“Don’t Call Me Black” – Failures in Discourse on Racism and Discrimination

Table of Contents

• [0:01] Introducing the place and the social project
• [3:10] Clarifying concepts: why it’s critical
• [8:13] Semantics versus morality: what really matters?
• [11:01] Factual examples and are they racist?
• [21:32] Defining racism according to Yehuda Shenhav
• [26:51] Racism as discrimination: final conclusions
• [27:52] Definitions of discrimination and racism
• [31:03] Average characteristics of groups
• [32:46] Gender differences in chess
• [38:27] Measuring averages in an empirical test
• [43:12] Parental discrimination and the concept of discrimination
• [51:41] Relevant and irrelevant discrimination

Summary

General overview

The speaker opens with a brief recommendation of a café that functions as a social project employing at-risk youth, relying on volunteer students, operating not for profit, and managed by a social worker. He then argues that public discourse about racism and discrimination has expanded and escalated in a way that harms the struggle itself, because when everything is defined as racism or discrimination, trust erodes and “antibodies” are created that prevent people from listening even in justified cases. He wants to clarify the concepts out of commitment to the values of opposing racism and discrimination, and reaches the conclusion that the term “racism,” in its ethical use, is empty or unnecessary, while “discrimination” and analytical tools such as relevance, generalization, and constraints make possible a more substantive and precise discussion.

The café and the social project

The speaker recommends the café as a social initiative worthy of assistance and support. He notes that it employs at-risk youth and volunteer students, that it is not for profit, and that it is run by a social worker. He presents it as an opportunity for people who don’t know the place to become acquainted with it.

The failures of discourse on racism and discrimination and the need for conceptual precision

The speaker argues that the tendency to slap labels of racism and discrimination onto everything damages the struggle, because it is a “broadening of the front” that weakens correct claims and arouses emotional resistance. He says his goal is not to undermine values of equality but to define more clearly when it is right to fight and when an unnecessary battle is being created. He adds that there is sometimes confusion between racism and discrimination, and that even if one must fight a phenomenon, it should be fought “under the right flag” in order to preserve trust and effectiveness.

The concept of “racism” as a loaded term that is not a dictionary question but a moral one

The speaker draws a distinction between descriptive use and evaluative use of a concept, and argues that “racism” is not a neutral term but one with a connotation of condemnation. He says the important question is not whether something falls under a dictionary definition, but whether it contains an ethical problem and whether it is “reprehensible.” He describes many arguments as semantic disputes that end with the dictionary instead of a moral examination of the behavior and its justification.

Factual claims about differences between groups are not “racism” but a question of truth and falsehood

The speaker gives examples such as “Black people play basketball better than Jews of Hungarian origin” or claims about intelligence, and argues that these are factual claims that should be decided through data, surveys, and measurement. He says that even if such a claim is mistaken, it is a factual error and not necessarily a reprehensible act, so there is no point in shouting “you’re a racist” instead of presenting data and refuting it. He emphasizes that a factual claim may be true or false, and there is no reason to assume that averages between groups must be identical in every possible trait.

Prejudice, the source of the error, and the gap between belief and behavior

The speaker agrees that a factual error can stem from prejudice, negligence, or refusal to check, but he argues that even then the immediate product is still a mistaken belief and not necessarily a moral injury. He contends that the more meaningful question begins when practical conclusions are drawn from those beliefs and people are treated differently. He proposes distinguishing between holding a theoretical position and actual acts of discrimination.

Critique of essentialist definitions of racism and of Yehuda Shenhav

The speaker quotes a definition by Yehuda Shenhav from the Mizrahi Democratic Rainbow, according to which racism is the attribution of inferiority through stereotypical traits and the formulation of difference in terms of an unchanging biological essence, and he describes this as connected to “essentialism.” He brings another formulation from an encyclopedia of ideas that speaks of biological and cultural differences perceived as deterministic, and challenges the requirement that the component of immutability is a meaningful condition. He argues that if a person is discriminated against on the basis of a trait that can be changed or one that cannot be changed, the evaluative problem remains the same problem, and therefore essentialism does not explain what is objectionable.

Racism as a special case of discrimination, and preferring the language of discrimination over the label “racist”

The speaker argues that racism is at most one kind of discrimination, and that the basis of it—race, religion, gender, height, shoe size—is not what produces a different moral severity. He says the term “racism” carries a charge that implies in the subtext, “you’re a Nazi,” and that this demonization is unjustified when in practice what is involved is discrimination that can be analyzed more substantively. He suggests that instead of a general accusation, one should ask what the basis of the discrimination is, whether it is factually correct, whether it is relevant to the purpose, and whether there is an unjustified generalization.

Relevance, generalization, and two kinds of discrimination in relation to the individual and the group

The speaker distinguishes between drawing conclusions about groups and applying them to an individual person, and argues that generalization is a central problem: even if there is an average difference between groups, nothing should be inferred from that about every individual. He says that denying someone admission to a university because of group membership, even if the group average is lower, is problematic because the person himself or herself should be examined. He adds that denying admission because of a substantive criterion such as suitability for the activity is not discrimination in itself, but the problem of generalization appears when individual examination is replaced by group membership.

Justified profiling, security, constraints, and quality-group score

The speaker gives the example of airport screening after 9/11 and argues that profiling Muslims in the context of airplane attacks is a relevant parameter and not “racism,” because there is no logic in checking to the same extent groups that will not commit the act. He presents profiling as a professional practice in security, and warns against an “anti-racist psychosis” that seeks to abolish all screening even when it is justified. He gives the example of the military quality-group score and the claim that residents of Lod are assigned a lower score than residents of Tel Aviv, and explains that sometimes technical constraints and the inability to examine every individual lead to the use of broad-brush tools, similar to criticism of the psychometric exam as an imperfect sorting measure that is nevertheless sometimes necessary when no alternative exists.

“A chosen people,” the Kuzari, and prejudice that subordinates reality to a preconception

The speaker presents the claim that Jews are “a chosen people,” and the Kuzari, which describes “five levels” up to the level of the Jew/the prophet, and says that this claim gives him the shivers. He argues that it is difficult to define what would be required to prove a uniqueness of a different kind from ordinary differences between nations and cultures, and he is not persuaded that there is any essential factual difference between Jews and non-Jews beyond ordinary cultural differences. He describes how people arrive with an a priori conception based on the verse “and you shall be My treasured people from among all the nations” and subordinate reality to it, and he gives the example of students in Yeruham who argued that moral non-Jews are “like a pig stretching out its hooves,” merely making an external impression, and he presents this as a claim that cannot be tested and that stems from a prior assumption.

The distinction between legitimate preference and violation of rights, and the connection to civil rights and human rights

The speaker argues that caring more for members of your own people than for members of another people is not necessarily racism but rather a “division of roles,” similar to the way parents care for their own children. He uses the distinction between civil rights and human rights to argue that a state has a special obligation to the civil rights of its citizens, but may not violate the human rights of others. He says the decisive question is what one does with perceptions about differences between groups, not the mere fact of holding them.

Criticism of the political use of the term “racism” and the claim that it has been emptied of content

The speaker argues that when everyone who speaks “in the language of Ben Gvir, Smotrich” is called racist, no distinction is made between speech and conduct, and the ability for precise criticism is lost. He also gives as an example cases such as educational institutions in Emmanuel and argues that sometimes the result of having fewer Mizrahim may stem from criteria perceived by the institution as relevant and not necessarily from an intention to discriminate, and therefore automatic accusations are harmful. He concludes that the concept of “racism,” in its ethical use, adds no analytical tool beyond “discrimination,” “exclusion,” relevance, and generalization, and that using it in public discourse is sometimes demagogic and intended to paint the other side as evil instead of conducting a discussion about justification, facts, and criteria.

Closing remarks: a law against racism against Haredim, and the continued argument about essentialism

The speaker responds to a claim about a “racist law” against Haredim and says that a law against racism aimed at one group is itself problematic, and he proposes at most a policy of stricter punishment in halakhic rulings in certain contexts. He returns to say that he is not “fighting” but clarifying, and that after the clarification the concept of “racism” says nothing useful for the discussion, whereas a toolbox of questions about the basis of discrimination, individual examination, relevance, and constraints does make discourse possible. At the end he touches on the argument about essentialist claims in the context of women’s aptitude for Torah study, and argues that both the claim that all differences are cultural and the claim that there are differences in ability require evidence, and that both sides may subordinate facts to a value-laden agenda.

Okay, let’s begin. We’re starting, all right? Good. Usually, the last few times—this is already the fourth time—so in the previous times I did a bit of propaganda on behalf of this café, so I’ll do that here too in two sentences. It’s a social project that’s really worth trying to help and support. So if anyone happens to be around, I don’t know, comes to the area and it suits them, then I can recommend it. They employ at-risk youth here and all kinds of people, there are student volunteers here, and it’s not for profit. The person who runs it is a social worker. So this is a blessed initiative, and this is a chance to introduce the place to anyone who doesn’t know it. Okay, so that’s it regarding the place. What I wanted to talk about today is failures in the way we talk about racism, discrimination, and the like—a discourse that is very present in our world in recent years. I think it’s escalating; the presence of this discourse is getting more intense over the years. There are people who get annoyed by it because their feeling is that these are fake values, or they oppose it on principle—in other words, they’re in favor of discrimination or in favor of racism or things like that, however you want to define it—and therefore they try to attack these concepts and these claims in order to dismantle the theses. I’m coming from the opposite starting point. I’m going to do something similar, but I’m coming from the opposite starting point. Meaning: it really matters to me that there not be racism, I’m against discrimination, but דווקא for that reason my feeling is that when everything gets the label of racism or discrimination, it’s shooting oneself in the foot for those who want to promote these values. Because basically you lose credibility. If everything is discrimination and racism, then leave me alone already with discrimination and racism. I mean, then it just annoys me. It ruins things. That is, ostensibly you use these tools to bring about a better world, and then you actually make things worse. Even regarding things that maybe can’t be defined—or aren’t necessarily defined—as racism and discrimination, let’s be stricter. Let’s define that too as discrimination and racism, and then at least we’ll be safer. But it doesn’t work like that. Usually when you become more stringent, you cause damage. What lawyers might call expanding the front. Once you wage the battle too far out, you can lose it. If you make incorrect arguments, then even your correct arguments won’t be heard anymore. Once you trigger antibodies by telling someone that he’s racist or discriminatory or something like that, then now he won’t hear you or listen to you even where you’re right. And therefore I think it’s very important to clarify these concepts, precisely because I do value them. That is, precisely because I do think these are important struggles, it’s very important to sort these concepts out. But clarifying these concepts will naturally lead to all kinds of conclusions that at first glance may seem strange—conclusions according to which many of the claims sheltered under the struggle against racism and discrimination are simply incorrect. It isn’t racism and it isn’t discrimination. That’s the price you pay when you try to stay committed to honesty. When you’re honest, you need to know that sometimes you’ll oppose those who are fighting discrimination and racism. You’re not opposing them because you’re in favor of discrimination and racism, but because they’re fighting the wrong battle. Is there some example of that kind of strategy? I’ll bring one; we’ll encounter such examples, yes. That’s exactly my point. I’m just prefacing it so that—first, I wouldn’t call it apologizing, but first, because when some people hear this kind of argument, they get the impression that I’m really trying to dismantle these values or go against these principles and promote discrimination and racism. So no, I’m not here to promote that. I am here to define it better. So that we can fight when there’s something to fight, and when not, not wage unnecessary battles. Sometimes it’s only a conceptual difference: you’re fighting racism, but actually it’s discrimination and not racism. And that too is an important precision, even though it doesn’t mean we shouldn’t fight; it means we should fight under the correct banner. That’s the general introduction. Now let’s get a bit into the subject itself. The concept of racism, first of all, as I said before, is used broadly—too broadly in my opinion, far too broadly—and that stems from the vagueness of the concept. The concept is not well defined. People who use it don’t always know how to define it properly, and then everything they don’t like gets defined as racism. And what they do like—that isn’t racism, right? Both sides of the coin. And on both sides one can make mistakes. I may want to add one more preface: when people talk about racism in general, they are not speaking specifically in terms of race. So often the argument goes: wait, wait, this isn’t racism because it isn’t based on race but on some other basis. Irrelevant. What difference does it make? I mean, if I discriminate against someone based on his shoe size, that’s also not okay. So why do I care whether I’m doing it based on his genetics, or his origin, or whatever, or his shoe size? It doesn’t matter. So I don’t know—based on gender, based on height, based on whatever you want, religion, I don’t know exactly what. It doesn’t have to be race specifically. The use of the concept of racism today—it’s clear, and here I haven’t even entered the minefield yet—but this clarification seems to me accepted by everyone. The concept of racism is a borrowed concept. It’s used in senses much broader than how it was originally used. Originally it was the Nazis, or whatever, that’s always the inspiration here. It was used on the basis of race arguments, race profiles, but really we’re talking about it in terms of any group whatsoever. It doesn’t matter right now whether the basis for defining it is race or religion or sex or gender or height or the first letter of the name. It makes no difference at all. Okay? But that’s already a very important hint toward what I’ll say later: that the concept of racism itself is rather empty, rather lacking in content. First of all, my starting point on this issue is that when people talk about racism, it’s not a neutral concept. That is, there’s a difference between dying and being murdered, or between being killed and being murdered. The difference is that being murdered or murdering is a concept with a negative connotation. Okay? Causing death has a less negative connotation, because sometimes you cause death justly—it depends on the context—but the concept as such has a less negative connotation. In our context, racism is a concept with a connotation. It’s not just a descriptive concept—not only a descriptive concept. Meaning, when I say that one race is different from another race, then that needs examination. You can always say yes, for me that’s what’s called racism, period. But I need to check not only whether this can be called racism. It can be, if we define the concept of racism that way. You can define it however you want; that’s semantics. What matters to me is not how the concept is defined, but whether this kind of thing, this kind of attitude, has an ethical problem. Is there a moral problem here? That’s the important question. When I ask whether a certain thing is racism, that is not a dictionary question. I can go to a dictionary and see whether it falls under the heading of racism or not. But that doesn’t interest me. Call it komforken if you want. I don’t care what it’s called. That’s semantics. What matters to me is the question whether this thing is reprehensible. That’s what matters. That’s a real question, not a semantic one. I can’t define things as reprehensible. I claim that they are reprehensible. The claim that they are reprehensible is a claim, not a definition. Right? The concept of racism can be taken as a definition. One person can define it this way, someone else another way—so where’s the argument? We’ll just define it differently and that’s it. The argument begins where I claim that what you’re doing or thinking is reprehensible. And then that needs to be checked. Because it comes from the group I belong to, and in your mind too. I didn’t understand. Because if you talk about racism in the connotative sense or in elevated language, it’s not necessarily about race but about a certain group that I belong to and can’t change, and then that’s racism. No, now you’re talking about essentialism. In a moment I’ll get to the connection to essentialism. The group I belong to. Fine, okay, so what? So there’s a negative connotation because you’re saying things about me. I didn’t say that the connotation of racism is not negative. I said the opposite. The connotation of racism is negative, and for me that’s now a tool. Why? Because now I want to examine different definitions of the concept of racism, or decide what is included in it and what isn’t, without getting dragged into semantic arguments. Someone can tell me: look, for me this is defined as racism; for him it isn’t defined as racism. Fine. Don’t argue about definitions of concepts. That’s why I’m giving this preface. I want to examine what here is reprehensible, and whether it’s reprehensible. Therefore when I use the concept of racism, I use it in senses loaded with evaluative content. It’s not just description. In descriptions you can adopt whatever concept you want; that’s semantics. Now, this is a very important point, because very often these arguments somehow begin and end around semantics. Is this called racism or not called racism? You open a dictionary, it appears there, it appears… who cares? Why do I care what’s written in the dictionary? Then don’t call it racism. I’m asking whether it’s reprehensible. That’s what matters. All right? So I’ll speak about the concept of racism, but remember: whenever I speak about the concept of racism, I mean the reprehensible thing called racism. In other words, is this thing reprehensible or not? That’s really what matters. Not the question of what is called racism. Okay. Now I’ll begin. First point: I want to claim—or start with an example. Suppose I claim that Black people play basketball better than Jews of Hungarian descent, some of whom I know personally. Is that a racist claim? Really? What? Again, racist in the sense we discussed before—that is, reprehensible. I gave a preface, remember. I’m not asking a semantic question. I’m asking whether there’s anything reprehensible here. Is there something reprehensible here? I don’t know, it sounds like a fact to me. A fact that’s also very true, at least as far as I know the world. I’m in the easy position to speak, because I’m on the lower end of that axis. Okay. But is there something reprehensible here? There’s a fact. The fact is that, on average I’m saying right now. First of all, the question is whether it’s true. I didn’t ask whether it’s reprehensible; I asked whether it’s true or not. Okay. So what are you saying? You’re saying that if it’s true then it isn’t reprehensible, and if it isn’t true then it is reprehensible? No, I’m asking whether it’s true. Okay. Let’s examine both possibilities. Whether it’s true or not true, let’s examine both possibilities. So assuming it is true, then it’s not racism and not reprehensible. Why? Because if it’s true, then what’s the argument? True in every case? In most cases? Fine, you’re getting ahead of me, I’ll get there. Meaning, I’m building this step by step. So right now I want to make the following claim: a claim of that kind has nothing to do with racism in the sense I spoke about before—that is, in the sense that has an ethical connotation, whether it’s reprehensible or not. I’ll claim more than that. It has nothing to do with racism whether it’s true or false. Even if it’s false, in my view it still has nothing to do with racism. Because if it’s false, then as far as I’m concerned what you said is simply a factually mistaken claim. Suppose I meet someone who says such a thing. What I’d argue against him is not: you’re a racist. What I’d argue against him is that I’d bring him data to show that the Hungarians play wonderfully and LeBron James could take basketball lessons from them. Okay? If I manage to show that absurd thing. But that’s what I’d argue against him. There’s no point arguing against him: you’re a racist. Notice that in arguments where we are debating a value-claim, where there is some sort of evaluative disagreement, in any field whatsoever, I cannot get someone to change his mind on the basis of pointing only to a fact. I won’t argue with him—or at least that won’t be the focus of the argument—about whether he is factually mistaken. Whether he is factually mistaken or not is one argument. But when I have an evaluative disagreement with him, then the level of discussion won’t be through empirical proofs or facts. I’ll have to argue that his conduct doesn’t fit a certain value. That is, that he is behaving reprehensibly, or thinking, or relating in a reprehensible way. In the kind of argument I’m speaking about here, it won’t proceed that way. It will proceed through surveyors. That is, they’ll do surveys, whatever, check how Black people play basketball and how Jews of Hungarian descent play basketball, and you’ll discover whatever you discover. I have a guess what you’ll discover. But you’ll discover whatever you discover. And that’s how this argument is decided. There’s no point speaking to such a person in terms of “you’re a racist, what you’re saying is ugly,” whether he’s right or wrong. Notice, regardless of whether he’s right or wrong. Okay. So therefore, a very important point on the way to trying to characterize this concept is that factual claims are very hard to treat as racism, as something reprehensible. Any factual claim. That is, I spoke about basketball playing, and that sounds neutral to us. What would you say if I said that Black people have higher intelligence than Jews of Hungarian descent. Is that racist? By the way, I’d say the same thing for everyone, same thing. Even if I say it about everyone. If you have one place now in a scientific institute… Oh, now you’re taking me very far. I’ll get there, we’ll get there. And after all the average is like this and the average is like that. You’re already several steps ahead. I’ll get there, all right? I’m trying to build this step by step. This claim, which sounds much closer to racism, right? It too is not racism, for exactly the same reasons. We’re dealing here with a factual claim. Give an IQ test and see. Now maybe this claim is true, and maybe this claim is false. I don’t know, I haven’t checked. It can be true, and it can be false. There is no reason in the world to assume that if we average among all the population groups in the universe, whether on the basis of race or any basis whatsoever, we’ll discover exactly the same average intelligence. I don’t see why that has to be so. Maybe it is so, I don’t know. But there’s no reason to assume it must be so. What I’m trying to claim has nothing to do with whether it’s true or false. You can argue that it’s true, you can argue that it’s false. But that argument is again a factual argument, exactly like the basketball case. It is of course much more irritating when you talk about intelligence than when you talk about basketball ability. But at the essential level it’s exactly the same thing. You’re making a factual claim here, and factual claims need to be checked with factual tools. Check it, do tests, do a survey, see what the result is. Either he’s right or he’s wrong. If he’s wrong, inform him that he’s wrong. But shouting at him that he’s a racist—not only will it not help, and I’m not even talking on the level of whether it will help, it’s irrelevant—he’s not a racist, he’s mistaken. He is simply mistaken. He holds a false fact. There’s nothing reprehensible in being mistaken. Therefore I’m saying even if it’s a mistake, not only if it’s true. If it’s true it’s easier to explain, but even if it’s a mistake there’s nothing reprehensible about being mistaken. You can be foolish, or you didn’t notice, or whatever, all kinds of reasons a person can be mistaken. But I don’t see how one can accuse him of racism because of that thing itself. I’ll get to this in a moment—that racism may cause that mistake—but the mistake as such is just a factual mistake. Therefore it’s not relevant to speak here in terms of racism. Now there’s another step: where does that mistake come from? Suppose there is a mistake, yes. Five generations? Five levels. And you decided that’s racism. What you’re saying isn’t true. Right, in a moment I’ll address that example, I’m getting there. Time to talk about racism. Wait, so that’s exactly the point I’m speaking about now—I mean to get to that thing itself, precisely that question. But first of all, this is really where the question enters: okay, a mistake isn’t racism; a mistake is a mistake. You can be foolish, you can be mistaken without being foolish, it doesn’t matter, but a mistake is not something morally reprehensible. However, there can be a situation where you arrive at this mistake not for innocent reasons. You arrive at this mistake because you have prejudices, you don’t bother to check, you decide that this group is a group of fools or wicked people or whatever, all kinds of things like that. You don’t check; you go with your prejudices and decide that this is the character of that group. Here we are already getting closer to the concept of racism, and I still want to claim that this still isn’t it. Why? Because in the end, what came out of this thing? Beyond the question, this mistake is an indication of something, but it’s an indication of some kind of attitude—I don’t know—of following preconceived notions. Okay? But after you’ve followed your preconceived notions, in the end what you have is a mistake. What you have is simply that you hold an incorrect fact, you believe an incorrect belief. Okay? So it may be that this comes from some place of contempt, prejudice, or whatever—but where did it lead? It led to a factual mistake. So if I now use the same test I used before—if I want to argue with such a person, am I supposed to accuse him of being a racist? That won’t help, and in my view it’s also not relevant. I can simply bring him facts. I can show him: let’s do an IQ test for such-and-such a group and that group, and let’s see. Either you’re right or you’re not right. By the way, we may discover that he is right—it can happen—and we may discover that he isn’t, and then he’ll have to admit it, I hope, if he’s honest enough. All right? Now you see that even this thing, which is already very close to race—racism—still, in the end, I don’t think it’s really racism. I don’t think one can accuse such a person of violating the value opposed to racism, insofar as there even is such a thing; in a moment we’ll see. In the end he holds a mistake. It may be that if he refuses to hear the evidence I bring, the facts, the measurements I made, and refuses to change his mind and so on, then he is also stupid and stubborn, I don’t know. Here we get even closer to the concept of racism. But I think that still—still—something is missing here. And before I get to what’s missing, maybe I’ll say it already, because you already raised it, Asaf, so I’ll say it already, though I’ll get to it later. Clearly you also have to derive some implications from it. At least that’s how it seems. The fact that you think someone is stupid, or that a group is stupid—okay, that’s what you think. You’re mistaken or you’re not mistaken. The question is what you do with what you think. Do you, as a result, behave differently? Do you give them different treatment? Here we’re already getting much closer to this concept. So until now I spoke only about the question of what positions I hold, without the practical expressions of those positions. I think that as long as those positions have no practical expressions, then regardless of what those positions are, it’s already very hard to speak here about racism. It’s much closer to a mistake than to racism—perhaps a negligent mistake, perhaps a mistake born of prejudice—but in the end it’s a mistake. Okay? But I’ll get to that in a moment. Look, I’ll give you a definition from Yehuda Shenhav of the Mizrahi Democratic Rainbow. He is apparently the local authority on this topic; I always see people quoting him. So he writes in an article as follows: he defines racism as attributing inferiority to a person or a group by using stereotypical traits and by formulating the difference between groups in terms of an unchanging biological essence. Okay? In other words, we are basically talking about attributing inferiority in some parameter to one group as opposed to another through stereotypical traits. What does “stereotypical traits” mean? Apparently that you assume there are certain traits that characterize the group; not necessarily that every group has a trait that characterizes it, but you assume that this group has some trait that characterizes it, and you formulate the difference between groups in terms of an unchanging biological essence. In plain language, this is what’s called essentialism. Essentialism means you are basically assuming that the differences between groups are essential. It’s not something that happened by chance, that can change, right now it’s like this and tomorrow it’ll be different, but that there is something essential here that isn’t supposed to change. And this is a feature that often gets slipped into this discussion of racism, and in my view completely unjustifiably. Essentialism, in my opinion, has no significance at all in this discussion about racism. Look, I’ll read to you, for example, from the Encyclopedia of Ideas, where they also bring this in the name of Yehuda Shenhav: race is a concept that defines the differences among groups of human beings in terms of differences in biological and genetic development. The biological difference between races is the result of the prevalence of a dominant gene in a given race. Racism is an expression of actual and theoretical social practices that base their attitude toward other human beings on biological and cultural differences. Here enters this dimension that there has to be an attitude; it’s not enough just to make the distinction on the theoretical plane. Perceived—now he adds—biological and cultural differences perceived as deterministic foundations that are not convertible. Again, essentialism. Some fixed thing; it can’t be changed; that’s the nature of this group. It can’t be changed. And now look at the examples: turning the biological—skin color, in parentheses—the social—country of origin—or the cultural—eating habits—into something unchangeable. That sentence I really do not understand. If I make these things unchangeable, then I’m a racist? Let’s see. The cultural, like eating habits—I assume that can change. People change eating habits from time to time. If you assume not, then you’re a racist? If I assume not, then I’m mistaken. Why am I a racist? I’d say more than that: skin color, I don’t know what. If I assume it can’t be changed, then I’m a racist? Skin color can’t be changed. So what? The scientific statement that skin color can’t be changed turns me into a racist? Why? Now you can say that maybe there will be techniques, and today there are already technologies to lighten skin, darken it, I don’t know exactly. Fine. And if science hadn’t succeeded in doing that, then I’d be a racist? And only because science can do it I’m not a racist? It’s irrelevant. He assumes that a cultural difference and a skin-color difference are the same thing. Why? Why do I have to assume they’re the same thing? But if all there was, say for argument’s sake, were Black people. If I said that everyone whose shoe size is 42 is X, then I’m not a racist? Any group—what does that have to do with skin color? Why do you pick skin color as the defining trait? Why? Okay, so basically this has nothing at all to do with essential or non-essential traits. The question is what you say, how you relate to different groups according to some characteristics, whether they’re essential or not. If we say that skin color isn’t essential, that I think you can change it in a hospital, go have surgery, say for the sake of the argument that you can change it, okay? But still I give discriminatory treatment to people with light skin, okay? Even though they can darken their skin in a hospital, then I’m not a racist? But I didn’t treat skin color as something essentialist. Look, I’m saying the opposite. I’m saying: you know what? You have light skin, disgusting, go to the hospital and darken it. All right? They’ll tell me I’m a racist. By the way, that’s an example he himself brings. So what are you actually saying here? That if it’s based on a trait that can be changed, that too is racism. So why is essentialism a condition for racism? Why assume that something being unchangeable is an important parameter when you talk about racism? As far as I’m concerned, if you relate to a certain group on any basis whatsoever—shoe size, skin color, height, the first letter of the name, whatever you want, religion, anything you want—and I give them different treatment, I understand that that’s not okay. In a moment we’ll see, let’s call that racism for the sake of discussion, fine. But why is essentialism important here? What does it have to do with anything? Okay, but then you understand that what you’re really telling me is just a specific case of discrimination. That is, racism is discrimination, and I’ll actually get to that later—I completely agree with you. Racism is nothing but discrimination when the basis of the discrimination, in the specific case of racism, is race. But it doesn’t really matter. Discrimination isn’t any better if it isn’t based on race but on shoe size. You’re supposed to give a person fair treatment, equal treatment, I don’t know. What difference does it make on what basis you base the discrimination? So again, I’m basically returning to the point that racism is not really a parameter with independent evaluative significance. I’m returning to it; I’m actually saying it now because until now I hadn’t. Racism is basically some branch of discrimination. No, it’s not a branch of discrimination; it’s one of the causes that create discrimination, or one of the parameters that create discrimination. Fine, no problem. The only issue here is not racism but discrimination. If I discriminated on the basis of shoe size, that would be equally reprehensible, right? So why call it racism? Call it discrimination. Right, it’s a kind of discrimination. No, but again, the term racism has a connotation, and so it’s important to me to be precise with it. Because if you’re talking about discrimination, there’s no problem—and by the way it’s also not something specially loaded. Discrimination is perfectly fine as a term; I think most people would agree that it’s wrong to discriminate against people. Right. So why talk about racism at all? But then you’re saying that there is actually nothing with a specially problematic connotation in the concept of racism beyond discrimination—every discrimination of every kind whatsoever. Embedded in this issue of racism is the concept of generalization. You generalize a group of people. I can say that, evaluatively, generalizing is something wrong. Okay, then you’re already moving ahead—no, no, no, I’m still getting there; that’s later. Okay, so if you say that all Haredim are like this—there was that case in Ramat HaSharon—if you say that all Haredim are like this, here too I disagree, and we’ve already spoken about that, so I can answer. No, no, I disagree, and I’ll tell you why. Even if someone says all these people are like this, all people are like this, or all Haredim are like this—even if he’s wrong, then it’s a mistake, not racism. No, it’s not only a mistake. It’s making life easy for yourself. No, maybe after hard work I’ll show you that it’s not true for each one. Do the work and show me that. Show that it’s not true for each one. And I claim that the very act of generalizing, the very fact that you’re making life easy and generalizing, is immoral. I said at a stage we’ve already passed, I said earlier that there may be a situation in which someone says—because of negligence, because he’s unwilling to check, because of prejudice—he assigns some stereotypical feature to a group. Okay. Okay, so I agree, by the way. But the question is whether that’s what’s called racism. I’m getting there in a second. So for now what I want to claim is that the factual claim itself is certainly not racism. What I spoke about earlier, and what you’re raising now, is that sometimes I arrive at the factual mistake I hold for reasons that perhaps can be called racism. Meaning: I have some prejudice about some group, and therefore I decide that that’s the characteristic of that group. But here too one needs to distinguish between two things, and I’m getting to that now. First: the question whether, as a group, it’s incorrect to say such a thing, or inappropriate to say such a thing—because groups do have characteristics. Of course groups have characteristics. See the basketball example. What, no? All Persians are stingy. Wait, characteristics of groups. No, I’m not talking about generalization yet. A characteristic of a group. When I say Black people play basketball—what? badly at basketball, that’s… yes. No, no problem. No, obviously. That’s why I’m saying I’m not yet talking about generalization, I’m currently talking about the group-average characteristic. All right? The average characteristic. I want to say that on average Black people are more stupid than white people or white people are more stupid than Black people, all right? Because that’s what I think. No, it isn’t moral to say that. Why isn’t it moral? It’s only a question of true or false. What does morality have to do with it? No, even if it isn’t true. Even if it isn’t true, then you’ve made a factual mistake. More than that, I think that… Oh, so now you’re speaking about the question of why one arrives at that mistake, and that’s what we discussed earlier. But if it’s true, there’s no evaluative problem here. None whatsoever, obviously. But it isn’t true. It can’t be that an entire group is characterized by something. No, why can’t it be? No. If they have a common denominator, say skin color. That’s the only thing you can say about the group. You want to create a connection, an interaction, between one characteristic and another. In that move you’re already sinning by a problematic generalization; it’s not factual, it’s not factual at all. Of course it’s factual. What do you mean? If I—why, on average… if I take a hundred groups of people… What difference does it make? Morality… who, for example, those… should receive equal treatment. Right. No, that’s why I’m saying: there is a group characteristic. The fact that there are exceptions is true, but you can’t say there are no group characteristics. If I say, yes, if I say women play chess less well than men, say for the sake of discussion. Could that not be true? What? First of all, factually it is true. Now I don’t know what the reasons are. Are the reasons genetic, cultural, is it changeable, is it not changeable? First, in my view it’s not implausible even that it’s not changeable, by the way. I don’t know, I haven’t checked, I have no idea, but it could be. What, it couldn’t be? Couldn’t it be that women’s genetics have some connection to chess ability? Of course it could. You can say that there are more men who are… who succeed at chess than women. What’s the difference between saying that and saying that on average men play better than women? Because that doesn’t say the same thing. It’s not the same sentence. Also regarding skin color. If, say, someone came to a doctor and sees that there’s someone here whose skin color resembles his, skin color that is very light, then are you forbidden to classify him into a category as opposed to the dark-skinned one who’s already not… No, now you’re already talking about treatment, and that’s the next stage I want to speak about—after the factual determinations. After there is a factual determination, the question is what I do with it. And right now I’m saying, leave it, I’m not doing anything with it. For now I just want to examine the statement itself, that women play chess less well than men. Afterwards we’ll check what happens if I do something with it—say I don’t accept a woman to the chess team even though she plays excellently. What? This gender separation just isn’t proven. No, because here you’re talking… no, you jumped there… there it’s easy. Because if it’s relevant, then obviously you’re right. That’s why I’m speaking on the factual plane. Treatment needs to be examined in terms of relevance. On the factual plane, relevance is irrelevant. It’s a question of true or false. All right? So I’ll get to discrimination in the next stage and then… Even in the way you say it, it matters greatly. You can say there are more men who are good chess players than women, and I can agree with that, but the reason may be—and this is important—more men are involved in chess; women aren’t involved in it at all. When you say men are better at chess than women, you’re smuggling in the assumption that they compete on equal terms and this succeeded more and that, while women didn’t even approach it. Of course that’s true. There are competitions that prove it. What do you mean? There are competitions that prove it. Women’s ranking is lower than men’s in world chess; there are rankings. They play each other, and women lose in most cases. The men’s world champion will make a joke out of the women’s world champion in chess. That’s a fact. But you can’t conclude from that that men are better. Of course I can conclude that. What do you mean? Again, you can say that maybe I’m mistaken. No, your derivation is mistaken—no, your definition is mistaken. Why? Because you’re not being precise. Be precise: there are more men… No, no, no, incorrect. I said something else and I stand by it. The average chess ability of men is higher than the average chess ability of women. If you rank all men, I’m making a claim right now regardless of whether it’s true or not. Wait, wait, wait—regardless of whether it’s true or not. Right now I want to examine whether this claim is reprehensible, not whether it’s true. I also think it’s true, but that’s beside the point. Okay? I’m saying women give birth much more successfully than men. Okay, perfectly fine. Excellent claim, only it’s trivial. Trivial—why? Because that’s what… No, here you’re ignoring… I’m not ignoring anything because I didn’t speak… Again, but no, again you’re going back to exactly the same evasions that I’m trying to avoid. I’ll simply get to that later. I’m not talking about whether I’m right and why I think women are better or worse. That doesn’t matter. I want to determine the fact: are they better or worse? Afterwards we can talk about reasons. Now, you’re already aiming toward what Shenhav wrote here. You’re saying: if I attribute it to genetics, then it’s supposedly essentialist, not changeable, not dependent on culture or something that can change. I’m not talking about that right now; I’m talking about the factual determination. The factual determination must be examined in terms of true or false. There is nothing else here, nothing. By the way, I’m now going to make an even stronger claim. Even if I claim that it stems from human genetics, that women play less well, there is nothing racist here. Whether it’s true, I don’t know. But the discussion… No, I have no problem, gladly. The justifying discussion says: one has to examine all men and all women. Of course. No, I don’t want to be precise; intentionally I don’t want to be precise. I don’t want to be precise because I’m not aiming at a true claim; I’m aiming to examine whether this claim is reprehensible. You keep taking me back to the question of whether what I’m saying is true. That doesn’t interest me now. I think it’s true too, but that doesn’t matter. The question is whether the formulation is reprehensible. Because you’re not stating facts; you’re already giving it… No, I’m stating facts only. I’m making a factual claim. Say women are weaker in… Wait, I’m making a completely factual claim, scientifically testable. Don’t tell me no; I’m now explaining to you what claim I’m making. Take one woman against one man—she may be better than him. But that’s not the claim I’m making. You’re not listening to what I’m saying. I’m making a factual, scientific claim that can be falsified, okay? Women on average play less well than men, period. That’s what I’m claiming. Now, how would I test it scientifically? I’ll show you how I’d test it scientifically, okay? Then it will be clear that it’s a factual claim. I say: take all the women in the world, go through them one by one, all right? Play chess against them, okay, rank them on the scale used to rank chess players, rank them, all right? You’ll get a collection of ratings. Do the same for men. Compute the average rating of the women and the average rating of the men. My claim is that the average rating of the men will be higher than that of the women. Factual claim. True, false, I don’t know at the moment. It’s a factual claim. Your claim is classic scientific arrogance, and the experiment you propose is not practical. You can’t take all the women in the world and all the men in the world. But I’m explaining… No, you’re returning to exactly the same… No, I didn’t propose that experiment so that you should do it and check whether I’m right. That’s not the point at all. It’s impossible to do. But I’m not talking about that. I’m talking about that experiment in order to tell you that the claim I’m making is well-defined and that it’s a factual claim. Now, when I say there are now 100 billion ants in the universe, on Earth, all right? That’s what I claim. There’s no way to check that, right? Is that claim a factual claim? Obviously yes. How do you check it? You go through every centimeter and count how many ants there are. Can you do that? No. But the fact that I offer you an empirical way to check it, even if it isn’t practical, proves that this is a factual claim. That’s all. That’s what I came to do here. I didn’t come to tell you to do the experiment and test me. That’s irrelevant; we can’t do that experiment. Obviously. But what I’m trying to show you is that what I’m saying is a well-defined claim, and it’s a factual claim. Either I’m right or I’m wrong, but it’s a factual claim. Okay? Now, the point is that in the end I don’t think unchangeability and essentialism matter here. It doesn’t interest me, because in the end the question is whether I’m right or wrong—that’s what really matters. If I claim that it’s a result of genetics that women play less well, or I claim that it’s the result of culture, in my view that changes nothing. What difference does it make? The question is whether I’m right or wrong, and that is measured in terms of truth or falsehood. I’m saying again: sometimes if I’m mistaken, sometimes my mistake stems from problematic reasons. I have prejudices and I’m unwilling to examine them, and therefore I reach this conclusion. Here we get a little closer to the concept of racism. But why is the claim not essentialist? If you said men cook better than women. Why? Because we see lots of chefs who are men; most of the world’s chefs are men. We know in essence that women cook better than men. Do you see here an example of a claim? Might you say that the claim that men cook better than women is an essentialist claim? No. All you’re pointing to is that in this case that claim really seems less true than the claim I made. Okay, so what? What does that have to do with the issue? The fact that there are true claims and false claims—how does one prove anything about the other? What does that have to do with the point? You can show that whoever claims that men cook better is mistaken. You can even say—more than that, I would say more than that: someone who says men cook better is making an ill-defined claim. Which is not true of the claim I made. The claim I made is well defined, and the experiment I proposed is the definition of the claim. You won’t be able to do a parallel experiment unless you define well what it means to cook well. It may be that you can define “cook well”: give your food to a group of a hundred chefs who will give it a rating, say they have some standard, take the average score, march every human being in the world before those hundred judges on MasterChef, and they’ll get their score, and you’ll see whether men get a better score than women. Once you’ve defined it that way, it is a well-defined factual claim. I don’t know whether it’s true or not, but it’s a well-defined claim. So the question whether the claim is defined or undefined also isn’t important; it doesn’t interest me. If the claim is undefined, then all they’re telling me is: your claim is undefined, you’re talking nonsense. That isn’t racism; that’s just saying things that aren’t defined. That too isn’t racism. In the end, whether something is essentialist or not also changes nothing, as I said earlier. If I discriminate against someone on a non-essentialist basis, people will relate to me in the same way; it’s equally wrong as discriminating on an essentialist basis. One may not discriminate against human beings for no reason, regardless of essentialism or non-essentialism. And the very observation prior to discrimination, the mere observation that one group is different from another—either that’s true or it isn’t, but it’s measured in terms of truth or falsehood, not in terms of racism or not racism. So where are we, basically, at this point? A parent who loves his child more than other people’s children—is that also discrimination? I can’t hear. A parent who loves his child more than other people’s children—is that also discrimination? Okay, that’s also a kind of discrimination. But what of it? It’s not bad. It’s not bad? That can be debated. Who said it isn’t bad? I don’t know that it isn’t bad. One can debate it. Either you don’t accept the value opposed to discrimination or you qualify it. Let’s discuss it. You said earlier that it’s not reprehensible—you’re speaking about things being reprehensible or not reprehensible. I think that too is reprehensible, but all right, one can debate it. No, to care for him more. He corrected himself. Not only to love him more, but also to care for him more. Of course! To care differently for one child versus other children—not because he needs more, but for one child versus… no, someone else’s child! I thought you meant your other children. No, that isn’t discrimination. But I’ll speak about that, I don’t know, maybe I’ll say something about it later. In my opinion it isn’t discrimination at all. The State of Israel sees that every child—except for Haredi children—has the right to receive education and vocational training. Right? That’s a basic right of children. Do we provide for the education of children in Zimbabwe? Why? Where does that discrimination come from? It’s not discrimination. The government of Zimbabwe should provide for the children of Zimbabwe. That’s a division of roles. Not discrimination, but a division of roles. His parents will care for him, your parents will care for you. Fine, that’s a different discussion. So what I want to speak about now is actually the next stage. The next stage is the question of what I do with these distinctions. That is, the distinctions themselves are very hard to see as racism, even where they come from some problematic source—someone with prejudices who refuses to check them—because in the end, okay. Okay? Rather, the problem begins where you draw conclusions from those differences. And drawing conclusions from those differences also has to be distinguished into two different cases. You can draw group conclusions and you can draw conclusions about individual persons, and here we come to the issue of generalization that we discussed earlier. So suppose, for example, I claim that white people have lower intelligence than Black people. That’s what I think, factually, okay? Now a white guy comes to me. No, listen, you belong to the less intelligent group, I’m not accepting you to the university. That starts getting closer—getting even closer—to problematic treatment. Right? Why? You’ve done some profiling, as they say. You built a profile for the group he belongs to and determined your attitude to a specific person on the basis of the group profile. Now notice, here I’m speaking about profiling that is correct, not profiling that is incorrect. I’m speaking in a situation where the group really is less intelligent, for the sake of discussion right now. Suppose I’ve reached the conclusion, I did average tests, I reached the conclusion that white people are less intelligent than Black people. Okay? Now a white student comes, wants to be admitted to the university, I say I’m not accepting you, you’re white. What? I think not. I think not, but I’ll explain a bit more. I think not because you need to examine him. After all it’s obvious—and here I come to the issue of discrimination, generalization, sorry—it’s obvious that there can be average traits. This group on average is less intelligent than that group. Fine. I don’t know, someone in a humanities track in high school, on average, is less intelligent than someone in a science track. Sorry for speaking so bluntly, but that’s how it is. We all know that’s how it is. Okay? Does that mean that every single person in a humanities track is an idiot, or that there can’t be someone in the humanities track who’s smarter than all the physicists? Of course there can be. So if he now comes to apply for a job, I ask him, tell me, what track were you in? He says humanities. I say okay, try your luck somewhere else. Not okay. Why? Because you need to examine him, you need to see whether in fact—he may sound smart. A person is entitled to treatment according to what he is and not according to the group he belongs to. That’s the issue of generalization. And it’s the same thing, because the statement “on average humanities-track students are…” is true, but is he the stupid one? Exactly. Right. So I’m saying: that’s the issue of generalization. Because not accepting someone because he’s stupid isn’t discrimination. We do screening in university; we do screening. You can debate IQ tests, the psychometric exam and so on—it doesn’t matter. Exactly. Here I’m saying: that isn’t called discrimination. Why? Because there’s a relevant criterion here. Once the criterion is relevant, there’s no problem. If the criterion is irrelevant, that is discrimination even on the group level. Meaning, if you take someone—“I don’t accept white people because they’re stupid, so I don’t agree that they come into my club.” But in the club there isn’t any activity connected to intelligence. Then it’s not because white people aren’t more stupid, but because the stupidity criterion is irrelevant to the criterion, it’s not a relevant criterion to the activity I’m talking about. That’s one kind of discrimination. A second kind is generalization. And here I’m speaking when the criterion is relevant. I run an intellectual activity in the club. And I say: you’re from that group that’s less smart, you don’t come into the club, because this is an intellectual activity. That’s already a relevant parameter. And still there’s a problem here, and this is the problem of generalization. What do I mean? That person belongs to that group which on average is less smart. Fine, but he himself may be very smart and may be a genius. Why do you decide that the average characteristic is the characteristic of each and every individual? Okay. Suppose because that group is less smart—because I don’t think in a politically correct way, but this is a real parameter—the white group is less smart than Black people, and now I’ll take someone from the white group and admit him to university even though he’s less smart, because in the end he’ll contribute to the research and pull the whole white group after him—is that affirmative action? Or is it something else? No, what you’re really saying is that screening on the basis of intelligence is an irrelevant parameter, because in fact you can fix that in the university, so de facto it isn’t relevant. And this specific one will always be last. Basically, the fact that there’s one doctor walking around in the white group and they’ve never seen such a thing in their life… No, it says you have some other consideration for why to admit him even though he’s stupid. Fine, that’s not… I’m speaking about something… that if I don’t admit him there’s no problem. You’re only suggesting to me: still admit him, even though not admitting him isn’t racism. But go ahead and admit him because there are other bonuses you’ll gain from it even though he’s the last in the class. No problem. And you can’t accuse me of racism if I don’t admit him. Therefore that’s a different plane of discussion. What does that have to do with racism? I’m not admitting him because he isn’t suited to the activity I’m running. Right. Again, you need to distinguish between two things. If you say he’ll be last in the class, that’s essentialist. He’s not—it won’t change—he’s the stupidest. He’ll be last in the class. It’s just worthwhile for you to bring him in because you also want a doctor from that group. Fine, but that’s not—if I don’t admit him there’s nothing racist here. It’s irrelevant. You can tell me okay, it’s worthwhile for you to admit him anyway even though it’s not racist not to admit him, because you’ll gain something else. No problem. But that’s not a claim of racism against someone who doesn’t act that way. It’s not the same thing. It’s a completely different plane. In short, what I want to say is that when we speak on the plane of treatment, not on the plane of characterization itself, then if you give irrelevant treatment—or use an irrelevant parameter toward the group, even though the characterization is correct but irrelevant to the activity you’re talking about—that’s discrimination. I don’t call it racism but discrimination. Okay? If the parameter is relevant, then you don’t have that first type, but you still have a second type. Because if you take one person from the group, why do you decide that he fits the profile of the group? Maybe specifically he has some other abilities. A group is not a solid block. On average it’s true. Okay. That’s the second thing. But here too, notice, there are still cases where we do this anyway and it’s completely reasonable. It won’t be something reprehensible. After 9/11 in the United States, after the Twin Towers, there was a claim there: what kind of profiling is this, that only Muslims are checked at airports? It’s not okay, it’s racism, it’s profiling, all kinds of things like that. That’s absurd. I mean, who carries out attacks on airplanes? Muslims. Not that all Muslims carry out attacks on airplanes, of course, but there is no point in checking non-Muslims; they’re not going to carry out an attack. So why should I check everyone in order not to be racist? That’s just being an idiot. Maybe if people are getting hurt you still have to do something even though it isn’t racism, but the argument itself is a strange one because this is a completely relevant parameter. Not only is it completely relevant, it’s true. But after all it’s not true that all Muslims are terrorists—absolutely not, it’s a very tiny minority. So why do I check every Muslim? That’s the second kind of discrimination, the generalization. But here too it’s justified. It’s justified because I don’t know in advance who is the terrorist and who isn’t, and I know that if there is a terrorist, he’s in that group. I have no choice; I have to do profiling and checks. By the way, profiling is a profession. Security personnel at airports—one of their areas of expertise, and today they even have software that does it—they profile people. They work by profiles, which by definition is the most obvious racism imaginable. But I don’t think any reasonable person would regard such a thing as something reprehensible. That’s precisely not racism. With Muslims it doesn’t enter. They examine each one individually. No, but you only check Muslims. Yes, but you give each one individual treatment. But they say that’s racism because you only check Muslims, as though being Muslim means you’re a terrorist. No, not Muslim—a forty-five-year-old with a beard up to age fifty. Okay, then it’s age racism. So let’s limit it by age as well as religion. Yes, fine, so it’s not race, but we already said that race isn’t the issue here. Let it be any profile whatsoever. And again I say: this argument is unnecessary, I agree with you. There is nothing reprehensible here. But again, because there has to be justification for this profiling treatment. If there is justification, then even if I do it in a generalizing way there’s still no problem. For example, I’ll take—I can already see the difficulty. I feel like exploding. What do you mean? He can say whatever he wants; I don’t want to explode—what do you mean? Isn’t that justified? He can’t say there are no terrorists, right? That there’s no need to check people? You have to check people; things have happened in the world. That he can’t say. Now the question is whom to check—let’s think whom to check. Now, many people do in fact say this, by the way—more in the United States but there are crazies here too—check everyone equally. Why check… everyone? There’s no reason to invest energy and effort and delay people, huge delays and everything, for checks whose results you know in advance. You know—there are certain groups, they don’t blow up planes. I don’t know if they’re better or worse, they have other troubles, but they don’t blow up planes. So why check them? There’s no logic in it. It’s that same anti-racist psychosis, where every such profiling is perceived as racism. And part of my attempt here to define this concept is precisely to prevent this kind of psychosis, this kind of illogical application of the idea. For example, the army’s quality-group score, which I think was abolished—it underwent changes and then was abolished altogether; I think today it no longer exists at all. There is characterization. Residents of Lod have a lower quality-group score than residents of Tel Aviv. By definition, if you’re a resident of Lod, your score is lower. Now what—aren’t there residents of Lod who are heroic fighters like the greatest fighters? Of course there could be. Why not? There’s no reason to assume that residents of Tel Aviv are all excellent fighters and residents of Lod are not. But suppose it’s even true on average, yes? On average maybe it’s true. But why do you apply it to every resident of Lod? There are residents of Lod who are not like that. So that’s the second type. But note: if, for example, the army doesn’t have the means to check everyone—it can’t, I can’t check everyone, it’s simply not practical—do you understand that there’s still a logic to doing this? It’s a bit infuriating, a bit annoying if you belong to the weaker group, but on the other hand what can you do? By the way, the psychometric exam is also problematic sorting. What? I can’t hear? What can you do? There’s no choice, there’s no choice. It really is not an ideal policy; if I could behave differently, it would be proper to behave differently. But constraints are also a factor. I can’t—so what am I supposed to do, not sort people into elite units in the army? I need to sort them, right? Now I can’t go through all—say for the sake of argument that I can’t go through all the people. So what am I supposed to do? Not sort? Then people who aren’t suitable will get through. So I do the best sorting I can. By the way, the psychometric exam too is problematic sorting. The psychometric exam is problematic sorting. There are many critiques of it. I think they’re often exaggerated, but there is something to them, they have substance. The psychometric exam does not predict success in studies all that well, certainly not in all fields; every field has the abilities it requires. But what can you do? So far they haven’t found a better tool for screening. So what do you want—to let everyone into the university? There’s no room. So here it’s not a principled question but a technical constraint. I don’t have the means to act properly. But that too is a consideration. If I don’t have the means to act properly, then I profile. What, again? If it’s merely convenience—no, if it’s convenience, then an argument begins, I accept that. Meaning, if it’s just a matter of convenience, but you really could have done it differently, then I fully accept the criticism. In fact the army did accept the criticism and abolished the quality-group score. I hope that’s really true and that they didn’t just do it because of political correctness. But maybe they really understood that the criticism was justified and it really is possible to check this, and it was merely convenience. Then indeed in such a case don’t do it, because it’s not okay. That’s exactly the advantage of this kind of analysis. I want to examine first what kind of behavior is not okay. After I know whether it’s not okay or yes okay, now let’s see what constraints cause me to behave this way. If there are no sufficiently strong constraints and I’ve concluded that this behavior is not okay—change your behavior. Excellent, that’s one of the outcomes of this analysis. But notice: all the discriminations I spoke of here, in all three types. One discrimination speaks about a group: you take a parameter that maybe you can call an incorrect parameter. You can take a correct parameter that really does characterize the group on average, but it isn’t relevant to what interests you. You can take a parameter that is both correct and relevant, but you apply it to an individual person and not to the group as a whole, and an individual can always have traits different from the average of his group. And sometimes you can take relevant traits that correctly characterize the group, relevantly, and apply them to an individual because you have no way to behave properly. Then you have no choice; you do it even though there’s a problem here. Okay? Now all these things, in one way or another, are really what happens in racism. But understand that all these things are basically discrimination, not racism. They are discrimination. If I did this on any basis whatsoever, it would be wrong. There’s no point here—these are just words. There’s no reason to create another concept in my ethical vocabulary, my moral vocabulary. I already have the concept of discrimination, exclusion, discrimination, whatever. I don’t need another one. The concept of racism adds nothing at all to this matter. Okay, you got off lightly. No, the question is what it gives you if you come to someone and say he’s a racist. No, if you’re an academic researcher, no problem, then classify the discriminations by type and write an encyclopedia of discriminations. I’m talking about public discourse, not academic research. In public discourse, when you use the term racist toward someone, it is a term that places him in a very problematic position. If you tell him: look, what you’re doing here is unjustified discrimination, no problem at all—show me why this is discrimination, why it’s unjustified, and you’ll be right, and if I don’t concede then I’m really not okay. No problem. The concept of racist has a very problematic connotation and it is unjustified. There is nothing in racism beyond discrimination. It is only a kind of discrimination. Based on an improper ground? Every discrimination is based on an improper ground. No, there is affirmative action. Fine, that’s not discrimination, all right. For me too, discrimination is a concept with a connotation; discrimination means unjustified discrimination. Yes. I’m saying that using the concept of racism basically tells the person in the subtext: you’re a Nazi. Sorry for the blunt use of the term—that’s basically what people are telling him. No, I’m not a Nazi. Maybe I discriminate, maybe that really isn’t okay. Correct me, protest, criticize me. But this horrible connotation attached to the concept, in my opinion, has no justification whatsoever. The concept of racism is not that broad. And if I now say, for argument’s sake, that there is preference for someone because of his race, then I’m a racist? He’s not going to kill everyone who doesn’t… No, no, fine. I mean to say that you have within you the same problem that existed among the Nazis, appearing in a less extreme form, so there’s no need to kill you and no need to… fine. But it’s the same problem. The use of this concept is not neutral usage; it’s not a conceptual mistake. People use this concept because it carries on its back all the connotations it has accumulated. And I’m saying that’s unjustified. Talk about discrimination. That’s substantive language. If I’m discriminating, on what basis is the discrimination? It turns out that a very large part of what is perceived as racism is not even race-based at all. Really not. Nationality, religion, gender—much more than race. But the definition of racism as it appears in the definition itself is race in the biological sense, as they used to define it. Fine. So what do I care? Then we’ve gone back to discrimination. Discrimination on any basis whatsoever is equally problematic. It may be more popular, no problem, it may be more common, I won’t argue about the prevalence of the phenomenon. About its severity, I will argue. Because the severity is the same severity. In the end, we’re talking about discrimination. That’s actually the concept we’re looking for. Now, one can take all sorts of… well, I’m already running late. One could say discrimination on racial grounds. Yes, of course one can. Right. Discriminations have many grounds, many types, obviously, no problem. But when you speak about racism, it’s perceived as though this is a problem in itself. It’s not like discrimination; it’s something much more severe, with that awful connotation. There is no justification for that. It’s demagoguery. And in the end, not because the person is right or behaving correctly. No, he isn’t behaving correctly. Criticize him, argue with him, but argue with him on the relevant plane. If he has made a mistake, argue with facts, show him that he’s mistaken. Don’t shout at him that he’s a racist; show him that he’s mistaken. If he isn’t mistaken but it’s not a relevant parameter, tell him that. Look, it’s not a relevant parameter. You’re right that I’m more stupid, but your occupation doesn’t require high intelligence, so what’s the problem? Or if it’s something else, you can tell him: look, I may belong to that group but I’m a genius, test me. Okay? And if I tell him that, it’s far more effective and also correct—not only effective—than telling him you’re a racist. What do you gain by calling him a racist? It’s just an accusation. There’s nothing constructive in that discourse. It doesn’t interest me. I maybe want to finish with a few examples. I didn’t get to many things, but still, a few examples to see how this works. Look, let’s take for example the assertion that the Jews are a chosen people. Right? The Kuzari that was mentioned earlier here, which says that there are five levels: inanimate, vegetative, animal, speaking—that is, human beings—and the prophet or the Jew, whichever, yes? That’s the fifth level. It gives one a bit of a shiver, I think, to read something like that—me, at least. Let’s… what’s the problem here? What’s the problem here? First of all, the first question is whether it’s true. If it’s true. Now what does “true” mean? To check if it’s true, one has to check what it means. What does it mean that it’s a chosen people? I wrote a chapter about this in one of my books; you can’t define such a thing. Between any two peoples there are differences in characteristics. Or two groups, not necessarily peoples—you’ll find differences in characteristics broadly speaking, typical characteristics of one kind or another. There are characteristics of the Belgian people, the Zimbabwean people, the British, whatever you want. There are also characteristics of the Jewish people. We’ve accumulated a history, we have our own culture, we have certain characteristics. Is that what “chosen people” means? In what sense is it a chosen people? We’re different from others; Belgians are also different from others. So why is that… what is the definition of a chosen people? Before I ask whether you’re right or wrong, I want to know what I need to check in order to know whether you’re right or wrong. And my feeling is that the problem already lies there. That is, already there you won’t really succeed, I think, in defining what sort of difference there has to be for me to say that the Jew is different from others in a way different from how the Belgian is different from others. Because everyone is different from others. Every group is different from others. But you’re claiming there is some difference here of a different kind. What does that mean? I think I can’t define such a thing; I don’t understand this definition. Suppose I could define it—now we’d need to check whether factually it’s true. I personally am not impressed that it’s true on the factual level, insofar as I’m able to observe people like me and like you. There are good Jews and not-good Jews; there are good gentiles and not-good gentiles of all kinds and types. I cannot see differences beyond the differences that exist between any two cultures. Okay, that’s clear. Okay? Personally, I don’t see those differences. So what is it? I also think that many others who speak this way don’t see it either. And what brings them to say it—and here I think is the point—is some a priori conception before looking at reality. They don’t learn it from reality; they come to reality with certain conceptions which they impose on reality. It says in the Torah, “and you shall be My treasured people from among all peoples,” and they interpret that, in my opinion incorrectly, as though there is some essential difference between Jews and gentiles. Now when you look at it through those lenses, you’ll also see essential differences. But not only belief—I’m not sure it’s even defined. Okay, so I’m saying: if I had a good definition of the matter, I could ask myself maybe it’s true and maybe it isn’t true. I can’t even understand the definition, so I don’t know how to test it. If I’m supposed to examine the practice, how people actually conduct themselves, I don’t see an essentialist difference. There are things we’re better at, things we’re worse at. I don’t see an essentialist difference. There are peoples who are better than us in almost every factor—not every factor, meaning some other people—I don’t think you’ll be able to define in any very clear way an experiment that shows how Jews are better than others in every sense. Again, it’s very hard even to define this claim before checking whether it’s true or not. Now where does it come from? And here we really get very close to the concept of racism, because it really does come from some kind of preconceived notion. A preconceived notion that says Jews are different from gentiles, period. Even if you don’t see it, it’s there. Now of course, once you already come with that preconceived notion, naturally you’ll also see it. More than that: I once had a discussion with students in Yeruham when I was teaching there in a hesder yeshiva, and somehow—we were talking, I don’t remember exactly—we got into Jews versus gentiles and so on. They told me, obviously Jews are much more moral than gentiles. I told them, look, but there are gentiles who behave very morally. I don’t think I’d be willing to make such a claim even on average, but certainly not—wait a second—not something essential about each and every person. They told me, yes, but a gentile who behaves morally is like a pig stretching out its hooves. There’s a midrash like that, saying, “See, I’m pure.” He’s really doing it to make an impression on us, but deep down he’s a wicked person. How do you know that? Did you check his… do you have some sort of X-ray machine? I don’t know—how do you check what he has inside? They didn’t check and they can’t check. They don’t actually see real differences. They simply come with that conception in advance. And when you come with that conception in advance, that is already very close to racism. Now, one can argue whether it’s reprehensible or not, and here that’s racism in the descriptive sense or in the moral sense. You can say: the Holy One, blessed be He, told us that Jews are built differently from gentiles, and therefore I really do accept that claim. The question, of course, is what you do with it. That’s the last factor we spoke about. Meaning: beyond the question of how I perceive the differences, the question is what I do with the difference I perceive. Do I give different treatment to these versus those? And even when I talk about different treatment, different in what sense? As in the sense you mentioned earlier—if I care more for members of my people than for members of another people, that’s not racism. Every people cares more for its own people than for another people, right? That’s a family-type relation. I care more for my children than for children of other families. That’s the nature of things, and the parents in the other families do the same. You can call that a division of roles. There is a distinction in philosophy, and also in law, between civil rights and human rights. Civil rights are rights a state should grant its own citizens. Human rights are due to every human being regardless of citizenship. A state may not violate someone else’s human rights, but it can fail to give him the civil rights it gives its own citizens, because those are civil rights. So that isn’t called discrimination, but violating human rights is called discrimination. Okay, so here too in the Jewish context, or “chosen people,” one has to examine what you do with these things. This profiling itself, which says that Jews are in some sense better than others—I think it’s not true, I think it’s undefined, but suppose someone thinks it is, okay—do I automatically say that he is a racist? No, I say no. Because the question is what he does with it. And the question is to what extent he imposes it on reality in places where the… what? Yes, where he takes it. Therefore I think these concepts have to be used sparingly. And I return here—and I won’t go on to more examples now, there are many more—but… Wait, one second, I just want to finish the… I want to go back to the point with which I opened: that the overly broad use people make of these concepts often harms our ability truly to struggle for them. Because once you see racism everywhere, as I said before, then you can’t fight racism. And once everyone who perceives something differently from someone else is a racist, then you’ve emptied the concept of racism of moral content. It has no moral content. If everyone who thinks that Jews are, I don’t know, spiritually built differently from gentiles is a racist—I said I’d get to that later, it’s going to disturb my flow. Okay, people here generally understand what “gentile” means. Wait, if someone is talking with the Holy One, blessed be He, let me speak. I’m not talking with the Holy One, blessed be He, I’m talking with the group here. I’m the messiah, speak to me, I’m the Holy One, blessed be He, speak to me, I’m the Holy One, blessed be He. Sir, you’re interrupting me. Fine, we’re continuing, you’re interrupting me. I am Jesus son of Mary Magdalene. Good luck. I am Jesus son of Mary Magdalene. Fine. In short, the claim is that… the claim is that… the claim is that when you use these concepts too broadly, you do not allow yourself to struggle in the places where one ought to struggle. When you say that everyone who, say, in our discourse today, everyone who speaks in the language of Ben Gvir, Smotrich, or whatever, various things like that that I absolutely do not identify with, is a racist—that is a problematic statement. It is problematic because you do not distinguish between people who speak in that language and people who actually behave that way. The question is what you do with that kind of language, and I think that discourse is very problematic. This is true regarding discrimination against, say, Mizrahim in educational institutions that didn’t admit them in Immanuel; there were all sorts of stories like that. There too there was criticism that was very problematic, even though the phenomenon itself is problematic, but the criticism was no less problematic. Because there were parameters there that were relevant to that discrimination. In the end the result was that fewer Mizrahim came out, but often that result comes from considerations that are relevant considerations—it just happens that Mizrahim fit their criteria there less well. That doesn’t have to mean it was aimed from the outset at discriminating against Mizrahim. That needs to be examined. But those automatic accusations are very damaging. That is basically what I want to claim. What I want to claim is that the concept of racism, in my opinion, has no meaning at all on the ethical plane. It is undefined. Now if you want, on the descriptive plane, to say that someone who thinks two groups are different from one another is what’s called a racist—fine. If you define racist that way, then fine, write the relevant dictionary. But that’s why I said I am not… I claim that the use of the concept of racism is unnecessary, it has no content, it is empty of content. Talk to me about discrimination, not about racism. Discrimination is something that has content, and one can define its different types and argue about them substantively. You can see: this is justified discrimination, unjustified discrimination; one can talk. I gave roughly the criteria for how one can talk. When you talk about racism, you’re not conducting any discourse. You’re not conducting any discourse; you just want to use a loaded word in order to paint the other person as wicked, but in fact you’re saying nothing. The concept of racism, in my opinion, is completely empty of content. It has no content. It has no content on the ethical plane. Again, on the descriptive plane you can say that someone who thinks these are different from those is a racist—that’s a matter of semantics. Define the concept that way and then it’ll be defined that way; I don’t care. But in language use, in public discussion, it’s an ethical use of the concept. The ethical use of the concept is empty. Not because the phenomena against which this concept is raised are not reprehensible—some of those phenomena are reprehensible. But precisely because of that, it is wrong to fight them under this banner of racism. Rather, one should speak about discrimination, define criteria, speak about relevance, speak about generalizations, and all the concepts we spoke about earlier. Okay? Fine, I’ll stop here. There’s much more, much more to do with this. Does anyone want to comment or ask? It’s a racist law. It’s a racist law. A racist law—why? Obviously, because it discriminates against one group as opposed to other groups. Why is it forbidden to be racist only toward Haredim? It’s forbidden to be racist toward anyone. If you assume the concept of racism has meaning—I don’t know. After what I’ve said now, I’m not sure I understand that concept. You can tell me there is a law against racism, but there already is, I think—I don’t know what exactly—it derives, at least according to case law, from various Basic Laws. I don’t know, maybe there is one too, I don’t know exactly. Fine. But if you say a law against racism against one particular group, that is itself a racist law. You can say that if you see a weakening in relation to that group, then there is room to tell judges: judge more harshly those who behave with racism toward Haredim, because there is some problem here. Fine, there’s room for such a policy on the level of judicial rulings. Give a harsher punishment for murder within the family; give a harsher punishment than for ordinary murder, because here there is some problem that is harder to deal with. Say, just as an example, someone might make such a claim—that’s legitimate. Fine? But to legislate a law against racism against Haredim—that’s just part of the madness of those lunatics up there. I still haven’t understood why you’re fighting so hard against the concept of racism. I’m not fighting it; I’m trying to clarify what it says. And after I clarify what it says, it turns out it says nothing. So why use it? Use the more relevant, clearer concepts, concepts that can be discussed. Discrimination? Discrimination, exclusion, I don’t know, call it things like that. No problem. Then say: why are you discriminating against him? That’s all. Why are you discriminating against him? In what way is he different from the other person? Why are you giving him that same treatment? Then he’ll have to explain. He’ll say to you: look, he’s more stupid. Ask him: why is he more stupid? How do you know he’s more stupid? Did you test him? And if not—he belongs to that group, and that group is stupid. Ah, wait—but did you test him personally too? I gave a whole toolbox that makes it possible to conduct this discussion—not because I don’t want the discussion to take place, on the contrary, precisely because I do want it to take place. And this sloganizing use of racism, racism, racism doesn’t allow this discussion to happen. What bothers me here is that this is not how you fight racism—not that the fight against racism bothers me. What bothers me is that when people fight racism, they actually don’t manage to get results, because they’re fighting the wrong demon. But essentialism is correct… But I’m saying—that’s exactly the point, one of the examples I didn’t get to delve into. There are people who say that women have less talent for learning Torah, for example in that context, and therefore they are exempt from Torah study, maybe they’re forbidden to learn Torah—there are all sorts of claims of that kind. Now I’m not entering that discussion; that claim is completely absurd. But say for the sake of discussion, let’s argue about it, okay? Very often women come—or others come, doesn’t matter—and say: that is an essentialist claim, and that’s not okay. And I say: not true. It’s not an essentialist claim. It’s not an essentialist claim. I didn’t say that women are essentially less talented. I said that at present they are less talented. If I had said that essentially and unchangeably they are like that, then you could say I’m an essentialist. But even—one second—but even then I want to make another claim. Even if I did make an essentialist claim, who says I’m not right? Do you have any arguments, any evidence against that? Or alternatively, those who say that women are equally talented as men in Talmud or Torah or whatever, and the only difference—or more talented—the only difference is that culturally they were excluded, not enabled, all kinds of reasons like that. Maybe that’s true. But why does that claim not require evidence? That claim can be raised, but the claim that they are less talented cannot be raised? In my opinion, both claims can be raised. And one can check whether they are true or not—maybe it’s true, maybe it isn’t. But somehow, someone who claims that everyone is equally talented doesn’t need to bring evidence. It’s enough to say otherwise it’s racism or essentialism. And here it’s exactly the same failure. I claim that both sides in this argument suffer from the same failure. They subordinate the facts to their evaluative agenda. And both do that. Those who say women are less talented without knowing, without checking, say it because they want—I don’t know—to discriminate against women, exclude women, and so they are basically subordinating the factual claim to their evaluative agenda. But those who oppose it…