Q&A: Intentional Definitions in an Aristotelian Conception
Intentional Definitions in an Aristotelian Conception
Question
Does the view that our definitions are intentional definitions (and not constitutive definitions) require a Platonic view about the existence of ideas or concepts? In other words, is it consistent to hold a view of intentional definitions within an Aristotelian framework?
Answer
You asked a similar question just yesterday.
It is possible to speak about intentional definitions even according to the approach that concepts exist only within our own cognition, and that there are no Platonic Ideas of them somewhere out there. I am trying to hit upon that same experience or feeling that we all have, and if I succeeded, then the definition was aimed correctly.
Of course, if all concepts are conventions, then an intentional definition can at most point to what those who originally agreed upon the concept had in mind.
Yes, right. I wanted to check whether I had understood things correctly. Thank you very much!