Q&A: The Existence of Collective Entities
The Existence of Collective Entities
Question
Hello,
I saw a lecture you gave on the topic of “the existence of collective entities.” The lecture was fascinating, although I tend to think that there are no such entities, and even if there are, they do not apply to nations and the like.
In any case, during the lecture you argued that state law binds those born after the law was legislated because the law initially applies to the “collective,” and at the time the law was enacted, the ones who represented it were the individuals who lived then.
I think the reason I am bound by laws legislated by my grandfather and grandmother is only because I have the ability to change the law. Meaning, as long as I have not changed the law, I have accepted it. There is no connection here to any “collective.” And the moment the state ceases to be democratic, my obligation to obey its laws will cease.
Of course, if I am right, that also has implications for the validity of this specific argument about the Sinai Revelation.
Thanks in advance
Answer
Hello N.,
I don’t recall a filmed lecture on this topic. Where was it? Do you have a link?
As for the matter itself, it seems to me that you are mixing together two levels of discussion: 1. The question of what the metaphysical basis is for being bound by ancient laws. 2. The question of what the moral-social condition for this is. You can say that if you do not have the ability to change it, you will not agree to be bound by it, but even if you do have the ability to change it, it is still not clear why that ancient law binds you at all. Without the collectivist assumption, I find it hard to see a good explanation for this (of course one can always fall back on legal efficiency and order).
As for the Sinai Revelation, which cannot be changed (at least not on the level of the great protest disclaimer, as the Talmud says), this is somewhat similar to a constitution or a basic law that can be changed only by a special majority. Notice the absurdity: Generation A determines that there is a basic law that requires a 70% majority to amend it, and now, two hundred years later, parliament in generation L votes on it. It turns out there is a majority of 68% against 32%, and yet the minority wins. The minority imposes its view on the majority only because generation A decided for us (= generation Y) that the minority would win.
Discussion on Answer
That is indeed an interesting explanation of the democratic process, and especially of the conservative one. By the way, Chesterton also wrote things very similar to those of Burke; I recommend you read him (I know Yossi already recommended him to you). His main claim is that conservatism is a democratic approach, but it is a democracy of many generations and not only of one generation. Therefore every change should be made slowly, until the generations accumulate a sufficient number of people in favor of change (I’m writing this much less beautifully and wittily than he does).
In any case, regarding our issue, it does not seem to me that there is any connection between the binding force of previous generations over our generation and the existence of a collective “entity.” On the contrary, all the nice and correct explanations you provided for imposing a contract on future generations constitute a rational justification for listening to past contracts even without the existence of a collective entity to which I am bound, and which they bound when they legislated those laws. At the very least, there is no necessary connection between the existence of such an entity and my obligation to past agreements.
Here is the link to the lesson of yours that I saw that deals with the topic – https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a8UkxVPG88g
I think there is a difference between the willingness to obey a law and being obligated to it. You may be willing to obey the law because of long-term considerations, but your obligation to an ancient law (the view that you must obey it, and if you do not, then you are in the wrong) is, in my opinion, based on a collectivist conception. Otherwise, it is your voluntary decision and not an obligation (that is, no one could come to you with complaints if you did not obey the law).
If I accept this definition of obligation, then I have to admit that I do not think I, or anyone else, has any obligation whatsoever toward past generations. Certainly, for reasons of utility of one kind or another, I have good reason to make use of past generations (Chesterton, Edmund Burke, etc.), but there is no obligation here in the sense that I am not acting improperly if I disregard the words of past generations. Therefore, one cannot come with non-utilitarian complaints against someone who violates the command of previous generations.
Only that is worthy of being called an obligation. Considerations of interest are beside the point. After all, we demand of a person that he be obligated and not violate the laws. It is not something left to his choice.
I accept that only that is worthy of being called an obligation, but I still think that I have no obligation (and neither do you) to past generations. We have other obligations (morality/God), but that is already a different matter.
Not to past generations, but to the system of laws that they accepted/established. The obligation is not because of their sanctity or authority, but because they were the first to begin this long-term contract. Its validity comes from its content.
I understand. I simply do not accept that there is any obligation in this context to stand by that same long-term “agreement.” I’d be happy if you proved me wrong in whatever way you choose.
I have no way to prove someone wrong or prove something to someone. I am only saying that such an obligation is based on a collective ontic conception. Whoever does not accept it, does not accept it.
I’ll add maybe a bit more explanation.
As Edmund Burke writes in Reflections on the Revolution in France, one of the ailments of democracy is short range. A government sees only as far as the four-year horizon. A plan that will bear fruit in ten years will never be implemented in a democracy, because no government is willing to pay the price for fruits that others will harvest (perhaps from the rival party). He suggests there an interesting model of moderate monarchy, but that’s not the point. What I wanted to illustrate is that sometimes there are situations that require long-term decision-making. Projects that cannot be carried out unless a long-term commitment is created. In such cases, the contract that is signed is long-term because there is no choice. Although a long-term contract (certainly if it binds descendants) is not moral, there is no choice if one wants to realize long-term goals.
It seems to me that this is also the logic of a constitution or basic laws. Despite the injustice of coercing future generations, the time frame here must be long. A basic law cannot be changed easily with every passing wind, because then it does not achieve its purpose. The stability of society and its values requires anchoring it in a more difficult and cumbersome amendment mechanism. Look at what is happening nowadays, when every government makes a constitutional revolution (the conscription law, core curriculum studies, and more), and the next government cancels it with the stroke of a pen. It is impossible to function that way. The law loses its meaning and becomes equivalent to a government decision. It is not reasonable for a law to have the same force as a government decision.
The Sinai Revelation was the signing of a long-term contract because the project requires a long time frame. The Holy One, blessed be He, expects us to lead some mission throughout history. Continuity is necessary (this cannot be done if in every generation He would make a contract with another people to do it). Therefore the injustice is created in which we are coerced by our ancestors into a long-term contract without having the possibility of changing it.
By the way, that is not entirely accurate, because we do have quite a few possibilities for change within the system. And in principle it is also possible to throw the whole thing out (and bear the price. In particular, if the abandonment is justified, then presumably the Holy One, blessed be He, would justify it too and not impose the price on us). But of course such decisions are made by the public and not by each individual. Exactly as changing a state law is done publicly (in the Knesset) and not by each individual.