Q&A: The Reason for the Decree Against an Egg Laid on the Sabbath
The Reason for the Decree Against an Egg Laid on the Sabbath
Question
Regarding rabbinic decrees, usually they serve as a fence around Torah commandments, and sometimes they are enactments and proper practices. But some of them seem, to a weak-minded person like me, to make no sense, and I would be very grateful for help in understanding their rationale. We learned (Beitzah 2a) that an egg laid on a Jewish holiday is forbidden. Among the views brought in the Talmud (2b–3a) is Rav Yosef’s view, that this is a decree because of fruit that fell off a tree—that is, the Sages decreed that fruit which fell from the tree on the Sabbath or on a Jewish holiday may not be eaten, lest one come to pick fruit from the tree when he does not find enough satisfaction in the fruit that fell. And Rabbi Yitzhak’s view is that this is a decree because of liquids that seeped from fruit on the Sabbath, which the Sages prohibited from being drunk on that same Sabbath. There too the same explanation is repeated, that this is the same decree. The Talmud explains that this is not a decree upon a decree, but all one single decree. That is, according to Rav Yosef the hen is like a tree and the egg like fruit that fell from it, and according to Rabbi Yitzhak the hen is like fruit and the egg like the liquid that came from it. I will quote Rashi’s explanation of the matter:
“It is one single decree—not that this is a decree lest one come to the case of fallen fruit, but rather when they convened and decreed regarding fallen fruit, the egg was included as well. And even though there is no issue of detaching here, nevertheless it was included within the rabbinic decree, for it too is fruit that fell.”
That is, there is no fence here; rather, it is the same decree. One may add that it is clear this is not a decree because of concern that someone might confuse an egg that was laid with liquid that seeped from fruit, from the fact that the Jewish law is that if a person gathered fruit for the purpose of eating it, liquid that seeps from it is permitted, since there is no concern that he may come to squeeze it. If the Sages had been concerned that a person would err and permit squeezing fruit, they first should have decreed a prohibition on liquid that seeped from fruit designated for eating before they decreed a prohibition on an egg that came from a hen.
In short, my question and request are: what did the Sages see here that led them to attach an egg laid on the Sabbath to the decree of fallen fruit or to the decree of liquids that seeped? What need and what rationale is there for this decree?
Answer
Yoel, hello.
Sometimes there is another reason behind the decree, and what is stated in the Talmud is only the formal definition. So for example, it may be that the decree about liquids that seeped is really because of something newly created, and therefore an egg is included in the decree. And the fact that they formulated it as a decree because of liquids that seeped is only the framework of the decree and not its rationale. (Especially if the later Sages who issued the decree did not have the authority to enact a new decree, they have no choice but to rely on the first decree, so they do that by way of an expanded linguistic interpretation of it.)
However, in the Rashi you quoted there seems to be a different rationale. He argues that we follow the wording of the enactment and not its rationale, and “fallen fruit” includes an egg that falls from the hen. However, regarding liquids that seeped it is hard to say this, though Rashi seems to have understood it that way there as well; see his comments there. And see Rabbi Zalman Nechemiah Goldberg in his article in the collection Mevakshei Torah on Jewish holidays (vol. 22), where he wrote that we follow the wording of the enactment and not its rationale; see there, where he discusses this at great length. But according to our approach, there is no need for that. If we are dealing with later Sages who cannot issue decrees on their own, they make an expanded linguistic interpretation of an earlier decree, but not necessarily because one always follows the wording of the enactment. Something like this is what several later authorities distinguished regarding rabbinic Sabbath restrictions between restrictions that expand a Torah-level prohibited labor (like selecting food from refuse because of selecting refuse from food, which is rabbinic sorting) and restrictions that create a new prohibition (like riding a horse because of harvesting, which is certainly not rabbinic harvesting).
According to Rashi, it sounds like this is a linguistic expansion, and apparently one has to say that in their time people really did understand, in the language they used, that the egg is the fruit of the hen or something that seeped from it. It is hard to infer from our language to the language current in their day. In any case, according to his approach this is a linguistic consideration.
However, the general issue of a decree upon a decree versus one single decree deserves fuller discussion. Some understood that it is a matter of timing (as I recall, that seems to be Maimonides’ implication): if the two decrees were issued at the same time, they count as one decree. According to this, there is no difficulty at all here. The Talmud says that the decrees were enacted together, and therefore this is one decree. (There need not be any essential connection between them. And perhaps a linguistic connection, as above, is enough.)
But Ri d understood (Sabbath 31a) that “one decree” means that the first decree was said about the very same item to which the concern applies, and then one may issue a further decree on top of it. He distinguishes there between carrying in a karmelit, which was forbidden lest one come to carry in the public domain, and therefore one may not decree something else because of carrying in a karmelit, since that would be a decree upon a decree; and insulating food in hot ashes, which was forbidden lest one stir the coals—where what they forbade, insulating in anything that adds heat because of insulating in ashes, is not a decree upon a decree, because “lest one stir the coals” concerns the very ashes themselves that are forbidden, and not some other thing. Therefore a decree about insulating in something that adds heat because of ashes is not a decree upon a decree but one single decree. (In my view it stands to reason that this would also be the case if the second decree were about the same item to which the first one was directed, even if the first one itself concerned another thing.) According to his approach as well, the matter fits nicely, since both liquids that seeped and fallen fruit are decrees concerning the liquid and fruit themselves, lest one come to pick or squeeze them, and so one can indeed issue another decree because of those decrees regarding an egg, and that is not a decree upon a decree but one single decree.
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Questioner:
Thank you very much for the answer! With your permission, a few comments: A. It cannot be understood that the decree about liquids that seeped is really because of something newly created. As is proven by the law I cited at the end of my remarks: liquid that seeped from fruit designated for eating is permitted. It is clear that the concern is because of squeezing—that is, threshing—and not some other concern. B. From Rashi it does not seem to be a later linguistic expansion; rather, at the time they decreed regarding fallen fruit or liquids that seeped, they included an egg that was laid in the decree. [It is quite hard for me to imagine people so foolish that the decree about fallen fruit or liquids that seeped would be inadequate for them and likely to fail if it did not also include an egg that was laid; and on the other hand, liquids that seeped from fruit designated for eating are permitted, and those same fools supposedly understand that perfectly well and there is no concern that they will confuse the cases.] C. The Maimonides you mentioned is in his Commentary on the Mishnah, Sabbath chapter 4, mishnah 1. D. I was not familiar with Ri d, and many thanks for that important reference! (His words are on 21a.) In any case, it seems to me that even according to his approach, in our case this is a decree upon a decree and not one single decree. After all, the decree is not “lest he pick the fruit that fell” or “squeeze the juice that already seeped.” It is forbidden to eat the fruit that fell and to drink the liquid that seeped lest he pick other fruit and squeeze other liquid. If so, this is like carrying in a karmelit, and the decree about an egg that was laid is a decree upon a decree—unless one accepts Rashi’s explanation.
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Rabbi:
A. One can say that in the case of fruit designated for eating, liquids that seeped are not considered something newly created, since originally it was food and now it is food. It seems to me that there is a contradiction between the Talmudic passages on this issue. In general, interpretation of decrees is done linguistically plus substantively. There may be a linguistic expansion, but it would not be applied to fruit designated for eating because that is already food. True, one could have issued a linguistic decree here as well, but for substantive reasons they did not.
B. I did not necessarily say that in Rashi this is a later expansion. Nor is this about fools. The question is what is included in the language of “fallen fruit” or “liquids that seeped.”
C. Indeed.
D. Yes, there. As for the matter itself, at least regarding liquids that seeped, the concern could also be about that very fruit.
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Questioner:
A. The hen whose egg we are discussing is one designated for eating (as explained at the beginning of the tractate), and the egg is defined as “food separated from food,” and is not considered something newly created or set aside in itself, except because of the decree of liquids that seeped or fallen fruit.
B. This is not about fools? Then for what purpose and for whom did the Sages include an egg that was laid within their decree—just to be annoying?
D. The decree is on the liquids that seeped from the fruit, not on the fruit itself. And with liquids one cannot violate the prohibition.
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Rabbi:
Notice that the order has changed.
B. Even without fools, as I wrote, one can say that this is a conceptual expansion. It is not because someone is foolish, but because within the language of the decree an egg is also included, and they did not make distinctions in decrees. This was not done just to be annoying, but to create order, so that whatever the language includes will be forbidden, and they would not start getting into purposive interpretations (something like deriving law from the reason of a verse).
A. See above, section B. If one sees the egg as a linguistic expansion of liquids that seeped, then it is indeed something newly created in an essential sense, or at least it enters into the wording of “something newly created” and is therefore forbidden. The decree of liquids means that the egg receives the status of the liquid, and that is something newly created. By the way, I seem to recall a long and detailed passage in tractate Sabbath that treats liquids that seeped as something newly created, and not as a rabbinic extension of threshing. I did not have time to look it up now.
D. The liquids are part of the fruit, and therefore it is considered a decree on that same item. And certainly an egg inside a hen designated for eating is considered part of the food.