Conditions – Lesson 1

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[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You sign a contract, I said. So the first paragraph explains the rationale of the parties. What do you need that for? They know the rationale of both sides; they already talked to each other for two weeks before they came to the lawyer to sign the contract. So what are you saying in effect? Because the contract has to contain everything. The contract says, “This is the rationale, and this is how we implement it.” Now notice, this is a very important point. We’ll see this later on, probably not today, no, not today anymore, but we’ll see it later. The question is: what would happen if the Torah had not introduced the condition of the sons of Gad and the sons of Reuven? Would it even have been possible to make such a contract? Could you stipulate conditions without the Torah? Did the Torah itself introduce the very concept of a condition, or not? The concept of a condition seems intuitive. Everyone knows you can make conditions. The Torah just says, “You have to do it this way and not another way.” In other words, is the novelty from the sons of Gad and the sons of Reuven a leniency or a stringency? Is it coming to tell me, “Yes, you can make conditions,” something I might not have known otherwise? Or is it saying, “Of course you can make conditions, but only in this way and not otherwise”? Okay? So we’ll see later, it may be a dispute among the medieval authorities (Rishonim), but for our purposes, in the structure of the passage, the structure of the passage very much points to the second view. Why? Because the passage says, “Look, this is the rationale.” Right? Both sides want it. But there is a very specific way to do it. If you don’t do it in the form of a double condition, with all the rules that we’ll see in a moment, you won’t succeed in accomplishing what you want. Which means that without the Torah’s innovation, if you don’t do it according to the pattern the Torah established, you cannot operate through the mechanism of a condition. That is the Torah’s innovation. And that’s why the Torah repeats it again, to show how Moses implements the rationale. Only this way can the rationale be implemented. That is the Torah’s innovation. Without it, the rationale would still exist, but we would have had no way to carry it out. Think about a situation where the sons of Gad and the sons of Reuven want their inheritance on the far side of the Jordan, and Moses wants them to take part in the war. Okay, and the Torah had not introduced it, the highlighted section simply doesn’t appear. Fine? It’s not there. There’s no way to do it. You want it, but there’s no way. Legally, there is no valid mechanism that would succeed in implementing the wishes of both parties, connecting this to a contract. Only because the Torah introduced this form of condition, this mechanism of condition, can this rationale be carried out. Okay? And therefore the Torah repeats it again in the highlighted section, because here it is really introducing the very concept of a condition. Without this innovation, the desires would exist but there would be no way to implement them. Why not? What’s the problem? After all, every legal system recognizes stipulations. You can make conditions; seemingly that’s just common sense. Why is there an assumption that you can’t? Without the Torah’s innovation, you wouldn’t have been able to make conditions? We’ll see this later. In halakhic thinking, it’s apparently not so simple. Okay? Now, I want to go a bit into the question, “What is a condition at all?” and the basic definitions, so we can spare ourselves the whole big factual introduction. Then we’ll get into the conceptual points, but first we need to understand the framework, so we’ll have the data. Okay? So I want to go through a chapter in Maimonides. Chapter 6 of Hilkhot Ishut in Maimonides, which basically summarizes the topic of conditions. In fact there are two chapters in Hilkhot Ishut and two chapters in Hilkhot Gerushin that pretty much repeat themselves, but I think most of the main points appear in this chapter, so I chose it. So Maimonides says as follows, this is in the laws of betrothal. Yes, he’s talking about betrothal, but actually this applies generally to conditions. So Maimonides says this: One who betroths on condition—if the condition is fulfilled, she is betrothed; and if the condition is not fulfilled, she is not betrothed. What’s written here? The definition of a condition. Meaning, the fact that you can make a legal effect apply only on one side of an alternative. If something happens, then the legal effect takes hold, and if something doesn’t happen, then the legal effect does not take hold. That is the fundamental innovation of the passage of conditions, and it is not trivial. Without learning it from the sons of Gad and the sons of Reuven, it is not certain that one could do such a thing at all—to betroth a woman on such a condition, and if the condition is not fulfilled she is not betrothed. Both the husband and the woman may want such an arrangement, but it is not clear that there is any legal way to implement it just because you want it. Not everything we want can be implemented legally. For example, if the two of us want it, I want to transfer to you something that does not yet exist—oil that will be extracted in fifty years. I want to sell you that commodity. You can’t; a person cannot acquire something that does not yet exist. You want to buy it, I want to transfer it, so what’s the problem? The problem is that there is no legal way to create a valid sale of a future commodity; it is something not yet in existence. Same thing here: both parties want to betroth her conditionally, she agrees and he agrees, and if the condition is not met he doesn’t want it. Okay? Both parties want it. It’s not obvious that even if they want it, it can be implemented. That is what the Torah introduced in the passage of conditions. Yes, it can be implemented, but in a very, very specific way. Then Maimonides says this: Whether the condition came from the man or whether it came from the woman. By the way, the woman too can make a condition. Many halakhic decisors—I once dealt with annulment of the betrothal of some couple that got married, never mind, it was a case of get-refusal—so we sat in a religious court and annulled the betrothal. Now, how is betrothal annulment constructed? It’s basically some kind of implied condition. The woman consented to the betrothal if such-and-such would happen, but if it doesn’t happen then her consent from the outset was a mistake. The moment she did not consent, then she is not betrothed. For example, in the case we dealt with, the husband already left for abroad on the first night. He didn’t even arrive at the hotel for the wedding night. Two foolish kids who got married at age eighteen. They got married and the husband flew abroad; he didn’t come, she waited for him in the hotel on the first night, and he didn’t come. Two or three days later they suddenly found him outside, and he was alive and living with another woman somewhere else in the United States. Bizarre. Anyway. So I argued that such a betrothal is invalid; no get is needed. He refused to give a get, there was a whole mess there, he wanted money, he extorted money. And I argued that the betrothal could be annulled. Why? Because on that basis she never consented. In other words, she did not agree to accept betrothal if she would not receive conjugal life, a relationship. She got no relationship at all. Okay? That seemed obvious to me. Never mind. In any event, they told me, yes, but you understand that this is really an implied condition? The woman says: I consent, provided that I receive a relationship; if I do not receive a relationship, I do not consent. True, she did not state it explicitly, but I understand from the context that every reasonable person stipulates such a thing when consenting to betrothal. So that is called an implied condition. She wanted to get married. Obviously. Therefore in such situations, we’ll see Tosafot in tractate Kiddushin; Tosafot says that in such situations you do not need to stipulate explicitly, you don’t need a double condition, because it is clear implicitly that this is what is intended. The problem is that the conditions appearing in the Talmud are always conditions made by the husband. The husband is the one who performs the act, so he can also stipulate: I perform the act on condition that such-and-such; if the condition is not fulfilled, then I do not perform the act. Who says a woman can stipulate conditions? Here it’s an implied condition; she does not perform the act, she only receives the betrothal, the husband is the one who betroths. So I argued: what do you mean? There is the woman’s consent; the woman consents; she can say, “I consent on condition.” Yes, that’s an option. It has to be substantive, and there’s a question whether it has to exist from the moment of betrothal and not arise afterward; there are many more details here, I’m not going into all of that right now. So here, this Maimonides says: whether the condition came from the man or whether it came from the woman. The woman too can stipulate. Even though in all the cases in the Talmud, there isn’t a case in the Talmud where the woman stipulated a condition. I think none appears, only conditions made by the man, but that’s not essential. There’s a logic here that it’s obvious: if a person consents—say, seller and buyer—also the seller. Acquisitions are usually carried out from the buyer’s side. The buyer performs meshikhah, taking possession, or hazakah, or lifting, or something like that. The seller does nothing. Can the seller… can the seller stipulate conditions on the sale? The buyer is the one doing the act. Of course he can, because he is consenting to the matter. He says: I consent only if such-and-such is fulfilled. Same thing with the woman. The woman is basically the seller in this transaction. She is selling herself and the husband is the buyer. So true, the husband performs the act, right? But the woman consents. She says: I consent only if such-and-such is fulfilled. Therefore the woman too can stipulate a condition. And every condition in the world, whether in betrothal, divorce, buying and selling, or the other laws of monetary matters, must satisfy four elements in a condition. This is what is called the laws of conditions. In other words, a condition has four rules governing how it must be formulated. I move to halakhah 2. And these are the four elements of every condition: that it be a double condition, that its yes precede its no, that the condition precede the act, and that the condition be something possible to fulfill. Let’s explain each of these. A double condition—we already discussed that, right? If you cross the Jordan, you will receive it; if you do not cross the Jordan, you will not receive it. You have to state both sides of the condition. “Its yes precede its no”—what does that mean? First: if you cross, you receive the land; and after that: if you do not cross, you will not receive the land. You say the positive side first, the negative side second. That is the second law. And that the condition precede the act. What does that mean? Right. Meaning, in each of the two sides, the positive and the negative, the wording must mention the condition first and the act afterward. If you go armed before the people, you will receive the inheritance; if you do not go armed before the people, you will not receive the inheritance. I cannot say: You will receive the inheritance if you go armed before the people. No, because then I have put the act before the condition. I want to put the condition before the act. By the way, it’s not a simple question how to define what the act is and what the condition is. If you’re talking about the rationale of both sides, both sides have a rationale; each side has its own rationale. Moses wants them to cross the Jordan, and they want to receive the inheritance. From each one’s perspective, the act in this contract is different. From the perspective of the sons of Gad, the act was receiving the inheritance, and the condition was that they cross the Jordan. From Moses’ perspective, the act is that they cross the Jordan, and the condition is that you receive the inheritance—or the result is that you receive the inheritance. Yet intuitively it is certainly clear that the act here is receiving the inheritance. You can’t say that they will cross the Jordan on condition that they receive the inheritance. That’s not right, right? The result is: if they cross the Jordan, the result will be that they receive the inheritance. Therefore it is clear that the act here is receiving the inheritance and the condition is crossing the Jordan, taking part in the war. So “the condition precedes the act” means first state the condition and afterward state the act. Fourth law: that the condition be something possible to fulfill. For example, if he stipulates with her on condition that you ascend to heaven. It is impossible to fulfill this condition, and therefore it is not a valid condition. And if one of these is missing from the condition, then the condition is void, as though there were no condition at all. Rather, she is betrothed or divorced, and the sale or gift takes effect immediately, as though he had made no condition at all, since one of the four elements is lacking. In other words, if one of the requirements of proper, valid formulation of the condition is missing, then the condition is void. But notice carefully, what does it mean that the condition is void? Exactly. Not that the act is void; the act stands, just without qualification. Meaning, it stands in every case, whether the condition is fulfilled or not. So what is cancelled is the condition. In the language of the Talmud: the condition is void but the act stands. Fine? Meaning, the act stands in any event. We’ll see later that this sounds very puzzling, but we’ll see later what it means. Halakhah 3. How so? One who says to a woman, “If you give me two hundred zuz, then you are betrothed to me with this dinar, and if you do not give me, you will not be betrothed,” and after stipulating this condition he gave her the dinar, then the condition is valid and she is betrothed on condition. And if she gives him two hundred zuz, she will be betrothed, and if she does not give him, she is not betrothed. What is he trying to illustrate in halakhah 3? Let’s look at the antithesis in halakhah 4. That is the correct formulation. What is the incorrect formulation? And if he said to her, “You are betrothed to me with this dinar,” and put the dinar in her hand, and then completed the condition and said, “If you give me two hundred zuz you will be betrothed, and if you do not give me you will not be betrothed,” then the condition is void, because he placed the act first and gave it into her hand and only afterward stipulated, even though it was all within the span of immediate speech. And she is betrothed immediately and need give him nothing. “The condition precedes the act”—Maimonides interprets this against everyone. “The condition precedes the act” for him is not about the wording; it’s about the execution. Meaning, you first have to make the stipulation and only afterward carry out the act, say the condition. Why? Because if you look at the wording in halakhah 3—in halakhah 3, according to all the medieval authorities (Rishonim) except Maimonides, or most of them, this is a wording of act before condition; it’s not a valid formulation. Look what he says here: “If you give me two hundred zuz, then you are betrothed to me with this dinar.” What is the act here? No, this is a valid formulation. “If you give me two hundred zuz, then you are betrothed.” “You are betrothed” is the act, and “if you give me two hundred zuz” is the condition. So he placed the condition before the act. Fine? So that works. That is true also according to the other medieval authorities (Rishonim). But in his definitions he says: after stipulating this condition, he gave her the dinar, then the condition is valid. He is not talking about the form of wording; he is talking about whether you give her the dinar after stipulating, or whether you stipulate after giving her the dinar. Suppose I would formulate it the other way around: “You are betrothed to me if you give me two hundred zuz, and you are not betrothed if you do not give me two hundred zuz.” Would that be fine according to Maimonides? “You are betrothed to me if you give me two hundred zuz, and you are not betrothed if you do not give me two hundred zuz.” It seems that according to Maimonides this would be fine. According to the other medieval authorities (Rishonim) it would not be fine. Why? Because I placed the act—“you are betrothed to me”—before the condition—“if you give me two hundred zuz.” But Maimonides is not talking about the wording, what appears first and what appears second in my sentence. Maimonides is talking about the order of execution. Meaning, if you first do the act of betrothal and only then stipulate the conditions, it doesn’t work, because you’ve already done the act. You first have to stipulate and only afterward perform the act. He is not talking here about the question of how exactly the speech has to be structured. The other medieval authorities (Rishonim) understand “the condition precedes the act” as a requirement about the wording of the condition, not about when you perform the act and when you stipulate. That’s true. I didn’t understand. Meaning, there’s no problem giving the dinar and then doing it? No, according to the other medieval authorities (Rishonim), there is a problem. It just doesn’t need to be said. The requirement that the condition precede the act is a requirement of wording. The fact that you have to say the condition before doing the act is obvious. That’s not what is being discussed; it’s not even part of the laws of conditions, it’s obvious. If you already did the act, what are you stipulating afterward? I sold you land, right? A week later I come and say, you know, I sold it to you only if it rains tomorrow. You sold it; it’s over. Because it’s within immediate speech. Because it’s within immediate speech. That’s an additional innovation of Maimonides; he says even immediate speech doesn’t help. But on the conceptual level, I don’t know whether the other authorities agree. But on the conceptual level it is obviously true as a matter of logic—this has nothing to do with the laws of conditions—that obviously you first have to stipulate and only afterward do the act. Maimonides says this is the innovation in “the condition precedes the act.” And apparently that’s why he adds that this is so even within immediate speech, because if it were not within immediate speech there really would be no innovation here. Obviously, if you did the act, what are you stipulating afterward? It’s over. But the other medieval authorities (Rishonim) say no: the innovation of “the condition precedes the act” is an innovation in wording. Do you have to state the condition first and only afterward state the act? Of course they agree with that too. Does immediate speech not help? I don’t know. According to the other medieval authorities (Rishonim), maybe immediate speech does help. I’m not sure. Okay?

[Speaker H] Rabbi, if it’s within immediate speech, then the condition also has to be within immediate speech.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, yes. So we read halakhah 4. The gloss of the Ra’avad: “Then the condition is void, because he placed the act first and gave it into her hand and only afterward stipulated.” Abraham said: This is not the way. Rather, even if he said everything before the act, and only afterward gave the dinar, the condition is still void, because it is not similar to the condition of the sons of Gad and the sons of Reuven, where they said: “If they cross over”—that is the condition—and afterward: “then you shall give”—that is the act. But this one did not say so; rather he said: “You are betrothed”—that is the act—and afterward the condition. There, that’s what confused me. Look at Maimonides in halakhah 4. In halakhah 4 Maimonides formulates it: “You are betrothed to me with this dinar,” and he put the dinar in her hand, and then completed the condition and said, “If you give me two hundred zuz.” Here the order of the speech really also changes. But Maimonides is not satisfied with changing the order of speech; he also brings in when he gave her the dinar. That’s the point. And the Ra’avad says: What are you talking about? The order of speech by itself, regardless of when you gave it—even if the dinar was given afterward—because you reversed the order of speech, that already counts as act before condition, and the condition is void. Why? Because it is not similar to the condition of the sons of Gad and the sons of Reuven. That is the first hint we see that the laws of conditions are derived from the way Moses formulated the condition of the sons of Gad and the sons of Reuven. And likewise, if he said to her—halakhah 5—likewise, if he said to her: “If you give me two hundred zuz, you are betrothed to me with this dinar,” and afterward gave the dinar into her hand, then the condition is void, because he did not double his condition, since he did not say to her: “And if you do not give, you will not be betrothed.” And she is betrothed immediately and need give him nothing. Again, the condition is void but the act stands. Halakhah 6: likewise, if he said to her: “If you do not give me two hundred zuz, you will be betrothed to me, and if you do give me two hundred zuz, then you are betrothed to me with this dinar,” and afterward he gave her the dinar into her hand, the condition is void, because he placed the no before the yes. And she is betrothed immediately and need not give… This one really is a wording condition in Maimonides. What? No, a double condition is also a wording condition. Fine? So that is halakhah 6. Halakhah 7: likewise, if he said to her: “If you ascend to the heavens or descend to the depths, you are betrothed to me with this dinar.” Yes, the wording here is condition before act. “And if you do not ascend to the heavens and do not descend to the depths, you will not be betrothed,” and afterward he put the dinar in her hand—so everything has been fulfilled: it’s a double condition, yes before no, condition before act, but it is impossible to fulfill. Then the condition is void and she is betrothed immediately, for it is known that it is impossible to fulfill this condition, and this is nothing but exaggeration in words by way of jest and mockery. Here Maimonides adds another point. Why indeed is she betrothed? Because in fact he did not seriously intend to make a condition. Maybe just to try to betroth?

[Speaker I] It’s possible

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] was about to say this; we’ll still get to this topic. Jewish law 8: If he made a condition regarding something that can be done, except that the Torah forbade it—for example, if he said to a woman: “If you eat forbidden fat and blood, you are betrothed to me with this dinar, and if you do not eat, you will not be betrothed”; or, “If you eat pork, this is your bill of divorce, and if you do not eat, it will not be a divorce”—and after making the condition he placed the dinar or the bill of divorce in her hand, then the condition is valid. If she transgressed and ate, she is betrothed or divorced. If she did not eat, she is not betrothed and not divorced. And we do not say here that he made a condition against what is written in the Torah, because it is in her power not to eat, and then not to become betrothed and not to become divorced. First of all, Maimonides says: this is not called something impossible to fulfill. It’s possible to fulfill, right? It would be forbidden, but it’s possible to fulfill. Something impossible to fulfill is something physically impossible to do, not something the Torah forbids. But Maimonides says—he hints here—there is another law among the laws of conditions, which I didn’t bring here at all. I don’t know why he chose not to include it when he said there are only four laws. There are more. Someone who makes a condition against what is written in the Torah—the condition is likewise void, while the act remains valid. Maimonides says: but here this also is not making a condition against what is written in the Torah, because she can eat pork, though she can also choose not to eat pork, so he is not forcing her to transgress what is written in the Torah. If she does not transgress, then the rule is that she will not be divorced. Fine, so that is his right. A condition that is against what is written in the Torah is only a condition where the result necessarily goes against the Torah. “This is your bill of divorce on condition that you have no claim on me for food, clothing, and conjugal rights.” Right? Here the result contradicts what the Torah says. She cannot be betrothed to me without there being food, clothing, and conjugal rights. And in what case did they say that anyone who makes a condition against what is written in the Torah, his condition is void, except in monetary matters? For example, if he betrothed, divorced, gave, or sold on condition that through his condition he wants to acquire for himself something that the Torah did not grant him and withheld from him, or that through his condition he wants to exempt himself from something the Torah obligated him in. In such a case we say to him: your condition is void, and your act has already taken effect; you are not exempt from something the Torah obligated you in, nor will you gain something the Torah withheld from you. Here he brings in the issue of making a condition against what is written in the Torah. How so? Jewish law 10: for example, if he betrothed a woman on condition that he bears no obligation toward her for food, clothing, and conjugal rights, we say to him: regarding food and clothing, your condition stands, because that is a monetary condition; but regarding conjugal rights, your condition is void, because the Torah obligated you in conjugal rights. And she is betrothed, and you are obligated in her conjugal rights, and you cannot exempt yourself through your condition. That is the example of making a condition against what is written in the Torah. And so too in every similar case. Likewise, if one betroths a beautiful captive woman on condition that he may enslave her, she is betrothed, but he may not enslave her; the condition is void. He cannot enslave her, because the Torah forbade him from subjugating her after he had relations with her, and by means of his condition he cannot acquire something the Torah withheld from him; rather, his condition is void. So he is actually bringing in five rules of conditions here, not four: the positive before the negative, the condition before the act, a doubled condition, something within his power to fulfill, and that it not be a condition against what is written in the Torah. Why does this appear separately? What? Why apart from the four? He said there are four laws of conditions and listed them, and suddenly now he moves to this issue—why didn’t you say there are five, including making a condition against what is written in the Torah? Maybe—at least as a possibility, and we’ll see this later—Maimonides understands that the first four laws of conditions are learned from the condition of the tribes of Gad and Reuven. But making a condition against what is written in the Torah is not learned from the condition of Gad and Reuven. You can’t go against the Torah; that has nothing to do with the condition of Gad and Reuven. Therefore he says there are four laws of conditions learned from the passage of the tribes of Gad and Reuven. This condition is not really one of the laws of conditions at all. Making a condition against what is written in the Torah is not a law from the laws of conditions. You simply cannot commit transgressions, that’s all. It has nothing to do with the laws of conditions. It is not learned from the tribes of Gad and Reuven. 11. If he made a condition with the woman at the time of betrothal or at the time of divorce that she have relations with her father or her brother or her son, or the like, then this is as though he had made a condition with her that she ascend to the sky or descend into the depths, and his condition is void, because it is not in her power that others transgress and have forbidden relations with her. So it turns out he made a condition about something not in her power to fulfill, and so too in every similar case. This case is a little tricky. He makes a condition with her that she have relations with her father, right? Seemingly that’s like pork—he is simply making a condition with her involving something the Torah forbids. Not only is he causing her to sin; not only is the issue that he causes others to sin; rather, she depends on others. Meaning, if they transgress and she transgresses, then fine, everything works out—but it is not in her power to fulfill, because she also depends on others. You cannot make conditions with someone that depend on another person having to agree. Now this is not so simple. For example, “on condition that the father agrees.” I betroth the woman on condition that her father agrees, that he is willing. That too depends on someone else, and yet that is a condition that does work. Right, so there is this combination here of a transgression, but a transgression that depends on someone else. “On condition that the father agrees”—it is reasonable that the father may agree, so we don’t have a problem. Here, because it is a transgression, if it depends on her, she can decide to commit the transgression, and that is not called making a condition against what is written in the Torah. But a transgression by others—this is called either making a condition against what is written in the Torah, or—or really, another case of something not in her power to fulfill. Actually, not making a condition against what is written in the Torah; it is called something not in her power to fulfill, because it is not in her power. But if he made a condition with her that she give a certain person her courtyard, or that she marry off her daughter to my son, and the like—or “on condition that the father agrees,” what I mentioned earlier—then his condition stands. Because it is possible for her to fulfill it, and she can give that person a great deal of money until he gives her his courtyard or until he marries off his daughter to his son, since there is no transgression here. Here he says it explicitly. Meaning, the fact that it is not entirely in her power does not bother me—except if what is not in her power is a transgression. Okay? Otherwise, no. 13. Place these matters regarding conditions before your eyes at all times, in every place where you hear “one who betroths on condition such-and-such,” or “one who gives a bill of divorce on condition such-and-such,” or “one who sells or gives on condition,” know that the condition contains these four matters that we explained, so that we should not need to spell them out in every single place. And if one of them is missing, there is no valid condition here. What is Maimonides saying? Everywhere in the Mishneh Torah where I speak—there are many places this appears—about someone who betrothed a woman on condition that she give him two hundred zuz, know that I really mean to say something much more detailed and elaborate. He used the formulation of the positive before the negative, the condition before the act, a doubled condition, everything. I’m not going to say it every time. I’ll just say that he betrothed her on condition that she give him money, but I mean that everything happened here. We’ll see later that this remark has implications, because you can’t infer from Maimonides’ language that in this particular case you do not need a doubled condition. He didn’t mention the doubling of the condition because he doesn’t enter each time into the precise formulation, but clearly the intention is that the condition was made in accordance with all the laws of conditions. There are some later Geonim—Jewish law 14—who said that a person needs to double his condition only in cases of divorce and betrothal, but in monetary law he need not double it. It applies only in divorce and betrothal, not in monetary law. This is truly astonishing. And it is not fitting to rely on this view, because the doubling of the condition, together with the other four matters, was learned by the Sages from the condition of the tribes of Gad and Reuven: “If the tribes of Gad…” and “if they do not cross…” And this condition was not in divorce or betrothal—it was in monetary law. So how can one say that the laws of conditions exist only in divorce and betrothal? Fine, say to me they apply there too—but only there? After all, the source deals with monetary matters. And this is how the great early Geonim ruled, and that is the proper practice. What Abraham already wrote there, it doesn’t matter—these are later authorities’ words. How did those later authorities learn the passage? What? Rav Amram Gaon? Yes. We are speaking here in the Laws of Betrothal, chapter 6 of the Laws of Betrothal, and there are two parallel chapters also in the Laws of Divorce. He deals with conditions in the Laws of Divorce and in the Laws of Betrothal. He does not deal with this in the Laws of Sale; there he only mentions briefly that it can be done conditionally, but he does not say all the details because he relies on this. Why he chose specifically here, I don’t know—maybe in order to teach it, meaning to tell you not to think this is only in the laws of sale and the like. What perhaps those later authorities understood—because it is indeed very difficult to say such a thing, after all the passage deals with monetary law, so how can you say it is only in divorce and betrothal? Maybe they understood that there it is not really ordinary monetary law, because giving you the inheritance east of the Jordan and exempting you from settling the Land raises issues of transgression. There is the commandment of settling the Land of Israel; living outside the Land is like one who has no God—never mind, all sorts of things like that. So here you are really making a condition against what is written in the Torah, or making a condition in an area of prohibition, not in monetary matters. And therefore they say that stipulation is only in issues of—meaning, everything that requires a doubled condition is only when it is not monetary; in monetary matters everyone can do as he likes, and as long as both sides agree, everything is fine. Formal legal rules exist in areas of Jewish law that are not monetary law, like the tribes of Gad and Reuven, and like divorce and betrothal. Maybe that’s how they understood it, I don’t know. Is it a prohibition involving money? What? No, not exactly. If it were truly a prohibition, then maybe it would be making a condition against what is written in the Torah—or maybe not, because it’s like “eat pork.” But the point is: it is not something random where in monetary law alone we can just agree and everything will be fine. Jewish law 15: One who betroths conditionally—when the condition is fulfilled, she becomes betrothed from the time the condition is fulfilled, not from the time of the original betrothal. How so? If one says to a woman: “If I give you two hundred zuz within this year, you are betrothed to me with this dinar; and if I do not give, you will not be betrothed,” and he placed the dinar in her hand in Nisan, and then gave her the two hundred zuz that he had stipulated with her in Elul, she is betrothed from Elul, not from Nisan when he gave her the dinar. Therefore, if a second man betrothed her before the first man’s condition was fulfilled, she is betrothed to the second, because she was not yet betrothed. And the same law applies in divorce and in monetary matters: the moment the condition is fulfilled is the moment it becomes a divorce, or the sale or gift takes effect. All right? Jewish law 16: In what case is this said? When there was a condition and he did not say “from now,” as in the formulation we saw in Jewish law 15. But if he said to her: “You are betrothed to me from now with this dinar if I give you two hundred zuz,” and later he gave her the two hundred zuz, then she is betrothed retroactively from the time of betrothal, even though the condition was fulfilled only much later. Therefore, if another man betrothed her before the condition was fulfilled, she is not betrothed. And the same law applies in divorce and in monetary matters. Jewish law 17: Anyone who says “from now” need not double his condition nor put the condition before the act, because all the laws of conditions do not apply to a “from now” condition, only to an “if” condition. Yes, if it is a prospective condition. Rather, even if he put the act before the condition, his condition is valid. But he must make the condition regarding something possible to fulfill. That still applies even in a “from now” condition. Why? Because “something possible to fulfill”—he said above that this is a matter of reasoning, that otherwise he is merely speaking extravagantly. It is not formally part of the laws of conditions. Since that is so, it is true also in a condition of “on condition,” not only in a condition of “if”—it means he did not seriously intend the condition. Everything that is learned from the passage of the tribes of Gad and Reuven, which are the formal laws of conditions, applies only to an “if” condition, not to a “from now” condition. But matters that arise from simple reasoning—that if he did not mean it, then he did not mean it—apply in every case. It makes no difference; there is no reason to make formal distinctions. Okay? And if he made a condition regarding something impossible to fulfill, he is merely speaking extravagantly, and there is no condition there. And anyone who says “on condition” is as though he said “from now,” and he need not double the condition nor place it before the act. “Anyone who says ‘on condition’ is as though he said ‘from now’”—that’s what the Talmud says. There is a dispute in the Talmud, but Maimonides rules this way. Then in practice a “from now” condition is usually phrased with the language of “on condition.” So now we have two formulations: “You are betrothed to me if I give you two hundred zuz,” or “You are betrothed to me from now,” or “You are betrothed to me on condition that I give you two hundred zuz.” When I say “on condition,” it means “you are betrothed from now”; I do not need to say the words “from now.” If I use the phrase “on condition,” it means: you are betrothed from now on condition that he gives two hundred zuz. If I say, “You are betrothed if you give me two hundred zuz,” then the betrothal takes effect from that later time. How so? So she’s not betrothed if she gave the two hundred zuz? What, with “on condition”? No, she’s not betrothed at all, ever. If he gives it to her, then she is betrothed from now. If he doesn’t give it to her, then she is not betrothed at all. “From now”—we’re talking about “from now.” If he gives it to her, she is betrothed from now. If he doesn’t, then she is never betrothed. We’ll still talk about these transitions; there are logical and temporal problems here—how they relate to the timeline, things operating backward along the timeline—we’ll discuss that later. How so? If one says to a woman, “You are betrothed to me on condition that you give me two hundred zuz”; or, “This is your bill of divorce on condition that you give me two hundred zuz”; or, “This courtyard is given to you as a gift on condition that you give me two hundred zuz”—his condition is valid, and the woman is betrothed or divorced, and that person acquires the courtyard, and they must give the two hundred zuz. If they do not give it, then she will not be betrothed, nor will she be divorced, nor will that person acquire the courtyard. And even though he did not double his condition, and even though he put the act before the condition and gave the betrothal money or the bill of divorce into her hand and that person took possession of the courtyard, and only afterward fulfilled his condition—again, according to his view, this counts as putting the act first—for when the condition is fulfilled, that person acquires the courtyard and the woman becomes betrothed or divorced from the first moment when the act was performed, as though there had been no condition there at all. Meaning, if the condition is fulfilled, then she is betrothed from now as though I had made no condition whatsoever. But that is only if the condition is fulfilled. If it is not fulfilled, then she is not betrothed at all. Now maybe I’ll begin with a comment on Jewish law 16, yes, where he distinguishes between a “from now” condition and an “if” condition, between “on condition” and “if.” He says that in a condition of “on condition” you do not need the formal laws of conditions, except for something possible to fulfill; whereas in an “if” condition we need to formulate it according to all the laws of conditions. This is not agreed upon among the medieval authorities. This is the Geonic view. The Rosh, Tosafot, and others among the medieval authorities do not agree. They argue that you need the laws of conditions also in a condition of “on condition,” also in a condition of “from now.” The Maggid Mishneh, for example, here on this law in Maimonides, writes: “Anyone who says ‘from now,’ etc.—this is the view of the Geonim, may their memory be blessed, and what compelled them was the language of the Mishnahs, which use ‘on condition,’ which is like ‘from now,’ and they did not mention doubling the condition. Tosafot disagree on this, and Nachmanides and Rashba left this matter unresolved and it requires further analysis. The Rosh also disagrees on this. And the tradition of the Geonim is Torah and should prevail.” Meaning, the Maggid Mishneh rules like the Geonim and Maimonides. But the Rosh and Tosafot disagree, and Nachmanides and Rashba hesitate—they are unsure. He says here: what compelled Maimonides and the Geonim to make this distinction? There are many Mishnahs that say, “This is your bill of divorce on condition that you give me two hundred zuz,” and they do not say, “And it will not be your bill of divorce if you do not give me two hundred zuz.” They do not double the condition. So apparently, say Maimonides and the Geonim, in a condition of “on condition,” a “from now” condition, you do not need to double the condition. That is their proof. What do the medieval authorities who disagree do with this proof—Tosafot, the Rosh, and others? The Lechem Mishneh there says as follows: “The Maggid Mishneh wrote: this is the view of all the Geonim, and what compelled them was the language of the Mishnahs, which use ‘on condition,’ which is like ‘from now,’ and do not mention doubling the condition. This is very difficult—what compulsion is this? What kind of proof do Maimonides and the Geonim have from the Mishnahs? After all, the Mishnahs that say ‘This is your bill of divorce if I do not come’ also are not precise for all commentators, because there too the act is mentioned before the condition.” In an “if” condition you do need the laws of conditions. There too it is not written properly; it is not formulated correctly. Yes—“This is your bill of divorce if I do not come”—the act comes before the condition here. And this is an “if” condition, which certainly does need the laws of conditions. So what follows? Says the Lechem Mishneh: obviously the formulations in the Mishnah are not coming to quote the exact stipulation; they are just telling the story. Meaning, what he stipulated and what the whole issue was—not with exact wording, because this is not a quotation of the language of the condition. They say: in such a condition, where he divorces her if he does not arrive, the law is such and such. Exactly how they worded the condition is irrelevant. That is precisely why I said earlier that what Maimonides himself wrote above will come back to matter here. Because he himself says that he does not formulate things precisely every time, and you should not infer too much from his wording. So why are you inferring from the wording of the Mishnahs? Therefore, regarding Maimonides himself, I doubt whether the distinction between “on condition” and “if” is really based on close reading of his wording of the Mishnah. The Geonim maybe did so—I don’t know; I haven’t seen their words inside. No, not Tosafot—Tosafot says that in any case it is required. But Maimonides himself presumably understands it from reasoning. Okay. In any event, in Maimonides there are four laws of conditions: a doubled condition, the positive before the negative—there are three more laws that Maimonides does not mention, or mentions but not in the same way. One: the first law is that it must be something applicable to agency. Only something for which you can appoint an agent can be made conditional. The Talmud says this in Ketubot; we’ll soon see it. The second law: the condition and the act must concern different matters. What? “I give you the land through an agent. I transfer the inheritance to you through an agent.” “The condition and the act in one matter” means, for example, “I divorce the woman on condition that she return the document to me.” Meaning, I am not conditioning it on something else; I am making the condition about the very object of the act itself. “Condition and act in one matter”—we’ll see later that in the Talmud the final conclusion is not entirely clear, but this too comes up as one of the laws of conditions. And the third thing is making a condition against what is written in the Torah—that the condition must not be against what is written in the Torah in order to be valid. If one makes a condition against what is written in the Torah, the condition is void. We saw that Maimonides did bring this point, but separately, not within the framework of the four laws of conditions—perhaps because it is not learned from the tribes of Gad and Reuven. I don’t know. In any case, for our purposes there are really seven laws of conditions, not four. All right? A doubled condition, the positive before the negative, the condition before the act, something within one’s power to fulfill, something applicable to agency, that the condition and the act not concern one and the same matter, and that the condition not be against what is written in the Torah. Now just a few remarks on the additional requirements. “Condition and act in one matter”—we’ll see the Talmud in Gittin 74. The Rabbis taught: “This is your bill of divorce, and the paper is mine”—she is not divorced. “On condition that you return the paper to me”—she is divorced. What is different in the first clause, and what is different in the second clause? Meaning, why in the first case is she not divorced and in the second she is? What? Fine. All right. What is different in the first clause, and what is different in the second clause? Rav Chisda said: this follows Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, who says she may give him its value. Here too it is possible that he can appease her with money. Meaning, maybe he can compensate her monetarily and she’ll return money instead of the paper. Fine, that’s technical and not important. Abaye challenged him: say that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said that only where the object is no longer extant in its original form—fine, if it is no longer intact, then it is no longer relevant. Rather, Abaye said, a second answer: this follows Rabbi Meir, who says we require a doubled condition. And here he did not double his condition. You see? “This is your bill of divorce and the paper is mine”—he did not double the condition. Rava challenged him: is the reason only that he did not double his condition? Had he doubled his condition, would it have been a valid divorce? But from where do we learn all conditions? From the condition of the tribes of Gad and Reuven. Just as there the condition came before the act, so too every condition must come before the act. This excludes this case, where the act came before the condition. So what difference does it make whether or not he doubled his condition? Even if he had doubled it, it would not help, because here the condition did not come before the act; the act came before the condition. “This is your bill of divorce” is the act; “on condition that you return the paper to me” is the condition. Rav Adda bar Ahava challenged him: is the reason that the act came before the condition? Had the condition come before the act, would it have been a valid divorce? But from where do we learn all conditions? From the condition of the tribes of Gad and Reuven. Just as there the condition was about one matter and the act about another matter, so too every condition—excluding this case, where the condition and the act are about one and the same matter, because she is returning the very bill of divorce itself. Again: “This is your bill of divorce and the paper is mine”—there she is not divorced. But here the condition and the act are in one matter: “This is your bill of divorce on condition that you return the paper to me.” Here she is divorced. So what does “condition and act in one matter” mean? It means that the condition is void, while the divorce stands; she does not need to return the paper, because it is a condition and an act in one matter. And “condition and act in one matter” does not mean the act is invalid—on the contrary. It means the condition is void and therefore the act remains valid in any event. She is divorced and does not need to return the paper. All right? That is what “condition and act in one matter” means. Again, when I say “condition and act in one matter,” is “This is your bill of divorce and the paper is mine” an example of condition and act in one matter? No, because that is not a condition at all. “This is your bill of divorce and the paper is mine”—then she did not receive the bill of divorce, so she is not divorced, because there is no receipt of a bill of divorce here. “Condition and act in one matter” applies only when we are actually speaking within the laws of conditions. “This is your bill of divorce on condition that you return the paper to me”—that already is a condition. Since the condition concerns the very substance of the act, I am giving her the bill of divorce on condition—making a condition—that she return the paper. Okay? So that—this can’t work. So what does it mean, that it can’t work and therefore what? Then she’s also not divorced? But in the first case she isn’t divorced, and in the second she is. She is divorced—the condition is void, not the act. The act stands; she is divorced. She just doesn’t have to return the paper. Condition void, act valid. Okay? Rather, Rav Adda bar Ahava said: because it is a condition and an act in one matter. Therefore, when it says here that she is divorced, it is because it is a condition and an act in one matter. Rav Ashi said: this follows Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, for Rav Huna said in the name of Rav: anyone who says “on condition” is as though he said “from now.” And therefore what? If saying “on condition” is like saying “from now,” then she was divorced on condition that she return the paper to him. So suppose she returns the paper in a month. During that month she had possession of the paper. That is not called condition and act in one matter. But in a condition of “if,” truly—“you are divorced if you return the paper”—that would not help, because that is condition and act in one matter, and so the condition would be void and the act valid. But because anyone who says “on condition” is as though he said “from now,” then in “on condition” there is no problem of condition and act in one matter. Okay? So what? There is no problem of condition and act in one matter, and therefore what? Therefore the condition is valid. So when it says “she is divorced,” it means divorced—but she must return the paper. Because both the condition and the act are in force. And she is not divorced if she does not return the paper. So according to that, when it says here “she is divorced,” it does not mean as we understood until now—divorced in any case and the condition is void. Rather, it means divorced if she returns the paper. Meaning both the act and the condition are valid. Okay? What about the fact that it does not say he doubled the condition? “This is your bill of divorce on condition that you return the paper to me”—but not “and it is not your bill of divorce if you do not return the paper.” And the act precedes the condition. Everything we said above—what about that? According to Maimonides there is no problem, because this is a condition of “on condition.” In a condition of “on condition,” the laws of conditions do not apply. But according to the medieval authorities who disagree with Maimonides, this is indeed problematic. What will you say? That maybe we should not infer too much, that they just described it in simple terms and did not quote the whole stipulation. But that is not correct, because the Talmud itself later says that here it is not a doubled condition. So maybe one could say that in the final conclusion the Talmud really means only then that this is not exact wording. It retracted: everything you said at first, you thought because you had no other way out. So maybe indeed the intention is not that he actually failed to double the condition. Now that I already understand what we are dealing with—condition and act in one matter—everything is fine, and we no longer need to assume the language here is exact. They were simply describing the case. In truth, in the Rema it is not clear. In the final conclusion, “condition and act in one matter,” in the plain sense of the Talmud, really is one of the laws of conditions. But in a condition of “on condition” it is not relevant, because in an “on condition” case the object really belongs to her during the month until she returns it. Okay? And according to Maimonides, in a condition of “on condition” it is not relevant—maybe because in a condition of “on condition” you do not need the laws of conditions. But I think that is not… the Talmud here does not imply that. And I think that according to Maimonides, “condition and act in one matter” would be like “within one’s power to fulfill.” And even in a condition of “on condition” that would not help. Why? Because here this is not necessarily learned from the passage of the tribes of Gad and Reuven—that the condition and the act not be in one matter—but rather from logic. You can’t perform an act and its own negation; the condition is to return the very object of the act. Therefore such a case certainly means the condition is nullified even in a condition of “on condition,” like something impossible to fulfill. The Rema says: “And some say further, even if all these four matters are present”—the four laws of conditions—“we also require that the condition concern one matter and the act another matter. But if both concern the same matter, it is not a condition.” The Rosh and the Tur. “And one should be stringent and take his view into account.” Fine. So “condition and act in one matter” is also a binding requirement. And that is the plain meaning of the Talmud. One could have read the Talmud as though this was rejected in the final conclusion, but no—it was not rejected. Rather, the Talmud says that if it is “on condition,” then it simply is not called condition and act in one matter, because for a month the paper truly was given to her and belonged to her. But if there were a case of “on condition” in which the condition and act really are in one matter, then indeed it would not help. Because there is a requirement that the condition and the act not be in one matter. What? I don’t know. That is regarding condition and act in one matter. As for something applicable to agency—that is a Talmudic passage in Ketubot. By the way, the whole Talmudic discussion we saw now in Gittin is important to know, because we see there, first, all the laws of conditions—from there Maimonides brings them. And second, we see that they are learned from the condition of the tribes of Gad and Reuven. After all, what does the Talmud keep saying? “But from where do we learn all conditions? From the condition of the tribes of Gad and Reuven. Just as there the condition came before the act, so too every condition must come before the act.” Since we learned the entire section of conditions from the tribes of Gad and Reuven, it is obvious that we need to adhere to what we saw there, namely that the condition precedes the act. What do we see here? What do we learn from the condition of the tribes of Gad and Reuven? There are two ways one might have understood it. One way is as I said earlier: that the concept of a condition exists intuitively; we would know that even without the tribes of Gad and Reuven. The tribes of Gad and Reuven came only to teach us the formal laws of conditions—that it has to be done this way and not otherwise. But one could also say no: were it not for the passage of the tribes of Gad and Reuven, we would have no concept of condition at all in the Torah. Once we have the passage of the tribes of Gad and Reuven, the whole idea of conditionality is introduced—provided that it is formulated according to the four laws of conditions, or the seven laws of conditions. Okay? What do we see from the formulation of the Talmud here? What? Clearly we learn from there—but what exactly do we learn? The laws of conditions, or the very possibility of making a condition? Only the laws of conditions. Meaning, the possibility of making a condition exists even without that, and from the tribes of Gad and Reuven we learn the laws of conditions. I think it says the opposite here. The Tanna—no, in any case the laws of conditions are learned from the tribes of Gad and Reuven. The question is whether what is learned there is only the laws of conditions, or whether what is learned there is the very possibility of making a condition, provided you make it in that way. Clearly the laws of conditions are learned from the tribes of Gad and Reuven—that is explicit in the Talmud, in the Talmud we saw here. But the question is whether we also learn from there the very possibility of making conditions. From the language of the Talmud it appears that we do, because what does the Talmud say? “Since from where do we learn all conditions? From the tribes of Gad and Reuven—well then, you have only its original form.” So you must make the condition as you saw it in the passage of the tribes of Gad and Reuven. According to the first possibility, where we learn only the laws of conditions, I could have known the very idea of condition on my own. The Talmud could not formulate it this way—“since from where do we learn all conditions?”—from logic. It could only say: but from the passage of the tribes of Gad and Reuven we learned that the condition must precede the act. Fine, it could have said that. But from the Talmud’s wording it is quite clear that the Talmud did not understand it that way. The Talmud understood that without the passage of the tribes of Gad and Reuven, we could not have made conditions at all. What? Never mind; you could still say from logic that only in such a situation is it plausible that the Torah introduced this law of stipulation. One second, I want to add here in summary. I’m uploading the summary to the model, both the summary and the recording. Okay. Another thing is “something possible through an agent.” We need to finish soon, so let’s just begin this. In Ketubot 74, the Talmud says there is no condition in chalitzah. If you perform chalitzah with a woman, you cannot do chalitzah conditionally. Tosafot says there that the Talmud says this is because it cannot be done through an agent. Tosafot explains it there; he says as follows: “A condition [is valid only] in something that can be fulfilled through an agent,” etc. “And if you ask: what is the reasoning here? Why is it that only something that can be done through an agent can be made conditional? We do not learn from there”—from the tribes of Gad—“except with respect to something that is supported by reason. For we do not learn from there that a condition is effective only in a transfer of land.” You do not take the passage of the tribes of Gad and Reuven and learn everything that happened there; otherwise perhaps you would say that the laws of conditions exist only where land is being transferred, only when land is being given, because that is what was going on there. Why don’t we learn that? Because simple reasoning says there is no reason to single out land from every other transaction. Therefore, says Tosafot, even what we learn from the tribes of Gad and Reuven does not mean there is no logic behind it. On the contrary—only things that make sense do we learn from the tribes of Gad and Reuven; things that do not make sense we do not learn from there. So if that is so, says Tosafot, it is not enough for you to tell me that in chalitzah—something that cannot be done through an agent—you cannot make a condition, just because that is not what happened with the tribes of Gad and Reuven. Fine, betrothal also was not in the tribes of Gad and Reuven. You need to explain to me that there is some reasoning that distinguishes between something that can be done through an agent and something that cannot be. And this is a very important lesson, because many times in yeshiva-style analytical thinking we are used to saying: there is no need to look for a rationale; we have a scriptural source, so what is the problem? The verse says it, and that’s it; no need to look for reasons. That is not true. If the verse says something explicitly—say, “You shall not plow with an ox and a donkey together”—then I say fine, the verse said it. I don’t understand why it is forbidden, but the verse said it, and I do not really care why it is forbidden. But when the Sages derive something from a scriptural exposition, it is not explicitly written in the Torah. You ask yourself: on what basis did the Sages expound it? Why did they learn from the tribes of Gad and Reuven that only something involving agency can be made conditional? Why not learn that it applies only to land, only to a transfer of land? Clearly the Sages had some understanding that something not subject to agency is not reasonably something that can be made conditional, and then they learned it from the tribes of Gad and Reuven. One can of course ask: fine, if they had a rationale, why do they need the source from the tribes of Gad and Reuven? And it could be that the rationale alone was not enough. Yes. Not just an asmachta—the rationale alone would not be enough. One person can suggest one rationale; another can suggest a different rationale. The derivation from the tribes of Gad and Reuven comes and tells us: it reinforces this particular rationale. For example, the Talmud in Sanhedrin says there is a scriptural decree that the law of the stubborn and rebellious son does not apply to a daughter, only to a son. So the medieval authorities explain there that this is because a daughter is not likely in the end to become a highway robber, whereas a son could become one. So there is a rationale for the verse. Now the Talmud itself—and in the Jerusalem Talmud this is even more explicit—says it is a scriptural decree. The Meiri asks: why? We have an explanation; the medieval authorities give an explanation. So why call it a scriptural decree? He says: no, even scriptural decrees have explanations. So if there is an explanation, if there is logic, why do we need the verse? The answer: let’s suppose we had no derivation from the verse. Then maybe I would know the rationale that a daughter is not likely to become a robber. Okay? Would that be enough to state clearly that there is no law of a stubborn and rebellious daughter? What about a boy whom I estimate will not become a robber in the future? He seems like a good kid, or he is disabled and could not be a bandit. Fine? Should he therefore not have the law of a stubborn and rebellious son? The reasoning says no. But I do not think I would build the legal novelty on that reasoning. I have lots of reasons and I could say many things. Someone who had good education would not have the law of a stubborn and rebellious son because he is not going to rob people. Lots of arguments could be made. Reasoning alone is not enough to build a legal rule on; not for nothing do we generally not derive law from the rationale of the verse. But if I have a scriptural derivation, then the derivation tells me: this rationale you are thinking of is one you can actually build on—it is strong enough. So it does not replace the rationale; it only comes to say that this rationale you are considering is strong enough to ground a law. Therefore, the fact that there is a source from a verse does not contradict the fact that there is reasoning behind it. Okay? That is what Tosafot is saying here. Therefore, “something possible through an agent” must also have a rationale behind it. So Tosafot says—and with this we’ll finish—“And one can say that the reason is this: since the act is so much in his control that he can carry it out through an agent, it is logical that it should likewise be in his power to make it conditional. But chalitzah, which is not in his power to carry out through an agent, is likewise not in his power to impose a condition upon, so that even if the condition is not fulfilled, the act should remain valid.” What does that mean? If you can send an agent, that means you are the exclusive master of the act. You can delegate authority to others. That means the authority is in your hands. You can decide to delegate it. In chalitzah you cannot do it through an agent. The Torah imposed it on you. So the owner of this act is the Torah, not you. The Torah wants you to do it, but you do it as a servant of the Torah. You are not the master of the act. Therefore you cannot appoint an agent. The power is not in your hands, so you cannot delegate authority to an agent. Something for which you can send an agent means that you are the owner—you determine whether you will do it or whether your authority passes to the agent. The authority is yours, and you can delegate it onward. If you are the owner, you can also make conditions. Tosafot says: that is the logic. The logic is that only something that exists in the realm of agency is truly in your control, and only over such a thing can you make conditions. All right? Good. We’ll stop here. We’ll continue further with this Tosafot, but at this stage.