An example for clarification: a person wants to put on tefillin a few minutes before sunset, and he sees his friend, who has just broken his leg, asking for help (without any danger to life). Is it possible that by Torah law this person can choose whichever commandment he wants: tefillin or acts of kindness?

As I said, I don’t think there is a halakhic rule that determines priority. But in the absence of a rule, one may choose as one wishes, and therefore the moral consideration is legitimate and perhaps even more appropriate.

But with Siamese twins you need to draw lots. And likewise, if one sees two pursuers and two people being pursued and can save only one of the pursued, you wrote that he should draw lots, and you emphatically rejected choosing according to each person’s own preference. Yet here, in a choice between a commandment toward God and a commandment toward one’s fellow, he can choose as he likes. [And if one sees two lost objects, one belonging to Shimon and one to Reuven, and can return only one, it would seem he should draw lots. But if there are two identical lost objects of Shimon’s and he can return only one, then clearly he can choose whichever he wants.]
What is the distinction?

[I thought of two possibilities. The second comes from your own words, but even the first seems to have some logic to it.
A. If the value symmetry is absolute, then he should draw lots; but if there is a conflict between two different values, then a person can decide which one he chooses. (Though it’s a bit difficult to understand.)
B. When we are about to infringe on a person’s “rights,” one may not decide that arbitrarily on one’s own, and one must proceed equally. The only permission to infringe someone’s right is that the person is treated as though he waives it and agrees to allow the infringement in return for receiving the maximum chance that can be given him in a fair distribution. That’s what you wrote regarding Siamese twins. And regarding two pursuers, where you also required a lottery, even though there is no infringement of the rights of the second pursued person who will not be saved, one must say that the duty to save is also something like a right that the Torah grants the pursued person. And so too the duty to return his lost object is something like a right of the person who lost it. ]

Option A that I wrote is that a person may choose as he wishes between values, but when there is one value with two instances of implementation, he must draw lots. Because choice is made only at the level of values. And that choice between values can take place in two ways: 1. arbitrary choice. 2. “identifying” which value is more important in the specific case.
If deciding a conflict between two values is done by identification—that is, a normative decision of what I think should be done from the standpoint of the most general imperative possible (for in practice the values do have a common measure, etc., as you wrote elsewhere. And according to your view, in any case it is obvious that all of them are priced in terms of the intensity of God’s will, and if so all decisions and scales are possible)—then it is understandable that there is no connection at all to a lottery, and this is no more similar to Siamese twins than night is to day, and one should always (that is, is obligated to) do what in one’s opinion is more correct.
But if a choice between two different values (which are perceived as equal, either positively or by default) may be made arbitrarily, whereas a choice between two implementations of a particular value specifically requires a lottery, then that is something that needs explanation—and perhaps we arrive indirectly at option B above, which deals with infringing the rights of the recipient whom the value obligates us to protect.

Actually, what I wrote about God’s will is irrelevant if the values are binding even on Him, blessed be He, because then too—how did He decide on the ranking? Rather, the scale itself is binding on Him, meaning we return to the scale independent of God.

A good question. But one could argue that harming another person takes precedence for two reasons: 1. Morality is in our hands, whereas the religious commandment is in His hands to deal with its consequences (as I wrote in the column). 2. Harming another person is also a prohibition both toward Heaven and toward the other person.

Regarding 2, one could somewhat say the opposite: both I and the other person are obligated in the honor of Heaven.
If, for example, one has to choose between waving the etrog and returning a lost object worth 10 shekels, then the other person too is obligated to invest 10 shekels so that he himself can wave the etrog. So one could say that it cannot be that I am obligated to invest 10 shekels of my own so that I can take the etrog, and he is obligated to invest 10 shekels of his own so that he can take the etrog, but I am obligated to look after the other person’s 10 shekels at the expense of my etrog.

That too is a possible consideration. I am only claiming that there is room for such considerations even where Jewish law itself has no clear rule.
By the way, once I choose one side and begin acting on it, I am now engaged in one commandment and therefore exempt from the other commandment. That is, the non-fulfillment of the other commandment is justified. Therefore the act of choosing a side does not involve a direct prohibition, but only indirect causation of a prohibition, or putting oneself into something like a situation of duress. Like someone who puts himself into a situation where he will need to violate a prohibition in order to fulfill a positive commandment (for example, someone who throws out all his old flour before Passover and now needs to bake matzah from the new grain).
Somehow there is an intuition that the commandment toward one’s fellow ought to come first, but the reasoning באמת is not clear to me.

And by the way, your point too can be answered: I am obligated to invest 10 shekels for my commandment, but why should my fellow lose 10 shekels for my commandment?!

Indeed, that can of course be answered—with a question mark—and I mentioned it only as a possibility. The commandment is not my commandment or your commandment, but the commandment in general, and the goal is to increase commandments in the world and increase benefits. For the benefit of a commandment, plainly, is not supposed to be only for the person performing it, but something more general (even the fact that the person performing it received spiritual benefit from the commandment is itself a general benefit).

[By the way, in my view this really is an a fortiori argument or an argument from a general principle: if I feel obligated to pay 10 shekels of my own for a principle that seems right to me, then to exactly the same degree I feel obligated to pay 10 shekels of my fellow’s for that same principle that seems right to me. Harming my own rights or interests is exactly the same moral problem as harming the rights or interests of others. And paying 10 shekels of my fellow’s is even easier because there is less impulse involved (that is the a fortiori point. In terms of value it is an argument from a general principle, and practically it is a fortiori that it is easier to take from someone else). But I didn’t present that argument before in exactly that form (even though I’ve been turning it over for quite a while), because it seems to me—understatement intended—that in your eyes it is completely absurd.]