Q&A: A “Theological” Proof for the Non-Existence of Infinite Universes
A “Theological” Proof for the Non-Existence of Infinite Universes
Question
Hello Rabbi. I thought of a “theological” proof for the non-existence of infinite universes, so that it could be used as a refutation of the atheists’ claim about infinite universes. If it is correct, it would be worthwhile for you to add it to the trilogy, even if phrased differently. The proof: Premise A: If infinite universes exist, then almost certainly, somewhere in one of the universes, the following items came into being on their own (not necessarily in the same place): all models of iPhone, all models of airplane, all models of spaceship, and more (infinitely many) special and complex items. This premise is based on the “infinite monkey theorem,” according to which, given infinitely many attempts, everything will necessarily come into being on its own. Premise B: Not even one of the above items has come into being anywhere in the universe, all the more so not all of them. Conclusion: infinite parallel universes do not exist. Premise A is clear, and Premise B is accepted by most atheists. That is: if we forced them under threat to bet all their money on the question whether somewhere all these items came into being on their own—they would certainly bet that they did not, because they would not want to lose their money. The conclusion is that implicitly they do not believe in the existence of infinite universes. Q.E.D.
Answer
In my estimation, you have not found the Holy Grail. Those who think that these items really should come into being will tell you that indeed they are there. And those who do not think so probably will not raise the objection you are trying to deal with.
Discussion on Answer
In my estimation, yes. But it is worth trying.
You could strengthen the proof against materialists, who say there is no free choice.
The chance that in an hour I will be prime minister is negligible, but there is some tiny chance.
If so, across infinitely many universes I will probably be prime minister there. (Especially if he believes in biological identity among duplicates, that this is the same person.)
That is exactly the same claim as all the claims raised regarding multiple universes. According to the multiple-universes proposal, one should not be impressed by any rare thing, because there is a universe in which it happens.
I do not know what most people think, but if I were sure there are infinite universes, obviously I would bet that anything that has some probability indeed happens in one of the universes. That is the whole idea of multiple universes (as I understand it, and I do not understand the topic). Why do you think Premise B is accepted by most atheists who accept Premise A?
That is exactly what I wrote to him in my first message.
The point is that people throw out the infinite-universes hypothesis far too easily, and do not notice its ontological cost.
When someone is aware that he is actually supposed to believe that countless airplanes, iPhones, and spaceships came into being on their own throughout the universes, he thinks twice about whether he really believes it.
Obviously, if you truly and sincerely believe in infinite universes, then this proof does not work on you.
Likewise, if someone does not believe in morality, the proof for God from morality does not work on him.
Yosef, you are still presenting the argument incorrectly. You are positing the premise that there are no iPhones. A more precise way to present the argument is to say that according to the many-universes thesis, in different places there are iPhones and demons and fairies, and now to place the reader before the choice of whether to accept this or that. I am careful to present theological arguments in that way; otherwise you immediately get responses like the ones you got here. By the way, in my book God Plays Dice (and perhaps also in the article—I do not remember), I speak about fairies and gods that are created in various universes according to this thesis, which tries to present an alternative to the existence of God. In my terminology there, this is the Mad Hatter’s tea party from Alice.
So, do you agree that the argument is valid, just that there are no people who hold the premise without the conclusion, and therefore it is not useful?
How is this different from your theological proof from morality, where you do see value? There too, a priori, someone who does not believe in God will not believe in morality, yet empirically we see that this is not so.
So too here, it seems to me that when people know this is the implication of belief in infinite universes, many of them will reexamine it very carefully.
In practice, you can see that people are not aware of this implication of their belief in universes, and if you ask them whether Premise B is acceptable to them outside the framework of the discussion about the existence of God, they will say that it is acceptable.
In conclusion: do you think that if I force an atheist to bet on Premise B, without revealing to him that this is the implication of his belief in infinite universes, he will bet that all these complex things came into being?