Answer

First, a few general remarks. It’s important in discussions like these to distinguish between first-order and second-order questions. That is, first one must discuss whether it is possible to make a change, and only afterward whether it is appropriate to do so (because of slippery-slope concerns and various dangers). These are two entirely different questions. The first is a question in Jewish law, and the second is a question of halakhic policy (not a halakhic question). Of course, even before all that one must ask whether there is any need for change at all.
My position is that regarding the question of need, there certainly is a need, even beyond specific needs; in general there is a need for refreshing and updating, since many people feel that Jewish law is becoming a laughingstock even in the eyes of those who observe it. As for the possibility of making changes, that depends on what exactly is at issue (see below). Questions of policy are indeed difficult, and I have no way to offer a comprehensive framework. On the other hand, it is important to remember that not making changes is no less dangerous. Even now many people are abandoning many laws because they seem to them—and rightly so—irrelevant. Why should their situation count for less in our map of concerns?!
 
The main question is the halakhic possibility of making changes. Here I’ll say a few things (I don’t remember which sources I referred you to). First, when it is clear that the enactment was originally based on a mistake, there is no obstacle to changing it, and there is no need for a court greater in wisdom and number, for this is a mistaken enactment, which is void just like a transaction made in error. Still, reason suggests that one would need a consensus of halakhic decisors who agree to this (not halakhically but meta-halakhically), but today there is great reluctance among decisors because of Reform, and therefore I doubt this will happen unless it begins "from below." And when we are talking about obvious mistakes, in my opinion such agreement is not necessary.
 
As for the concern that perhaps we did not understand their words correctly—I never understood these concerns. To the same extent there is a concern that perhaps we did understand their words, and then right now we are making mistakes and violating Jewish law. How is this concern different from that one? All we can do is use our best common sense and make decisions. Not deciding is also a decision. Especially since that too has heavy costs, as I said above.
 
Now I’ll go through the points you wrote:
 
1. Regarding absorption in utensils, if this is a different type of utensil, then the Talmudic law does not apply to it at all. That is not a change, so what is the problem?
2. A mistaken custom should be abolished, and it is important to abolish it (not merely permitted). But mistaken laws are not customs; they are mistaken laws. Repealing a law is not connected to custom. A custom is binding under the rule of "do not forsake," and one should not mix it up with repealing laws, which has a different halakhic definition. Regarding legumes, see the second column on my site.
3. I don’t think all of their changes are legitimate (some because of the content itself, and some because they ignored the mechanisms for change in Jewish law), but I’m also not willing to disqualify everything done by Conservatives. Each matter has to be judged on its own merits. In addition, there are quite a few kinds of Conservatives (just as there are Orthodox), and not all of them belong in one basket.
4. It depends which changes we’re talking about, as above. I don’t think it makes sense to discuss whether the Conservatives’ changes are correct for their community, because the question is not what authority those rabbis have (my impression is that most of them are rather ignorant), but whether those changes are valid. In general, if a change is valid, it can be made regardless of this or that rabbi. Today there is no authorized court that would count as a court permitting something that was prohibited by a counted assembly. The question is whether the change is proper and can be made without ordained judges, not who today is authorized to make it.
5. I assume you mean male homosexual intercourse. I don’t understand the need for such evasions (like saying "the disease" instead of cancer). I do not currently see a need for change, though I would be glad if we could find a way to make such a change (people suffer greatly from the current halakhic situation). The situation today is not essentially different from the past (except that then it was less public), and therefore this is not a need for a change but a need for a renewed examination of the law—whether it really forbids this.
I am indeed concerned that everyone will set up his own court and do whatever his heart desires, but again I’ll make two points: A. In any case, that already happens today, and because rabbis do not participate in it, ignoramuses are the ones doing it (those who decide to text on the Sabbath and the like). Is that better? B. I am no less concerned about not making changes. That too has heavy costs.
Rabbi Navon’s conservative approach is familiar to me, and I disagree with him completely on this matter (in my column about legumes I referred to a radio debate we had on this issue).
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Questioner:
As usual, thanks for the response.
 
As for the substance of the matter:
1. If it were ordinary metal, would it be permitted even without a court? Apparently Rabbi Melamed writes that after the fact it is permitted with metal and not specifically stainless steel (if I saw correctly, needs further examination). I didn’t see him address at all that this would require broad agreement to repeal a rabbinic enactment, etc…. What am I missing?
2. And a custom that people simply want to abolish because it makes life harder (assuming, of course, that they decided it should be abolished for policy reasons, etc. etc.)—is that possible? Logic, all the more so from a court enactment, would say yes… but the decisors opposed this in the past, perhaps for policy reasons?
3. Indeed, clear enough.
4. Suppose after long deliberation they want to do this. And we accept the Raavad’s objection that practically this is possible whenever it is possible to establish a court—does that wondrous court have to be accepted by all Israel, or can each community rule for itself?
5. Of course the discussion is theoretical, and no one needs to run and change it, etc. etc. I had no problem writing the term male homosexual intercourse. I just didn’t want someone to type the term into Google in order to get, supposedly, a permit for himself, arrive here, and draw incorrect conclusions. As usual, I’m cautious. In my opinion, justifiably so…
A completely different connection. The Rabbi wrote that he is doubtful about the existence of the World to Come and divine providence. If so, it follows that in our time there is no reward and punishment either in this world or in the next… and so according to this approach, apparently—and again, only apparently—there remains no reason to keep commandments except out of gratitude, morality, respect for tradition, and so on… Do you really think it would be possible to sustain an entire people observing commandments that way? (I know the objection to noble lies, but not everyone is mature.)
As usual, thank you and all the best.
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Rabbi:
1. Even if it were ordinary metal, it would be permitted without a court, since this is a decree made in error. That is what I wrote above.
2. A custom that people simply want to abolish because it makes life harder—one has to discuss why earlier generations did not abolish it, or why they instituted it in the first place, since even then it made life harder. And the fact is that it spread and was not abolished, for otherwise it would have lapsed on its own (as an enactment or custom that was not accepted by most of Israel). In any case, regarding custom there is of course more room for leniency, as opposed to law, for which this is not a sufficient ground. Perhaps if the decree ceased in practice among the public, one could discuss it מצד a decree that spread and then lapsed.
 
With custom, it seems that the whole issue is only one of halakhic policy and not really of Jewish law itself.
4. I didn’t understand the question.
5. Do you really think people are so foolish that they won’t understand what you meant, and now won’t be able to type it into Google? In our generation these evasions have no value or point. They are only ridiculous.
I don’t know whether there is or isn’t a point to it. But as I explained, I am not willing to build the service of God on noble lies. It has no value that way. Beyond that, there is reason to observe commandments because that is the truth, regardless of reward and punishment, as Maimonides wrote at the beginning of chapter 10 of the Laws of Repentance. And if maintaining the people as commandment-observant requires lies, then I want no part in such service of God. Then let them not observe commandments. I am not willing to make decisions for others.
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Questioner:
 
2. If so, maybe it would be worthwhile also to discuss "mechanisms for changing custom" as part of the discussion of changes in Jewish law. I just haven’t seen anyone touch on it.
4. In short—does one of the criteria for a court that is permitted to repeal decrees include that it be accepted by all Israel? For example, to reinterpret "an eye for an eye" literally.
5. The opposite. I was counting on Google’s stupidity, that it wouldn’t send them to this page because the expression was missing. The people here would presumably understand what I meant; Google wouldn’t. But once you wrote it, there was no longer any point, and in any case I had no problem repeating it.
I understand… but I hope you understand my concern here a little too… especially since this is not about inventing lies, but about an opinion that spread throughout the Jewish people and that our Sages really accepted as true… admittedly, the Rabbi is doubtful about it for one reason or another…. But educating people that there is a World to Come, even if it is not 100% certain, or is perhaps only the Sages’ hypothesis, seems to me entirely reasonable… I accept that perhaps it is worth pointing this out. In any case—I am the lesser party here. I don’t agree, but I respect it. I can only hope that my concerns about the risk here will prove unfounded.
I, for my part, do accept the idea of the World to Come because that is the tradition and because it has clear theological logic, but my opinion is not relevant to the discussion.
And after all that I’ll say this: over the past half year I’ve learned a great deal from the Rabbi’s writings, and my thinking has really been opened to many directions (philosophy, logic, theology, Jewish law, removing the fear of questions and opinions, analyzing inferences, etc.), and in general to engagement with subjects in Judaism that I had not previously delved into—and for all of that, despite the criticism, I have to give thanks. If you managed to intellectually break a few of my friends in Unit 8200, then I can only tip my hat. (Though I’m not at all sure that engaging in these topics is suitable for every Jew, but that’s already another discussion.) Like many others, I’m looking forward to the next books coming out, though it’s clear to me they’re going to stir up a storm—in the negative sense—in the way the Guide did in its time…
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Rabbi:
There are no mechanisms for changing a custom. A different custom changes it. In the case of an individual, there is sometimes annulment of vows.
There is no halakhic criterion of a court being accepted by all Israel. A Sanhedrin is, of course, by definition accepted by all Israel, but that is not what we are discussing here.
I’m glad my words are helpful. Though I didn’t understand what "to break your friends in Unit 8200" means. In any case, if you tip your hat, make sure the sergeant major isn’t around. 🙂
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Questioner:
So if, for example, I decide to stop observing the prohibition of legumes (I’m Sephardi so it’s not relevant, but let’s say), or a custom where there’s not even any doubt that it has a rationale—am I not violating "do not forsake"? (Maybe I missed something and there is no such rule? Does annulment of vows apply to that too?) Because what follows from your words is that if many people are offenders and violate the custom, then it gets abolished. Is it only me to whom this seems a bit strange?
I mean that they say there may be something to what you’re saying. For a place made up of lots of 18-year-olds with degrees, that is absolutely not trivial….
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Rabbi:
Regarding legumes, see the second column on my site.
You are indeed violating "do not forsake"; that is why I said that for a personal custom annulment of vows is sometimes required. But when the public stops observing the custom, it lapses. Every custom is a deviation from the normal halakhic baseline, and it begins with a few people who decided on it without any basis. Therefore, a custom that stops another custom is also really a custom that begins with a deviation.
Take as an example the custom not to put on tefillin on the intermediate days of a festival. It has no source in the Talmud itself (there the discussion is about the festival itself). So here we have an improper custom, and after several offenders violated the commandment of tefillin, it became a custom not to put on tefillin. Notice that here we are talking about an actual halakhic transgression and not merely violating a custom.