Q&A: On Free Thinking and Religious Commitment
On Free Thinking and Religious Commitment
Question
Hello Rabbi, a0
I have a few questions, begging your pardon, regarding the Rabbis YouTube video on free thinking and religious commitment:
1. Why is it that after the close of the Sanhedrin (the “formal obligators”), if nowadays we were all to accept upon ourselves some leading sage of the generation, the Rabbi says that this would carry halakhic weight and his status would revert to something like a Sanhedrin? After all, according to your view, after the period of the Sanhedrin all rabbis are considered only substantive authorities…?! What really underlies my question is this: was what made the Sanhedrin a formally binding authority (and not merely a substantive one) the acceptance of the people, or the Torah? If it was by virtue of the people, then I understand why today, if we all agreed on one leading sage of the generation, his status would be like that of the Sanhedrin. But if it was by virtue of the acceptance of the Torah, then even nowadays we would no longer be able to renew a Sanhedrin and turn it into a body with formal authority, since the Torah granted that authority only to the original Sanhedrin back then (or maybe not).
2. Regarding moral norms, for example, and the distinction between good and evil: why am I not allowed to define for myself what is good and what is evil? Why am I only allowed to accept moral values as they are, and merely choose whether to obey them or not? What is the fundamental difference? After all, with regard to murder, which categorically belongs on the negative and evil side, why is killing a terrorist considered a positive act, while murdering an innocent person is not? Because seemingly the terrorist, too, could say in the same way that murdering a Jew, God forbid, is good, and his arguments would stand for him. After all, even in the Jewish religious sphere there are cases where it is preferable to die rather than commit a transgression (even in cases where the threat of murder is directed at someone else and not necessarily at me, and still Jewish law commands me not to violate the prohibition and thereby seemingly cause my fellow to die, for example), since there are certain values and situations that are superior to the value of life. And according to the terrorists view, it could also be that exterminating the “infidels” is a value higher than life…
3. To sharpen a previous question: regarding a certain person whose article the Rabbi discussed about the difference between rabbinic and sovereign authority, why did the Rabbi assume that the author of the article also did not mean commitment to negative values? Why must that be assumed?! What is the problem with creating a value system for myself and defining for myself what is good and what is evil? After all, that whole lesson was built on this assumption, and what follows from it is that even that supposedly sovereign person is ultimately committed to some definitions of good and evil. Why does the Rabbi state as a given that “murder is bad and helping others is good”? Cant one say that the very statement of the previous sentence is a kind of fixation or lack of free thinking?
4. Where do I learn from that only the Sanhedrin was given formal authority? In other words, why does the commandment “and you shall do according to what they instruct you” point specifically to a Sanhedrin mechanism and not to the Talmud, for example, or any other rabbinic authority…
I would be glad if you could address each question.
Sorry for the length, a0
Thank you very much.
Answer
- You are bringing us back to the question of renewing ordination. Maimonides claim is that a consensus from below can reconstruct the chain of ordination from above that was broken. That is also how the Talmud received its authority (for its sages were not ordained).
- There are several different questions here, and it is hard to address all of them. You can decide whatever you want, but some decisions will be mistaken. Just as a person can decide that the wall he sees in front of him is a cat. Moral values are a kind of fact, and if there is a disagreement about them, then one side is right and the other is wrong. (There can be cases in which there are two correct answers, but not all cases are like that.) The same applies to the example of terrorists. Indeed, from their perspective they see the situation that way, but in my opinion they are mistaken.
- I dont have to assume that, but I do assume it. I also dont have to assume that there is a wall in front of me, but I assume that if I see it, then it is there. By the way, from my acquaintance with him, that assumption is probably correct.
- Jewish law determines that “do not deviate” was said only with respect to the Sanhedrin. You can see this in the verses as well, and that is the consensus of all the halakhic decisors (except Sefer HaChinukh). a0 a0
Discussion on Answer
Moral acts are not facts. Moral values or moral norms are facts. An atheist cannot morally criticize anyone, because from his point of view there can be no justification for moral norms. See the fourth notebook (the fourth conversation in the first book). Without moral realism there is no way to ground valid morality.
But it is important to me to understand why moral acts are in the category of fact?! And what gives morality its validity, especially if I am a non-religious person… that is, does a secular person or an atheist have justification to criticize me for certain behavior by virtue of “human morality” / conscience, or in the case of a non-religious person is morality subjective, dynamic, and lacking validity..