Q&A: A Comment on the Book “The Sciences of Freedom”
A Comment on the Book "The Sciences of Freedom"
Question
In the book, Koppel’s argument for the existence of free choice is presented (pp. 220–230).
A few comments:
A. The Rabbi divided (or perhaps Koppel did) between three kinds of series: a random series, a half-random half-fixed series, and a completely fixed series. Where do we find such a completely fixed series? After all, even if all the elements are arranged among themselves with perfect coherence, who determined the value of the first element (and therefore of all of them)?
B. The Rabbi rejected Koppel’s argument on the basis of restricting the series to the life of a particular person, and therefore we are once again dealing with a finite series, one that can be modeled, etc. How can the argument be refuted on the basis of a particular restriction? After all, any infinite series that we restrict—its restricted part becomes a finite series.
Perhaps the question should be asked differently: according to the assumption (agreed upon?) that our world is a limited world and not an infinite one, then even without restricting it we are dealing with a finite series, and at the end of the world (whatever that means), it will turn out retroactively that the series is a modelable series = deterministic.
As a possible solution, I would suggest dualism together with the survival and eternity of the soul (Plato, if I remember correctly).
Answer
First, Koppel is trying to show plausibility or possibility, not the actual existence of free choice in practice.
Second, there is a misunderstanding here. When I speak about modelability, I do not mean that one element in the chain determines the next one (a recurrence formula), but rather that there is a formula that describes the whole set-up as a whole (if there were a recurrence formula, that would be its solution). Therefore, the first element has no special significance. You can ask who determined the formula, but I am discussing the very existence of a formula.
In rejecting his view, I argued that my definition of freedom is not based on an infinite series that cannot be modeled (that is only a good illustration, but it is not essentially necessary). Rather, this is a local mechanism—that is, a relation between two elements in the series (a recurrence formula that contains a free element). In this definition, it really does not matter whether you can de facto attach some model to the result (the chain of our behaviors). Hence there is no need to add survival of the soul in order to arrive at eternity, in order to hold a libertarian view.
More power to you.