Q&A: The Borderline
The Borderline
Question
Hello and blessings,
First, I would like to express my thanks for the illuminating articles and books.
I would like to ask for clarification: where is the line that limits you when you accept or reject faith-based or halakhic determinations? I’ll ask the same question in several similar variations:
Acceptance of facts determined by the Sages: you repeat the claim that we are bound by the normative statements of the Sages, but not by their factual statements. Therefore, in certain cases you rule differently from what is commonly accepted, such as accepting a woman’s testimony, killing lice on the Sabbath, repayment of a debt before its due date, and so on. This is in light of your confidence about the reason for that particular Jewish law.
My question is: why not go further and determine across the board that whole sections of the Shulchan Arukh are no longer relevant today? For example: the laws of salting, the laws of menstrual cycles, the laws of cooking on the Sabbath, the laws of cooking meat and milk, the laws of tereifot, and more. From my simple impression, the halakhic system in these areas is founded on factual determinations that were formed through rational reasoning rather than empiricism, and therefore they should be voided, or changed.
If we take the laws of menstrual cycles: we can accept the normative statement that one must abstain close to the expected cycle, as they derived from a verse, but in order to determine when the cycle may come we would use modern tools. What’s wrong with that?
Acceptance of faith-based statements of the Sages:
According to your distinction between factual and normative statements, to what extent are you bound by metaphysical statements, such as statements about Heaven and Hell, the World to Come, and the resurrection of the dead?
Verses of the Torah:
You are not willing to sign on to the claim that the Torah’s verses in their exact form as we have them were transmitted to Moses our Teacher, even though you are certain about the revelation at Mount Sinai.
At the same time, you accept every verse and every determination absolutely, and try to reconcile it when it does not fit your approach.
In the post about homosexuality, you strongly refuse to find an explanation for the prohibition, and when you are asked about its reason you answer, ‘I do not know.’
Since in the ancient cultural world such relations were considered morally forbidden, I do not understand why not assume that this is the basis of this prohibition. Maimonides already wrote that it is preferable to find a reason for a prohibition, and not rush to determine that everything is beyond our grasp.
I ask this because you are also willing to accept that later human ideas became interwoven into the text. How do you know that a commandment like this one, whose human-cultural interpretation seems apparently clear, was given as it is by God?
Verses of the Hebrew Bible (Tanakh):
In response to a question about divine response to prayer, you refer to the verse in Psalms, ‘The Lord is near to all who call upon Him.’ Here the question is: why not treat the verse in its cultural constellation, and say that David wrote it out of his own outlook and faith? Why should his words, which are not a ‘normative statement’ but a factual one, trouble us at all?
In summary: the basis of the question is uniform. If we are making a selection and deciding what to accept and what to reject, I ask: where exactly does the boundary lie?
Thank you very much in advance, and more power to you.
Answer
Hello Moti. You’ve asked a very substantial question, and it is hard for me to draw a complete map. In my current book, the trilogy, I hope to do that. Still, I’ll try to answer briefly.
The determinations of the Torah are different from the determinations of the Sages. Regarding the Torah, my assumption is that the facts are correct—either because the Holy One wrote it, or because it was given through prophecy. True, in cases where it is clear to me that there is a mistake there—and conjecture is not enough—I would be willing to consider that a verse from a human and mistaken source was inserted here. But that would only be in cases where the error is clear to me. I do not think I know of such a case.
As for interpreting homosexuality, that is a matter of deriving the reason for the verse, and in Jewish law we do not do that except in cases where the reason is clear. Especially in the Torah, where it is hard to assume that it prohibited something merely because in that world they thought it was forbidden—unless this is a human addition, see my comments above.
Maimonides writes that it is preferable to find a reason for a prohibition, but that is on the interpretive plane. In Jewish law, we do not derive law from the reason for the verse.
Regarding a woman’s testimony, I did not write that I rule differently. I raised the possibility of changing the Jewish law. And that is different from interpretation and deriving the reason for the verse regarding homosexuality, because the disqualification of women is not written in the Torah, whereas the prohibition of homosexuality is. The disqualification of women is a rabbinic derivation—which seems rather dubious—and it is certainly reasonable that it is based on their outlook. See a response of mine that will apparently be published in Makor Rishon this Sabbath.
Regarding killing lice, it is indeed completely clear that this is a factual error. In the case of repayment of a debt before its due date, this is not even a change in the Jewish law. The Sages did not establish a law—that the borrower is not believed when he claims he has already repaid—but rather stated a fact, that in practice he does not repay early. One must examine whether this is still true in our day or not.
Indeed, regarding those sections of the Shulchan Arukh as well, when I reach a clear conclusion that we are dealing with an error, I will not rule in accordance with them. Even regarding the Talmud, I argue that its authority is not granted when its words are based on an error from the outset—not when reality has changed, because then we enter the question of whether, when the reason falls away, the enactment nevertheless remains, and the like. In most of the cases you mentioned, I do not think one can reach the conclusion that this is a demonstrable factual error. It is true that they did not rely on observations, but the determinations are normative. For example, absorption measures are not objective. A line must be set for when absorption is significant, and the Sages and the halakhic decisors set that line. The fact that they did not rely on observations is not so important, because observations cannot provide the answer—since one still has to determine the threshold of prohibited absorption. It is true that these days there is discussion of absorption issues in light of measurements—Rabbi Dror Fixler from Bar-Ilan, and in Rabbi Yair Frank’s master’s thesis, which was done under his supervision.
The same is true regarding menstrual cycles: there is no way to determine when the cycle will come, and we are dealing with an arbitrary line. It is reasonable that the Sages also did not think that the date in the month determines anything. This is a matter of setting an arbitrary line, apparently in order to preserve awareness of the prohibition and its importance. All the laws of presumptive status after three occurrences are established without reference to a known mechanism, as is explicit in the Talmudic passage in Yevamot 64b–65a—look there carefully—whether it is the spring that causes it or fate that causes it. If there are modern scientific indicators that predict the onset of the cycle, I am definitely in favor of abolishing the laws of menstrual cycles.
As for response to prayer, how do you know that I am not saying exactly what you wrote? I am certainly willing to say that. However, in the Torah itself we are speaking about God’s intervention in the world, and therefore my assumption is that His policy changed, not that it was never true. In that way prophecy and miracles also disappeared from the world, and so too divine interventions in general, including response to prayer.