Q&A: Intention in Commandments
Intention in Commandments
Question
Hello Rabbi Michael Abraham!
Regarding the discussion about the “book from Bnei Brak,” around the question whether there is an obligation or value in having intention when refraining from something forbidden by a prohibition, because commandments require intention. As you may recall, I brought various sources from the Ari obligating intention, while you argued that this is nonsense.
Recently, a comprehensive and wonderful book was published called Torat HaMitzvah by Rabbi Aharon Rubinfeld (author of Torat HaKinyanim), which serves as a fascinating encyclopedia of various aspects of commandment fulfillment (one who is occupied with one commandment is exempt from another commandment, intention in a commandment, a commandment that comes through a transgression, and the like). I looked through his book, and also spoke with him about this issue in person.
On the main issue of intention in commandments, he brings the two basic sides of the matter (with many references and quotations): whether the obligation of intention (according to the view that commandments require intention) is an additional component of fulfilling the commandment, since the Torah wants there to be “service of God” in its fulfillment, that one should fulfill it in thought and in deed; or whether the intention is part of the commandment itself, such that without intention the act of the commandment is defined as mere inadvertent involvement, has no value, does not have the status of a “commandment-act,” and is considered as though he did not fulfill the commandment.
Another point: he goes on at length to prove that even according to the view that intention is not indispensable, there is still an obligation ab initio to intend. The view that commandments do not require intention says so only after the fact (Rabbeinu Yonah on Berakhot 2, Ritva on Rosh Hashanah 28, Charedim 1:17, and others). And regarding the reasoning for this obligation, Ritva in Pesachim 7, Charedim, and others wrote that it is because of “and to serve Him with all your heart.”
Some wrote that there is an ab initio obligation to intend on a Torah level. And the question arises: if the obligation is on a Torah level, how is it not indispensable after the fact? And the answer is: if the ab initio obligation stems only from the verse “and to serve Him with all your heart,” then it is an additional component alongside fulfillment of the commandment, and therefore does not invalidate it.
Now then, if we say that intention is part of the commandment, so that without it the act is considered mere inadvertent involvement, then what the Ari wrote is indeed not understandable, since when refraining from a prohibited negative commandment there is no act to be performed. But if we understand it according to the second side, that intention is an additional component of the commandment because of “and to serve Him with all your heart,” then one can understand why even when observing a prohibition there is value in intending. For even when a person abstains from something forbidden, he is also called upon for this element of “and to serve Him with all your heart,” in thought and in deed.
That is, there is indeed a dispute whether intention is indispensable, and what the reason for intention is. But since it is agreed that ab initio one should intend according to all views (even according to the view that commandments do not require intention), and it stands to reason that this ab initio requirement stems from the reasoning of “and to serve Him with all your heart,” then there is now a basis for the obligation to intend when refraining from something forbidden. This is an obligation of intention in commandments (at least ab initio) because of “and to serve Him.” In other words, the obligation of intention when being careful not to remove the sidecurls is not a result of the verse “you shall not round off,” but a result of “and to serve Him.”
(I can send photographs from the book.)
I would be very happy to hear a response.
As for the classes in Petah Tikva, my soul longs and yearns to continue participating, but at the moment it is difficult for me both because of the times and because of transportation. I hope to renew my participation later on.
What topics are you dealing with in the class right now and in the near future?
Thank you very much!!!
Answer
Hello.
As for the two approaches, yes, these are indeed old and established ideas. But I do not agree with your linking this to the question whether intention has meaning in prohibitions, and we already discussed this. In my opinion, even if this is an additional law, that still does not mean it applies to prohibitions. Beyond that, I also do not agree that the fact that one should intend ab initio according to all views (this is simple and agreed upon, and does not require proofs and quotations) necessarily means that this is an additional law.
We are now beginning to discuss holiness and the non-sacred. The recordings are uploaded regularly to the site.
All the best, and goodbye,
Discussion on Answer
I didn’t understand the question.
I wanted to ask: Tosafot in Pesachim 115a, s.v. “Rav Chisda objects,” writes according to the view of Rav Chisda that commandments require intention, and despite the fact that one does not fulfill his obligation of the commandment of bitter herbs with the first dipping, he still recites “who commanded us concerning eating bitter herbs” over the first dipping.
Now one must consider whether this can fit with the side that intention is part of the commandment, and if he did not intend, הרי הוא like mere inadvertent involvement.
I would be glad to receive an answer.
Thank you.