Artificial Intelligence – Lecture 6 – Rabbi Michael Avraham

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I got held up a bit on the way here; I only just arrived. Arrived not in the sense of landing—I got home. Okay, so we talked a bit about the concept of judgment, of creativity. I tried to distinguish between mechanical actions and actions that involve judgment and creativity. And I said that usually we connect creativity and judgment to the semantic plane rather than the syntactic plane. Meaning, technical calculations are usually calculations that may not require awareness, but precisely for that reason they remain on the technical plane. And when we do some creative act, when we choose a tool to solve a problem, that usually comes through conscious thought, even though it’s not always like that, but many times it is. And so what I basically want to say for our purposes is this: when I speak about intelligence, I actually require there to be awareness and judgment—that is, it must not be a mechanical decision. Because a mechanical decision, in my view, is not an unintelligent decision—not low intelligence, but rather, intelligence just doesn’t apply there. It’s not relevant to intelligence at all. Intelligence can belong to the one who created that thing which then does the work mechanically. If we take a computer—now I’m not talking about artificial intelligence, just an ordinary computer, with ordinary, classical software—then when a computer solves a problem, it is of course not intelligent in any sense. Its programmer, the one who wrote the software telling it how to solve that problem, is the intelligent person. Or the one who built the computer—that is the intelligent person. In other words, the one who created it. But once you’ve created it, from then on it’s mechanical action. And once the action is mechanical, I do not attribute intelligence to it.

[Speaker B] And is that connected to something like System 1 and System 2?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s connected, definitely connected. System 1 is something unconscious, and that’s why I qualified what I said earlier and said that you can also choose tools to solve a problem unconsciously. A lot of times we do that through System 1, in fact. But usually it happens through the conscious system. Now, to sharpen this point further, I want to continue this analogy between judgment and choice. I want to say that in the realm of values, basically, we speak about free will or choice. In the intellectual realm, people—even people who believe in free choice—quite a few of them will say that in the intellectual realm things really do happen deterministically. I simply understand something or become convinced of something because it’s true, not because I chose to understand it or to be convinced. So they are unwilling to accept that same free will that they may accept in the context of values has some parallel in the intellectual context. So first I want to sharpen this concept of free will in the realm of values, and then go back to judgment on the intellectual plane.

In the realm of values—well, this is an argument I’ve already spoken about more than once. There’s a very common objection to the notion of free choice, and the objection basically goes like this—a kind of “either way” argument. Let’s take some event that happened. That event either has a cause or it doesn’t have a cause. Right? There’s no third possibility; that’s the law of excluded middle. Either it has a cause or it doesn’t. Now, if it has a cause, then the event occurred deterministically, right? The cause produced the event, so basically this is a deterministic event. If the event has no cause, then it’s random, then it’s accidental, and therefore that too is not free will. So it turns out that whether there is a cause or there isn’t, it isn’t free will. Or in other words, there’s no place on the map at all for this event—or this mechanism—that we call free will. Because either there’s a cause and then it’s deterministic, or there’s no cause and then it’s random, and there’s no third possibility. In other words, either there is a cause or there isn’t. There’s no third option. This is a very, very common argument against the notion of free choice. Many people see it as some kind of crushing argument. I explained several times in the past, also in the book The Science of Freedom and elsewhere, that this argument fails. It fails because it begs the question.

What do I mean? Suppose I believe in free choice. When I speak about free choice, I’m talking about a situation in which there is no cause that made me act—because otherwise it’s deterministic—but on the other hand it’s not random. Right? That’s my claim. In other words, what someone who says there is free choice is really claiming is that there is a third mechanism. Beyond randomness and determinism there is a third mechanism. What is that mechanism? Choice, or free will. What distinguishes it from determinism? That’s clear. Determinism has a cause and this doesn’t have a cause. The hard question is what distinguishes it from randomness. After all, neither of them has a cause. So I argue that what distinguishes them is purpose. True, neither has a cause, but an event of choice is an event that strives toward the realization of a purpose, whereas a random event strives toward nothing; it has no cause and no purpose. In other words, when I choose to do something, I choose not because of some cause but for the sake of some goal. I decide to make a phone call in order to set a meeting, I decide that I want a meeting tomorrow, and as a result I now make the call in order to bring about that meeting. So it turns out I’m basically operating with my face turned toward the future, not because of a cause that existed in the past but for the sake of a purpose that will exist in the future—a value-based purpose or some other kind of purpose.

[Speaker C] Rabbi, Rabbi, Rabbi, Rabbi—but that’s just wording, just wordplay. When we say purpose, what we really mean is that the current state is not ideal from our point of view, something is bothering us in the current state, we want to reach a purpose, meaning state B. If the current state is ideal and I don’t want to change it, I want it to go on forever like this, then there’s no purpose, no need. But if there is a purpose, that means the current state is not good; we aspire to a future state that will be better. And that’s just another wording for an absolute causal factor. There’s no difference at all. What’s the difference?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You’re simply begging the question. It’s just not true.

[Speaker C] No, forget me, I’m talking about the argument itself. What’s the difference?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The argument itself is a foolish argument. I’ll explain why.

[Speaker C] Maybe the Rabbi will explain?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I was in the middle of explaining and you stopped me. I’m trying to explain. What I’m saying is that when I—suppose I accept your formulation. I think the current state is bad and I’m striving to realize it in a better way. That striving is the result of a decision. I decided that I want to improve the situation. For some reason, I have no idea why, you assume that if the current situation is bad and I strive for a better one, then that happens deterministically. Where did you get that from? I claim not.

[Speaker C] If the current state—the current state—is good, then how did it suddenly happen that you decided to strive for—? It isn’t good.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It isn’t good. The reason is that I decided to improve it—that’s the reason.

[Speaker C] But that’s not disconnected from the situation.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, it’s not disconnected, but it’s my decision. For some reason you decide that if the situation now is bad, then the situation causes me to act. Where did you get that strange assumption from? The situation is bad—some people will act to correct it and some won’t. Why? Because these decided to act and those decided not to act. So what if the situation is bad? What does that mean? I’m not even sure I accept the wording that the situation is bad, but that doesn’t matter. You’re assuming something here that in my view is not logical, and certainly not necessary. So I’m saying that in the end, the position of free choice is a position that says there are three mechanisms, let’s call them that. They’re not really mechanisms, but let’s call them that. One mechanism is action because of a cause. That’s called determinism. The second mechanism is action without a cause for the sake of a purpose. That mechanism I call free will or choice. The third mechanism is a mechanism without a cause and without a purpose. That mechanism I call randomness.

Now, I haven’t said that everything I’m saying so far is true. This is the libertarian position. That’s all. Now let’s see whether the argument I raised earlier attacks it. If I want to argue against it, you can say I disagree, no problem. My discussion is not about whether it’s true; my discussion is whether the “either way” argument I raised earlier really attacks this position. And my answer is absolutely not. It’s just confusion. Why? Because that argument basically says this: either there is a cause or there isn’t. If there is a cause, then it’s deterministic, and if there isn’t a cause, then it’s random. Hold on—you jumped. If there isn’t a cause, that doesn’t mean it’s random; it depends on whether there is a purpose. If there is no cause and there is a purpose, that’s choice. If there is no cause and there is no purpose, that’s chance. Or in other words, the libertarian assumes there are two different mechanisms that happen without a cause. One of them is when there is a purpose—that’s free choice. One of them is when there is no purpose—that’s randomness. The determinist assumes—and he has every right to assume—that there is no such thing as choice. Everything without a cause is randomness. Okay? That’s the dispute. But now explain to me what the argument adds to that dispute. You’re just begging the question. You can say you disagree with me, no problem. But you can’t say that you raised an argument against me—you didn’t raise any argument. Your argument just assumes your premise and therefore reaches your conclusion. But you want to attack my position. How can you attack my position by means of an argument that starts from your premises? Your premises are that anything without a cause is random, but that’s precisely the point under dispute. I argue that there is something with no cause that is not random. If it has a purpose, then it is free choice, not randomness. Therefore this argument is simply irrelevant.

Now I’m using this argument in order to sharpen the libertarian position. And now I’m going one step further. Now I’ll actually present the libertarian position. So far I’ve only said: let’s put the libertarian position on the table and see whether this argument attacks it. And the answer is no, it does not attack it. I explained why it does not attack it, yes.

[Speaker D] Just maybe as food for thought—back in Aristotle’s time, or I don’t know, two thousand years ago, there was also final causation. Meaning, something that an object does for the sake of something else; it was pretty well known in the world that not every cause is…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not only in Aristotle’s time—even today.

[Speaker D] Yes, okay, I know the Rabbi talks about this too. So it doesn’t have to be that this kind of cause is deterministic, because a final cause could be deterministic.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct. A final cause is also deterministic, and therefore for our purposes, a final cause is a cause. So it doesn’t… it doesn’t matter.

[Speaker D] But people were able to think that there are several kinds of causes, like several things that move… You could also say that the cause is choice.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A stone that “strives” toward the earth cannot but strive toward the earth.

[Speaker D] Right, right—that’s what I wanted to say, that something teleological isn’t necessarily about choice.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but I’m talking about a purpose that I choose, okay? So in short, what I want to say now is that I really used that argument—or the rejection of that argument—in order to sharpen what free choice means. Free choice means that the present situation does not dictate what I will do. But on the other hand, it’s not arbitrary; there is logic to what I do. The logic comes from the purpose toward which I strive, not from the cause because of which I act, okay? That’s what I’m saying about free choice. Now I move to the plane…

[Speaker C] But when we come back and ask why—why does that chooser, why do you choose? Why? What brought you to choose? Then maybe in the end he’ll say, “I flipped a coin.” Because if it’s not in the cause—in the purpose, which is really a cause—then all we’re left with is a coin toss.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not “I flipped a coin,” but like this.

[Speaker C] No, but you felt something in the body, in the soul, in— I didn’t feel anything, because I decided, I didn’t feel. No, but it’s not a robot, there’s some part in the soul, in the body, let’s call it some divine element that…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Listen, you keep coming back to the same thing—you keep begging the question. You keep coming back and assuming that everything must have a cause… because really it can’t… because really… that’s exactly the debate. You assume that; I don’t agree.

[Speaker C] But let the Rabbi try to formulate another possibility for me.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I already formulated it very clearly: the cause does not…

[Speaker C] It wasn’t enough to justify the decision, so what caused the decision? Choice. Fine, okay, but suppose not… But how can you even explain why they chose? How can you even get that out in words?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I can’t explain why they chose, because you’re looking for a causal explanation. I’m telling you again, you’re begging the question. If you’re looking for a causal explanation, you won’t get an explanation that isn’t causal. But as far as I’m concerned there are also purposive explanations, not only causal ones. But you keep coming back to the same point.

[Speaker C] I already said that in my view purposive is just another wording for causal, but even if we don’t agree with what I’m saying, the Rabbi still says, “I choose because I have a purpose.” Okay, but then the purpose is in the choice, and it comes back and causes… so here too there is something causal.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, to say “I choose this purpose”—the purpose doesn’t cause; I choose it.

[Speaker C] And in what sense is it not a cause for the Rabbi’s choice? In what sense?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I could have chosen not to choose it. I could have chosen not to choose it.

[Speaker C] That’s not clear at all.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We simply aren’t capable of grasping it. There are people with the same value system as mine and they don’t act as I do. So is there always some cause to it, with Inoue versus the… what was the Japanese general’s name? I don’t remember, yes, always… Togo.

[Speaker C] Because he should have said, “I feel differently.” Inoue felt differently than General Togo, and Inoue felt differently. Right? Absolutely, I didn’t say there’s no cause.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You keep coming back to your assumption that there always has to be a cause, and that’s what we’re arguing about, so there’s no point in the debate. You keep coming back and attacking me from the assumption that everything must have a cause. That’s precisely what I don’t accept.

[Speaker C] I’m only claiming—I’m only claiming—that you simply can’t even formulate in words something without a cause.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You can’t? And what have I been doing until now? Causality here… What I’ve been doing until now is exactly to formulate this in words. Maybe I didn’t succeed, I don’t know—you judge. But what I’ve been doing until now is to put this into words.

[Speaker B] Rabbi, sorry—choosing something for the sake of a purpose without there being an earlier cause, according to what you’re saying, doesn’t that point to some kind of deficiency? Why deficiency? Because what the philosophers say about the creation of the world is that the Holy One, blessed be He, did not create the world because He is complete, so He lacks nothing, and therefore there is no place for desire. If I choose something for the sake of a purpose, let’s say without there being a prior cause for it, still the very deficiency that makes me choose what I choose—it comes somehow from a deficiency.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Of course. When I strive to improve the world, strive toward the realization of some value, then I assume that the current state is not perfect and I want to perfect it.

[Speaker B] And that isn’t called a cause?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, of course not. It’s my decision to perfect the state of affairs. I could have chosen not to perfect the situation, to see the world as lacking and not take steps to perfect it. The fact that the world is lacking and I strive to complete it does not mean that this striving is deterministic. That’s exactly what Shmuel said earlier, and I absolutely do not agree. Where does that assumption come from? The fact that the world is lacking and I strive to complete it can be the result of my decision to strive to complete it. We both agree—I don’t know, maybe we both agree—but I agree with many other people, say me and the people in Greenpeace: both of us agree that one ought to act for environmental quality, okay? But they devote their lives to this and I don’t. Why? We both believe in that value, we both understand that the current state is not good and that it would be proper to improve it. They decided to act on it and I decided not to act—or decided not to act, it doesn’t matter right now. It isn’t because of the situation. We both see the situation in the same way, the current deficiency and what could be done to improve it. We both see it the same way. And the fact is that one decides to act and the other decides not to act. So therefore the explanation I offer—you can say there are hidden causes, but I see no reason to assume that, no reason at all to assume it. I say no: because I decided to act, therefore I act. My decision is the cause. And why did I decide? Because that’s what I chose.

Fine, so that’s on the plane of choice. Now, choice deals with values. Judgment usually deals with facts, okay? That’s not entirely accurate—that judgment deals with facts—because there is also thought, say, in the field of morality. There is thought in morality. But I’m saying that thought, even in morality, is different from choice. Because thought basically draws conclusions from assumptions. Choice establishes the values that serve as the assumptions. In other words, once I have a certain value-set that I chose, I then use my mind to see how to act in light of it or how to realize it. Right? So even thought in morality is not choice; it is like thought about facts, except that these “facts” are facts that I decided upon by virtue of my free will. But from that point on, thought is really dealing with facts. Okay?

Now what happens in the realm of facts? In the realm of facts people tend to think that even if you accept free choice in the evaluative context, in the realm of facts it’s simply a question of whether something convinces you or not. That is, when you reach some conclusion, it’s not a matter of judgment—either it convinces you or it doesn’t. What is there to choose here? Do you freely choose to be convinced? There’s no issue of choice here. If it seems logical to me, then I understand it, then I buy it, then I adopt it. And if not, not. But whether it seems logical to me or not is something forced on me. Leibowitz constantly repeated that facts are forced on us, science is forced on us. Choice exists only in the evaluative realm, and only there. And I argue that this is not true. I say that even in the realm of facts there is room for free action, which in this case, in order to distinguish it from choice in the evaluative realm, I call judgment. Okay? Judgment means, for example, choosing an intellectual tool in order to solve a problem. To solve a factual problem, not a moral problem. Right?

One of the examples through which this may be easiest to demonstrate is the one we saw in the previous lecture, the previous meeting. What did we talk about? The MIU puzzle, yes, the MIU system. Remember? Three letters: M, I, and U, and four rules for building legal words in the language, and the question was: if you start from MI—that’s a legal word—apply the rules however you want, is MU a legal word? Right? Now make attempts, give it to a Turing machine, give it to a computer, whatever—the problem never closes, never ends. A computer could not solve the problem, because we know that the word MU is not legal. And since the word MU is not legal, and since there are infinitely many possibilities to check using the rules, the Turing machine or computer would run for an infinite time, checking all the possibilities and never reaching MU. Therefore it could never stop and say: okay, I’ve reached the conclusion that MU is not a legal word. This is Turing’s halting problem. We’ll get to these things later too.

So how did we solve it after all? Not me—Hofstadter solved it and I brought it here. What was the solution? The solution was: let’s examine the number of I’s in the words. And I claim—he basically proved a theorem—that in the system as defined there, the MIU system with the four rules and MI as the given legal word, the rule is that in every string, every string that is a legal word, the number of I’s cannot be divisible by 3. That’s a theorem that can be proven. From that point on, the conclusion is of course immediately obvious: then MU is clearly not a legal word in the language, because the number of I’s there is zero, and zero is divisible by 3. So MU cannot be a legal word in the language.

Now notice what we did here. What we basically did was choose a tool, choose a tool through which the problem could be attacked. For example, I had some possibility of choosing this tool or another tool; somehow it seemed to me that checking the number of I’s, or the modulo 3 of the number of I’s, was a tool that could move me forward, a tool that might help me investigate this question. Someone less talented wouldn’t have thought of this tool. Once I tell you this tool, anyone can do the check, and anyone can prove that MU is not a legal word in the language. The creative part of the matter was to go in the first place to this question: is the number of I’s in the word divisible by 3 or not? Why on earth check that? Why not check whether the number of U’s is divisible by 16? Or whether the number of M’s plus I’s minus twice the number of U’s is a prime number? I mean, I can check a million—not a million, infinitely many—properties. How did you suddenly come up with the idea to check whether the number of I’s must be divisible by 3 or must not be divisible by 3? That is non-mechanical thinking.

Now here there are two interpretive possibilities. Someone might come and say—and I’m not bringing this as a proof, I’m bringing it as an illustration—someone might still say: this idea popped into my head, it popped into my head, I didn’t choose it. It popped into my head. What’s the parallel in the evaluative context? It’s parallel to randomness, right? Meaning, action done through calculation without decisions or creativity parallels determinism. Right? There are rules, I apply the rules, I solve a quadratic equation. To solve a quadratic equation, once the formula exists, no creativity is needed—I just apply the formula, that’s all. That’s a mechanical action, parallel to what I called determinism in the evaluative context, okay? But here I’m speaking about an action that is not mechanical. I chose this device—divisibility by 3 of the number of I’s—which is a creative choice, very much not mechanical. There are infinitely many other possibilities I could have thought of.

Here there are two interpretive possibilities that correspond to the two additional mechanisms in the context of choice. What are they? Free will or randomness. Okay? And indeed both of these interpretations exist. One interpretation says: this idea—the divisibility by 3 of the number of I’s—just popped into my head. It wasn’t me; I didn’t exercise judgment or anything, it popped into my head. I got lucky, I don’t know exactly what. And once it popped into my head I applied it and boom, I succeeded. Another interpretation, which I tend toward, says: no, I exercised judgment. I tried to assess the likelihood that this tool could lead me to the goal before I knew that I would succeed. I had some kind of initial assessment that helped me see—my assessment was that this had a chance of helping me. Other tools had less chance of helping me. I exercised judgment and decided to try using this intellectual tool. I propose to interpret this as an exercise of judgment, like choice. Only here I didn’t choose values; I chose an intellectual path for coping with the problem and handling the problem. But that too is a choice. And here, and only here, is talent found. That’s my claim. Talent is measured only in creatures—or only in mechanisms—of this kind, ones that involve decision. I decide whether to use this tool or that tool. Someone who knows how to decide to use the right tool is a more intelligent, more talented person. But if this thing just pops into my head by chance, then I’m a lucky person—but why assume I’m talented? I’m lucky. Or if it’s mechanical…

[Speaker C] But Rabbi, but Rabbi, it’s obvious that this is intuition. His intuition is simply stronger because of something. And the moment it arose in him, he had no choice. He had a choice to decide—he had an intuition.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Shmuel, Shmuel, wait, wait—let’s spare ourselves the continuation, okay?

[Speaker C] I didn’t say the word emotion, I said intuition, which we all agree on.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’ll spare you the rest, leave it. It’s the same argument. I presented two interpretations. One interpretation is that I choose this tool through judgment. The second interpretation is that it pops into me—right?—by chance. Not by chance! Why chance? Wait, wait, wait. So then it’s random. A third interpretation is that it’s mechanical. Meaning, it simply emerges from my intuitive structures. Okay? Now you’re proposing one of the other two interpretations. Fine, I understood. I’m proposing the first one. So what exactly do you want to argue about? You propose that interpretation and I propose this one, that’s all. Okay?

Now everyone can choose. All I’m claiming is that this interpretation also exists. That’s all. Now you can decide whether it seems right to you or not, and I’m not going to conduct that argument here, because I didn’t claim this is true. I didn’t present an argument in favor of its truth. All I said is that there is such an interpretation, exactly as I did with regard to choice, where the critics say it’s either randomness or determinism, and I say: mistake, there is a third possibility. Is the third possibility correct? Fine, you can argue about that. But I claim there is a third possibility. The same thing here. The conventional interpretations are either that it pops into me randomly, or that it happens out of my intuitive structures or however you want to call it—that it follows mechanically from how I’m built in one way or another. Those are the conventional interpretations. And I claim, precisely against what you’re saying—because that is the conventional position—you are missing something. Not that you’re wrong, but you are missing something in the argument. Why? Because there is also a third interpretation. I also claim it is true, but leave that aside. All I’m saying is: first understand that there is a third interpretation. This interpretation is possible too. So don’t assume as obvious that there are only the two possibilities—either it just pops up on its own or it’s mechanical. No, there is a third possibility.

[Speaker C] But suppose the Rabbi were Hofstadter and the Rabbi were to tell me, for argument’s sake, I don’t know, “I chose through judgment, and suddenly the possibility arose of using this solution method.” I would ask the Rabbi: now do you have the choice not to do it? Judgment not to do it?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Of course I do. But I’m asking how I chose it, not what I’ll do from that point onward.

[Speaker C] The moment it appeared, it was forced.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, it didn’t appear! I chose it. Again.

[Speaker C] So when was the judgment? Before it was there, there was nothing to exercise judgment about. After it was there, then it was forced.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] My judgment was that I choose to examine this tool because it seems to me that it will lead me to my goal. That is my judgment. That’s it. Then of course I choose it and discover that it really does lead me. Fine—call that deterministic if you like, I don’t care. I’m talking about the question of how I chose this tool. That’s all. Now, you propose other interpretations, and that’s your right. All I’m saying is that this interpretation exists too. And I claim one more thing—and now I’m stating my actual claim, which I also believe, though that’s a different discussion: according to the other two interpretations, the concept of intelligence is emptied of content; it has no meaning. The concept of intelligence I’m talking about exists only if one adopts the third interpretation. If you don’t adopt the third interpretation, then I have a dispute with you, and I think you’re using the term intelligence in a way that is incorrect—or at least not in the sense in which I speak about intelligence. Okay? That’s basically the claim I want to make.

Now, this is an illustration of a situation that people often ignore. People who speak of intellectual action as something forced on us—either forced on us by a random mechanism, or forced on us by our mental structure, it doesn’t matter, but still forced on us, meaning there is no judgment here—these are exactly the same people who argue against libertarianism in the evaluative context. And just as there, so here, they are missing a third interpretive possibility. There is a third interpretive possibility, and they miss it. They don’t understand that there is a third possibility. Once we understand there is a third possibility, now we can discuss which of the three is correct. I have no problem with that. You can argue about it, and I don’t have good arguments in favor of this or that—I have a sense, but fine, everyone has their own intuitions. But one point I do insist on: you cannot argue that there is no third interpretive possibility. That’s all. From here on, everyone can choose what they want.

And now I claim: since there is a third interpretation, the concept of intelligence is relevant only—relevant only—to decisions of this kind. Of this kind. Because in decisions of this kind I exercised a certain sort of talent. In the other two mechanisms, talent is not relevant. It popped into me! So what? Whoever popped it into me was intelligent, not me. Or alternatively, if it comes out mechanically from my brain structure, then I don’t call that intelligence either. Whoever created my brain structure is the intelligent being, not me. I am the machine that merely carries out what someone programmed me to do.

[Speaker E] By the way, what is the connection between intelligence and talent?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] To me it’s the same thing.

[Speaker E] Talent is one thing, intelligence is another. Intelligence is ultimately some kind of information a person accumulates and can use. No, no—intelligence isn’t information.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? Since when is intelligence information? Of course not. Intelligence can be the use of information, the ability to solve problems. That’s the accepted definition of intelligence—the ability to solve problems.

[Speaker E] Okay, fine, same thing—but talent is something else.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why? Talent is the ability to solve problems. What’s the difference? I’m using it in that sense, so what difference does it make? I’m using those two words in the same sense, okay? Maybe in the dictionary you’ll find a different definition, but it doesn’t matter to me. Okay? The main thing is what I want to say; the terminology is less important here. So that’s the claim, basically.

[Speaker D] I have a question about that. I don’t know whether it’s a challenge or not, but it seems to me that when you define a person as smarter or less smart—or let’s take animals, one animal is smarter and one is less smart—what does that have to do with their capacity to choose? What you mean is that their abilities are greater.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So let me… I talked about this last time too, I’ll repeat it. My claim is that you can speak about the animal as smart in some borrowed sense—that it knows how to deal with many problems, no problem. When I speak about intelligence, I’m speaking about something beyond that. I’m speaking about your dealing with the problems—not just that there is coping with problems. A computer also copes with problems. But really it’s not it that is coping; it’s the one who programmed it.

[Speaker D] I understand, but my question is this: when I say someone is more intelligent or less intelligent, I don’t mean that he chooses more or chooses less, but that he has greater or lesser abilities.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly! I explained this last time. “More intelligent” means someone who knows how to solve more problems or solve problems better. Okay? But there is a condition for that: that the ability to solve problems is the result of exercising judgment. When I say he is more intelligent, I’m not saying he has more judgment—that’s not the point. The condition for speaking at all about intelligence is that we are dealing with actions done through judgment. Once that condition is met, I can attribute intelligence to the act. Now when you ask how much intelligence to attribute, that isn’t about the degree of judgment, it’s about whether I succeed in solving many problems or few, or the quality with which I solve problems.

[Speaker D] My abilities. Right. So that’s not a challenge to the idea that if I say there is more or less of a certain thing, that doesn’t depend on judgment, on how much judgment. So doesn’t that show that intelligence is the second thing and judgment is maybe some necessary part but…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, not at all. This is exactly the whole point I’m making—precisely against that. All I’m saying is that you cannot speak about intelligence if this is an action that is not the result of judgment. Once the action is an action resulting from judgment, you can speak about intelligence. Okay, and now what do I say once I can speak about intelligence? I’ll say there’s high intelligence, low intelligence, medium intelligence, and so on. What will that depend on? Not on whether I exercised judgment—that’s just the prerequisite to enter the discussion. Once I’ve entered the field, now let’s see who wins. Okay? Whoever wins is the one whose judgment solves more problems than someone else’s. But having judgment is the condition for entering the game in the first place.

[Speaker D] Maybe it’s the condition that there be someone doing it. Judgment means there’s someone here, but whether he’s intelligent or not is about his abilities.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Again, we’re going back to… But what difference does it make? When I speak now about intelligence or a smart person, I mean a person who exercises smart judgment. Not a… not some computer that solves things “smartly,” say, where the computer has no awareness, right? It solves lots of problems, but only because its programmer programmed it. So I claim that the one who is smart there is the programmer, not the computer. The computer is a lump of iron, and its programmer is the smart one because he caused it to solve the problems. Why do I attribute that to the programmer and not to the computer? Because the one who exercised judgment there was the programmer, not the computer. Once the computer has been programmed, it does what it was programmed to do. If the programmer himself also acts like a computer—that is, mechanically—then what justification is there for attributing intelligence to him and not to the computer? Then he too isn’t intelligent; only the Holy One, blessed be He, who created him that way, is the intelligent one. Therefore I say that when I speak about intelligence, hidden behind that is the fact that we are talking about action by way of judgment.

[Speaker D] Okay, I just think that most people don’t feel the way the Rabbi says. I mean, even that programmer, if he were compelled, we would still call him intelligent; in our intuition that’s what intelligence is, those abilities. But anyway, I don’t want to say more.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, we can take a poll. I’m almost certain that most people feel the way I’m describing; they just don’t know how to conceptualize it. That’s why I’m working on this here for so long, also in the previous lectures, because my sense is that this intuition does exist in people. Everyone agrees—or not everyone, most people agree—with this definition, except that they don’t know how to conceptualize it, or they make a mistake because they think it’s just an illusion and really everything is deterministic, and so they shift their use of the term intelligence, it goes through a kind of metamorphosis, and now it turns into some mechanical notion. Meaning, how many actions you do. But I claim no: how many actions you do tells me how much intelligence you have, but the question whether you have intelligence depends on whether you are exercising judgment here or not. Right? Okay.

Yes. I brought the example of the difference between an infinitesimal and a point, right? A point has zero length—why? Because its dimension is not one. So what does that mean, that length is dimensional? No. But the condition for my speaking about length is that your dimension be at least one. Now what is your length? Whatever I measure—two centimeters, ten centimeters, a kilometer, fine. But clearly if you have no dimensions, one cannot speak about length. Once you have dimensions, we can begin talking. Then I assign different degrees of how much length there is, which length is more and which is less—that already follows from the ruler; I measure how much length it has. But unless you’ve entered the field—meaning, unless you have one dimension—you’re not in the game.

[Speaker D] But the one dimension itself is the same thing as length. The moment there is dimension, that means there is—it doesn’t matter what.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It means there is length, but it doesn’t tell you how much length there is.

[Speaker D] Yes, but it’s really the same thing. That’s different from intelligence, because here it’s really the same…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] thing, more or…

[Speaker D] less is still on the dimension.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s exactly the same as intelligence, exactly, there’s no difference at all. When you have length—when you have one dimension—that means you have length. Now you can ask how much length you have; let’s measure and see, one centimeter, two, three. With intelligence it’s one-to-one. If you act through judgment, that means you have intelligence. Now you ask how much intelligence you have—let’s see how many problems you know how to solve. Exactly the same thing, completely analogous. I’m saying this is a subtle point, and that’s why I keep repeating it even though we’re circling back all the time. It’s important to me that this be clear, even if the repetitions are irritating, because this is a very important point. It’s almost the focal point of the whole discussion that will come later. So it’s very important to me that this distinction be clear. You can disagree with it, but at least understand what my position is, or what I’m trying to claim.

Now I’m moving one step further. So what we’re really saying is that there is here some sort of creative thinking. Like the choice of divisibility of the number of I’s by 3, right? So this is some kind of creative choice that has no… In the scientific context, in philosophy of science, people often use the distinction between the context of discovery and the context of justification. What does that mean? When someone thinks of a certain theory, and suddenly invents a new theory, a new paradigm completely different from previous theories—Einstein, relativity, quantum theory, something that completely changed the accepted way of thinking until then—how did we get there? Usually people say we got there because there were certain facts that the existing theory didn’t explain; they challenged the existing theory. But that’s not enough, because the fact that the facts challenged the current theory means I need to find a new theory—but there are infinitely many new theories. How did I decide that this theory is the right one? So usually in philosophy of science they distinguish between the context of discovery and the context of justification.

The context of discovery is some kind of inspiration. How did I discover it? I don’t know, my grandmother appeared to me in a dream and told me that the theory of relativity is the correct theory and that Newton should be abandoned, okay? And because I love my grandmother so much, that’s what I decided to do. From the point of view of philosophers of science, there is no problem with such a description; everything is fine, it doesn’t invalidate the theory. Where do we test the theory? In the context of justification. If the theory has certain predictions and we run an experiment and put the theory to the test, do they get confirmed or not? Okay? Therefore the relevant plane for testing the theory is the plane of justification. You go to the lab and test it. The discovery doesn’t interest us. The discovery—everyone can draw inspiration from wherever he wants, from his grandmother, from looking at the scenery outside, from random thoughts that came into his head. That’s the context of discovery: a subjective, creative context, not interesting. That is, it’s not the context that interests us.

Now, maybe it isn’t interesting. The question of what interests us and what doesn’t is of course a matter of taste. It interests me very much, for example. But what I want to say is that what I said earlier is that a person’s intelligence ultimately focuses on the context of discovery, not on the context of justification. Because in the description I gave here, there is also intelligence in how to build an experiment and how to derive predictions that can be tested experimentally. There is certainly intelligence there. But I’m saying that in the simple description I gave here, intelligence is focused in the context of discovery. Why? Because in the context of discovery I need to choose a theory out of infinitely many possible theories. There are infinitely many theories that will explain all the facts, including the anomalies I discovered in the existing theory. But I want to choose the correct theory among them. Maybe the simplest one—that’s one of the criteria for theory choice. But I have some creative process in which I choose a certain theory out of all the many possibilities. This process is completely parallel to what I described earlier with divisibility by 3 of the number of I’s. Okay? It’s some kind of creative process. It seems to me that this theory will work.

Now we go to the lab and discover that in many cases it really does work. How can that be? I chose some theory out of the blue from among infinitely many possible theories. I would expect that never to work. There’s no chance it would work. What are the odds that in a random choice I happened to hit the correct theory? But it turns out that not infrequently it does work. Not always—sometimes it isn’t confirmed experimentally—but many times it is. What does that mean? Anyone who remembers my graph argument that I’ve repeated several times—it doesn’t matter, it’s that argument. The claim I want to make is that in the context of discovery, human intelligence is expressed. Because a person can hit upon the correct theory even though the facts don’t point to it. The facts point equally to the whole set of possibilities. Each of the possibilities can explain the facts, but only one of them is the correct possibility, and that will be revealed in future experiments, not from the information that exists now. So how can it be that in this “lottery” among all the possibilities I come up with the theory that later gets confirmed with a not-bad success rate? It means I exercised some sort of talent, intelligence. I chose the right theory. It’s like choosing the problem-solving tool, as with divisibility by 3. I choose the tool to solve the scientific puzzle I had—how to explain these facts. And that choice is eventually vindicated; it turns out that I chose well. What does that mean? That there is some kind of talent in that choice. It isn’t a lottery, it isn’t something random—

[Speaker C] but

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I exercised some sort of talent here.

[Speaker C] What was the judgment that the Rabbi exercised in order to choose that paradigm? Let’s take the example…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It seemed to me that this theory had a better chance of succeeding.

[Speaker B] But that’s

[Speaker C] similar to what you said earlier, that it’s simply intuition… wait, one at a time. Intuition is also forced on a person. Does the Rabbi choose intuitions?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No. No, it is not forced on a person. Who said it was?

[Speaker C] No, but again—before there was the intuition, we hadn’t yet foreseen it. Once that “messiah” arrived, it’s already here. So when was that judgment? There isn’t even a time window to do it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We’re returning to the same point for the fifth time in this lecture alone. I’m saying that choosing the tool is a choice that results from judgment. That’s all. You say no—that’s your right, no problem. But the interpretation I’m offering is a possible interpretation. If you claim it’s not a possible interpretation, then you’re simply mistaken. If you claim it’s not correct, then we have a dispute. Fine—you think not and I think yes. There’s no point returning to it every time; we keep coming back to the same thing. Yes, what did you want to ask?

[Speaker B] Regarding this—you say there is intelligence in discovery before justification. But I don’t clearly distinguish that discovery from what you called earlier things that “pop up,” which do not show intelligence.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There can be an interpretation—I said that’s the accepted interpretation in philosophy of science—that it popped into him. Meaning, therefore, this discovery is some sort of thing like his grandmother, just inspiration or something. It popped into him. That’s true—that is the accepted interpretation. And what I’m proposing is an alternative interpretation: he exercised judgment and reached the conclusion that this theory seemed more likely to work. And he succeeded; but the fact that it succeeds in quite a few cases means that if judgment is involved here, then intelligence has been revealed here. Of course, that’s according to the interpretation I’m proposing. Someone else will say no, it pops into you randomly, that’s not… fine, that is certainly one possible way to interpret it. I agree.

[Speaker F] Even if we go with the part where the Rabbi talks about judgment, in order for my judgment to be correct, don’t I also need to have stronger and more accurate intuition than other people, and don’t I also have to add education to that? Meaning, my judgment, which is still judgment, is made up of a few other things that I bring…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I completely agree. Completely agree. I definitely think people can improve their intelligence, improve their judgment, absolutely. Improve their intuition. Experience, knowledge, intellectual skill—these are things that are acquired too, not only innate. There is probably some innate component as well; I’m not a brain researcher and I’m not… but surely, it’s pretty clear that there is. But obviously there are also acquired components, unequivocally. Okay. And in general, skill isn’t something totally disconnected from knowledge. A lot of knowledge can certainly contribute to skill. The more fields you know, the more ideas you know, definitely the arsenal of tools from which your judgment can choose the relevant tool is a broader arsenal. So the chances are better that you’ll hit the right tool. So I absolutely agree that this is not a sharp distinction between education and skill.

[Speaker B] Rabbi, a few weeks ago you explained the distinction you made in basketball between LeBron James and Beckenbauer—you said that someone who plays basketball has this without thinking about things, kind of a natural overall vision, unlike Beckenbauer who had more conscious judgment. Okay. So why say about LeBron James that this is something that doesn’t involve more intelligence?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I’m not sure. I’m saying it’s an impression like that. I think the pace in basketball is much faster than in soccer, just as a general matter. In basketball things happen at a much quicker pace. I mean, within twenty-four seconds you finish your possession, right? You pass, suddenly see someone, you need to react very quickly. I think basketball is much more Kahneman’s System 1 than System 2. In soccer you have more time to plan. And Beckenbauer—again, I’m not an expert in soccer, nor in basketball, but even less in soccer—but Beckenbauer was known as someone who plans. He sits there, looks at the players, plans, he’s like an architect. So I’m saying as figures—again, I’m not getting into whether I’m right—I’m just saying as paradigms, I take Beckenbauer as an example of this and LeBron James as an example of that. Maybe I’m wrong, maybe in his case it’s conscious and maybe in his case too it wasn’t conscious. I don’t know. But I think as figures they illustrate this distinction well.

[Speaker B] Okay? What I meant was—my question was about basketball. True, it happens in seconds, but why not say that those reactions, which really probably don’t need any thought, are also like a discovery that popped into the person who discovered some theory? Right.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You’re returning to… That’s the question you asked before, and I’ll answer in the same way. Certainly, that is a possible interpretation, definitely.

[Speaker H] I want to ask a question. Okay. According to the interpretation of… if someone doesn’t agree with you… doesn’t agree with the third interpretation… then there is no intelligence…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, the question is what he defines as intelligence—a mechanical ability. In my view there is no intelligence in such a case, because I define intelligence as something that is the result of judgment. The accepted definition in artificial intelligence systems is not like that.

[Speaker H] Intelligence is the ability to solve problems,

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] however many problems, regardless of judgment or no judgment. On the contrary, I think most people in artificial

[Speaker H] intelligence don’t

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] think there is judgment; they choose one of the other interpretations.

[Speaker D] So according to that, a computer also has intelligence. Right. Artificial intelligence is entirely about dealing with the intelligence of computers. That’s what they do. Fine, so… Rabbi, one question. Can one also say that even according to the… there is a difference between a system that understands and a system that does not understand? Meaning, understanding is some sort of mental event, and because there is no such mental event, say, that we think computers don’t have, then there is no intelligence? That adds something else.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There are two parameters that intelligence requires—meaning, without them you can’t speak of intelligence. One of them is awareness, and the second is judgment. Both are required.

[Speaker D] Without awareness

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] there is nothing to talk about, in my opinion. Awareness without judgment—the practical difference is what happens when there is awareness but no judgment? Say a human being—after all, a human being has awareness. But someone who thinks that a human being acts deterministically, I claim that even if he has awareness, that is not intelligence. In other words, you need both.

[Speaker D] And can one also say at this stage that there are people—I don’t know, that’s how I see it—who say you need awareness but not necessarily judgment? Meaning, understanding—when I understand. Understanding is a mental event. Understanding is something internal; it’s not something external.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That is a very widespread view. I just want to say that this view is widespread in many cases because people are not aware that there is also a third alternative. And I think that therefore, for me, it is much more important to convince you that there is also a third interpretive alternative than to convince you that it is true. Why? Because in my opinion, once most people really understand that there is a third possibility, they will also understand that that is what they themselves think. In other words, they don’t think that way simply because they are not aware of this interpretive option. That’s what I claim.

And therefore, incidentally, in the book on choice, The Science of Freedom, I wrote this explicitly there. My goal is not to prove that a person has free choice, but to show that there is an interpretive possibility to interpret all the given data according to the paradigm of free choice. When I say that if people become convinced that there really is such an interpretive possibility, they will also adopt it. Because in the end, our intuition says that we have free choice. And people who don’t accept that do so because they think there is no possibility, that it contradicts the data. Therefore, as far as I’m concerned, it’s enough to show that there is such a possibility, that it does not contradict the data, and that’s it. From that point on, in my opinion, most people will adopt it.

[Speaker E] Wait, Rabbi—in your opinion, does determinism limit intelligence or cancel it entirely?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] One cannot speak about intelligence where the action is deterministic, yes, according to my definition. The accepted definition is not like that, but I’m saying again: in fact there is no intelligence there. Sorry, but anyone who uses that term that way is using it in a way I simply do not understand.

[Speaker E] Meaning that between a libertarian and a determinist it can’t be that both are intelligent people in the sense of scientific intelligence?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I’m saying again: a determinist can be a very intelligent person. Why? Because he is mistaken about determinism. Because he acts in a libertarian way; he does exercise judgment, he just doesn’t understand that he exercises judgment.

[Speaker E] Ah, I see. Fine, that’s a nice distinction.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. You’re correct that according to his own view, if he were right and all human beings behaved deterministically, then by my definition one could not speak about human intelligence. I’m only claiming that even though he is a determinist, he is simply wrong. That is, he does not grasp reality correctly. He does exercise judgment even though he denies it. Right? Okay.

Now what I want to say is, again…

[Speaker C] Wait, Rabbi, sorry again. Let me simplify myself. A scientist stands… the Rabbi said there can always be infinitely many possibilities to explain some fact in reality. And suddenly he latches onto some paradigm that can later also be justified. What is the cause that he chose it? He had infinitely many possibilities before him. There’s nothing here… how can one explain that?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Shmuel, I’ll draw your attention to one word you used. You asked what is the cause that he chose it, right?

[Speaker C] Or not cause—how does he explain to himself why he chose it?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He doesn’t explain it to himself. He simply understands that it is correct.

[Speaker C] “Understands” is something rational, so let him explain it to me.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Of course it’s completely rational. Explanation too is based on basic understandings, right? It’s completely rational. He says: this seems right to me, this seems less right to me. That’s all. Why? Why? There is no why. Why are you looking for causes? There are no causes.

[Speaker C] Even judgment has no causes, Rabbi?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. Not “even”—judgment has no causes. That’s the whole claim.

Fine, let’s continue for a moment. So what I want to say is that this creative thinking too—say, I mentioned earlier Kahneman’s System 1 and System 2; I think I already mentioned it in previous sessions. Kahneman talks about the fact that we often operate on autopilot, right? Things… the question of how to relate to the creative stages of our thinking is a very non-simple question. The two accepted conceptions, as I said earlier, are conceptions that say one of two things: either it’s a lottery, meaning it popped into me randomly—the context of discovery in philosophy of science and so on. The second possibility is that in the background there is actually a mechanical process going on, but I’m just not aware of it. Meaning, when I’m not aware of it, it simply happens faster. But when I drive a car, say, on autopilot, with no awareness, yet I do everything correctly—I signal on time, I overtake correctly, I do everything right, but without any awareness—I am not making decisions; these are actions that happen to many people, well-known phenomena. According to the interpretation I’m now citing, the claim is that you really are making decisions, you’re just not aware of it. Everything is always mechanical. There is nothing creative here. Everything is mechanical, it’s just mechanical and you are unaware of it, so it seems to you somehow that it arose out of the blue because you are not aware of the whole mechanical chain that led you to that conclusion.

With intuition, if you ask people what intuition is, many people will tell you—or this is the accepted approach in philosophy—most people will tell you that intuition is unconscious systematic thinking. Basically, you carried out mechanical logical thinking—from premises, by means of arguments, to a conclusion—you worked in a fully logical way, only it wasn’t conscious, and it reached your awareness only at the stage when you arrived at the conclusion. So that conclusion seems to you somehow like something from nothing: my intuition suddenly dropped a conclusion on me. So some interpret this as happening randomly—it just came up somehow. Another interpretation says: no, no, it’s completely mechanical, only the mechanical process was unconscious and reached my awareness only at the end. And I claim there is a third mechanism: I exercise judgment and I understand that… with intuition, now I’m not talking about autopilot… with intuition I exercise judgment and come to the conclusion that this seems more probable, more correct. There is no unconscious mechanical calculation behind it, or at least not necessarily. That’s the interpretive proposal I’m offering. And it’s not just chance either. You see? It’s exactly the same move I made regarding free choice in relation to values. Exactly the same thing.

So I hope all these repetitions I’ve made here—and really, we’ve repeated the same thing over and over—help explain and clarify what I’m trying to say here, because this really is the most important point for me in the whole move: understanding what judgment is and why it lies at the basis of the concept of intelligence, at least in my view.

Now there is an interpretation—I’m taking one step further now. When I arrive at some intuition, and again it somehow comes out to me… the Sages describe it too, right? Like a lost object that comes to a person when his mind is off it, when we have a Torah idea. The Sages say: how do we discover it, how do we resolve a strong difficulty? Like a lost object that comes to a person when his mind is elsewhere. That is basically intuition. And this thing has three interpretations, as I said earlier: random, unconscious mechanical, or creativity/intelligence. Okay?

[Speaker D] But that can’t be “when his mind is elsewhere.” Choice—that contradicts the Sages. “When his mind is elsewhere” can’t be choice, judgment.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m really not sure about that at all. But it doesn’t matter to me; I’m not bringing the Sages in order to rely on them.

Now there are many people who, when they encounter such a situation, will call it emotion. Here I return to Shmuel. What do I mean? Suppose I’m sitting over some difficult mathematical problem, some very difficult equation, for half a year sweating blood, and I reach the conclusion that the answer is eight. I’ve finished the calculations, I’ve done unbelievable calculations. Now think about someone else who sits over this equation and in a moment says, “Wow, it’s eight, the solution is eight.” I look at him in astonishment and say: how did you do that? I’ve been sweating blood over this for half a year—how did you do it in one second? So he says: I had a feeling it was eight. Okay? Very common statements, right?

Now I claim that the use of the term emotion in this context is not a successful use; it’s confusing. You can argue about the meaning of the concept, but that doesn’t interest me. I only want to argue that this usage is unsuccessful. Why? Because what he used there wasn’t really emotion; what he used there was intuition. What do I mean? Emotion is: I love someone and someone else does not love him. Do we have an argument? No. I’m built in such a way that I love him, and you’re built in such a way that you do not love him. When I say I love him, that’s a statement about me; it’s not a statement about him. And when you say you don’t love him, that’s a statement about you, not about the third person. Not necessarily. Wait, wait. If you’re claiming something about yourself and I’m claiming something about myself, then we have no argument, right? Because we’re not talking about the same thing. Emotions are not claims about reality. Emotions are some kind of internal state of the person. Therefore, if I have a different emotion from yours, then we have no argument at all.

Now if I don’t have a “feeling” that the answer is eight and you do have a “feeling” that the answer is eight, then you are right and I am wrong, correct? Because afterward I checked and saw that the answer really is eight. So that means your “feeling” was right. Or in other words, that “feeling,” in quotation marks, is a claim about the world. It can be judged in terms of true and false, unlike emotion in the emotional sense. I love, you don’t love. Okay? There is nothing to judge there in terms of true or false. If you love and I don’t love, then we have no argument. You’re not right and I’m not right and no one is wrong. There just is no right and wrong here. I feel this way, you feel differently, that’s all.

But regarding the question whether the solution is eight, the solution really is eight. In other words, the claim is a truth claim; a truth claim is a claim that is correct. What does that mean? It means that when I use the term “I had a feeling” when I say the solution is eight, the term emotion here is not successful, not fitting. Because in practice I judge your claim in terms of truth or falsehood. Emotions I do not judge. Emotions are simply what you feel—you feel it. So what I want to suggest here is: let’s not use the term emotion in that sense, in the sense of… instead of the term emotion I suggest the term intuition. Now I want to clarify that this isn’t just semantic synchronization. It’s not just, okay, use this word or that word, what difference does it make. True, it really doesn’t matter, only what I want to sharpen is that these are two different things. Choose whatever word you want to describe it. Call one X and the other Y, I don’t care. What matters to me is that we understand that these really are two different things. Emotion and intuition are two different things. One is judged in terms of truth or falsehood, and the other cannot be judged in terms of truth or falsehood.

In other words, I want to claim that when I speak about judgment and quantify it in terms of how much intelligence it involves—yes, that’s intelligence—I am basically claiming that this judgment or this intuition is not emotion. And what distinguishes it from emotion? Emotion is something inside me; it comes out of me either randomly or deterministically simply because that’s how I’m built. I love him not because I decided to love him; I love him because that’s how I’m built—love is aroused in me when I see him. Okay? Someone else is built differently, so he doesn’t love him. What do we assume? That emotion is a product of how I’m built. Okay? In that sense, intuition differs from emotion on precisely this plane. Because intuition, at least in my claim, is not a product of how I’m built—or not only a product of how I’m built—but also a product of the judgment I exercise, of what I decide. And that’s something that generally doesn’t happen with emotion. You can argue about it a bit, but I mean what I’m calling emotion here, okay?

And therefore I want to say that when you talk about emotions, and these confusions between intuition and emotions—you can argue semantically—but I’m saying this is harmful on the substantive plane, not on the semantic plane. Because once you call both of these things emotion, you simply fail to notice that these are two different things. Unless of course you really want to argue philosophically that they are not two different things, that what I call intuition is nothing but emotion, simply a product of my inner structure. But then you’ll have to explain to me why we judge it in terms of truth or falsehood, and why this so-called emotion, which is a product of my inner structure, actually hits the truth when I run an experiment.

[Speaker C] Right, right. So here, I’m prepared to let the Rabbi represent that position. I completely disagree that one cannot argue about emotions—of course one can. On the contrary, the only substantive arguments are about emotions. About facts there is nothing to argue—you prove, I prove. I think Lewis, in the book the Rabbi quoted, is really wrong. That’s not true; that is exactly where the argument is. When I say I love someone, that means there is something here that ought to be loved, that is worthy of love. I say the Land of Israel, the Holy One, blessed be He, the Torah—one ought to love them, and one ought to sacrifice for them. So when I say “I don’t feel that,” I’m disagreeing with you. I mean, I’m saying to that other person: I disagree with you.

[Speaker F] I support the Rabbi’s opinion, and because you keep coming back to this so many times, I have to tell you that already at the beginning when you started talking about emotion as coming from something intellectual, I really, really disagree with you. The fact is that people feel all kinds of emotions and act completely against reason, even when they know they are heading toward disaster, but the emotion leads them; therefore emotion has no…

[Speaker C] Did I say emotion comes from reason? I never said such a thing.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not at all. Wait, wait, just a second, let me try to answer differently. My claim is that if you call that thing emotion, then you’re simply making—not a mistake, it’s semantics—but the opposite confusion from the one I described. Instead of calling emotion intuition, you’re calling intuition emotion. What difference does it make? But still, you’re talking here about claims that can be judged in terms of truth or falsehood, okay? You’re talking about that. And once you are talking about that, what difference does it make what you call it? That is what I call intelligent actions. It doesn’t matter. So you call it emotion? Fine, good for you. It doesn’t matter. That’s what I want to claim, okay?

So I want to detach the discussion from the semantic discussion—whether I’m going from intuition to emotion or from emotion to intuition. What I only want to say is that there are two things. Two things. One thing is emotions in the spontaneous emotional sense that come out of me without judgment and without… simply because that’s how I’m built. And there is the—call it emotions if you like, I call it intuition—which is a result of judgment, which identifies something in reality. It identifies something in reality, and I can judge that identification in terms of truth or falsehood. Now if someone wants to call both of them emotion, good for him, but I say it’s simply bad terminology because it’s confusing. There are two different things here.

And therefore… but what matters to me is really not the terminology. Terminology is a tool. What matters to me is to claim that there are really two different things here. That’s the point.

Well, today I really decided that from now on I’ll try not to allow so many interventions from listeners, because it disrupts the continuity. So with everyone’s forgiveness, I’m going to try to limit the participation a bit. You can ask, but if I think it’s appropriate, I’ll stop it. Today I didn’t stick to that decision because I feel it was very important to me that this point come out clearly. Because it’s a very essential point. So I’m already asking your forgiveness and announcing that the policy—at least from my side, I hope I’ll stick to it—will change. I’ll allow less interruption because it’s hard for people to follow like this.

[Speaker C] Rabbi, I completely, completely agree with what the Rabbi said at the end. I think it’s a real problem in Israel. I hear it at the university too. You hear lectures in the United States or in Europe, and you hear lectures in Israel. There the lecturer always finishes; nobody interrupts him at all, and he leaves time for questions, and then that can even become an important part of the lecture because he goes deeply into the questions. Here, we Israelis—like me and everyone else—interrupt in the middle with questions that divert attention, and that really damages the whole flow. I completely support this. It’s just a bad habit everywhere. I haven’t seen even one place in Israel where they let the lecturer finish his remarks, especially when he’s an important lecturer and the Rabbi is really saying important things.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m saying a question here and there is fine, and of course if someone doesn’t understand something—not because he wants to argue—then that’s okay. But if things repeat themselves or things that divert the discussion, then I’ll allow myself to stop them a bit. Okay, that’s the note. Okay, if there are other questions or comments, then…

[Speaker D] Rabbi, yes—regarding what the Rabbi said about emotion and intuition and all that. Maybe one can just say that a person has feelings, okay, and feelings exist on different levels? Just as we understand that pain is different from love, there are several kinds of mental events that we feel—understanding and so on. It’s understood that pain is obviously not love and not that.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s exactly what I’m saying—call it whatever you want, all the rest is terminology.

[Speaker G] Rabbi, in this lecture you’ve only presented the picture. You still haven’t convinced us why one way is true or truer than the others.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Nor am I going to do that.

[Speaker G] Ah, not even later on? Okay.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] As I said, all I’m trying to offer is my interpretive option. My assumption—and my hope too, but it’s also an assumption—is that once people understand that there is such an interpretive option, I no longer need to convince them, because that is what they think. They’re just not aware of this interpretive option, and therefore they run into difficulties and retreat from it and think something else. One needs to understand that with starting points it is very hard to bring arguments for and against. Just as with free choice, I don’t know how to bring arguments in favor of free choice. All I did in The Science of Freedom was to show that this option exists. My assumption is that once I convince people that the option exists, the rest comes by itself. They retreat from it only because they don’t think it exists or because they can’t conceptualize it.

[Speaker G] Yes, but for intuition, for example, you have the graph argument and so on, where there is supposedly a statistical proof?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, correct. Okay. Well then, that’s all for today. Sabbath peace. Thank you very much.