Question

Hello Rabbi,
I’m listening to your lecture series on innovation, conservatism, and tradition, and I have a number of questions that have piled up (at least up to episode 11):
1. You argued that there is communal acceptance—that we as a community accepted the Talmud upon ourselves, and therefore it is binding. But where does this rule itself come from, that whatever the community accepts upon itself becomes binding on us? It sounds as if this is some iron rule, but that axiom is really not clear to me at all.
2. Intuitively, I feel there is reason to be wary of changing Jewish law (whether because of values or changing circumstances), because in truth we do not understand the reasons for the commandments. So assuming that is correct, is there not value in “passive omission”? Meaning, if you do not know—don’t touch it. I understand that there are places where I truly harm someone if I do not make a change—like an agunah, for example, where I would say that the harm itself and the moral value involved (which I also believe is divine) require the change—but isn’t there some sort of ranking in your view? Doesn’t “passive omission” belong here?
3. If I understood correctly, you interpret “Rabbi Shimon is worthy to be relied upon in a time of pressing need” as explaining that one should rely on him when there is pressure in the interpretation of the commandment—for example, when there is a moral obstacle—so then you interpret the verse in a way that does not assume the difficulty. You also said this is a case where the two interpretations are equally balanced. I do not understand either assumption. A. The plain sense seems to me that “pressing need” means physical pressure, not interpretive pressure. B. In what situation do you have two things that seem equally plausible to you? In my view there is always some tilt in a certain direction…
4. I’m trying to understand the mechanism: when exactly do I change Jewish law because of a value-based consideration? From what you say, it sounds like each person can assess the value differently, and also its weight differently—so it comes out that this is very personal and intuitive—which means that Jewish law goes back to really being a law of multiple opinions and disputes, without much ability to present an “orderly method,” since there are no clear rules—these are personal questions of my values and the weight I give them.
5. If you change a Torah-level law when there is a moral change, I do not understand why in the case of male homosexual intercourse it is so obvious to you that the Torah forbade it in every situation. Who says the prohibition was not only correct for its time, when we see that kings and aristocrats would take young boys for amusement, and so the Torah prohibited male homosexual intercourse—but today, when a large portion of those who do this do so under compulsion because that is how they are constituted—it is obvious that the Torah was not speaking about that. Is there no room for such an interpretation? And I also did not understand how that fits with what you said about destroying idolatry—that then it was moral to smash and destroy it, and today it is not, and therefore that has to change… so why not assume that there really is a moral change here regarding male homosexual intercourse?
6. Your interpretation of “Any matter established by a count…” applies only to repealing a law, but not to interpretation—for me, though, a change on the basis of values sounds like repealing a law, not interpreting a law. You also innovate by saying that the Sanhedrin is not relevant to the law of the Talmud, which can be changed—aren’t these forced readings in your view in order to support your approach?
7. Modern Orthodoxy—I think you are mistaken in identifying YU as Modern Orthodox. Today they are definitely much more similar to the Haredi world than to Modern Orthodoxy. Rabbi Weiss from Riverdale and Rabbi Lookstein from Manhattan are, in my opinion, more similar to what you are talking about, but I’m not fully expert regarding the U.S., even though my whole family is from there.
8. Rabbi Stav versus Rabbi Lau—you said it is all because people do not want a liberal rabbi. I think that is not correct—people want a rabbi with a knitted kippah. Why? Because in their eyes it represents a Religious Zionist ideology. How is that expressed? Doesn’t matter. People want people who are like them and who represent them. And yes—maybe that is foolish, maybe it is emotional, but I do not think it is only because Rabbi Stav is liberal…