Between Religion and Morality: A Debate Between Rabbi Michael Abraham and Professor Shalom Tzadik

[Speaker B] Hello everyone.

[Speaker A] First of all, let’s say welcome to Rabbi Michael Abraham. I’ll note already at the beginning of the conversation that we said we’d go without titles in this discussion, no need to say professor, no need to say rabbi. I’ll say that for me, I know Rabbi Michael Abraham as Rabbi Miki, and I imagine that’s what will come out spontaneously, so we’ll go with that. The topic of today’s discussion will revolve around religion, Jewish law, and morality. I imagine a lot of points will come up around those things from the opening remarks. So we’ll continue from the opening remarks, go through all the main topics, and in the end move to questions. So we have Professor Shalom Tzadik and Rabbi Michael Abraham — that’s the last time I’ll mention the titles — and we’ll let Rabbi Miki begin with his opening remarks, around 10 minutes, but we won’t be strict about time as long as everyone is roughly on time. So please.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] All right, first of all, good evening. I’m happy to be here, and happy that you’re here too. As for Jewish law and morality, I’ll really try to give some short summary of my position on the matter. I think it’s not a standard position, but it seems to me to be the correct one in terms of the nature of things. The tension between Jewish law and morality comes up around all kinds of questions, some current and some less current. There was the story with the chief military rabbi when he was appointed, surrounding some responsum he had given earlier — Rabbi Karim — in response to some student who had asked whether it is permissible to rape captive women. And he said that according to Jewish law, yes, because the Torah spoke in response to the evil inclination and so on. Then when he was appointed chief military rabbi, an uproar broke out — the press and so on, apologies, all kinds of explanations and clarifications — and my feeling was that they didn’t really provide an adequate answer. And the big question that troubles me in that context — even before that event, of course — was not what I answer secular critics, but what I say to myself. In other words, the question is whether I am really prepared to accept that the halakhic system, the Torah that I believe in and am committed to, relates this way to captive women in that case, or in various other situations. I don’t know, you can talk about the laws of a mamzer — his parents did what they did, and therefore he suffers all his life. I don’t know, a priest whose wife was raped — they have to separate, and so on. There are all kinds of inequalities between man and woman, various problems where somehow Jewish law seems not to fit what we at least today perceive as moral principles. I think this was also always true. Maybe not on the scale of today, but it was always true. I will qualify that a bit and say that these are actually not all that many cases. In other words, there is considerable overlap, but there are quite a few cases in which this tension arises, and the question is what to do with it. Here one can speak of several main directions that one finds among people who discuss this issue.

One direction is the blunt direction, you could say, which says: morality does not interest me. In other words, from my point of view there is Jewish law, there is Torah, whatever the Holy One, blessed be He, said is what obligates. Everything else, in Leibowitz’s language, is an atheistic category. That does not interest me as a believer. Now, one has to understand that Leibowitz himself probably did not mean that. There is an article by Goldman on this issue. Because he really wants to say that this is an atheistic category, but that does not mean it does not obligate me. It is not part of Torah, but I am obligated to it as a human being. Beyond being a believing Jew, I am also a human being, and as a human being I am obligated to it. He had no small number of moral rebukes, and it is hard to accept that he was not committed to morality. So that was not the meaning of his statement that morality is an atheistic category. But that is just a question of clarifying his thought; it is not my issue here. In any case, when I speak here about morality as an atheistic category, I mean it in a blunter sense than the one I described in Leibowitz. Morality is not interesting; what matters is only Jewish law.

A contrary conception, at the completely opposite pole apparently, is a conception one can find in Rabbi Kook in many places. I am far from expert in his writings, but here and there I saw it: basically everything is morality. In other words, the point of Jewish law is to arrive in the best possible way at moral conduct, at moral guidance. In places where we do not see a fit, or where it seems to us to be something immoral, the problem lies only with us. In the end, true morality is what Jewish law says, and we simply have misunderstandings here and there. That is the point. In certain places he would apparently say that one should adopt the interpretation that fits our morality, but where there is a clash — again, I am not pretending to represent his overall position because I’m not knowledgeable enough — these things are written in several places I saw. That is the opposite view. But one has to understand that in certain respects it is very close to the first view, because in the end what it also says is that one must obey Jewish law; it just claims that Jewish law is the instrument that gets me as close as possible to moral principles. So in the final analysis there will be some differences here and there, because he will want to fit Jewish law to natural morality, but it is not all that far off. It is not such an opposite pole from the first view, at least in practical bottom-line terms.

Neither of these two views appeals to me; they do not answer my own feelings. The view I attributed to Rabbi Kook — and again, I am attributing it, never mind for the moment whether I’m right — for me these are just labels for the two positions. The view I attributed to Rabbi Kook is really a view that in a certain sense somewhat empties morality of its content. Because in the final analysis what it says is that Jewish law itself is the line that directs me to moral behavior, and if I don’t understand, then apparently that is my misunderstanding. Bottom line, what he is telling me is that I must behave according to what Jewish law dictates. In other words, what I understand in my intuition as moral is all very nice so long as Jewish law doesn’t say otherwise. But if Jewish law says otherwise, then what I understand is apparently wrong. So de facto he is identifying morality with Jewish law, and I don’t know what that leaves of this category called morality. It is just some declaration saying that behind Jewish law there is really morality. Fine — but in practice you are telling me that I should act according to what Jewish law prescribes.

Maybe I’ll give an example that sharpens the discomfort I feel with this. Rabbi Dessler writes that falsehood, in a place where it is permitted — one may alter the truth for the sake of peace, and so on, the famous cases that appear in the Talmud — is not falsehood at all. Because falsehood is something one is forbidden to say. But something one is permitted to say is not falsehood. Now, that outrages me. It outrages me even though practically what difference does it make? He too says that it is forbidden to lie unless there are places where Jewish law permits it. What outrages me is the conceptual point, because the concept of falsehood is a concept that has an independent existence beyond Jewish law. You can say that in certain places it is permissible to lie, but don’t tell me that it is not a lie. In a certain sense I feel that Rabbi Kook does something similar to morality. Again, not completely — there are places where he does fit Jewish law, or interpret Jewish law, in a way that fits morality — but where there is some tension he cannot overcome, he says, all right, then apparently this is the ultimate morality. And that basically means that he empties this category of morality of its content. That is why I am uncomfortable with it.

What I propose as an alternative — and I really am making this short — is as follows. I’ll put it in very brief form. There are three categories into which one can divide Jewish law. There are moral laws that fit moral principles: “You shall not murder,” “Honor your father and your mother,” and so on. There are non-moral laws. These are laws that do not concern morality, neither for better nor for worse. It is forbidden to eat pork, things like that, which have nothing to do with morality. And there are laws that are anti-moral. These are the examples I gave at the beginning, where there is this tension between Jewish law and morality.

I actually want to begin with the non-moral laws. The non-moral laws tell us that Jewish law strives to realize values that are not only moral values. Call them religious values, spiritual values, values of holiness — whatever you call it does not matter — but values that are not moral values. They are not values that contribute to a proper society, a proper person in the moral sense, not in the spiritual sense; in other words, not values that we would ordinarily classify as moral. Okay, it seems pretty clear to me that Jewish law has an arsenal of values broader than the moral arsenal. So there are additional values there.

Now, once we have already reached that conclusion, the third category — the places where Jewish law is anti-moral, that is, where it clashes with morality — should no longer really trouble us. They should not trouble us because what we have here are two outlooks. From a halakhic standpoint it is obligatory; from a moral standpoint it is forbidden. Let us return to the beautiful captive woman. Suppose that from the standpoint of Jewish law it is permissible to rape a captive woman. For the purposes of the discussion, I am not going into the details now, but let us assume for the sake of discussion — and this is the accepted view — that according to Jewish law it is permissible to rape a captive woman. The Torah spoke in response to the evil inclination. Okay? What does that mean? It means nothing on the moral level. It means that there is no halakhic prohibition against doing it. But on the moral level it is still a horrific act, and it should be forbidden with the full severity of the matter — but on the moral level, not on the halakhic level. And when I say that Jewish law permits or forbids something, I claim that this says nothing whatsoever about the Torah’s moral view. Nothing whatsoever. In other words, there is a categorical difference between Jewish law and morality. Independence — these are two completely independent categories. That is basically my claim.

An example: there is a debate whether to eat chocolate or not eat chocolate, an example I have used many times. One person says eat chocolate because it is tasty. Another says do not eat chocolate because it is unhealthy. Who is right? Both are right. It is both tasty and unhealthy — let’s say in certain amounts it is unhealthy and it is also tasty. So what do you do? What you have to do is decide whether taste overrides health or vice versa. In other words, the question is what the decisive principle is. But even if I decide to eat the chocolate, that does not mean that the chocolate is healthy. It is not healthy; I only decided to prefer taste over health. If I decide not to eat the chocolate, that does not mean the chocolate is not tasty. It is tasty, but I prefer health over considerations of taste. In exactly the same way, when I say that these are two perspectives from which to look at the act — from a health perspective it is like this, from a hedonistic enjoyment perspective it is like that — okay? I claim the same thing regarding Jewish law and morality. There are two perspectives. From the halakhic perspective, with the beautiful captive woman there is no prohibition, and from the moral perspective it is absolutely forbidden. Okay? And now you have to decide what overrides what. In this case it is only a permission, not an obligation on the halakhic level, so I think it is much easier to decide what overrides what. But on the principled level, even if it were an obligation, you would have to decide what overrides what. But this is Jewish law and that is morality, and they are two independent categories.

I’ll finish — I have a few more seconds. The third category, which is a bit surprising, is the laws that are moral. I claim that they too are not connected to morality. In other words, these laws mean that the spiritual goals are achieved by not murdering, by honoring parents, and so on. By coincidence — or not by coincidence — this also achieves moral goals. Okay. But that fit is what I will call incidental. I do not think it is really incidental, but that would require elaboration. Still, it is a fit between two independent categories, and in some laws a fit emerges. Fine. In others it does not; in some it does. But even that fit does not point to moral values that the Torah teaches us. Morality we get from our inner feelings, from our intuition, just as every person in the world gets his morality. I do not recognize the concept of a Jewish morality at all. Morality is not Jewish.

[Speaker A] Good. Before you finish, I’d be glad if you could briefly address what you think the source of morality is, and whether morality is objective, just so we can ground our discussion.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That is a very complicated question; I can’t say it in a few seconds. I’ll put it this way: I am not a moral pluralist. I am a moral monist. In other words, I think there is one moral truth, but that does not mean it is necessarily in my possession. In other words, I may be mistaken. We have to argue, look, persuade — maybe others will persuade me, or maybe they won’t, that I’m mistaken. But I do believe in the existence of moral truth. In other words, I am not a pluralist on the moral level. I am even a moral realist. In other words, I think moral principles are facts, in certain senses. But I say for our purposes: even the moral laws, that fit is an incidental fit. In the end, when I want to know what is moral, I don’t look at the Torah, I don’t look at any sources of any kind. I look inward and try to understand what morality really demands of me, what is permitted and what is forbidden. In that sense, my conclusions are conclusions like those of any other non-Jew in the world, in principle. We are in a different environment, so of course we will have disagreements, just as different Jews have disagreements. But in principle, the methodology I use is the methodology of a non-Jew. In other words, I do not think the sources make any difference on this issue.

[Speaker A] Okay, thank you very much.

[Speaker B] So thank you very much. I’ll actually begin with a point on which we agree. There is indeed a point on which we agree: morality is objective and not pluralistic. And overall I also agree with a relatively small qualification that I’ll mention at the end regarding Jewish morality; in my opinion too there is no such thing as Jewish morality in the sense of a morality binding Jews alone. Rather morality is a kind of universal thing. On that too I agree.

What I do not agree with — and that is the issue we are discussing — is the relation between morality and Jewish law. And I’ll explain the position I support. I assume that according to the classification Rabbi Miki made — yes, I can’t resist, I’ll try to say Miki a few times. Miki, Miki, that’s okay. But according to the division Miki made, I am somehow in the Rabbi Kook position, which I see as the position of Maimonides. And I won’t speak about Rabbi Kook because I really don’t know anything about him, but I’ll present my interpretation of Maimonides, which is also what I think, regardless of whether Maimonides really said it or not; we won’t get into that argument now. In my view, the only goal of Jewish law is to arrive at correct morality. In other words, I don’t think it has any goal besides that, and for two main reasons.

One reason is that I think every other possibility can be ruled out, though that is the smaller problem. In other words, I don’t think there are spiritual goals that can conflict with morality, or indeed I don’t think there are spiritual goals at all, and I also don’t think there is any reason why God would command us to do something that is not good for us — He does not need us. Therefore I see Jewish law as a mechanism built by prophets who found divine truth through their intellect, and cast it into a Torah whose purpose is ultimately to benefit human beings, and that is its only purpose.

Now, are there tensions sometimes between things? I think there are tensions of two types, and it is very important to distinguish between them so that we can deal with them, I think, in a focused way. But before the tensions, I want to state the rule: in my opinion, on this very issue morality is the best proof that Judaism is the true religion, because social norms and ritual norms build different moral conceptions, and Judaism — religious Judaism, in practice — in my opinion has had tremendous success in what every person can see. Here I have an Aristotelian approach that is a bit different from modern morality; I’ll say more in a moment. But in things like the integrity of the family, loyalty to the group, responsibility, and things like that, I think Judaism gets very, very high marks because of the commandments.

And if we deal with, or refer to, the categories Rabbi Michael Abraham brought up: on this issue, I think there are commandments that are clearly moral, and I think they are indeed moral, and they do not come as sheer command. In other words, honoring parents is, in my opinion, a completely moral commandment. Therefore, even in the classic case of whether a son who is a dentist may treat his father, since according to Talmudic categories that counts as striking one’s father and mother, it seems obvious to me that he may. Because today, in the end, it is clear that giving his father a root canal is more a matter of honoring parents than of wounding him through a root canal. So I think these commandments are clearly part of morality.

As for commandments that are non-moral, Maimonides discusses them at length, and this is really the great innovation, and it convinced me a great deal — probably even before I read Maimonides, and that is why I was convinced by him. The ritual commandments, like fringes, the Sabbath, and so on, food, kosher laws, and things like that — their purpose is to create a framework for the moral commandments that are at the core of Judaism. In other words, if, practically speaking, the goal today in 2026 for a student is to find a partner at the university and not just live with her for a year or two and so on, but to find someone and build a home with her, then the fact that he has a beard and sidelocks helps a lot, because it is a social marker whose whole purpose is to encourage me to behave in a certain way. Kosher laws are very similar. I even think that in this respect this is quite close to the plain meaning of the Torah. Fringes are the same, prayer is the same — the point is to think about the world, about the purpose of life, about how we carry it out. All these things, in my opinion, all the ritual commandments, function as a framework for those commandments that are at the core. And the problem is that when you remove the framework, within a generation or two or three the core also falls apart. That is what happened in Europe, for example: they removed religious ritual, and in the end they practically abolished the concept of the family almost entirely. It does take a little time, because moral norms take a little time to change; that is a general rule.

Now what about the commandments that are anti-moral? And here I agree with Rabbi Michael Abraham that these are definitely the things that need to be addressed. What about the anti-moral commandments? I think they fall broadly into two groups. There are commandments whose purpose, when the Torah gave them, was to operate within the moral rules of the time. For example, I think there are two good examples of this that were not mentioned, and they solve the other examples. The example I think is best — one in which all of us in one way or another end up violating what is written in the Torah — is the issue of debt remission in the Sabbatical year. Since everyone puts money in the bank, and the bank lends out the money we put there, we are all in one way or another violating the prohibition of interest. Now the solution — a very old one, because the problem is very old — was to construct the system not by abolishing Torah law, heaven forbid, because that would damage the Torah’s prestige in the eyes of the people — that is Maimonides in Guide 3:41 according to Ibn Kaspi’s interpretation — but by bypassing the problem through the prosbul.

That, I think, is how the Torah dealt with everything that was once correct, but in the end either because of technological change — which is the issue with the prosbul — or because in specific areas reality could be advanced toward something more correct, which I’ll mention briefly in the case of polygamy, which is perfectly clearly permitted in the Torah. On that Rabbi Jacob Anatoli, one of Maimonides’ students, says in Malmad HaTalmidim that here too the Torah spoke in human language. He also adds drinking wine — apparently we still haven’t reached the stage of avoiding drunkenness, but with God’s help maybe one day we will. So in these areas, Rabbi Jacob Anatoli says — and I agree with him — that the Torah dealt with an earlier reality. It tried to improve it through the marriage contract, through the Torah’s stories showing that polygamy is not good. But in these areas it ultimately succeeded in solving the problem by means of rabbinic prohibitions: Maimonides prohibiting the concubine, Rabbeinu Gershom prohibiting polygamy.

And I think the same regarding, for example, the case of a priest whose wife was raped. Today the solution, which is quite practical and fairly similar to the prosbul in terms of a workaround, is to say that the husband does not accept the wife’s testimony, and so on. I think that almost every problem that is a general problem has a solution. Therefore, the halakhic system of 2026 is fairly compatible with what I think is correct morality. Here an important comment must be made: not every whim of progressive morality is correct. For example, I think — and one can argue about this too — that family structures that are not a father and mother and their shared biological offspring are not morally successful. And there is no reason to compromise on that, because it is a bad thing. It is not bad because it is not written in the Torah; it is written in the Torah because it is a bad thing, because it breaks down society, as we see for example in Europe.

What does still exist in 2026 — and here I think this is a real point and therefore it should be brought up — is another problem. As Aristotle says in the Ethics, and Maimonides in Guide 3:34 — Aristotle in Book Five of the Ethics — there are laws that are good for the general public, and they are good and they work and they work wonderfully, and for ninety-four percent of the population they are excellent laws. But for a particular individual they are a catastrophe. For example, the case I bring because I think it is important and happens often, so it is worth raising, is a person who becomes religiously observant at age thirty-five while his wife is secular and she does not want to immerse. In that case, in my opinion, he is obligated to continue what he was doing with her before. Because in the end the purpose of the laws of menstruation is to bring peace in the home by preserving sexual tension between the spouses; that is already written in the Talmud. And if the goal clashes with the means, then the goal overrides the means. In such cases, of course, one should not, cannot, and ought not change Jewish law, but in the specific case I don’t know whether the man will find a rabbi strong enough, brave enough, or with a sufficiently correct moral outlook to tell him it is permitted — I assume he would feel better if he did — but if not, and it is certainly possible that not, then I think in that case the person should make an independent moral judgment and decide to violate this rule so as not to destroy his marriage and leave his wife. That is worth raising, and in my opinion it shows well the relation between morality and Jewish law. Again: provided that morality is based on correct values. Correct values, I think, ultimately derive not from prevailing social views — because there are prevailing views that are terribly bad, there are terrible societies and good societies — but from what fits the structure of human nature, which in my opinion, and here I agree with Aristotle, needs stability more than it needs freedom, and also from the issue of society — how to make society function.

Now, violating Jewish law is certainly a bad thing, because it may break society apart. But sometimes there are things that are definitely worse. In such cases, it is better for a person to follow the moral position — again, provided it is a correct view. And here I’ll add one final point: I think Jewish law serves us as a compass, so that we do not follow every moral whim of the changing progressive world, which in my opinion sees as moral obligations, or morally acceptable things, things that are in fact very bad. For example, a person who falls in love with a new woman after being married to his wife for forty years — in the progressive Western world it seems completely fine to say, “I don’t love you anymore, bye.” In my opinion that is a terrible disaster, one that can really destroy both individuals and the collective in that Western world.

[Speaker A] Yes, thank you, Shalom. You really touched here on a lot of issues, so I think we can let Rabbi Miki respond. It seems to me ten minutes should be enough; we can also make it relatively free-flowing, but I do want to give Rabbi Michael Abraham his ten minutes, then Shalom, and after that we’ll make it more open.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Well, I don’t know if ten minutes — I don’t think I’m going to give a speech here. I have various comments that came up for me while Shalom was speaking. First point — and not the main one, but I’ll start with it — is that one has to be careful not to confuse correlation with causation. Statisticians often have jokes about that. And my feeling is — not just a feeling, a fact — that even if one sees that Jewish law leads to moral improvement, that in itself does not indicate that the purpose of Jewish law is moral improvement. Okay? In other words, the fact that there is correlation between Jewish law and moral improvement does not mean that the relation is causal. There are correlations that do not stem from causation. Therefore, the mere fact that we point out — which, by the way, I also do not accept, at least not fully — but let’s assume I did accept it, that halakhic behavior leads to a more moral society or person, that would not mean that this is the purpose of Jewish law. In other words, the purpose of Jewish law could be something else, and it might also make us more moral. Okay? That is the first point.

Second point: as I said earlier, I do not think Jewish law makes us more moral. Maybe in certain specific areas that Shalom mentioned earlier — family structure and its stability and so on; I disagree with him about some of what he said — but family structure and the like, I think it is pretty clear that a religious society in general, not specifically Jewish law but a religious society in general, is more stable than a secular society. You called it progressive; not all of them are progressive, but more stable. But a non-Jewish religious society is also more stable. In that sense I do not think this says anything about the purpose of Jewish law, and not even in the sense of correlation — causation I already mentioned earlier — not even in the sense of correlation. Not to mention that in many moral respects I do not see Jewish law advancing us at all. In other words, not in the area of family stability and the like, but in other aspects: action for the good of the collective, not to mention action for the large abstractions — the universe, climate, I don’t know, animal suffering, the more distant things — which is indeed a left-wing concern. But also on the plain of interpersonal morality. When I look at Haredi society, for example, where there are of course very beautiful things in interpersonal relations — free-loan societies and so on, we all know that — but the society as a whole is distorted, crooked, deeply flawed morally, I’m trying to watch my language, and I do not see that great halakhic strictness leading them to improvement. On the contrary: in certain respects my feeling is that halakhic strictness is perhaps even part of the reason for the moral deficiency that developed there. So I am not prepared to accept, even on the factual level, the correlation Shalom spoke of between commitment to Jewish law and moral progress. That is the second point.

Third point, and the most fundamental: I had not fully appreciated this before, I had heard it a little, but it seems to me that our disagreement does not even start there. Our disagreement begins with the question of what Jewish law is. Before the question whether Jewish law fits morality or does not fit morality, and what one does when there are conflicts — what is Jewish law to begin with? Because for me, Jewish law was not shaped by prophets and the like — well, it was shaped by prophets, but in the sense in which at least I understood you to be presenting it. Okay, so I think that is the most basic disagreement, and because that disagreement is problematic, it affects our issue in two ways. Because first of all, if the sages really shaped Jewish law, then frankly it doesn’t interest me in the slightest. In other words, I do not worship the sages and they do not particularly interest me. Nor am I a great believer in their superior ability or moral understanding compared to mine or others’. For me, the authority of the sages in the Talmud — after the Talmud there is no authority at all, but within the Talmud itself — the authority of the sages is authority on the formal plane. Not because they understood deep things that no normal person understands, how to revive the dead and all kinds of folktales of that sort. I do not believe in their moral insights more than in those of any other person. I do think they were good people and that they wanted to do good and that they were Torah scholars and transmitted to us the halakhic tradition. But if they were the source of the moral conception—

[Speaker B] You froze a bit.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If the sages are the source of the moral conceptions that shaped Jewish law, I’m not there. In other words, then I am not committed to that Jewish law. For me, Jewish law obligates me because it is the command of the Holy One, blessed be He. The sages shaped it because that is part of how Jewish law operates, and that is perfectly fine. But this is a point that to me is very important.

[Speaker B] Rabbi Michael, part of what you said got cut off.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, I’ll say it again. I don’t know what got cut off, but I’ll say: if the sages shaped Jewish law for moral purposes, then I do not believe in or feel committed to that Jewish law. Therefore the argument begins at very, very fundamental points. I am not committed to it because I do not worship the sages but the Holy One, blessed be He, and I am not committed to it because I also do not believe in the sages’ abilities in these areas. I do not think they understand morality better than I do. Or yes — not necessarily than I do.

And one final point I want to make in this context is that the dispute over what Jewish law is affects the question of how I formulate Jewish law. Because, for example, the Talmud says that we do not expound the reason for the verse. There is a dispute between Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda, and we rule that we do not expound the reason for the verse. Now, as I understood at least what Shalom writes, Shalom—

[Speaker A] I see it just fine. You—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Can you see Rabbi Michael?

[Speaker B] Yes, yes.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I think your connection isn’t so good.

[Speaker B] Because you also freeze here and there.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t see him, I don’t know why. Right. So the point is, the last problematic point — what?

[Speaker A] One second, Shalom. Let Rabbi Miki finish what he was saying, and at the end he can briefly repeat it if needed.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What I’m saying is that there are halakhic sources which for me are foundation stones, meaning they are binding. And my interpretations will be made within their framework. And my feeling is that the interpretation Shalom suggested earlier is not committed to those sources. Because, for example, when it is written that the halakhic ruling is that we do not expound the reason for the verse, my feeling is that all Shalom is doing is precisely expounding the reason for the verse. Okay? Because he says, for example, I don’t know, with prosbul or the laws of menstruation or things like that, that they only came in order to settle or improve the home and the relations between the spouses, and therefore there are all sorts of implications. That is expounding the reason for the verse, which from the halakhic standpoint of accepted legal ruling is out of the question. So we have a dispute here that lies much earlier, before we even begin talking about the question of the relation between Jewish law and morality. In other words, the question is what Jewish law is, who defines Jewish law. Because without clarifying that, I think we are speaking about different concepts, so there is no point even arguing.

[Speaker B] There is a point in arguing about that.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, yes, that is what I’m saying. But to argue about Jewish law and morality when the concept of Jewish law is serving us in different meanings — that is a rather barren argument.

[Speaker A] Ah. So before we move to Shalom, I’d be glad if Rabbi Miki could just briefly address the source of the commandment and what Jewish law is in your view, in about a minute, and then we’ll move to Shalom.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. I don’t know what you didn’t hear. For me, Jewish law is what was given by the Holy One, blessed be He, at Sinai. The sages did not formulate Jewish law; they certainly interpret it, shape it, no question. Ninety-nine percent of the details we have are the result of later interpretation and development, without question. But those interpretations are interpretations of the word of God that was given at Sinai. They are not interpretations meant to achieve moral goals. And not only is that not their motivation — it is the opposite of their motivation. The sages did not come at all to achieve that, not at all. All they wanted was to understand what Jewish law says. The moral question is a separate question, and sometimes there will be tension between them — fine, then we have to see how to deal with that tension. That is regarding the very conception of Jewish law.

[Speaker B] Great, I think I got it. I’ll respond, I think, to the main point, because the main point is what you brought up at the end. In the end I’ll speak about a few other things afterward, but I think the main issue you raised is indeed the issue on which we probably disagree, and it is the central one. In other words, let’s put it this way: what was or wasn’t at Sinai does not interest me very much. In other words, if there is someone who agrees with the interpretation of Rabbi Moses of Narbonne and Rabbi Yom Tov ben Shem Tov the Second on the Guide of the Perplexed — and it is certainly possible that that is Maimonides’ intention — whether yes or no, it does not really matter. Let us discuss the ideas themselves. Even if there was nothing there and it is all allegory, I think what matters is that it is true. In other words, what matters to me is not divine authority; what gives the word of God its authority is that it is true.

Now, I would not say that human beings shaped Jewish law in a completely general sense, because I think they found divine truth — divine truth accessible to every person. God, in the sense that He does not change, does not turn to human beings and tell them stories. Human beings apprehend Him, grasp Him, understand Him. And if they are prophets or sages, then afterward by means of the imaginative faculty they write down their ideas through laws whose purpose is to educate the people. Therefore, on this issue I’ll say something extreme, but I think basically true: when I read Maimonides, or Aristotle, or another law book of one sort or another, in the end I examine whether it is true — morally true, factually true, true with respect to all these things. I think Jewish law actually passes that test excellently. In other words, not every individual statement in the Talmud, with some of which I agree more, some of which I interpret allegorically, and with some of which I have no problem saying there were many sages and with some I agree and with some I do not. If I remember correctly — and maybe I’m wrong, I’m not as expert in the Talmud as Rabbi Michael is — but if I’m mistaken, I think there is a dispute in the Talmud over this question whether we expound the reason for the verse or not, and certainly there were sages in their generation who did expound it. Certainly Maimonides did, and for me that is enough. Now, what I think on this issue is that in Maimonides there is discussion before the ruling is decided, and therefore it is appropriate to rely on one position or the other, and that is not, in my opinion, a problem. What? Maimonides does that in the Guide of the Perplexed — that is basically—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maimonides ruled explicitly that we do not expound the reason for the verse. He ruled it explicitly.

[Speaker B] He ruled it in the Mishneh Torah. In the Guide, in Part Three, 26 through 49, he is dealing with something else. In other words, there is something you say to people—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He explains the laws, but he does not rule based on the reason for the verse. “We do not expound the reason for the verse” does not mean that we do not explain the reasons for the laws; it means that we do not take them into account when issuing a ruling.

[Speaker B] Fine, I don’t think we should get into an argument over Maimonides. I think, for example, it seems we can—

[Speaker A] Shalom, finish your point. It seems that for communication reasons it’s better if we do this a bit more orderly.

[Speaker B] Yes, yes, fine. So what I’m saying on this issue is that in my opinion I have no problem saying that a large part of what is written in the Talmud was said for educational reasons, and even this whole issue of whether one expounds the reason for the verse or not was meant, in my opinion, for ordinary people, for the masses, for whoever it may be. Therefore I do not think that was even the true intention of those who said it. One can say that this is a certain trick, and I think that if it is right then it is a nice trick. In the end, if it reaches correct conclusions — and therefore on this issue I think the sole purpose of Jewish law is to reach morality. Therefore there is nothing besides that. In other words, I also think every other possibility can be rejected — both a conception of God who turns to human beings and tells them stories, and a conception of God who gives laws unrelated to morality, and in my opinion also unrelated to supernatural performances, which certainly can be problematic whether they exist or not. Therefore, in my opinion this can be the only purpose of morality — of Jewish law.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Your connection isn’t so good; you keep freezing.

[Speaker B] So that’s morality. Now why does Jewish law meet the criteria?

[Speaker A] The internet isn’t great.

[Speaker B] Can you see me now? Yes, I don’t understand it, this… Yes, now, now can you see me? Yes.

[Speaker A] Could you repeat that?

[Speaker B] Now? Yes. Can you see me clearly now?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes.

[Speaker A] Yes.

[Speaker B] So now I’ll address what Rabbi Michael said earlier regarding correlation and the claim that religion yields good results. I think that when — and one can debate how this fits social science — but I definitely think there is a clear causal relation for two reasons. First of all, it goes on over the course of history for many, many years. And second, I do not see any correlation here that can be explained in another way. In other words, you see, for example, that people who observe certain ritual practices arrive at social outcomes that are completely different. Now, I think the explanation is very simple, and therefore it is clear that this is a causal explanation. If, for example — I once had a female friend and I said that she kept finding all kinds of men and couldn’t find a stable relationship. What you need to do is wear a skirt and tell everyone that you observe no-touching. No touching. By the way, she didn’t do what I said, and in the end within a year you’ll be married to a normal guy and build a family. In my opinion Jewish law was designed to create such a mechanism, and therefore if there is a clash one has to go in that direction.

Now, regarding the Haredi world — again, you froze. I think we agree, and since there isn’t a Haredi person here I don’t think— Now? Before that? Should I repeat what I said? Now I’m back? What I said earlier was that regarding the Haredim, I think we basically agree. We basically agree, and therefore I’m not especially interested in that point. I think what it means is that there are good things that Jewish law can address, like family, like social responsibility within your own society. And these things, I think, the Haredi world does overall well, and that also gives it the ability to survive despite the not insignificant problems it has in many areas, and on that I basically agree with Rabbi Michael.

Now regarding the things that— I think in the end this is a point that comes up a lot, and it is worth addressing at least briefly: responsibility to the whole world — to other nations, to the climate, to things like that. I think these things are not only not good morally; I think they are bad. In other words, I think climate is a modern superstition. Again, I haven’t studied it and I’m not a climate expert.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You froze again.

[Speaker B] A bit… and also not… ever… But from reading, let’s say, twenty articles on the subject, I was definitively convinced… not definitively… I was convinced. You—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You keep freezing all the time.

[Speaker A] The god of the climate is punishing you now. Yes. All right, I think we’ll move on until Shalom comes back. And in general, what he wanted to say is that he read dozens of articles and doesn’t really believe in climate, and that it is today’s superstition. I’d like to ask Rabbi Michael about—

[Speaker B] Yes, can you see me? So I’ll just finish this point. After speaking about climate I’ll say one word about universal morality. I think, unlike Kant and unlike Hume, and in line with Aristotle and Plato, that morality is specific to a particular society. That doesn’t mean it isn’t universal, because societies work the same way everywhere. But a person’s moral responsibility is not to abstract entities, meaning not to human beings simply as such, but to human beings with whom he has some kind of relationship. Therefore my responsibility, for example, is to the Jews who live with me, perhaps to others who are in covenant with me, but it is not to other societies unless those societies are at war, and then presumably with me, and therefore my responsibility there is to fight them. In other words, I do not think, morally speaking and quite apart from Judaism, that there is such a thing as a universal human society with reciprocal obligations toward human beings as such. In my opinion not only is that not moral, in the end it leads to distorted morality. Quite apart from religion, I think in this respect the relatively conservative position of religion fits Aristotelian morality and is more correct than Kantian morality.

That is regarding the specific issue of morality. But the main disagreement, which perhaps is nevertheless worth discussing for a few words, concerns the nature of what happened at Mount Sinai and the nature of God. In other words, I think there is no proof sufficiently convincing to persuade a person who is not already convinced that one can prove something happened there. The best thing we have, in my opinion, is Judah Halevi, who says that Jewish history down to today is the proof that there is providence over Judaism, and therefore this verifies the event. In my opinion this can be explained no less well by the discovery of an excellent legal system, and therefore that is, in my opinion, probably a better explanation, or at least more convincing to me.

[Speaker A] Yes. So before we move to Rabbi Miki, I’d like you also to address Mount Sinai, but also the point that according to Shalom — if I understand correctly — whether a commandment is Torah-level or not, whether developed by the sages, what matters is not authority, not divine origin, but whether it conforms to divine truth, which the prophets of course grasped in their wisdom and perhaps also the commentators, maybe Maimonides. And I’d be glad if you’d say how, in your opinion, the process of halakhic development worked, if not in the way Shalom says, namely the attainment of divine truth in one way or another.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Well, that really is the most basic point of disagreement, although I did not agree with almost a single sentence from the last part of what you said. We’ll get to that another time. But that really is the most fundamental question that arises here. For me, observance of Jewish law is solely a matter of authority, nothing to do with truth. In other words, I do not observe Jewish law because it is true; I observe Jewish law because it is the will of God. By the way, it seems to me this is stated explicitly in Maimonides at the end of chapter 8 of the Laws of Kings, where Maimonides writes that someone who — he is speaking there about a resident alien, but it is true for anyone — someone who keeps the commandments because reason compelled him is not among the pious of the nations of the world but among their wise men. And the way he asks us to observe Jewish law is not because reason compels us — in other words, not because it is correct — but why? There are many passages in Maimonides that supplement this point, and I can’t go into all of them, but for example in the Laws of Idolatry chapter 3, law 6, Maimonides speaks there about accepting God’s authority. In other words, not observing because of love or fear. And in chapter 10 of the Laws of Repentance he speaks about doing the truth because it is truth, and there of course one can interpret truth as Shalom does, but I think from parallel sources it is quite clear that this is not the intention. “Truth” means the obligation to obey the Holy One, blessed be He, not truth in the sense that what you are doing is the correct step, say from a consequentialist perspective or from the perspective of evaluating the act in itself.

So this really is one of the focal points of the dispute, because for me it is solely authority. That is, nothing besides that — not “also,” just that. Nothing having to do with truth. But where does the authority come from? The authority comes from the very fact that the Holy One, blessed be He, created the world and created me.

[Speaker B] And how do you know?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Acceptance of God — what Maimonides says in the Laws of Idolatry.

[Speaker B] But how do you—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] know that He created the—

[Speaker B] world like that?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I reached the conclusion that He created the world. Is that circular? Not at all — why is that circular? I reached the conclusion that He created the world. I accept the tradition of the Torah. I also reached the conclusion philosophically that there is a God who created the world, independently of the Torah. Those two things come together for me in the conclusion that God created the world. As such, He has authority to command, and I have an obligation to obey. That is where it begins and where it ends, period. It has nothing to do with what seems right to me. It plays no role at all in decisions about which commandments to keep and which not to keep. On the contrary, in my opinion someone who does these things because they are the correct steps is not serving God at all. In other words, he is not a religious person in the essential sense. He is a person who behaves correctly. As Maimonides says, he is among the wise men of the nations of the world but not among their pious. “Not among their pious” means that his act has no religious significance. He is doing the correct acts, excellent, but all the religious significance lies solely in commitment to the command or to the authority of the Holy One, blessed be He. That is the basic point. We can talk about other points, but that is— okay.

[Speaker B] Yes, I think on this issue Rabbi Michael basically agrees with Leibowitz, at least on this specific point, yes, and I disagree with him very strongly. I think you are also overall more consistent than Leibowitz here, because Leibowitz’s big problem on this issue is that on the one hand he rejects the supernatural and on the other hand obligates commitment to Mount Sinai, and I still haven’t understood how he squares that. Now, if I may address Maimonides for a moment and then move to the substantive issue: I don’t think Maimonides says what you said. I think regarding the issue of “their wise men,” first of all there are known variant readings in that passage.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Only between “but not” and “but rather,” nothing beyond that.

[Speaker B] Yes exactly, but I think Maimonides’ conclusion there is quite simple. He is talking about a resident alien. In other words, he says that if a person wants to observe Jewish law and be part of this, he has to accept commitment to the halakhic mechanism. I’m very much in favor of that. The question is whether the reason to accept the halakhic mechanism is not because it is true, and that is not written there.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But he explicitly rejects doing it because of rational conviction.

[Speaker B] He says—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] not to do it because of rational conviction.

[Speaker B] Yes, but you accept the authority of the sages because of rational conviction. I also think that fits much better with what is written in the Guide of the Perplexed and elsewhere.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In the end it’s not rational conviction.

[Speaker B] I also think that in the end this is what Maimonides says in Guide 3:34 — of course there is a dispute of interpretation there as with everything in Maimonides — that in certain cases there is such a thing as a sin for the sake of Heaven, where a person must refrain from observing Jewish law in order to reach the true thing.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s an explicit Talmudic statement.

[Speaker B] He comes back to it, yes exactly. But there the Talmud is speaking about unique cases. Maimonides speaks about a person who understands that this is not the right thing. In other words, these are two different things. The Talmud speaks mainly about public needs; he takes a term and places it elsewhere. But the issue about Maimonides is less important for the moment. It is an interesting scholarly issue, great. But what is more interesting, I assume, for the viewers is the issue itself. In other words, I think here I should address something I forgot to address earlier. I think the problem with Rabbi Michael Abraham’s view — and that is why I do not hold it — is that there is a huge gap in the leap from a God who created the world — and I don’t know whether God created the world or whether the world is eternal, but let us say there is a superhuman metaphysical reality, and overall I agree with that, and I also think it can be proven — and perhaps here there is a big difference between us, because if one reaches the Necessary Existent by a metaphysical proof, then that is a God whose nature is unchanging. If one reaches it by creation of the world, then that is a God whose nature changes, and here there is apparently a difference between us regarding the nature of God.

Now, even if God created the world, and I go with your view, to leap from that to the correctness of the Jewish tradition — apart from the purely accidental fact that it happens to be your tradition — has no coherent explanation. In other words, there are peoples with many traditions. I think the great advantage of Judaism here, and in my opinion this is the approach of Maimonides or of other rabbis, is that Judaism has an objective advantage in terms of its product. In other words, in terms of its product — take into account, again, the fact that in terms of family solidarity and so on. There are many other religions that took things from Judaism. On that Maimonides speaks in Guide 2:40, 2:39, so many religions, especially Islam and Christianity, took a great deal from Judaism, changed what they changed, and what they changed is generally worse — there are always exceptions — but what they changed is generally worse. But the basic structure remained the same structure, and so there is in the end a fairly strong influence, especially on Islam, of Jewish law and Jewish faith on both. Therefore there are shared structures. But even morally, I think, the Jewish product is superior here, and that is what proves the holiness of the Torah. Because otherwise there is a leap that, apart from tribal loyalty, is very hard to explain.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Well, on that too, I really don’t agree with what you said. First of all, in my view there are excellent arguments in favor of our tradition, and I do not recognize this huge gap that people always talk about between proving God’s existence in some philosophical sense and the question of revelation and commitment to the Torah that was given. That really is a topic, but it is a topic to discuss separately; I don’t think we should get into it now.

I want to return for a moment to a point I made earlier, because it has now come up again in your remarks. First of all, I do not accept your factual assumptions. I do not think the Torah leads to optimal outcomes. And I remind you once again that the Haredi case is typical, because the answer you gave is in my eyes similar to those who say there is no such thing as a religious thief, because if he is a thief then he is not religious.

[Speaker D] So—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So in effect you have turned it into something whose logic is similar. Because what you are really saying is: look, the Haredim, true, have many moral defects, but still the Torah apparently yields the best moral product. Why? On what basis do you determine that it yields the best moral product, if a very large part of the public, and a very considerable portion of its observers, behaves in a morally very problematic way?

[Speaker B] That’s a good question. I’d be happy to explain, yes. Personally I’ll explain it, because I think it’s an important point and indeed central to my argument. I think there are areas where the Jewish religion improves things, and improves them well, and there are other areas where it does not. In other words, I never said there is no religious thief. I think people — once again—

[Speaker A] You froze.

[Speaker B] thieves and worse exist in every society, and these are people who do not accept the society’s moral norms. Can you hear me? Yes? You can hear me. Now, I definitely think there are specific areas where religion improves life, such as family, group cohesion, and things like that. That, in my opinion, is what gives the Haredim the ability to survive, together with the fact that religion certainly leaves room for moral corruption that may, may — not must, but may — reach problematic dimensions. I think draft evasion during wartime is indeed a new low. But in the end, in many other things religion really does improve the situation.

The big problem, I think, with the opposite position is precisely this. In other words, if there is a spiritual reason or an exalted reason, or a God who addresses the world and gave us the Torah and is supposed to give reward and punishment for it — that, I think, really does not work. In other words, if one speaks about the world to come, of course anyone may believe; but if one speaks about a God who acts in reality, in my opinion the best proof that this is not true — and therefore the whole structure there is not true—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Let me save you the discussion: I agree with you on that point.

[Speaker B] Fine, then how— yes, but how do you explain that the God who intervened at Sinai does not intervene again?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because His policy is to stop intervening. What’s the problem?

[Speaker B] And where does that policy come from?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because we are already grown children. Once He held our hand the way you hold your children’s hands, and gradually we stand on our own feet scientifically, intellectually, in every way, and we can manage on our own. So now He has left us; He is no longer involved in the world.

[Speaker B] Or almost no longer involved.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I think—

[Speaker B] I think that whole explanation is intended to mediate between what is written in the Hebrew Bible and the reality we see. And I think the simpler solution is to say that what is written in the Hebrew Bible is allegory. That works much better than saying—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The price of this allegorical approach, at least for me, is that it throws out the baby with the bathwater. Because if these things are allegory, then I’m not there. In other words, the view you are presenting is basically a secular one. No, heaven forbid—

[Speaker B] I don’t mean that as an insult, right?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I mean that basically you are saying: look, I examine the different possibilities, I see which society is run best, and I join it. I disagree with you on two levels. First, factually: in my opinion, that is not the society that is run best. Second, even if that were true, joining in that way does not contain the slightest trace of religious value. In other words, that is not worship of God. You behave well, among the wise men of the nations of the world, but not among their pious. That is basically the story.

[Speaker B] On this issue again, I disagree with Leibowitz and with you. I think that is exactly religion. In other words, religion is a social structure, and joining it for a social reason—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The root of all our disputes really lies here.

[Speaker B] Yes exactly.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Aside from the issue of statistics and correlation, where I also disagree, but that’s peanuts. In the end our argument begins and ends here.

[Speaker B] I agree.

[Speaker A] We can really split the discussion into several topics, one of them being the historical or factual issue. We could talk about whether Mount Sinai happened or not. Before we move to questions, I’d like each of you to give your two minutes to summarize more or less from your point of view, and then we can move to questions. Please, Shalom.

[Speaker D] Shalom, you can open the summaries.

[Speaker B] So overall I basically agree with Rabbi Miki’s analysis of the root of our disagreement. I think that my conception gives religion one major advantage, and that is the ability to persuade the unconvinced. Take a person born in a non-religious place. In my opinion he has very good reasons to join Judaism because it brings moral truth. And the moral corruption that exists in the liberal secular world, which only keeps getting worse each time, makes it more and more terrible. Therefore, in my opinion, that is the reason. In other words, I’m prepared to say that perhaps Rabbi Michael Abraham is right and there is a God and He gave the Torah and we are obligated to Him — and I’ll go even further than he does, and say He also gives reward and punishment. In that case, certainly one has to keep the commandments. What I am trying to argue is that even if that isn’t needed — and this is the point — a person who lives only here for sixty years, or maybe a bit more, eighty years today, will live a better life if he is religious. And that is mainly why it matters. In my opinion, that is the central reason this system was created, and it still does an excellent job more than 3,000 years later, and in my opinion that is the best proof that it is holy.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Here I’ll just note that even the argument you raised here is, of course, according to your own approach. In other words, this is now second-order. Why? Because the argument that says “this is how I manage to persuade a secular person to join” does not interest me. In my view the question of how I manage to persuade someone has nothing whatsoever to do with the truth. In other words, if I think something is true, then even if I don’t succeed in persuading anyone of it, it is still true. This pragmatic argument that says, “Look, even if you’re right, you won’t persuade anyone” — okay, so what? I’m still right, assuming I am right. In other words, the fact that I can’t persuade is not relevant to me. Now, of course, you go in pragmatic directions all the way through, so the ability to persuade is also a consideration for you. So that too is just a continuation of the earlier fundamental dispute.

[Speaker B] Yes, because it matters to me to persuade people in order to improve them morally, and you say it doesn’t improve them morally, so overall—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no. Even if it did improve them morally, but I can’t persuade them — so what? It is still the truth. So I can’t persuade them, too bad, what can I do? I wrote in several places that I oppose the concept that once, in some internet forum I participated in, they called “holy lies.” Holy lies are the possibility of lying in order to achieve positive results. I oppose that policy. Right, so that is exactly the dispute between us. I’m just saying that in a certain sense this is a bit of a dialogue of the deaf. Because when we discuss the question of the relation between Jewish law and morality, we are speaking about two different religions. Or two different legal systems. We are not talking about the same religion. In other words, we do not hold the same religion. Not at all.

[Speaker B] Practically, I think broadly yes.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Practically it’s completely close, I agree. But I’m saying that on the principled level we hold completely different religions. Therefore it is hard even to talk about the value of such a discussion between Jewish law and morality, because how can we decide such a thing? In the end, suppose I bring a Talmudic passage here or some verse there or whatever. You’ll say, “Okay, I interpret the Talmud allegorically,” and that’s it, so it isn’t true. So how do you conduct an argument like that? These are simply two languages. I don’t see a way to move forward or clarify the issue.

[Speaker B] So maybe I’ll end by saying perhaps we should do this again sometime in a few months. It was very pleasant to discuss this with you and I learned a lot. Maybe the next subject we should discuss is really who God is. Because in my opinion that is the root of the disagreement. In other words, we are dealing with two different conceptions of God that have different implications. And in the end, I think as it should be, because we are after all two consistent people, the line comes out nicely from top to bottom without too many flourishes. What?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’ll just note something. If there is indeed such a plan for the future, we can consider it, but I’ll only say that I have great doubts about the value of theological discussions. Some of the things you mentioned earlier, for example — you got a bit into theology, whether God changes, whether the world changes, how one arrives at His existence, on the basis of what proof or argument one reaches His existence — in my opinion none of that has any connection to the implications of what I am saying. In my view, that theology has almost no implications. These accepted dependencies in the world of Jewish thought and theology are totally unacceptable to me. Quite apart from the conclusions — I’m saying that there is a disagreement between us about the conclusions — but the way to clarify the disagreement is not through the figure of God and who the God is in whom I believe.

[Speaker B] I don’t think—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] that it has anything at all to do with the dispute.

[Speaker B] So here I disagree, and that is probably another disagreement. I don’t like using the term theology but rather metaphysics. In other words, I don’t take religious assumptions like the Torah or the Talmud or such places, but try through reality to work out what kind of God can be proved to exist. In my opinion this has moral implications, but of course on that too we do not agree. Okay.

[Speaker A] Yes, I’ll just say that we’ll now move to questions, unless — Rabbi Miki, you didn’t really summarize your own side, you mostly responded to Shalom’s side. If you want to say something more you can, and if not we’ll move to questions.

[Speaker D] I think it’s fine, I said my piece. Great.

[Speaker A] I’ll just say that the point here wasn’t the argument itself, but there was a great desire at least on the part of the group, in our WhatsApp group, for a conversation between Rabbi Miki and Shalom.

[Speaker D] So we’ll always be happy to hear you talking.

[Speaker A] So let’s move to the first question. I assume this is more for Rabbi Miki than for Shalom. What difference does it make whether the Torah is from Heaven?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Well, of course if you assume that they distorted the entire Torah, then it makes a huge difference that the Torah is from Heaven, because then you should throw out the sages, not the Torah. That is, if they distorted the Torah. I disagree with the assumption that they distorted the Torah. I think they certainly made mistakes, and not infrequently, but I do not think they distorted it. “Distorted” suggests some intentional and systematic activity. I think they interpreted the Torah to the best of their understanding. Some of their interpretive tools are also not clear to us — the thirteen hermeneutic principles and so on, which I studied for many years — and therefore some things we do not understand, and some things they certainly did get wrong, I have no doubt. Every person makes mistakes. But that does not in any way affect my commitment to the Torah.

I have written and said more than once that my commitment to Jewish law is not connected to the question of authenticity. In other words, it is not connected to the question whether this is really what the Holy One, blessed be He, intended at Sinai. What matters to me is whether this is our best understanding of what He said. In other words, is this really it? If Elijah came now and told me, “Listen, at Sinai He meant something else,” then there is the rule that it is not in heaven. But without that rule, fine, perhaps I would accept it. But if I have no information about what He meant, then the best I have is the interpretations that arose over the course of the halakhic tradition. And anyone who knows me knows that I am not among those most committed to the details of tradition, and I allow myself a fair amount of interpretive freedom, and I do not recognize authorities except very limited ones. But still, the framework of the discussion is the framework within the tradition. And from above I only claim that I have no doubt, a priori, that out of, I don’t know, 100,000 details of Jewish law we have today, I think at least 90 percent are wrong. In other words, 90 percent do not match what the Holy One, blessed be He, intended, because these interpretations really went very far, and it is hard for me to believe they fit the original intention. But I have no information about the original intention, and therefore there is a presumption. For now I go with what we have. If Elijah comes, we’ll talk.

[Speaker B] I actually want to be even more conservative on this than Rabbi Michael Abraham. I think that overall the sages did an excellent job. They took the initial pattern and developed it according to the best of their method, because—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In your view there is nothing for it to correspond to. If they reached the goal—

[Speaker B] Exactly, they developed it in a successful direction.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In your view there is no such thing as distorting the Torah.

[Speaker B] Exactly. Therefore in my opinion they certainly did not distort the Torah; they continued it beautifully. Not—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not continued — they created it.

[Speaker B] No, the prophets created it, it is ancient—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I mean the sages over the generations.

[Speaker B] So—

[Speaker A] Next question, and now also for Shalom. We’d first of all be glad if you could explain what the questioner calls your instrumental approach to Judaism. And practically, would conversion to Judaism for all the instrumental reasons Shalom raised be a valid conversion? Can a pragmatic Judaism of moral, economic, or marital convenience be any kind of religious ideal?

[Speaker B] So look, I’m not a rabbi, I don’t deal with valid conversions. But let’s say that I don’t think any rabbinical court, even the strictest one today, if someone came and said, “I want to observe all the commandments of the Torah because I am convinced this is the right thing and I agree with the God of Maimonides,” would reject him because he agrees with the God of Maimonides rather than the God of Rashi or Nachmanides. Even if they asked him and he said “Maimonides according to Rabbi Moses of Narbonne.” Therefore I don’t think there is a problem here concerning conversion.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I think that conception — sorry, there is one rabbi I can introduce you to who would not accept such a conversion. Yes, you?

[Speaker B] Yes. Fine, you are very strict; I’m against that. But you don’t sit on conversion panels, I think, Miki. Fortunately. Fine. So on this issue — about the instrumental question — I don’t know if “instrumental” is exactly right. I think it produces good morality. In other words, I think this is the world, this is life. We are human beings. We are a living creature that perishes and dies, and operates within social norms like some animals but a little more successfully, with an intellect that can grasp things animals cannot. And we operate within that framework. We do our best. And the best is to live in the best possible way for our society, for morality. And on this issue I think Jewish law does that. I don’t think that’s an instrumental approach. In contrast to some bombastic approach that changes, I don’t know, the face of the Shekhinah every time a person puts on tefillin, I think I have a rational approach to the commandments. That’s how I’d define it more than instrumental.

[Speaker A] A question for Rabbi Miki: is a person judged by whether he follows the sages, or by whether he hit the original will of God? Suppose a person does not put on tefillin, and for the sake of argument it turns out that absolute truth does not include putting on tefillin. Can God still come to him with claims?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Derashot HaRan deals with a similar question: what about a rebellious elder? A rebellious elder thinks the Sanhedrin are wrong. This is someone qualified to issue rulings; otherwise he would not be a rebellious elder. In other words, he thinks the Sanhedrin are mistaken. The Ran asks, especially according to the naturalist view, which says that sin brings spiritual or perhaps even physiological damage, why should he obey them? He has reached the level of issuing rulings and understands that they are wrong. The Ran answers that part of Jewish law is the obligation to obey the sages, the Sanhedrin — not every sage. Regarding the Sanhedrin there is “you shall not deviate.” So if you do not obey them, you will suffer damage from that violation of “you shall not deviate,” no less than from the violation you are worried about. Since that is so, you still have to obey them.

Now, I am not among the naturalists, but I do accept the Ran’s logic. In the end, the Holy One, blessed be He, Himself expects me also to obey the sages. So therefore He Himself — what do I mean “He Himself”? It is a rabbinic aggadah — the principle that it is not in heaven. But that principle of “it is not in heaven” basically says: even if the Holy One, blessed be He, comes out and tells you, “Listen, my original intent was this — in the case where the white patch preceded the white hair, impure or pure, this is what I meant,” and the sages say otherwise, Jewish law tells us to follow what the sages say. Not because they are right. They are not right, if we are talking about God’s will. God Himself knows best what He wants. But the Holy One, blessed be He, Himself says, “My children have defeated Me.” That is the language the aggadah places in His mouth. And that comes to tell us that the obligation to obey the sages is itself also the will of God. Therefore there is no tension between the duty to obey the Holy One, blessed be He, and the duty to obey the sages. I am speaking of sages who have authority, of course, namely the Sanhedrin. Not every sage, nor even the greatest sages; if they are not the Sanhedrin, there is no formal obligation to obey them.

[Speaker A] Okay. A question for Rabbi Miki — and we’d also be glad to hear Shalom’s view. How can Jewish law function as universal morality in a way that satisfies Kant? If it is universal, then it must stem from the universality of reason, and then it would apply equally to Jew and non-Jew, and so on.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That question is only for Shalom. I don’t know why they addressed it to me. Jewish law really is not morality, neither universal nor non-universal. That is exactly the point.

[Speaker B] So I think on this specific issue Jewish law is universal, because it calls everyone to join. In that respect it is universal. Isn’t it in favor of conversion? I think Judaism is a missionary religion. And here again I interpret Maimonides that way; in my opinion that is the correct interpretation of both Maimonides and the sages.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why not, by the way?

[Speaker B] No, I think it is missionary.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Ah, it is missionary.

[Speaker B] Okay. It is missionary. I think we are a missionary religion; we invented the trick, the rest just copied it. So I think it is indeed a religion that calls everyone to join. It has historical reasons why it developed this way or that, some of which should be changed. With regard, for example, to attitudes toward women, I think that is changing. Overall I’m pleased with the pace at which modern Jewish law is changing in certain directions — not too fast and not too slowly.

And regarding things like a priest and so on, that is a kind of preservation of tradition where there is not a sufficiently good reason to abolish it, and therefore we continue with it, and that’s fine, that’s excellent. If suddenly there is some clash, I don’t think anyone is existentially bothered that a priest goes up to bless the people and an Israelite does not. It is some remembrance of what used to be, for reasons that existed then, and it is a nice remembrance and overall beneficial. The story again with the priest’s wife who was raped, which really is a kind of problem — here Jewish law knew how to bend the situation in order to treat the symptom without abolishing the authority. Because in my opinion authority is very important. Authority is very important because it is that same sanctification—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why establish it in the first place only so we can bend it afterward? Better not to establish it.

[Speaker B] Ah, I think for historical reasons. At a certain period a priest’s wife who had been raped — as we see — was a major blemish, so as not to damage holiness. Just as a priest who looks bad or has a blemish does not go up to bless the people. So a priest whose wife was raped similarly does not— it’s like a priest not being allowed to marry a woman who was once promiscuous. In other words, they tried to create an aura of holiness around the Temple for social reasons, and the way to do that at the time was through certain things. Today there isn’t so much need for that, and fashions have changed a bit too, so things are changed just as with the prosbul — broadly the same kind of move — and it works excellently. So there’s no reason to say “it doesn’t work, it doesn’t exist, it changed,” because then everyone would dismantle the system, so it’s better not to say that. Okay.

[Speaker A] Fine. Another issue for Shalom: how did Shalom come to discuss Jewish law and morality if he does not see himself as obligated to Jewish law at all, but only to morality?

[Speaker B] Because I think Jewish law is a central tool for reaching morality. In other words, one of the central aims of what I do — both here, in scholarly activity, and in the channel and everything else — is to persuade people that Jewish law is a correct thing for reaching morality. Why do I do that? Because overall I want them to live more moral lives. I think that a person who, especially at a young age, decides to live a religious life will have a better life and will also contribute more to society and be a better person. He’ll have a family, he’ll have children. And beyond that — mainly, mainly that — he’ll have a better life. Therefore that is the goal. Jewish law is a very, very good tool for reaching a goal that is itself very good, but Jewish law is a very, very good tool — the best tool the human species has found for reaching morality. Therefore I think it is worth spreading. That is why it has lasted so long and had such influence, I think.

[Speaker A] I think the follow-up question is: what is the basis of the obligation to morality, and is there any reason it should obligate a Jew more than a non-Jew?

[Speaker B] No, it obligates everyone in exactly the same way. That is why I’m entirely in favor of a non-Jew converting for moral reasons. Again, one has to see when and how, and that it shouldn’t harm his family too much perhaps, and it really is a complicated issue that has to be dealt with case by case. But broadly speaking I think that for a non-Jew to convert is certainly a good decision, because he joins a society that is more moral, and we too grow and are strengthened by non-Jews joining us and becoming Jews, and that is wonderful for them and for us and for everyone. And in the end the obligation to morality is because it leads to a good life.

[Speaker A] Okay, fine.

[Speaker B] The obligation to morality is because overall it leads to a good life — that is, a more efficient life, a happier life. And if there are exceptions, then one has to deal with them in a way that tries to handle side effects well.

[Speaker A] Yes. It seems we have one more question. If there are more, write them now. Shalom, you seem to be admitting that liberal society is more advanced than Jewish morality, as you mentioned in regard to women, but your whole argument was that Judaism is correct because it is the most moral. So that is unclear.

[Speaker B] No, no. That’s important, because I was misunderstood. I hope that’s because I froze, and it may well be because I wasn’t precise enough, so I’ll try to correct what I said. I do not think liberal society is more successful regarding women. I think a society that socially pressures young girls to do sexual things with boys and then leaves them as single mothers at age forty-five is no model of anything. So on that issue I do not think at all that liberal society is more advanced than religious society in its treatment of women.

I do think that today, unlike two hundred years ago, there is a very broad and very understandable recognition that women can be intelligent. And I think there was once a kind of old question — even a hundred and fifty years ago, even a hundred years ago — whether women should have the right to vote. Switzerland gave women the right to vote in 1972 at the federal level, and the last canton only in 1992. By the way, it had been rejected in a referendum, and then they changed the constitution to impose it. But on this issue I think there was a major dispute whether women have intellect. Today I think it is obvious to everyone that they do. And if a woman has intellect, then it is excellent for her to study Torah, to study Talmud, to be a halakhic decisor, and things like that. Therefore I think an update is needed on this issue.

Am I saying that the treatment of women in liberal society is preferable? No. I think that if I could now — I don’t know — if they suddenly revealed to me that reincarnation exists, and as punishment for not believing in reincarnation they offered me the option of being reincarnated either as a secular woman or as a Haredi woman, I would immediately choose the Haredi one. And on this issue I think women’s situation is generally better in religious society because they are more protected. A man has one central biological advantage here, and one central social advantage, in that he can father children for longer. And socially, today most men earn more than women regardless of why that is; in my opinion it is entirely social and has nothing to do with anything else. What happens in secular society is that men managed to brainwash women into believing that it is fine if men abandon them at age forty-five because they fell in love with someone else, and that there is no complaint to be made against him at all. In that respect, in my opinion, conservative, halakhic, religious morality is vastly more advanced.

[Speaker A] Of course, if Rabbi Miki wants to respond, you can.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] These are things that came up throughout the entire conversation, and this is another subject. I think Shalom is too optimistic about the moral state of religious society and too pessimistic about the moral state of secular, non-Jewish, liberal society. But beyond that general point — which would require going into details to discuss — I will just say one thing. Here too I am not concerned only with outcomes. In other words, suppose that giving women freedom leads to the breakdown of the family structure, for the sake of discussion. Okay? I still think we should give her that freedom. We should give her that freedom because she has the right to receive that freedom. This consequentialist consideration — and once again, this is consequentialism — that says I will determine my relation to this person or that person because I want to shape society in one way or another, has some place at the margins in my view. At the base level, the question of rights comes before the question of outcomes. That is my claim.

[Speaker A] Okay.

[Speaker B] Can I say something?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, but very briefly.

[Speaker B] I’ll address that in one minute. I think this whole story of rights is, in my opinion, a moral mistake of the Western world that it would be a pity to buy into. In other words, I think people, human beings, prefer a zero-sum game. But I’ll say it again. Therefore, if a person gives up a lot of stability in order to gain freedom, in my opinion he loses in the end. Is what I said clear?

[Speaker A] Just repeat the beginning, about the Western mistake.

[Speaker B] What I said at the beginning is that there is a big dispute on this issue between modern liberal morality and conservative morality. I think conservative morality is correct. I think that if what people want, and their basic need, is more stability than freedom, then there is a zero-sum game between them. Therefore liberal society has gone too far with freedom.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maybe I’ll make one more comment in this context. This too is another point that came up earlier with Shalom, when he spoke about the harms of universalism. I wrote about this, and I think once again there is a kind of black-and-white thinking here. I fully agree that if there are no circles of belonging, or no hierarchy among circles of belonging, the world will be worse. In other words, if everyone has to care for the whole world, nothing will come of it. I even have an article on my site about this. But the antithesis is not that I am committed only to my own milieu and no one else matters. Rather there is a hierarchy. In other words, I care first of all for my own milieu, my family, my community, my people. But I also care about the climate and about animals and about humanity as a whole according to a certain hierarchy. Whether climate problems are invented or not — that is another discussion. I’ll say just one sentence about that. The articles you read are not relevant to the discussion, not because you are not right — I think you are not right, but not because of that. Rather because the fact that religious people are dismissive of climate questions is not because they read those articles.

[Speaker B] No, I’m not talking about religious people.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I am talking about religious people. The fact that they are dismissive of climate issues — I—

[Speaker B] That—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] is not because they read those articles and reached your conclusion that there are no real problems, but because of a moral defect. If they told me, “Look, I read this and I hold the opinion that it’s not true, it’s all made up,” fine. It may be that I think they are factually mistaken, but I have no moral criticism of them. Therefore the question of what is correct here does not determine whether this is a good or bad moral indicator. Lack of commitment to large-scale problems is a religious pathology. A pathology. Religious society is not prepared to address problems on large scales — large time scales, large distance scales, large social scales — and in my opinion that is a problem. And it is true that the opposite side, where range does not matter and I relate to the whole space equally, is also problematic. There has to be some sort of hierarchy.

[Speaker B] So on that issue I disagree strongly. I’ll just say— may I say something?

[Speaker A] One sentence, and then we’ll move on.

[Speaker B] Yes. I want to say regarding universalism that in my opinion the incorrect worldview of the global perspective says that society is made up of many societies of human beings that generally cooperate with one another. I think the opposite is the case. The world is made up of many societies of human beings that generally fight one another, and therefore to care for other societies is, in my opinion, a moral defect. On that issue we have both a moral and a factual disagreement, yes.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Philosophical or anthropological Darwinism. Okay. Fine.

[Speaker A] A question for Rabbi Miki: how do you get from the fact that God created the world to the conclusion that one ought to obey Him? It seems you are not accepting the distinction between normative claims and factual claims.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, that’s not true. Obviously, the naturalistic fallacy people talk about — Hume’s is-ought problem, that is does not determine ought — is certainly true. But many times when you hear naturalistic arguments, arguments that say “the fact is such-and-such, therefore it is forbidden,” or “therefore one must,” or “therefore it is permitted” — okay? — they are simply hiding an additional premise. You don’t put it on the table, and therefore it looks like a fallacy. The principle of charity says: fill in the missing premises and then evaluate the argument. Don’t seize on the argument exactly as it is presented. Here too it is the same. When I say that I am obligated to the Holy One, blessed be He, because He created the world, obviously there is also another premise in the background saying that if someone created me, I am obligated to him. Now the argument is valid. You can say that you don’t agree with that premise. Fine, then we can discuss it. But certainly that premise was also present in my mind when I said it. I did not commit the naturalistic fallacy.

Maybe the example I give for this is what I call philosophical gratitude, not moral gratitude or ontic gratitude. Gratitude in the sense that if you came from someone, you are obligated to him. That is the foundation of honoring parents. Therefore, for example, in my opinion honoring parents is not based, or not only based, on all the good they gave me throughout the years they raised me, but on the very fact that I came from them. And I think that is written in the Torah itself: “Do you thus repay the Lord, foolish and unwise people? Is He not your Father, your Master? He made you and established you.” In other words, He is the one who constituted you, the one who created you. So that creates an obligation to acknowledge Him, or to be committed to Him. By the way, I think this is not gratitude in the moral sense, because the fact that He created me — it could be that I don’t like that He created me. It might have been better for a person not to have been created. In other words, I am not sure it is good for me that He created me. Let each person decide that for himself. I think the mere fact that He created me on the ontic, metaphysical level, not because He did me a favor, creates my obligation to Him, like toward parents. That is the claim. Fine, this is already a broad subject in itself, of course.

[Speaker A] A question for Shalom: was the Torah given at Sinai according to your belief and understanding?

[Speaker B] I admit that I’m in a kind of doubt on that, but I certainly do not think one can prove anything happened there. I think Judah Halevi’s arguments are the best arguments in favor of revelation at Sinai, and they are not convincing to a person who thinks there is no supernatural reality. Therefore I think on this issue the arguments are not convincing, and I would not hang religion and Judaism on such a belief. I also think this is Maimonides’ position on the matter, and certainly the position of many radical commentators. On this issue I agree more with them. Whether it is true or not, I am doubtful, but I think it is certainly not a position— What does “radical supernatural” mean?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] God is not supernatural?

[Speaker B] Here, here people sitting here are heretics, heretics, of course. I’m not talking about Rabbi Michael Abraham but about other people; these are people who have no good argument.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but God is not supernatural? What do you mean you don’t recognize the existence of the supernatural? God — the existence of God is not something supernatural? His revelation is supernatural too, but His existence is not supernatural?

[Speaker A] It seems Shalom can’t hear. Okay, fine, so maybe we’ll leave that question for the next meeting. So Rabbi Miki, I think we’ll end with a question that is a kind of continuation of the previous one. Your parents created or generated you, so do they have the ability to legislate normative claims that you are obligated to do? Well obviously not.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why obviously not? Obviously yes. It only means — I’m not saying the obligation is absolute in the sense that if it clashes drastically with my values or causes me very great distress, then I won’t do it, but not because I have no obligation. Rather because there is another consideration that overrides that obligation. I am obligated to my parents even if they are wicked and even if they abused me, because I came from them. That does not mean I will obey everything they say. In other words, I have other considerations in the world too — interests, values, many other things. Therefore I have to weigh all the obligations, but that does not mean there is no obligation. It means that it is not alone on the field.

With regard to the Holy One, blessed be He, the obligation is more absolute, because everything comes from Him. There are three partners in the creation of a person, but in the world there is only one partner, not three. In other words, my parents created me using the powers the Holy One, blessed be He, gave them, with His help and so on. The Holy One, blessed be He, created the world; everything comes from Him. So it seems to me that there the obligation this creates toward Him is much more absolute. Parents are only an example, because it is closer to us, so I used that as an example.

[Speaker A] So Shalom, if you’re with us, do you want to address the issue of whether God is natural or supernatural in your view? Because you claimed something there.

[Speaker B] I think on this issue, again, doubt is always a good place, but I think there are no proofs for the existence of the supernatural, and therefore it is preferable to assume—

[Speaker A] But what does that mean about God? Is God natural or supernatural?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It means that the revelation of the Holy One, blessed be He, is supernatural, but is His existence itself something supernatural?

[Speaker B] No, no. I think neither His revelation nor His existence — nothing there is supernatural.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I didn’t understand. You reject Mount Sinai because it’s supernatural? Can you hear?

[Speaker A] Fine, I think that… Shalom, are you with us? Okay. Okay, I understand he can’t hear. So it seems we should really stop here, and maybe continue in another session. Can you hear me? Yes, Shalom, I think we’ll stop in this session. Okay. I’ll say that this really was a very interesting discussion. It’s interesting because, as I understood it, Rabbi Miki is much more in a place where commitment leads to the issue of Jewish law, while Shalom is much more focused on whether it has a rationale or not — that’s what interests him. These are very, very different approaches, and I think each one is radical in its own way relative to the more conservative stream.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And in the moral context too, by the way — the same thing, not only in the religious context. In the moral context too, I’m Kantian and Shalom apparently isn’t.

[Speaker A] Yes, absolutely. So it was really very interesting, a conversation we had been looking forward to from our side as well, and we also received many requests for it. And God willing there will be more conversations. So thank you to Rabbi Miki for coming to speak on our channel, and thanks to everyone who participated and sent questions. And that’s it — have a good evening.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Thanks and goodbye, good night.

[Speaker A] Bye bye.

[Speaker B] Good evening, thanks to Rabbi Miki, and sorry for the technical problems we had.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] All good, goodbye.

[Speaker B] Goodbye, all the best. Thanks to Rabbi Miki.