Q&A: A Question in Learning
A Question in Learning
Question
Hello Rabbi,
I’m currently teaching young girls a survey-style lesson on the first chapter of tractate Yoma.
This week we reached pages 6b–8a, to the discussion about whether corpse-impurity is permitted or merely overridden in the case of the community.
I’ve already come across this expression a number of other times, and I find its character similar to the rule of “it is a novelty” — we encountered that expression during our years of study with you in relation to conspiring witnesses.
In the various discussions, it seems to me that the rule of “permitted” — like “it is a novelty” — describes the possibility of a different kind of reality, one that is not required to fit into the regular legal system, and simply allows it as though the ordinary rules did not exist.
I also found such a discussion in the passage about the beautiful captive woman — in the question whether she is permitted even to a priest or only to an Israelite.
And on the other side stand those who insist that the matter is not a novelty, and that the rule is “overridden,” thereby leaving us with two different systems that have to work out and integrate with one another.
My direction is still quite preliminary, but I wanted to ask your opinion, and whether you have thoughts about sources that would be worth looking into.
Thanks in advance, and happy New Year.
Answer
Hello L.,
I’m glad to hear that you’re teaching. Much success.
As for your question, I don’t see a necessary connection between the question of permitted vs. overridden and novelty, and “you only have in it what its novelty gives it.” In my opinion, both “permitted” and “overridden” can either be a novelty or not a novelty.
Regarding a scriptural decree and “you only have in it what its novelty gives it,” I wrote about this in my article on conspiring witnesses.
Sound familiar? It’s on my site (search for “conspiring witnesses” or “scriptural decree”).
As for permitted and overridden, two comments:
1. Already the medieval authorities bring practical differences regarding the scope of the permission (in the context of saving a life and the Sabbath). In my humble opinion, there is no practical difference regarding the scope of the permission, because even if one holds that it is “permitted,” the permission applies only when it is needed for saving a life. So there is no real practical difference here (that is, “permitted” might be narrow and “overridden” broad). Therefore one must discuss what exactly the medieval authorities meant by the terms “permitted” and “overridden.”
2. Regarding impurity: at one time I thought it was unclear why impurity is permitted for the community. Fine — the elevated status of the community can override impurity. But how can it be permitted? It occurred to me that the community does not die (only its individual members are replaced; see the beginning of “On Repentance” and elsewhere), and therefore impurity does not apply to it. I also connected this to the Jewish law that in a case of uncertain impurity in the public domain one is pure, whereas in the private domain one is impure.
Discussion on Answer
Indeed, I had overlooked that Maimonides. But the connection is still not clear, because impurity in the public domain is not necessarily impurity affecting the public (especially according to his approach, where he apparently holds that impurity is overridden and not permitted). There’s a lot more to say about this.
See Maimonides’ commentary to Mishnah Parah 12:4, and see Laws of the Red Heifer 15:8.
Someone upon whom they sprinkled from a window used for the public is considered under compulsion in this respect, in that he had no reason to be concerned that the water was invalid, and therefore he is exempt from a sacrifice for entering the Temple (compare Laws of Unwitting Transgressions 5:6).
The principle is that since they sprinkled on him from a public window, he is not obligated to go and check very carefully whether the water might be invalid; rather, he is allowed to rely on the water’s fitness. In contrast, someone upon whom they sprinkled from a private window — he must check carefully that the water is indeed fit, and if he did not check and entered the Temple, he is considered unwitting (if it turns out that the water was invalid).
This principle is extremely important, and touches on the way we relate to someone who follows a “public” / “state” track (for example, in matters of kashrut) as opposed to someone who follows a “private” track.
From Maimonides’ words in his commentary to the Mishnah, it emerges that this is also the principle behind the rule that “in a case of uncertain impurity in the public domain, one is pure,” and consequently also behind the rule that impurity is permitted / overridden for the community (based on Laws of the Sources of Impurity 16:1), as explained in Keren Orah, to which I referred.
See https://hebrewbooks.org/pdfpager.aspx?req=14352&st=&pgnum=127 s.v. “And in my humble opinion,” in the passage beginning “And so his words in the commentary to the Mishnah can also be explained, etc.”
I understand, but as I wrote, the reasoning behind the connection between them is still unclear.
There is certainly a connection between “impurity permitted/overridden for the community” and “in a case of uncertain impurity in the public domain, one is pure,” as explained in the Talmud and in Maimonides (see Laws of the Sources of Impurity 16:1).
They both draw from the same underlying principle, and one should also add the rule taught in Mishnah Parah 12:4 regarding one who sprinkles from a public window.
And see about this in Keren Orah, Nazir 57a, s.v. “And in my humble opinion.”