Q&A: Regarding Rabbi Eliezer’s freeing of his slave
Regarding Rabbi Eliezer’s freeing of his slave
Question
Hello Rabbi,
In tractate Berakhot 47b it says:
Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: Nine and a slave join together. An objection was raised: There was an incident involving Rabbi Eliezer, who entered the synagogue and did not find ten, so he freed his slave and completed the quorum of ten with him. If he freed him, yes; if he did not free him, no! — Two were needed; he freed one and fulfilled the requirement with another. But how could he do that? Didn’t Rav Yehuda say: Whoever frees his slave violates a positive commandment, as it is said: “You shall work them forever”! — For the sake of a commandment it is different. — But it is a commandment that comes through a transgression! — A commandment of the public is different.
Some commentators say that freeing a slave for the sake of a commandment or for the slave’s own sake was never prohibited. But if so, it is difficult why the Talmud says, “it is a commandment that comes through a transgression.” Other commentators argue that a public commandment overrides an individual commandment (and even a prohibition). But then it is difficult why this was not ruled as Jewish law, since no halakhic decisor would permit violating a Torah prohibition for an individual in order to fulfill a rabbinic commandment of the public (perhaps except for freeing a Canaanite slave, and even about that I am not sure).
How, in your opinion, should one correctly understand these three stages in the Talmud’s line of reasoning:
- For the sake of a commandment it is different
- But it is a commandment that comes through a transgression!
- A commandment of the public is different
Best regards,
Answer
Hello,
First, Maimonides and the Shulchan Arukh rule that it is permitted for any commandment, not דווקא a public commandment. And that is also the implication of Tosafot there. The Rosh there does not even have the last question in the Talmudic text.
Your question was already asked against Nachmanides (Gittin 38b), who wrote that in a case of a commandment there is no prohibition at all (see Magen Avraham, sec. 90, subsec. 30, and Turei Even, Chagigah 2b). It was already answered by the Chatam Sofer on Gittin there, and that same answer appears in Igrot Moshe, Orach Chayim 1:188: there is no value in fulfilling “and I shall be sanctified” if the price is violating the positive commandment. Therefore there is no justification for freeing the slave, and therefore the prohibition has not been set aside. The freeing is permitted if it is done for a need, but it has to have net value in order to justify it. See Igrot Moshe there, who explained the three stages in the Talmud this way: only with a positive commandment of the public is there net value that justifies setting aside the positive commandment of “you shall work them forever.”
And the Ran in Gittin proved from this law that there is no real positive commandment of “you shall work them forever.”
Discussion on Answer
I don’t see any need for that strained answer. I’m also not sure that even if we say that the reading of Zakhor is from the Torah, the need for a quorum of ten for Zakhor is also Torah-level.
They answer that it was Shabbat Zakhor, and then it is Torah-level