; she can remarry and nothing needs to be done. So in what sense is the bill of divorce invalid? After all, the whole issue is whether the woman is divorced or not divorced. Meaning, she is completely divorced; there is no implication here even initially, nothing at all, nothing needs to be done. So then in what sense is this called an invalid bill of divorce? It seems there is some conception there that says: the divorce was done less well—I don’t know exactly what that means. Therefore it could be that you aren’t obligated to give another bill of divorce, but according to that conception maybe there is still some point in giving another one anyway, in order to make it fully complete. I don’t know.

[Speaker E] But you could understand in what sense the bill of divorce is invalid—in the sense that it would have been preferable to do it differently.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That initially, when you come to do it, you should do it that way. But then I think the wording “an invalid bill of divorce” is strange wording.

[Speaker B] Strange, yes.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In any case, I’m bringing it here only as an example—why then

[Speaker B] What would they call it then, a disgraceful bill of divorce? What? So what would they call it, a disgraceful bill of divorce?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, they would say: this is how a bill of divorce should be done. You don’t need to say it is invalid; you should say: this is how you do it.

[Speaker B] If the problem is with the wording “invalid,” then what should they call it?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then say: make a bill of divorce in such-and-such a way. Don’t say that a bill of divorce done in such-and-such a way is invalid. Say: when you come to make a bill of divorce, do it this way. Formulate it as a positive commandment, not as a prohibition.

[Speaker E] You could also formulate it as a prohibition: don’t make a bill of divorce in such-and-such a way.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine. The question is what is demanded of you: are you required to do, or required not to do? But I’m saying, they are talking about when you come to write the bill of divorce—what are you supposed to do, how are you supposed to do it—not what happened afterward if you already did it. And “invalid” is always post facto language. In any case, in the Raavad it seems that the Raavad understands this rule—“it is more of a commandment when done by oneself than by one’s agent”—as some kind of flaw in the betrothal that was created this way; it is not complete in some sense. Okay? Therefore he says: do it again. Now again, this still does not fully solve the problem. Incomplete, incomplete—but she is already betrothed. So what is there to betroth her again? But here you can already understand what the Raavad is saying: if you betroth her again now, the betrothal will be complete. I’ll bring a few examples that are well known in the yeshivot. There is Rabbi Chaim’s famous case about etrogs, right? What is preferable? You have two etrogs. One etrog is beautiful but of doubtful validity—you don’t know whether it is valid or not, but if it is valid then it is beautiful. The second etrog is valid, but definitely not beautiful. So the assumption is that you should take both, but which one should you take first? You should take the beautiful one first. Why? Because if you took the valid one, then there is no reason to take anything more; that’s it, you have fulfilled your obligation. What sense does it make to then take the beautiful one? If you took the beautiful one, you still have a doubt whether you fulfilled your obligation, because it is only doubtfully valid, and then you take the valid one just to be safe. Therefore you take the beautiful one first. And his assumption is that if you took the plain valid one first, there is no point in taking the beautiful one afterward, right? In contrast to what the Raavad says here. What the Raavad says here is that if you did the plain betrothal first, then afterward do the beautified betrothal.

[Speaker E] The etrog doesn’t contain anything. What? The etrog doesn’t contain anything; it’s just that my obligation has fallen away, so that’s the end of it. But in betrothal there is a legal effect that stands from now forever.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Here too there is some commandment that I am doing—the commandment of etrog, a kind of

[Speaker E] threshold that you have to cross.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You crossed it and that’s it. It’s not something

[Speaker E] that exists all the time, right? So if it’s defective, should it stay that way?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Here too the commandment is defective. So what difference does it make? The commandment is defective. Do it better, and you’ll have an excellent commandment.

[Speaker E] No commandment remains in force; rather, the obligation simply fell away from me.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The obligation fell away, fine. But if you would do it—assuming it is possible to do it again—do it again and you will have a better commandment. What’s the problem?

[Speaker E] I’m no longer commanded.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean, no longer commanded? But you have a commandment. You did the commandment badly—do it again. You are still within the proper time. I’m not talking about doing it after Sukkot. You are still within the time of the obligation. Do it again and you will have a beautified commandment, for your benefit.

[Speaker E] You are assuming that I can perform a commandment even if I am not commanded in it—that’s the point.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I am commanded in it. What do you mean, not commanded in it? On Sukkot one must take the four species.

[Speaker E] Yes, but one who already took them does not have to.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, he took a plain one; he did not take a beautified one. Just as with the woman: the woman is already betrothed, but yes, she is betrothed in a plain way and not in a beautified way. So the source for this is his father in Beit HaLevi. Beit HaLevi says, in Shaagat Aryeh section 50 and Beit HaLevi part 2, section 47—they discuss at length, because this begins from some passage in Tractate Menachot about two offerings: you offered a sacrifice, and then you found a more beautiful sacrifice. So the question is whether you can bring the more beautiful sacrifice even though you already offered the plain one. The Talmud says yes. And on the face of it, that is really a Talmudic source in favor of this whole line of reasoning. So they discuss whether it is the same thing or not the same thing. Is this before the sprinkling of the blood—meaning maybe before the sprinkling you can still do this, but after the sprinkling you can no longer do it.

[Speaker B] Obligatory or voluntary?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Obligatory. For a voluntary offering, you do whatever you want. A sin-offering. “If two sin-offerings were before him, one lean and one fat.” “And regarding this I had great doubt,” says the Beit HaLevi, “about one who took a valid lulav on the festival of Sukkot, and afterward another, more beautiful lulav became available to him. Is he obligated to take the beautiful one? For one could say that even though initially, if both had been before him together, he would have been obligated to take the beautiful one, now that he has already taken one and fulfilled his obligation with it, there is no longer any commandment-obligation upon him. If so, with what commandment would he beautify himself here?” This is exactly our case, right? When you do the action in an unbeautified way—but you already did it. What can be done? You already fulfilled your obligation. So true, with betrothal it doesn’t matter right now whether it is a commandment or not a commandment, but the action was done. Finished. Now she is betrothed. But you see that the Beit HaLevi is in doubt. He says, “And regarding this I had great doubt.” It is not obvious to him. I would say: what is there to doubt? Obviously, you have fulfilled your obligation, finished. Now this is of course connected to the whole discussion—he has an entire discussion there in Beit HaLevi, a famous discussion, and the Brisker Rav on Hanukkah—it is the same discussion, in the dispute between Maimonides and the Tur regarding fringes of flesh that are not essential. A passage in Tractate Shabbat 133: the Talmud says there that one does not go back after the circumcision for fringes that are not essential. On the simple reading of the Talmud, the intent is on the Sabbath. Meaning, on the Sabbath one does not circumcise further, because you have already fulfilled your obligation; you have a valid circumcision. True, removing those extra fringes is beautification, removing more non-essential fringes, but on the Sabbath we do not desecrate the Sabbath for beautification of a commandment. But when Maimonides writes “one does not go back,” he writes it simply: “one does not go back,” without connection to the Sabbath. One does not go back. So they explain there—it doesn’t matter now whether this is the Beit HaLevi and the Brisker Rav, in somewhat different formulations—they explain the dispute a bit differently, but the basic idea is the same. There is a disagreement there. The Tur says that only on the Sabbath does one not go back, but on a weekday one does go back. What is the disagreement? The disagreement is whether beautification of a commandment is possible after you have completed the act of the commandment. Say, for example, you performed the circumcision, some non-essential fringes remained, and after, I don’t know, an hour, you come and cut the non-essential fringes. Then you have beautified the result, but the commandment itself you already finished. The question is whether beautification can be done after the completion of the act of the commandment. In another formulation—I don’t remember which of them, whether it was the Beit HaLevi or the Brisker Rav—but one of them says that the dispute is this: everyone agrees that you cannot beautify after the commandment; the dispute is whether this counts as after the commandment, because the commandment is to be circumcised and not to circumcise. Then the commandment continues afterward as well, and you can beautify it.

[Speaker E] There too, with the etrog, it could be that this was the root of his doubt: whether the commandment ends the moment I first take the etrog in hand or not, because after all, one continues holding it—during Hallel one holds it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no. But he is talking about a case where it became available afterward. He says explicitly: “afterward a more beautiful lulav became available to him.” No—it is already out of his hand.

[Speaker E] No, it’s not a matter of whether it left his hand or not. Even today we put it down and then during Hallel and the Hoshanot we hold it again. Right. So is that part during Hallel no longer a commandment?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We do it, no problem, do it. But—

[Speaker E] I fulfilled my obligation, but every moment that I hold it is a commandment, so that continuing part I can do in a beautified way. That was the doubt.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why wouldn’t you do it? Here there is no doubt. No, it is obvious that you should do it. What is the doubt?

[Speaker E] No, his doubt was whether—what was he doubting? Whether he is obligated to take the beautiful one, whether to replace the…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So if he is obligated, then again it is the same thing. So what did you gain with your argument? What did you gain by saying that he does it during Hallel?

[Speaker E] First of all I’m saying: according to that, there is no room for doubt. In any case he should, why not? Right. So perhaps he entertained the possibility that in fact this whole continuation is not a separate commandment.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then do it with the first lulav—as if you are obligated to do it with the first lulav you took.

[Speaker E] I don’t know if obligated; it’s strange.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In the context of the discussion there, it is connected to the non-essential fringes—that is the same answer. Meaning, the question he discusses there—I no longer remember exactly the structure of it.

[Speaker E] Why indeed did he ignore the fact that this too is a commandment—the continuation is also a commandment?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, he thinks: once you finished Hallel, you finished everything. Again, the question is: suppose you have at home—no, yes, because… No, there is a pattern established by the Sages for how this commandment is fulfilled. So during Hallel you wave it, you hold it, afterward you put it down, you finished the commandment. That’s it. You fulfilled your obligation. Now another lulav happened to come your way. I don’t know—but surely not obligatory.

[Speaker E] Surely not obligatory.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, but the question here is whether he is obligated. The question is whether he has an obligation to take the beautiful one.

[Speaker E] Right, so what is this whole issue of obligation? In any case there is no obligation to take a beautified object.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, there is an obligation to take a beautified object. Certainly—a full obligation. “This is my God and I will glorify Him”—a full obligation. A full obligation. “This is my God and I will glorify Him.” That is a very common mistake regarding beautification of a commandment. People think that beautification of a commandment is something voluntary. Why would that be? Beautification of a commandment is a complete obligation. You are obligated to beautify a commandment. True, it does not invalidate the commandment. Meaning, if you did not perform the commandment in a beautified way, you fulfilled the obligation of the commandment, but you did not fulfill the obligation of beautification. It’s like tekhelet.

[Speaker E] People think that because tekhelet

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] does not invalidate the white, that tekhelet is beautification of the commandment. Tekhelet is certainly not beautification. Why? Because at the time when there is tekhelet, it is a full commandment; it just does not invalidate the white. If you did not have tekhelet, you fulfilled the obligation of the white. With beautification, on the simple reading it is the same thing. You are obligated to beautify—what do you mean? “Glorify yourself before Him through commandments.”

[Speaker B] Initially, initially, tekhelet does not invalidate?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Who said otherwise?

[Speaker B] Initially, initially, tekhelet does not invalidate. No.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A Mishnah in Tractate Menachot: “tekhelet does not invalidate the white, and the white does not invalidate the tekhelet.” It does not invalidate the white, but there is a full commandment to have tekhelet—a positive obligation. Maybe the word “beautification” hints that it isn’t…

[Speaker E] I don’t agree.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I know that it is commonly thought that way. I really do not agree. There are even institutes that write this. I do not agree at all. Beautification of a commandment is a complete obligation. You are obligated to beautify a commandment. True, it does not invalidate the commandment. Fine, okay.

[Speaker E] But I understand—I’m not proving from the fact that it doesn’t invalidate anything. Just on the face of it, to beautify is not an obligation, because nowhere is it written that a person is obligated—that’s all.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean, not written? “This is my God and I will glorify Him”—glorify yourself before Him through commandments.

[Speaker E] Fine, true, but it also says to bestow kindness, and we understand that it does not mean that you are obligated to bestow kindness.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why? You are obligated to bestow kindness. What do you mean?

[Speaker E] No, you are obligated—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] to bestow kindness. What do you mean?

[Speaker E] I know there is some measure…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You are obligated! No, fine, the question whether there is a measure is another question, but you are obligated. What do you mean?

[Speaker E] And in beautification of a commandment there is a measure. Right. So everyone fulfills beautification of a commandment, because it is always more beautiful relative to…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Let’s take the measure—what is the measure of beautification of a commandment?

[Speaker E] If it has no measure…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, it has a measure of one-third.

[Speaker E] No, one-third is about how much one must spend.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So why? What does “how much one must spend” mean? After all, I can do whatever I want anyway. So what is this one-third?

[Speaker E] Beyond that it is no longer… it is no longer all—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You are saying that more than one-third is forbidden. The novelty is not that one needs… The plain reading there is not like that. In Bava Kamma 9, the simple reading is not that way. The simple reading is that you are obligated to beautify up to one-third. So that means you are obligated to beautify. Fine, never mind. For our purposes, this Beit HaLevi basically—but you understand that he raises a question very similar to the Rashba’s question. Meaning, it could be that if you perform a commandment in a plain way, you have fulfilled your obligation. Now a chance comes to do the commandment in a beautified way—one could argue that you should do it again in a beautified way. Now here, with the etrog, this is even more far-reaching. Because with betrothal you can say that the first legal effect is defective, I want to repair it, so I effect it again in a corrected way. Fine, that one can still say. With the etrog—or with the lulav—this is much more far-reaching, because there, there is no… I fulfilled my obligation. There is no legal effect that was created and now needs to be fixed. Fine, one could say that the commandment that accrued to my credit, that is recorded to my credit, is a defective commandment. I do it again, and then I fix the commandment that accrued to my credit. So that really is a puzzling thing. And there is also a long discussion in Shaagat Aryeh and in Beit HaLevi, a long and complicated discussion. But in short, it is not trivial. It is not trivial that if you did something defectively, you cannot afterward go back and do it in a beautified way. And what we apparently see in the Rashba—I say, one could have explained the Rashba a bit more innovatively, without resorting to this novelty, and said: look, the betrothal is not defective; the betrothal is complete, everything is excellent. But in the person there was a less good fulfillment; do it again and then you will also have a wonderful commandment in Heaven. I think that in the simpler understanding, it makes more sense to say that the Rashba means that in the betrothal itself there is something defective. Otherwise it really becomes an act devoid of any meaning, especially if betrothal is not a commandment—then there is nothing to discuss at all. But even if it is a commandment, once she is fully betrothed to you, what is the significance of what you are doing? Therefore I tend to think that in the Rashba it says—and with this I opened the previous lecture—that “it is more of a commandment when done by oneself than by one’s agent” means that the commandment itself is done in a less complete way, the result is less… the result is defective. Do it again so that it will be complete; betroth her again. She is a little bit available, as it were—she is ninety percent my wife. Betroth her so that she will be one hundred percent.

[Speaker F] How would that relate to the view of the Shulchan Arukh? Say, do the Sabbath preparations again because if the maid already did them?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That might be the practical difference, because in betrothal there is a legal effect, so you can say that the legal effect is defective. In Sabbath preparations, if the food is cooked and it is cooked well, what will you do again—salt it again? That is the Rivash’s claim, yes. But I think that even the Rashba would not say to salt it again. What can be done? Fine? Fine? But he would say that there it cannot be repaired. What can be done? The food is cooked; it cannot be repaired. But in principle it is possible: you could throw this food in the garbage, or give it to the poor, and cook new food for the Sabbath yourself; or keep this food for a weekday and cook new food for the Sabbath. In principle, you could repair it there too. I think that there, because of the legal effect, this really is a good practical difference. Because if I am right that the obligation to go back and do it again is because the betrothal is actually a bit defective according to the Rashba, then I can understand why this is less applicable to Sabbath preparations, because no legal effect was created there as a result of the action, okay?

[Speaker E] So the point is that you can’t say they are defective if it has no implication whatsoever, and that sounds a bit strange.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, it does have an implication: betroth again. What do you mean, no implication? Like an invalid bill of divorce—the Berakh Shmuel did not ask about an invalid bill of divorce whether you need to give a bill of divorce again even though it has no implications?

[Speaker E] The implication is what happens if she becomes betrothed to another man.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, because there is something defective here, do it again.

[Speaker E] Yes, that I understood. But the point is this: suppose a woman were forbidden to the whole world except me in some way, like a yevamah. Right? Would there be any point in my betrothing her? Clearly not. Because this law of betrothal—what?

[Speaker B] I didn’t understand. Why a vow?

[Speaker E] Suppose the status of betrothal already existed. In any case she would be forbidden to the whole world with the prohibition of a married woman except to me. I didn’t betroth her; it happened somehow. And we have such a case with a yevamah. Would there be any point in my betrothing her? With a yevamah we see that there is not, right? Clearly not. There is no point, clearly not. So here too it is like that. I now come to impose the legal effect a second time. I say, fine, I did a defective act. Suppose I didn’t even do it at all, if you like. Fine? But there is no point in betrothing her, because she is forbidden to the whole world except me.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Here the problem is not the result—but here I want to create betrothal. So do it properly.

[Speaker E] No, but I’m saying, fine—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If you want to create betrothal, do it in the most beautified way. If you don’t want to, then don’t do it.

[Speaker E] It is like a fish that is already salted, in that sense. Because regardless of the fact that, say, you imposed it defectively and all that, it works exactly as if you imposed it properly.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It works, but it is less good. Your house is a shaky house.

[Speaker E] No, but that would be a case of “what is crooked cannot be straightened.” It is exactly like the case of the fish—it is already salted. The woman is already forbidden.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That is the Rivash’s claim. I’m saying, that is the simple side. I’m not looking for explanations for that. I’m looking for explanations for the Raavad. How can one understand what the Raavad says?

[Speaker E] These explanations—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I didn’t understand. In any case, that is what emerges from the Raavad, and if so, that really takes us back to the starting point: “it is more of a commandment when done by oneself than by one’s agent” somehow does seem to be a rule. This is the continuation of what we saw in the Mikneh, and that is why all this introduction from the Mikneh. Once you understand this as some principle found within the halakhic realm—I’m not talking about the Holy One, blessed be He, and the reward He gives me for good deeds—then the next step is the step of the Raavad. Not a necessary step, but the next step is the step of the Raavad. Okay, and that means less good betrothal as well.

[Speaker D] Is there another way to understand the Mikneh? Can’t the Mikneh be understood differently?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, with the Mikneh I’m not sure that this is so. I don’t think the Mikneh has to agree with the Raavad. The Mikneh says: this is a rule stated in the halakhic realm. But that does not mean that betrothal done through an agent is defective, or that there is any point in betrothing again after you already made defective betrothal. The Mikneh need not accept any of that.

[Speaker D] He said that “more of a commandment by oneself than by one’s agent” means both the reward and the by-oneself.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, reward for a commandment.

[Speaker D] It’s reward, like you said.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Reward for the commandment, but he understands that this applies only as reward for commandments. I’m saying, that is indeed strange, as I suggested earlier, but if I had to bet, I would not bet on the Mikneh agreeing with the Raavad. Does he agree with the Raavad’s law?

[Speaker E] Because of what you said, either he went like the Raavad, or else to say what I said earlier—that he held every good deed is a commandment.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes—now I’ve come back to what you said. In the Mikneh that is probably what it says, right?

[Speaker E] That every good deed is a commandment.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, yes. All right, we’ll stop here.