Answer

Oren, hello.
This is a very general and fairly broad question. It is connected to a general theory of normative duality that I dealt with in the past, and I am also writing about it in the theology book that is currently occupying me. I will try to address it here briefly, and only in a general and theoretical way. If there is a specific question, it can be discussed on its own terms in light of what is said here.
Assumption A: As a rule, the assumption is that there is commitment to both systems of law. Whether Jewish law itself recognizes these two commitments or not. A person can decide that he is committed to both. There is no necessity to see Jewish law as the final authority even for one who is committed to it.
Assumption B: Almost every person, religious or not, has a dual commitment alongside the law of the state. Thus, most secular people are committed to morality and to the law. Therefore, contrary to the common nonsense, such conflicts are not unique to the religious person. It is simply that the religious person’s value system is broader and more detailed, and therefore the clash with the law is more frequent. Beyond that, by its very nature the moral system clashes less with the law than the halakhic-religious system does (because the legislator is secular and usually committed to morality but not to Jewish law).
Assumption C: When there is dual commitment, conflicts can arise, and there is nothing problematic about that in principle. It does not contradict any logical law, just as a clash between moral values (a moral conflict) does not contradict logic. Clearly, whatever decision is reached will conflict with one of the commitments, but that does not mean the person is not committed to that system, because that is precisely the nature of deciding in a conflict.
Assumption D: The decision in such a conflict cannot be reached within one of the two systems, since it is a decision about the systems themselves. Therefore there is no “school-answer” to such conflicts, and this is your personal decision. The decision is also not entrusted to a halakhic decisor or to Jewish law in general, since it is not a halakhic decision.
Conclusion: Given such a conflict, you must decide what the nature of your commitment is to the two systems and what the nature of the conflict is. Translation: Decision A is to determine which of the two is preferable in your eyes. And Decision B is to determine how important the step under discussion is from the standpoint of each of them. The reason both decisions are needed is that even if commitment to the religious system is superior in your eyes, it is still possible that this is only a marginal violation of the religious law, but a substantial and important step from the standpoint of commitment to the law of the state. So, for example, in the dilemma whether to refuse an order. Think of someone who religiously opposes the return of territories, and for whom the religious commitment is more important than army cohesion and the values of law and democracy. Must he therefore refuse an order to evacuate settlements? Not necessarily. If the harm to army cohesion is devastating and the religious value that is harmed is tiny, there is room to obey even if the religious commitment is, in his eyes, the more important one. And of course the opposite is also true.
When the harm is equal, the decision will be made according to the standing the two systems have for you.
How is that standing determined? As stated (see Assumption D), this is a personal matter and there are no rules for it (for neither of the systems themselves can dictate its own standing relative to other systems. Only the person himself decides that).
In general, how should a religious person deal with the dilemma between values.
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Yuval S.:
Hello Rabbi Michi,
If I understood correctly, the solution you gave to the dilemma is assigning weight to each side and choosing according to the greater weight (and this despite the possibility that the one with the lower weight is the preferable system, for example Jewish law).
The dilemma dealt with choosing between two contradictory systems, and the solution you proposed is to posit a third system that examines the first two using weights and decides between them in cases of collision. But seemingly, if one system is the correct one in our eyes and it is to that one that our commitment is given, why should any weight whatsoever, however heavy, from some second system affect the decision? It seems that the third system intervenes and enters into the first system and deprives us of our commitment. So again, we are back to the dilemma of why the third system, which chose the one with the higher weight, is preferable to the first system that we chose to commit ourselves to. It seems to me that between the lines you assumed a deciding third system and in fact chose to commit yourself to it instead of to the first.
If we put it in everyday language, someone might argue against you that you are not really committed to Jewish law but to your own values. I know that you are not bothered by definitions and labels so long as you believe in what you are doing. But as someone who sees himself as committed to Jewish law, is there not really a choice here of another norm at the expense of Jewish law? (I am not claiming that this is wrong, only trying to understand and sharpen the point.)

Thank you and have a good day,
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Rabbi:
Yuval, hello.
When you are committed to several normative systems, part of the matter is that you have to determine a hierarchy between them. That is your task, and no one can do it for you. You can call that a third system, but I prefer to say that it is you yourself. So too, commitment to moral values obligates you to determine a scale of values that sets a hierarchy among the various moral values. That scale is not determined by one of the values, but by the person who is committed to them.
Therefore you are right that first and foremost stands the person. He is the one who determines the commitment and the relation to the normative systems, and clearly his decisions carry decisive weight relative to them, since their validity is based on his decisions (he is the one who decided to be committed to them). By the way, this is exactly what Rabbi Shimon Shkop says in Gate 5 of Sha’arei Yosher when he discusses legal theory. He says that since it is reason that decided to obey the Torah, then certainly additional principles that reason dictates are also binding, even though they are not written in the Torah. And I would add that if reason decides not to obey the Torah, then certainly that overrides what the Torah says (this is the concept of a transgression for its own sake in the Nazirite passage. The Sages also recognized this, as with conscientious objection in legal thought).
In that sense it is entirely correct to say that I am committed to my own values, and only to them. And so is everyone else. Except that my values instruct me to be committed to the Torah. Anyone who says otherwise simply does not understand what he is talking about. If commitment to the Torah is not his own decision, then this is not commitment but mechanical action. And if it is indeed his own decision, then once again we are back to the fact that he and his decisions stand above everything. And rightly so.
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Yuval S.:
Obviously the intention is that the third system is ultimately the person himself. And it is true that he is the one who chose to commit himself to the system of Jewish law, and he is the one who weighs, chooses, and decides in every matter.
 
You presented a way for a person to decide between contradictory systems he has chosen, and it is logical and clear. It seems to me that what is unique in the dilemma of Jewish law is that people generally assign greater weight in advance to Jewish law than to other systems. One could say that the discussion here is about the totality of the obligation: the moment a person chooses total commitment to Jewish law over every other system, he is deciding in advance that it will have the greatest weight in every dilemma that arises. Therefore, if in real time the person gives greater weight to the practical conclusion of another system, it would seem that this means there is no full and total commitment to Jewish law.

Let me try to sharpen this.
Let us sketch two models of choosing different systems together with Jewish law.
1. Our commitment to Jewish law is equal to every other system we have chosen (global morality, state law, etc.), and then the person indeed decides between them on equal footing using his judgment, which gives weight to each system. Seemingly, the result is that there is no total commitment to Jewish law but to the person’s own choice.
2. Commitment to Jewish law is above every other system and from the outset has greater weight, and in a moment of dilemma Jewish law will always prevail except in extreme cases where Jewish law itself would recognize that the person’s local decision, seemingly against it, is in fact what is appropriate from its standpoint (I do not know how to formulate this in halakhic terms, if at all; maybe this is nonsense). According to this, Jewish law really is total; it is just that it itself recognizes the existence of additional systems that sometimes prevail.
There is seemingly a third possibility: to give total weight to Jewish law in every case without exception. But then this is a choice in one halakhic system rather than in several. This is different from option 2, because there I am not bringing morality, for example, into Jewish law and turning it into something Jewish, but treating it as a parallel system that the Torah recognizes and to which it will sometimes itself give the heavier weight.

So is Jewish law total? Is it like every other system?
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Rabbi:
Hello Yuval.
I do not see anything new here. I can only repeat everything I wrote.
The question whether Jewish law is in first place or whether it is total is left to your decision. How can I answer that for you? I can tell you that for me it is not total. It was not total for the Sages either (a transgression for its own sake).
If you see non-total commitment to Jewish law as lack of commitment—so be it. That is only semantics.