Lesson from 1 Nisan 5767
This transcript was produced automatically using artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.
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Table of Contents
- Religion as law and “bounded by the ways of religion”
- Meiri: separating idolatry from moral corruption
- Maimonides in Bava Kamma: damages, two legal systems, and a moral criterion
- Meiri’s conclusion: attitude depends on choice, not origin
Summary
Overview
Religion is defined as law, and therefore “bounded by the ways of religion” means people who observe human and moral laws. Meiri is understood as saying that gentiles can be good and civilized people even if they practice idolatry, and therefore idolatry must be separated from moral corruption, with a rejecting attitude applying only toward gentiles who are not bounded by the norms of religion. Maimonides is cited as a source that explains the halakhic distinctions regarding non-Jews on a moral rather than genetic basis, describing one who lacks human virtues as not truly included in humanity but existing for the benefit of man. Meiri concludes from this that if gentiles are bounded by the ways of religion, then there is no difference in attitude between them and Jews.
Religion as law and “bounded by the ways of religion”
Religion is law, and religion was given as law, so religion is law. “Bounded by the ways of religion” means keeping human laws, moral laws, and standards of civility and humanity. Meiri is presented very clearly as saying that “they are bounded by the ways of religions,” and therefore they are good, civilized, moral, and humane people.
Meiri: separating idolatry from moral corruption
Meiri states that even though they practice idolatry, one cannot permit their ritual objects, because that is idolatry and prohibited benefit. His interpretation does not say that all these laws apply only to idolaters, but rather that all these laws apply only to those who are morally corrupt. His great innovation, as against the Sages and the Bible, is that there is room to separate the treatment of idolaters from moral corruption, so that a person can violate the prohibition of idolatry and still, on the human level, be a good person. From this it follows that the laws that instruct us to treat gentiles in a rejecting way were said only about those gentiles who are not bounded by the norms of religion.
Maimonides in Bava Kamma: damages, two legal systems, and a moral criterion
In Maimonides himself there appears the topic of damages involving a Jew’s ox that gored the ox of a non-Jew, or vice versa. The Talmud itself tells of two Romans who came to study and praised the Torah except for this law, asking what they would tell the Romans when they returned. The law is described as follows: if their ox gored our ox, we judge by whichever law is stricter, theirs or ours; and if our ox gored their ox, we judge by whichever law is more lenient, choosing the more lenient law, ours or theirs—as in private international law, where there are two legal systems and one chooses the one more convenient for oneself. In his commentary to the Mishnah, Maimonides says: “Do not be astonished by this matter, and do not let it be difficult in your eyes, just as the slaughter of animals is not difficult in your eyes, even though they have not sinned.” He explains that “one who does not possess human virtues is not included in humanity,” that he is “not really a human being,” and that the purpose of his existence is for the sake of man, like animals created for human use. Therefore the attitude toward him is as toward one who has no rights, exactly like animals, in line with the Sages’ exposition: “You are called man, and they are not called man.” Maimonides does not present this as a genetic difference between Israel and the nations, but as a moral matter, and he is consistent in this elsewhere as well—for example, in the commandment to wipe out Amalek, which he also turns into something moral and not merely genealogical.
Meiri’s conclusion: attitude depends on choice, not origin
In that same passage itself, on page 37 in Bava Kamma, Meiri says that as a result, if there are gentiles who are indeed bounded by the ways of religion, the attitude changes. The treatment of them as something like “animals” is described as deeply dismissive of human beings, but it is said to be based on their choices and not on their genetics or their origin. On the other side of that same coin, if they choose differently, then the attitude will be completely different. Therefore Meiri says: “no difference between them.”
Full Transcript
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What is religion? Law. Meaning, religion was given—it's law. Religion is law. So “bounded by the ways of religion,” that’s what it means: they keep human laws, moral laws. And what Meiri is ultimately saying, in the clearest possible way—I don’t know why everyone interprets him differently—he says: they are bounded by the ways of religions; they are good people, civilized, moral, humane. True, they practice idolatry; you can’t permit their ritual objects, and that is idolatry and prohibited benefit. But still, his interpretation is more sophisticated than what we said earlier. His interpretation is not that all these laws apply only to idolaters. His interpretation is that all these laws apply only to people who are morally corrupt. And his great innovation, as against the Sages and the Bible, is an enormous innovation: that there is room to separate the treatment of idolaters from moral corruption. In other words, the two do not necessarily have to go together. It could be that a person violates the prohibition of idolatry, however severe that may be, and still, on the human level, is a good person. And as a result, you can go on and interpret the laws that tell us to relate to gentiles in a rejecting way as having been said only about those gentiles who are not bounded by the norms of religion. I’ll bring just one example—more than that, I’ll show you that this is in Maimonides himself; you don’t even need to get to Meiri. Maimonides writes this, and Meiri follows him, in the discussion of damages: a Jew’s ox that gored the ox of a non-Jew, or vice versa. There’s a somewhat problematic statement there. The Talmud itself says that they taught this to two Romans who came to study, and then they asked—they came to study Torah, and they were taught everything—and then they said: the whole Torah is wonderful except for this law; we don’t know what to do with it. What are we supposed to tell the Romans when we go back? Because it says there that if their ox gored our ox, then we judge according to whichever law is stricter, theirs or ours; and if our ox gored their ox, then we judge according to whichever law is more lenient. You choose the more lenient law, either ours or theirs—what you’d call private international law. In other words, there are two legal systems here, and you just choose the one that’s more convenient for you—that’s the criterion. And that already looks a bit problematic in the Talmud itself. So there, in that context, Maimonides feels there really is a need to explain, in his commentary to the Mishnah, and he says this: “Do not be astonished by this matter, and do not let it be difficult in your eyes, just as the slaughter of animals is not difficult in your eyes, even though they have not sinned. For one who does not possess human virtues is not included in humanity.” Rather, truthfully speaking, he’s not really a human being. And since that is so, the purpose of his existence is for the sake of man. Like animals, in short. Animals—what? Is it hard for you to understand why they’re slaughtered? Maimonides says: no, why should it be? They haven’t sinned. Fine—but they’re animals. Animals were created for human use. Maimonides says: those who are morally corrupt are not worthy of being called human. “You are called man, and they are not called man”—that’s the exposition of the Sages. And that’s really what Maimonides is saying here. And since that is so, the attitude toward them should also be accordingly: they are basically meant to be used, they have no rights, exactly like animals.
[Speaker B] And maybe Maimonides doesn’t accept the genetic approach—the difference between Israel and the nations isn’t something…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no—it’s a moral matter. Maimonides, by the way, is consistent about this in many places. For example, he also turns the wiping out of Amalek into something moral and not only genealogical. Yes, in many places you see this in Maimonides, and here too. And indeed, the conclusion that Meiri himself draws from this—perhaps בעקבות Maimonides; he doesn’t disagree with Maimonides, so he doesn’t need to mention that he disagrees with Maimonides. Here Meiri, in that very same passage itself on page 37 in Bava Kamma, says as a result: if that’s so, if there are gentiles who are indeed bounded by the ways of religion, then on the one hand this is a very dismissive attitude toward human beings, right? That they’re like animals. But on the other hand, that’s exactly the point: it dismisses them because of their choices, not because of their genetics or their origin. And on the other side of that same coin, if they choose differently, then the attitude will be completely different. And that’s what Meiri says: no difference between them.