Q&A: A commandment fulfilled through a transgression in result-oriented commandments
A commandment fulfilled through a transgression in result-oriented commandments
Question
Good holiday, Rabbi.
It is commonly said among students that with result-oriented commandments, the disqualification of a commandment fulfilled through a transgression does not apply, since the result stands on its own and does not dwell in the same bundle as the transgression that brought it about.
But this is seemingly hard to understand. For if the principle is that whenever the commandment and the transgression do not come simultaneously there is no disqualification of a commandment fulfilled through a transgression, then how do you ever get the case of stolen matzah that one does not fulfill his obligation with? After all, since by chewing it he acquires it, and it is forced to set it up as a case where he swallowed the matzah whole (in which case he fulfills the obligation after the fact). Rather, it must be that since the transgression directly caused and enabled the commandment, it is considered a commandment fulfilled through a transgression. And likewise with a stolen lulav on the other days, with which one does not fulfill the obligation—it is forced to say that the very act of waving is considered ongoing theft from the victim, and it is more plausible that since he stole it previously, it is considered a commandment fulfilled through a transgression. If so, why should result-oriented commandments be any different?
I saw in Oneg Yom Tov at the end of section 30 (s.v. "Afterwards") that regarding repayment of debts he wrote that a commandment fulfilled through a transgression does not apply there, and there indeed the matter is understandable: in legal concepts such as repayment and acquisition, a rule like a commandment fulfilled through a transgression—which relates to fulfillment of the commandment—does not apply. And the fact that one is exempt from the commandment is not because he fulfilled it, but because without a debt there is no such thing as the commandment of repaying a creditor; this is like someone who circumcised an infant at night, where even if he is exempt from drawing covenantal blood, that is only because there is no suppressed foreskin in doubt, not because he has already fulfilled the commandment. But that is not relevant to religious commandments whose essence lies in the result, such as "you shall eliminate" and circumcision, where one could say that since the result came about through a transgression, he did not fulfill the commandment.
And so too it is written in Kovetz He'arot (sec. 11, subsec. 1), that if the commandment effects a legal qualification, then even though the rule of a commandment fulfilled through a transgression disqualifies fulfillment of the commandment, the qualification is not impaired. But that applies only if the two outcomes—the fulfillment of the commandment and the legal status produced—take effect in parallel. But if the legal status takes effect as an outgrowth of the commandment, there is no reason to say that the qualification is not impaired, for it too is itself a commandment.
Accordingly, what the author of Minchat Chinukh wrote at the beginning of commandment 9 would fall away: that according to the view that "you shall eliminate" is a passive-omission commandment, if one ate leaven on Passover the commandment is fulfilled. For even according to the side that this is a passive commandment, we are dealing with a religious fulfillment that the leaven has been eliminated, not with some halakhic qualification, and it is hard to say that in the end a legal state exists that is not impaired by the rule of a commandment fulfilled through a transgression.
What is the Rabbi's view on the matter? Do you have an explanation of Minchat Chinukh? Why should the transgression not impair the religious result of the absence of leaven?
Answer
A few comments.
- These distinctions are indeed widespread, but usually they don't really hold water. People say the same regarding indirect causation as a basis for exemption, and there too, in my opinion, it doesn't hold water.
- Regarding repayment of a debt, one must distinguish between a situation in which the commandment never takes effect upon him and a situation in which he fulfilled it. If one bought a house that already has a guardrail, then certainly the buyer did not fulfill the commandment of guardrail, but he is exempt from it because the commandment never took effect upon him. Therefore, even if he repays through a transgression, one can say that he did not fulfill the commandment, but it no longer applies to him; and one can indeed still speak here of a commandment fulfilled through a transgression. I wrote something similar regarding the marriage betrothal of a secular Jew. According to my view, that a secular Jew has no fulfillment of commandments or transgressions, betrothal still applies to him, because it is a contract he signed. That is, the betrothal takes effect, but clearly the commandment of betrothal—according to those views that count it as a commandment—has not been fulfilled. And if I circumcise at night, the reason is that a person is not considered circumcised unless the commandment of circumcision was fulfilled upon him, and therefore we require drawing covenantal blood. This is similar to "you shall make, and not from what is already made" in the laws of sukkah: even if one has a sukkah, since it was not properly made, it is as though he has no sukkah. A sukkah is only that which was created by an act, and not merely an object that looks like a sukkah. Of course, according to most views—and that is the simple understanding—the making of the sukkah is not itself a commandment. And Rabbi Chaim's well-known words are that if a minor became an adult between the first and second Passovers, and the Passover offering had been brought for him while he was a minor, he is exempt from the second Passover even though the commandment's obligation did not apply to him; the commandment was fulfilled upon him. He distinguished between the act of a commandment and the fulfillment of a commandment. And several later authorities wrote similarly regarding levirate marriage of a minor: even though the commandment does not apply to him, the woman is nevertheless bound through levirate marriage.
- And that can also explain Minchat Chinukh's intent: even if the transgression impairs the commandment, in the end he has no leaven and no obligation remains upon him to eliminate it.
Therefore, the relevant distinction is not between action-commandments and result-commandments, but between a result that depends on its being produced by a commandment—in which case, if it was done through a transgression, there is no commandment and therefore no result—and a result whose value lies in its very existence, in which case even if one brings it about through a transgression, we are not concerned with that.
Discussion on Answer
In several places in Minchat Chinukh it is evident that he mixes together the two definitions: lack of obligation and discharge of one's obligation. As I recall, regarding the commandment of "you shall eliminate," he understands that if it is a passive-omission commandment then it is essentially a prohibition inferred from a positive commandment, not a positive commandment fulfilled by passive omission. That is really not plausible. But with respect to a stolen sukkah he makes exactly this distinction, and it requires further examination.
Many thanks for the speed and detail.
I identify with the main thrust of your explanation, and it seems to me that the main points were already mentioned in my question.
Still, regarding your suggestion that Minchat Chinukh only means that he is not obligated for the technical reason that there is no leaven, but not that he fulfilled a commandment—seemingly that is hard to say, for this is his wording:
"Another practical difference is that if we say this commandment is by positive action, then if he eliminated the leaven on Passover by eating it, he did not fulfill the commandment, because it is a commandment fulfilled through a transgression… But if the commandment is by passive omission, then even if he ate it, in any case it is no longer in his possession, and he fulfilled the positive commandment, since he has no leaven."
From the contrast he draws between the positive-action side, where he wrote that he did not fulfill the commandment, and the passive-omission side, where he says that he did fulfill it, it is clear that he is discussing a positive fulfillment of a commandment, not merely a technical exemption—which would also be relevant on the positive-action side. Especially since, quite apart from his conceptual inquiry, what sense is there in discussing whether he is obligated or exempt when in practice no leaven remains?