Q&A: Response to the Rabbi’s Note in the Book “The Sciences of Freedom”
Response to the Rabbi’s Note in the Book "The Sciences of Freedom"
Question
Hello and blessings,
In the book “The Sciences of Freedom,” page 78, in the first intermezzo, the Rabbi brings Maimonides’ question in the Laws of Repentance (6:5) about “they enslaved them and afflicted them” and about “this people will rise up and go astray” [and his answer to it]. The Rabbi comments in note 37 that ostensibly there is a conflation here between predictive ability and objective determinacy; that is, ostensibly, “what is written in the Torah is that God knew this would happen, but it does not say that He decreed it upon them” [and as for the question of knowledge and free choice, Maimonides already answered it at the end of the previous chapter (5:5), that there is no contradiction between God’s knowledge and free choice, except that we do not know the nature of His knowledge]. The Rabbi answers that apparently Maimonides understood that this indeed was a decree.
In my opinion, it is hard to understand the text that way, and it is not clear what led Maimonides to understand it so. Especially regarding “this people will rise up and go astray”—what reason is there to say that this is a decree? Why would He decree upon Israel that they go astray? This is merely a notification, not a decree.
But the Rabbi’s question in the note is not difficult to begin with. On the contrary, it really is only knowledge and not a decree. The point is that in both cases we are not dealing only with knowledge [God’s knowledge to Himself] but with communication [to human beings]. The moment God shares someone in His knowledge, even without “decreeing”—just the fact that what God knows is now also known by someone else—at that moment the matter leaves the boundaries of God’s own knowledge, and by that very fact it unavoidably becomes a decree, meaning it contradicts free choice. Because regarding human knowledge, one can no longer answer that we do not grasp its nature, etc.
Let me spell this out. At the moment I am referring only to the problem of knowledge and free choice [and therefore ignoring the fact that this is a collective, which is indeed Maimonides’ actual answer; I am only explaining why he is compelled to answer specifically in that way]:
If God tells Moses that He knows that in the future the people will go astray, then there is no longer any way to reconcile this knowledge with the people’s free choice. For if Moses knows what is going to happen, and knows truly that the people will go astray—then the people have no choice, because for flesh-and-blood human knowledge Maimonides’ answer (there 5:5), that we do not grasp it, does not apply. And if Moses’ knowledge is not true, and it is possible that the people will not go astray, then it follows that God told Moses a falsehood / God did not know the future, and that cannot be.0
In fact, if one pays attention to Maimonides’ wording, he himself says that this is a matter of knowledge/communication and not a decree, and he even incorporates into his answer what he had already said—that God’s knowledge does not contradict free choice:
“…the Creator informed him only of the way of the world, etc., because He informed Moses that there would be wicked people in Israel, etc.; and likewise with the Egyptians, etc.—He informed him that in the end his descendants were destined to be enslaved in a land not theirs. And we have already said that a person has no power to know how the Holy One, blessed be He, knows the things that are to come.” a0
If the issue here is a decree, then after he has already answered that there was no decree at all upon individuals, why does Maimonides need to add, “and we have already said,” that God’s knowledge does not contradict free choice? Who was talking now about the problem of knowledge, and what does that have to do with the issue under discussion? On the other hand, if that answers the question, then why did he need the whole dialectical discussion regarding the collective?
But as stated, the whole discussion here is about knowledge, not decree. Rather, communication turns it into a decree. Therefore Maimonides first answers the problem of the communication, and then “closes the loop” by saying that from the outset the entire problem was only with the communication, not with the actual knowledge itself.
That is, Maimonides’ precise wording in his answer shows that he distinguishes between what God communicated [to Moses] and what He knows [to Himself]. To Moses He communicated only the way of the world, only about the collective; therefore there is no contradiction to free choice, since this statement pertains only to the collective. But Maimonides knows that regarding God’s own knowledge one cannot answer this way, because God Himself also knows the future of individuals. Therefore he adds that after we have solved the problem of what Moses knows, what God knows is no problem at all, as he already answered in the previous chapter. a0
Best regards,
Netanel
Answer
Hello.
There is no difference between knowledge of the Holy One, blessed be He, that remains with Him and knowledge that is conveyed to human beings. In both cases it negates the ability to choose. That is the truth. Whether Maimonides thought so or not—that is a less important question from my perspective. a0
Discussion on Answer
I understand. And I am saying that for me it is not really important what Maimonides thought, and therefore I am not getting into that issue here.
By the way, the distinction between knowledge and decree is not like the distinction between knowledge that is conveyed and knowledge that is kept to Himself. By the same token, one could explain that he understood “this people will rise up and go astray” as a decree. But as I said, in my opinion the issue is not important.
I’m sorry, but I don’t understand…. I’m talking about a note in the book where the Rabbi does in fact deal with Maimonides’ words. In the book the issue apparently was important to the Rabbi, and he dealt with it and discussed it in a note. I bought the book and I’m reading it now, and I have a response to what the Rabbi wrote there. The Rabbi answers me that it’s not important what Maimonides thought, and therefore the Rabbi is not getting into it here. Where should I ask about the note in the book if not here? I can’t talk to the book.
Netanel, it seems to me that the Or Sameach says what you’re saying, when he disagrees with the Raavad there on the spot.
See here (including in the comments):
https://mikyab.net/Q&A/Questions about Knowledge and Free Choice/
Indeed! Thank you very much! That is exactly what the Or Sameach says in two words (regarding the Raavad’s objection that God’s knowledge does not compel): “The knowledge of the prophets compels”—and nothing more need be said.
Following your comment and the Or Sameach, I looked now at the Raavad there and saw in his words the distinction I made in my question to Rabbi Michi between the two cases—the Egyptians and “this people will rise up and go astray”—and I argued that regarding “this people will rise up and go astray” there is no logic or reason at all to think that it is a decree, and it is obvious that we are dealing with knowledge. That is what one sees in the Raavad there: regarding “this people will rise up and go astray” he answers that it is knowledge and not a decree, while concerning the Egyptians he elaborates a different resolution. a0
It really still requires clarification, according to the approach that Maimonides’ question is because he understood that in both cases we are dealing with a decree—how did the Raavad understand what Maimonides himself writes at the end of his answer, that “we have already said” that God’s knowledge does not compel? What does knowledge have to do with this question? [Perhaps because in the end, even if we solve the problem of decree, a question would still remain from the standpoint of knowledge, and therefore Maimonides mentions that such a question does not arise in any case.] a0
I also saw just now, and will note, that the Lechem Mishneh there also learns that in both cases we are dealing with knowledge and not decree, and says that Maimonides is essentially raising here again the question of knowledge [and not a new question from the standpoint of decree], and that this is what Maimonides wrote at the end—that God’s knowledge does not compel. He only said that in the case of a collective there is an additional answer, etc. [For my own part, I do not understand a thing of what he says; I’m only noting it for our purposes.] a0 a0 a0
Thanks again
Netanel
According to Maimonides, there certainly is a difference. For God’s knowledge is not knowledge in the ordinary sense, and precisely for that reason it does not compel (what the meaning of that knowledge is, that is already another question), whereas human knowledge is knowledge in the ordinary and familiar sense, and therefore it is also compelling (assuming it is certain knowledge).
I didn’t understand. The whole discussion in that note was about Maimonides’ view. The Rabbi asked about Maimonides’ failure to distinguish between knowledge and decree in the question from the Egyptians and from the people. On that too the Rabbi could have answered that Maimonides held there is no distinction between them and that this is not the truth, but the Rabbi writes there, “Maimonides apparently understood that…” etc. So if we are discussing what
M a i m o n i d e s understood and intended, and why M a i m o n i d e s asked from “this people will rise up and go astray”—then Maimonides’ explicit view is that God’s knowledge does not contradict free choice, and he wrote this within his answer on this very issue itself, as I quoted. But regarding communication to others, it is impossible to say that, and therefore from M a i m o n i d e s’ perspective communication to others d o e s make a difference. And I am saying that this is what underlies M a i m o n i d e s’ question from “this people will rise up and go astray.”