Lecture dated 2 Adar 5767

This transcript was produced automatically using artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.

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[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Ah, never mind, but these are the sages who are in the Land of Israel. Meaning, if you have outstanding Torah scholars, the great sages of the generation, sitting outside the Land of Israel, that’s irrelevant. Irrelevant. In a moment we’ll see here in Maimonides another comment on this issue. But Maimonides brings proofs. Because if you don’t say this, then the existence of the Great Court will never be possible. Now Maimonides brings a proof for his reasoning. If you don’t agree with my reasoning that ordination can be renewed, then the existence of the Great Court will never be possible, because each one of them has to be ordained, beyond any doubt, and God already promised, regarding their restoration, when He said: “And I will restore your judges as at first.” Perhaps you’ll say that the Messiah will appoint them? Even though they aren’t ordained? How would that happen? Meaning, Maimonides says, fine, maybe the Messiah will appoint them? But that is impossible, because we already explained in the introduction to this book that the Messiah will add nothing to the Torah and subtract nothing from it, neither in the Written Torah nor in the Oral Torah. So the Messiah can’t receive powers beyond the powers that an ordinary king has. He’ll be a king, fine, but according to Torah law he’ll have whatever authority a king has. A king can’t ordain people. You need the king’s permission, and apparently also that of the exilarch; that’s written also in Babylonia. But that’s permission, not… he’s not the one ordaining. He only grants permission. That’s a condition, but it’s not the ordination process itself. It’s impossible—there is no ordination without someone already ordained who ordains you. You need the exilarch’s permission. So therefore, says Maimonides, if we are promised, “I will restore your judges as at first,” we have to say that there is some mechanism for renewing it, otherwise how will it happen? Maimonides says: and perhaps you’ll tell me the King Messiah will appoint them? That can’t be, because a king has no such authority, and the King Messiah is an ordinary king; he has the halakhic powers that an ordinary king has. And I think that the Sanhedrin will return before the revelation of the Messiah. Beyond that, Maimonides says more than that: I also think that the Sanhedrin will return even before the revelation of the Messiah, so that solution is automatically off the table. The Messiah can’t appoint them if they will appear before him. And this will be one of its signs, as it says: “And I will restore your judges as at first, and your counselors as at the beginning, and afterward you shall be called the city of righteousness.” And this will undoubtedly happen when God prepares the hearts of human beings and they abound in good deeds and their longing for God and for His Torah grows, and so on. So if that’s the case, then basically Maimonides is saying here that there is a fairly clear proof that there is no escape—we have to accept Maimonides’ reasoning, because otherwise how will the promise be fulfilled that the Holy One, blessed be He, will restore our judges as at first? There is no other way to renew ordination.

Up to this point, the commentators are already somewhat hesitant. By the way, there is nobody who explicitly says that he does not accept Maimonides’ opinion—as far as I know, at least. Someone who categorically raises this possibility and rejects it. There isn’t; I don’t know of anyone like that. There are of course many medieval authorities who didn’t discuss it—maybe because they didn’t think of it, maybe because, I don’t know, for various reasons, or because they agreed. But there is no one who explicitly raises this possibility and rejects it, meaning does not accept it. That’s also an important point as background for the discussion.

Maimonides, in the fourth source, in his commentary on the Mishnah to tractate Bekhorot, adds another point that is important regarding the Land of Israel. “And we already explained at the beginning of Sanhedrin that a court is not called simply a court unless it is ordained in the Land of Israel, whether ordained by someone already ordained or by the agreement of the people of the Land of Israel to appoint him head of the academy.” Here you already see that these have to be the people of the Land of Israel. For some reason he doesn’t mention Torah scholars; maybe he’s just being brief, meaning Torah scholars who are in the Land of Israel. And then he adds an explanation: “Because the people of the Land of Israel are the ones who are called the congregation.” You remember what we discussed in the previous topic, that in the 11th century the main halakhic break was created as a result of the concept of congregation disappearing from the world. The concept of the public—which until then was only the entirety of the Jewish people, that was the only public that was recognized—began to split into separate communities, and then there was a need to renew this concept of a sub-public, a partial public. So that’s what Maimonides is saying: the congregation, the concept of congregation, exists only in the Land of Israel. They are called the congregation, and the name calls them “the whole congregation.” Then he continues: “Even if they were ten individuals”—ten private individuals, not a congregation in the usual sense—“and we pay no attention to those outside the Land of Israel, as we explained in Horayot.” Meaning, Maimonides says: if there are ten Torah scholars in the Land of Israel, even if they are scattered, not in one community, they are the ones called the congregation of Israel. And even if the greatest sages of the generation are sitting outside the Land of Israel in various places, there is no need to pay attention to them. The Torah scholars in the Land of Israel are the ones called the congregation, and they are the ones who can do this act.

Also in the laws of the shofar—the second source that I skipped over—Maimonides mentions incidentally: “And in this time, when the Temple is destroyed, in every place where there is a permanent court they sound the shofar on Rosh Hashanah that falls on the Sabbath, provided that it is ordained in the Land of Israel, they sound it there on the Sabbath.” What does “in this time” mean? Notice what he says. “In this time” means when he was writing, 800 years ago. “And in this time, when the Temple is destroyed, every place where there is a permanent court, they sound it there on the Sabbath.” And what is a permanent court? “Provided that it is ordained in the Land of Israel.” Once again Maimonides says that in this time there is a concept of someone ordained, right? That clearly emerges from his words.

Okay, so what are we learning here, basically? Maimonides innovates that ordination can be renewed by agreement of the sages—apparently the sages of the Land of Israel—and then they do not need to pay attention to those outside the Land of Israel if the sages of the Land of Israel agree. He brings proof for this from the future restoration, “And I will restore your judges as at first,” because otherwise ordination cannot return in the future. There is a little room to hesitate about the status of Torah scholars outside the Land of Israel, but it seems to me that the straightforward reading of the totality of Maimonides’ sources quite clearly suggests that indeed he means the Torah scholars in the Land of Israel, and that’s it.

Notice: all of this is from reasoning. Meaning, okay, to state the reasoning without a source—fine. To state the reasoning that ordination can be renewed, that very reasoning—that… here there can be a good proof, because otherwise how will we have judges in the future? But from that same reasoning to innovate that it applies only to the Torah scholars in the Land of Israel, without a source—meaning, they are called the congregation and they need not pay attention to any Torah scholar outside the Land of Israel, even if he is far greater than they are—that is much stronger. In other words, there is some conception here, let’s call it extreme, I don’t know what else to call it, of the significance of the Land of Israel in terms of our definition as a congregation, as a public. Maimonides takes it as self-evident from pure reasoning, without sources, that this thing can happen in the Land of Israel, only in the Land of Israel and not outside it, and in one sense that is stringent and in another sense lenient. Meaning, if the sages of the Land of Israel agree, it doesn’t matter what the sages outside the Land of Israel think.

Okay, so this is the source of all this whole mess. Now what happens in the 19th century? “Mess,” I hope nobody was looking. What happens in the 16th century? As I said earlier, twenty-five Torah scholars gather, they bring this Maimonides and say: fine, here we are, the majority of the Torah scholars in the Land of Israel, we agree to ordain Rabbi Yaakov Beirav to be ordained, and from now on he is ordained; he can adjudicate fines, ordain others—the ordination has returned. This discussion of course relies on the reading of Maimonides that the sages of the Land of Israel are enough to renew this matter.

But the sages of the Land of Israel were not only the sages of Safed; there was also a group of sages in Jerusalem, and the greatest among them, the best known among them, was Maharalbach, Rabbi Levi ben Haviv. They sent a letter to Jerusalem. That letter had two things in it: one was a writ of ordination for Maharalbach, meaning they ordained him too. Rabbi Yaakov Beirav, after he was ordained, ordained Maharalbach—maybe you’ll say that’s bribery, I don’t know. And the second was a letter asking whether he agreed. Meaning, they took a step here in which on the one hand they had already ordained Rabbi Yaakov Beirav, and he himself had already ordained others, including Maharalbach himself, and at the same time he sends to him asking him to agree, because after all you need the agreement of all the sages of the Land of Israel. So he sends him this letter, and Maharalbach is in a not-simple dilemma.

Maharalbach—I didn’t photograph this passage for you—writes as follows. There is a very long pamphlet, so I didn’t photograph all of it here. Maharalbach concludes his pamphlet by saying—he opposes it, Maharalbach opposes it, and in general the sages of Jerusalem oppose it, and a controversy arose around this issue. There was an exchange of letters back and forth in several rounds. And Maharalbach writes as follows: “For I am distressed and causing distress, and my heart is pained, that I did not merit to be counted in such a commandment,” after he had opposed it, he did not agree to the renewal of ordination, “the commandment of appointing worthy judges in the Holy Land, and that it should be fulfilled through me together with all my rabbis, for its reward is very great.” So he is very sorry about this. “Therefore I say that if it still appears to the rabbis of Safed—may their Rock preserve them and bless them—that there are proofs for sustaining their agreement, and that we should gather in one place for the honor of the God of Israel and His Holy Land, and there discuss and deliberate according to law, with no bias whatsoever, except for the service of Heaven, as befits those who dwell in the Holy Land, then in my eyes too it will appear a fine and proper thing, and here I am, and I know that also my leaders, my mighty ones, the perfect sages—may their Rock preserve them—in this holy city,” meaning Jerusalem, “will agree to this; and if perhaps after the discussion and deliberation it turns out that we do have the power to perform this commandment and establish it fully, happy are we that we merit this.” Meaning, he opposes it, but says: listen, you took a hasty step. You ordained before you asked us. It seems to me, from study of the passages, that it is not correct; you cannot ordain, for various reasons, some of which I’ll mention later. He is the first one to raise the possibility that there is opposition to Maimonides’ idea. Meaning, Maharalbach infers it from medieval authorities, but nobody says it clearly, as I mentioned before. There is no medieval authority who says, I do not agree with renewal of ordination by agreement of sages. There is no such thing. No such medieval authority is known, and he doesn’t bring one. He brings inferences—from Nachmanides on the Torah, from Rashba, which is even more problematic—but there are no clear statements.

He himself at least expresses such a side; he is a bit uncertain, or expresses a side that perhaps this whole reasoning of Maimonides isn’t even correct. Who says you can rely on it? But he says: let’s sit together and see. If we, the sages of Jerusalem and the sages of Safed, discuss and deliberate and you convince us that you are right, then we’ll be the first to agree gladly. This is an important commandment, and I am very sorry that I could not find a way to agree with you, because my heart too aches over the fact that this is an important commandment. Come convince me. In other words, he is saying to them: why did you jump ahead? What made you decide this before discussing it? You ask, you send a letter of ordination, and also ask me if that’s okay. First let’s clarify, let’s see; after it is agreed upon, we’ll ordain someone, then we’ll begin this matter. If indeed we agree. At the moment it doesn’t seem right to me, says Maharalbach. Okay? But you see that he too saw it as an important commandment, he too regretted the fact that he could not lend his hand to it, but he still opposed it—strongly, for various reasons.

Within all this, it’s worth adding that in the document they sent to Maharalbach, it appears that their aims were somewhat more modest than one might think at first glance. First of all, Maharalbach was very concerned that they also wanted to start dealing with the calendar—sanctifying the new month—and that is one of the things that requires ordained judges, and we have no way to do that today. He says he absolutely does not agree to that. Why? Because true, Maimonides’ view is that any court of three ordained judges can sanctify the month—you don’t even need a nasi, an av bet din, and a Sanhedrin—but precisely for that very reason, says Nachmanides, it is clear that they must be ordained, otherwise everyone will create a different calendar for himself and there will be complete chaos. So they answer him that no, they never intended to touch the calendar at all. Rabbi Hillel the Elder—not Hillel the Elder, Hillel the Nasi—whom Maimonides says was some kind of head of court in the Land of Israel, he basically established the calendar for future generations; he sanctified the months and established the calendar for future generations, because someone not ordained cannot do this. That itself is some kind of innovation—that you can do this ahead of time. But that is indeed what Maimonides innovates; Nachmanides disagrees. In any case, they say: we are insignificant compared to Hillel the Nasi, and certainly we are not going to argue with him, and we will not touch the calendar. That’s one thing.

Another thing: it appears that what they mainly wanted—at least in one of the rounds, I already don’t remember which one—was not to return to adjudicating fines and start judging all the Torah laws. What they mainly wanted, at least as they present it, was to allow people to receive lashes. That’s quite surprising. Why? Because there are people who want to receive lashes in order to gain atonement. “Those liable to karet who were lashed are exempt from their karet.” Meaning, someone who committed a sin punishable by excision—if he receives lashes, that atones for him. Now if there is no court of ordained judges, you cannot impose lashes on him. It won’t help just to beat him; these have to be lashes that are the result of a ruling by a court of ordained judges. Without that, it is not considered lashes in the halakhic sense. And therefore he is not atoned for; he remains liable to karet. So one of the main reasons presented there is the desire to allow people to gain atonement, to sentence them to lashes and lash them.

So he discusses there whether perhaps repentance also accomplishes this; Maharalbach answers them there that perhaps this can be done through repentance and there is no need to renew ordination for that. That too is an interesting discussion in itself—whether repentance can really do what lashes do, and if so, why lash at all. But that is in any case a different discussion from what we are dealing with here.

In any case, the discussion develops. They also sent to Radbaz. Radbaz was the greatest sage of Egypt at that time. Maharam Alshakar was also still in Egypt then; afterward he came up to the Land of Israel as well, and so did Radbaz. In the end both of them passed through Jerusalem and eventually came to Safed. And through all these stages, Radbaz also opposed it. At first, from Egypt—because in Egypt, the one who sent to him was Maharalbach. They themselves did not send to him at all, because Maimonides writes that we pay no attention to sages outside the Land of Israel. So they didn’t ask the sages outside the Land at all. At that time in Europe too there were Torah scholars—Maharshal, Rema—there were Torah scholars in Europe too, and nobody asked them. So they did not send anything abroad at all. Maharalbach, as the opponent, also sent to Radbaz to express his opinion, and Radbaz writes in his glosses on Maimonides on this law—Radbaz tells about it there, and writes that he also has a responsum about it. I haven’t seen the responsum itself inside; I don’t know whether it was printed in his responsa, maybe it was. And he says that he had already opposed it back then, and afterward he also arrived in Jerusalem and in the end, of course, moved to Safed. Throughout the whole process he also opposed this matter, Radbaz did.

Anyway, it becomes clear from all the testimonies I mentioned earlier that the sages of Safed continued on their own path. Rabbi Yosef Karo, in the responsa Avkat Rokhel—that’s Rabbi Yosef Karo’s responsa—writes there on an entirely different matter, in responsum 18 I think, that someone there asks them for the reasoning of a ruling they issued: “Write to me from what basis you judged me.” So Rabbi Yosef Karo says: we are not going to write you any reasoning, because we are the Great Court of the generation. Why would you need to write the reasoning? If someone wants to go to a greater court, then he needs to show the reasoning of the first court’s ruling. But if we are talking about the Sanhedrin, the Sanhedrin does not write anyone any reasoning—“from what basis you judged me”—because you cannot take it to anyone else; the Sanhedrin is the supreme institution. Rabbi Yosef Karo says: in our generation, we are like the Sanhedrin. We are the Great Court. Therefore we will not write you, “from what basis you judged me.” Meaning, there was a very clear conception there: they were the greatest sages of the generation, and therefore this possibility of restoring ordination arose.

In any case, a controversy developed. Now you have to pay close attention: this controversy has two meanings. The first is the controversy itself, the content—whether this is correct. Can one rely on Maimonides, on this reasoning of Maimonides, and renew ordination? But there is another dimension of the controversy, and that’s why it becomes a kind of tangle. Because even if one can rely on Maimonides—let’s say Maharalbach does not agree—still, even if Maimonides is right in his reasoning, you need the agreement of all the sages of the Land of Israel. Meaning, Maharalbach can attack on two planes. He can say: I don’t agree with the reasoning; you cannot ordain because I do not agree with Maimonides’ reasoning. There are other medieval authorities; I do not rule like him for one reason or another, whatever. Maharalbach can say: you know what? You are right about Maimonides, but I don’t agree. After all, you need the agreement of all the sages of the Land of Israel.

More than that: what he can disagree with can also be on two planes. I can disagree with the reasoning that ordination can really be renewed, and I can disagree with the identity of the person being ordained. I do not agree that he should be ordained. I agree with Maimonides’ reasoning, I accept everything, but I am not a partner to the decision to ordain specifically Rabbi Yaakov Beirav. So as a result of those same two aspects I spoke about earlier, Maharalbach can basically disagree on two planes.

An interesting question is: what happens if Maharalbach says, I agree that Rabbi Yaakov Beirav is worthy of ordination; I only doubt Maimonides’ reasoning. I’m not sure Maimonides is right that ordination can be renewed. What then? The sages of Safed can come and say: okay, for Maimonides’ reasoning you do not need all the sages of the Land of Israel. That is a halakhic question, and we’ll do what we think is right. If we agree that this reasoning is correct, then we will ordain. But Maimonides himself says that you need the agreement of all the sages of Israel. Fine—you agreed that Rabbi Yaakov Beirav is fit for ordination; you’re only disagreeing with us halakhically. You’re arguing with us that you cannot ordain. Fine—on that issue, you do not need the agreement of all the sages of Israel; it is a halakhic question to be decided like any other halakhic question. So there are many channels here, and it is not entirely clear in which of them this whole matter proceeded. It’s just not entirely clear. Maharalbach raises objections that are mainly objections to the law itself. He doesn’t speak about Rabbi Yaakov Beirav as being unworthy of ordination or something like that. He does express concerns about what will happen afterward—that this one will ordain that one and so on, suddenly we’ll lose control and all kinds of people I don’t know will start getting ordained. But he doesn’t say Rabbi Yaakov Beirav is unworthy. He raises all kinds of objections: is this reasoning correct, do you need all the sages of the Land of Israel, a majority of the sages of the Land of Israel, what does Maimonides mean? There are all sorts of discussions like that. Do we even need all this ordination in the first place? Repentance helps too, so you don’t need lashes—arguments of that type. It is not entirely clear whether such opposition can even operate on that second plane I mentioned earlier, the plane that says that you need the agreement of all the sages of the Land of Israel. Because as for Maimonides’ reasoning—who says that requires the agreement of all the sages of the Land of Israel? That is a piece of reasoning; we’ll argue about it and decide what we think is right.

[Speaker D] Okay, but this ordained person won’t have authority over those people.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why not? Of course he’ll have authority. Why? Because he is ordained.

[Speaker D] Someone who is really ordained—he’s not ordained for me, he’s not ordained.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But if we decided that he is ordained and we have the authority to do that, then you too, after all, admit—

[Speaker D] I admit that he is worthy, but I don’t accept your interpretation of Maimonides.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, you won’t obey him even though he is ordained, but from our perspective we ordained him. It really does raise a not-simple question; you’re right. Because an ordained person, as Maimonides himself said, when he is ordained by someone already ordained, doesn’t ask anybody. Meaning, they don’t need to agree. So assuming that he is really ordained, then he no longer needs anyone’s agreement. You’re just claiming, correctly, that in this specific ordination process this is exceptional—it’s not like ordination by someone already ordained, because here, if I did not agree, then you won’t have authority over me. Could be. There are many tangles here that arise.

[Speaker C] Maybe a majority can decide in terms of—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s another question that came up; Maharalbach discusses that too. The question is whether we say here “the majority is as the whole,” or we don’t say “the majority is as the whole.” We talked about that last time.

[Speaker C] “The majority is as the whole” there, or “the majority is as the whole” regarding Maimonides, or “the majority is as the whole” regarding the man?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, no—regarding the man, “the majority is as the whole.”

[Speaker C] Maybe yes, but not now—the conditions aren’t ripe yet.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, that’s the same thing. Meaning, but not necessarily only about the law itself; also about the concrete act of ordination. That’s a big question—whether “the majority is as the whole,” or all the sages of the Land of Israel, or only the majority. That is one of the big discussions that also comes up in Maharalbach.

[Speaker B] And the fact that they thought that what Rabbi Yosef Karo said—that they were the Great Court of the generation—that still doesn’t prove that they decided they were ordained.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, no, of course not. I’m only presenting the background. The background was that it was clear to them that they were the court authorized for the whole world, not only for the Land of Israel. Meaning, there were Jewish Torah scholars elsewhere, but the greatest concentration, the greatest strengths, were in Safed at that time, and I think there really were top-rank figures there in quantity. A quantity of quality figures, yes—not quantity in the simple sense. So in the end they apparently did ordain after all. You can explain that in various ways.

[Speaker B] In the first source it says this: “It appears to me that if all the sages in the Land of Israel agreed to appoint judges and ordain them, then they are ordained.” Meaning, he isn’t talking about ordination in the abstract, he isn’t talking about the specific people, he is talking about the ordination. He is talking about the sages needing to agree—all the sages need to agree with the reasoning.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No—what does he say? “It appears to me.”

[Speaker B] No, fine, but not with the reasoning—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] They have to agree to the ordination.

[Speaker B] They need to agree to the idea of the ordination, not to the people.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, the ordination—that’s “it appears to me”; that he said himself.

[Speaker B] They need to agree to appoint and ordain.

[Speaker D] His idea, his idea is that if all the sages agree to renew ordination—how can you say such an idea?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] My idea, he says, is that if everyone agrees with my idea, then my idea is correct.

[Speaker B] No, my idea says that everyone needs to agree to renew ordination in order for it to be possible to renew ordination.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s not clear. But my reasoning says that ordination can be renewed if everyone agrees. No—whether if everyone agrees then it is right or not right, that’s to renew the ordination; that is already a condition, that’s already a condition. But the condition—it’s not reasonable to interpret the condition as agreement—

[Speaker B] To the halakhah that ordination can be renewed.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The halakhah here Maimonides established, by reasoning.

[Speaker B] That’s not—it’s not a change, it’s not agreement to the halakhah, it’s agreement to the conditions. It means the conditions—agreement that now the time is ripe.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Ah, that yes. In my view that’s part of what I said—the circumstances, not the halakhah. Meaning, definitely—not only regarding the person, also regarding the conditions, regarding everything. There has to be agreement on the factual aspects, not on the normative aspects. Meaning, not on the very possibility of doing it, but on whether it is relevant now, whether the person is suitable, all the circumstances.

[Speaker B] But they can’t ignore it and say a majority is enough even if Maharalbach doesn’t agree. Why? Because Maimonides himself says “all the sages.”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that’s what we mean when we say “the majority is as the whole.” When we say “all”—you also need “all” when all Israel are impure, only then can the Passover offering be brought in impurity. And the Talmud says that this means “the majority is as the whole.” No, there it says majority in the Talmud. No, in the Talmud it says majority, but in the Torah you need all.

[Speaker B] Because that’s the definition, because that’s all the fathers—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The whole rule of “the majority is as the whole” says that in a place where you need everyone, a full majority counts like everyone. If you don’t need everyone and a majority is enough, then you don’t need the rule of “the majority is as the whole.” Meaning, the principle is that in a place where there is an explicit requirement of all, even a majority fulfills that requirement. That’s the concept of “the majority is as the whole.” We talked about this in the previous topic.

Okay, anyway, I’m already getting close to the end. This whole business develops; as I said earlier, it continues for several generations. Rabbi Yaakov Beirav ordains five students. Interestingly, it’s like the five of—yes, Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava. He ordains four and flees to Damascus because of some informing or something like that. He ordains four students, and later one more. There are five who were ordained by Rabbi Yaakov Beirav, as far as I remember at least. They themselves continue ordaining onward. Rabbi Yaakov Beirav’s grandson, who was also called Rabbi Yaakov Beirav the Younger, was also ordained. Not only was he ordained, he himself ordained many others, meaning it continued for several generations. Rabbi Chaim Vital was ordained by Rabbi Yosef Karo. Rabbi Chaim Vital, the student of the Ari, was ordained by Rabbi Yosef Karo as an ordained judge. Meaning, Rabbi Yosef Karo himself was ordained and used that authority to ordain others. He accepted the validity of the ordination; he himself was ordained, and he also used it in order to ordain.

And now for the great wonder—the great wonder is that in the Shulchan Arukh there is no hint of this. No hint of any of it. It does not appear in the Shulchan Arukh that one can ordain, it does not appear in the Shulchan Arukh that there are ordained judges. I brought here one source, the Beit Yosef. The Beit Yosef says: “And regarding what was written, that there is a practical difference nowadays, even though fines are not adjudicated, etc., this is difficult to me, since nowadays there are no ordained judges—since now there are no ordained judges, when he comes before us, what difference does it make?” After all, now there are no ordained judges. So what are you talking about? Who is talking? He himself is ordained—he himself! And what does he say? “Since nowadays there are no ordained judges, what do we do?” Not only is he ordained, he also ordained others. Amazing. Then he continues: “And perhaps even now ordained judges can be found, according to what Maimonides wrote in chapter 4 of the laws of Sanhedrin,” what we read earlier. And afterward he also brings Rashba—that’s the next source I brought. Rashba too basically brings this Maimonides and—it’s not clear whether he fully agrees with him or not, but he does not explicitly write that he disagrees; he brings him and raises some reservation.

So this is very strange. Rabbi Yosef Karo himself, as one who was ordained, as one who also ordained others, one of the leading figures there among those involved—he himself says, wait, but today there are no ordained judges. He writes this as something simple, not even in this topic, but in another topic where they discuss—

[Speaker B] There regarding—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean?

[Speaker B] Meaning, when the sages of Safed saw that Maharalbach opposed it and the sages of Jerusalem opposed it, they said: fine, we lost. It’s impossible to have ordained judges. But what? Let’s make something like ordained judges. And then they started ordaining people for adjudication, for restoring the status and these things.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I really think there was indeed something like that, because otherwise it is very hard to understand so many contradictions. Mabit, for example—I’ll come back to that in a moment. Mabit too was one of the ordained ones, one of the great sages of Safed in that period. He sat on the court together with Rabbi Yosef Karo. There were also all kinds of major controversies there, but he too was one of the ordained. He himself writes in his book in several places: and today, when there are no ordained judges, I don’t know, one needs to do such-and-such—in all sorts of contexts that are unrelated to this issue at all. He himself was ordained by Rabbi Yaakov Beirav. Very strange. More than that, there is someone else here that I saw—Chida. You see? I’ll bring here from Chida. At the moment I couldn’t find where the source is. I had it written down but didn’t note for myself where the source is. Chida brings here the writ of ordination by which Rabbi Yosef Karo ordains Rabbi Chaim Vital.

[Speaker D] No, the writer—

[Speaker B] As if—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no—

[Speaker D] No, it’s—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It is brought in Chida, and Chida—no, no, no, Chida is the source. No, Chida has nothing to do with it at all. Chida is only bringing the document, he’s just quoting—

[Speaker B] He’s only the one quoting it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Chida is from the 19th century. What? A completely different period.

[Speaker D] Yes, yes, of course.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So Rabbi Moshe Alshikh signs: “And as proof, with my own hand I have ordained the complete sage, the pious mystic Rabbi Chaim Vital, that he may issue rulings, issue rulings, judge, judge like any ordained judge. I wrote and gave it into his hand.” And who is signed? Rabbi Moshe Alshikh. But Rabbi Chaim Vital was ordained by Rabbi Yosef Karo. There are other sources for that. So why is he suddenly quoting for me a writ of ordination that he himself saw? He quotes it and writes that he saw this document, a writ of ordination of Maharam Alshikh ordaining Rabbi Chaim Vital. What exactly is going on here?

[Speaker B] Rabbi Chaim—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Vital was ordained by Rabbi Yosef Karo.

[Speaker B] So how now is he saying that he was ordained—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly, that’s what I’m asking. How can that be? I think there are a few more points here that I won’t have time to bring all of them. I think that really the picture that emerges here is that in the end, after there was a controversy with the sages of Jerusalem—whether because they were not convinced about the matter itself, and notice the Beit Yosef we brought here says, “And perhaps according to Maimonides, who writes in the laws of Sanhedrin, perhaps ordination can be renewed.” When was this written? It was written twenty years after they ordained him—the Beit Yosef.

[Speaker B] Twenty years after they ordained Rabbi Yosef Karo.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So there, twenty years after he was ordained, the Beit Yosef writes: “And perhaps according to Maimonides in chapter 4 of the laws of Sanhedrin.” Meaning, it’s not only that he took Maharalbach’s opposition as applying only to the ordination itself—since there was no agreement of everyone, apparently the ordination is not valid. Maharalbach succeeded in arousing in him doubt also regarding the validity of the very possibility of ordaining at all. He himself raises it, brings Maimonides as a possibility. He’s not sure. He doesn’t know. Maybe one can ordain, maybe not. So it is clear that Rabbi Yosef Karo himself probably, after he was ordained and also ordained Rabbi Chaim Vital, came to think differently—he retracted. And he says: if they oppose on both planes, either because not everyone agrees, and once not all the sages of Israel agreed then it does not exist, or because they succeeded in arousing in him doubt about the matter itself—maybe it really is not certain that ordination is possible, for the various reasons that Maharalbach brought—then as a result he retracted, and regarded himself as someone who was not ordained. So he says to Rabbi Chaim Vital: listen, I ordained you, but an ordained person has to be ordained by someone already ordained, and I am not ordained, so you aren’t either. So now Rabbi Chaim Vital remains unordained. Then Rabbi Moshe Alshikh comes and ordains him, because Rabbi Moshe Alshikh apparently did not retract. And therefore he ordains him again. That seems to me—I’m saying, all this is a bit speculative—but it is one possibility. It’s clear that behind these things there was some kind of retraction, that much is clear. Meaning, Rabbi Yosef Karo did not regard himself as ordained, and it is clear that for him the very possibility of ordaining was not definitively settled.

[Speaker B] Maybe the ordination then was like the modern “yoreh yoreh.”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And then in the end there’s another contradiction that I found.

[Speaker C] Wait, and then you begin to understand what Maimonides meant by “all the sages,” because he saw what can happen if it isn’t all the sages, and if it isn’t all then there won’t be two Torahs in Israel.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, and one of the arguments—maybe I’ll really add this—

[Speaker C] In context, and then I also think Shlomo was right, saying: wait, but not half—not for half the nation.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And in fact I think that in this context it may indeed be worth mentioning one of the controversies that arose. Maharalbach proposed: let us all sit together and discuss. Why sit all together? We’ll send you a letter and you’ll say what you think, and so on. So indeed several halakhic decisors write that this must be done in one gathering. One gathering in which all the sages of Israel sit in the same session, discuss, and decide. And again this connects to the things we discussed last time—that the force of a public decision exists only if everyone debates together. Admittedly, in contrast to what Maimonides writes in the commentary on the Mishnah that we read, that even if these are ten scattered individuals, they are still called the congregation. But Maharalbach does not bring that—I don’t know why. He apparently held that this had to be done in an actual sitting together, with everyone sitting together, discussing and reaching a decision. And indeed several decisors write this, that it has to be done in a joint session of all of them.

And in fact, as one final testimony, look at the last source. Levushei Serad on Choshen Mishpat—that source before the last is another contradiction, that Maran once again on this issue that the sages of Safed retracted. I won’t get into it now because of lack of time, but let’s look at the final passage from Maharalbach. He describes there what happened in Safed. As I said, he is the source for what happened both in Safed and in Jerusalem. He is the only one who wrote and documented it. “And when they saw clearly that it was not according to Jewish law, some of their elders retracted.” He felt it—there were younger ones who continued ordaining. The grandson of Rabbi Yaakov Beirav continued ordaining, already into the fourth and fifth generation. Meaning, there were those who continued ordaining, but specifically the elders, the older Torah scholars from the first generation of those ordained, retracted. That is probably a hint to what I described earlier: Rabbi Yosef Karo and the first ones ordained by Rabbi Yaakov Beirav had already retracted, at least some of them. “And especially because they saw that we, the younger flock of Zion and Jerusalem, did not agree.” What is that “and especially”? Exactly the two planes we talked about. First, because of the very fact that not all the sages of Israel agreed, and second, maybe also on the level of content—that we convinced them that it is not entirely clear that ordination is possible. “And from the outset it had not occurred to them either to agree to it except on condition that we too would agree with them.” That, after all, is why they sent the letter. “For this reason I thought the matter had sunk away and passed, until I heard that the rabbi whom they sought to ordain still persists in his ordination and continues in his path and acted to ordain others.” Meaning, there was apparently a not-simple conflict there. Rabbi Yaakov Beirav continued ordaining, and his grandson too was ordained, and also the students of his grandson and so on—fifth generation, I think, it continued, student and rabbi, for five generations there were still people being ordained. You can see at the end of Levushei Serad in the previous source, look there at several names out of this chain. “And as for these, he did not remain quiet on his side, and the reason was that the elders did not want to accept it upon themselves. How could they not fear for themselves? How can it be that they continue, after even their own elders had already retracted? And certainly they are destined to give an accounting if they act to judge as ordained judges with that ordination.”

And the second thing with which God in His mercy granted me merit—this is already another passage, yes, I just brought it together—“which is of even greater value in my eyes,” etc., “is that I was the cause, through holy love, that the practical act of ordination that the rabbis of Safed wished to renew did not come to pass, since according to law and halakhah we do not have the power to renew it.” Here he writes explicitly that he does not agree with the idea itself, not only that. Also, some of their elders had retracted. So here is the proof for what I said earlier, the explanation for why it does not appear in the Shulchan Arukh, why in the Beit Yosef it appears in a hesitant formulation. In one or two other places in the Beit Yosef he writes “today there are no ordained judges,” and therefore various halakhic conclusions don’t matter—as something simple, he doesn’t even mention anything. So it is pretty clear that in reality, those elders whom Maharalbach describes—one of them was apparently Rabbi Yosef Karo. More power to you.