Regarding a woman who became pregnant in a bath, there is a dispute among the halakhic decisors whether the child is a mamzer.

According to the lenient opinions, should one also be lenient in our case?

Aharon, there is no connection at all.
Whoever holds that view in the case of pregnancy in a bath maintains that a mamzer results only from sexual intercourse, not from a pregnancy that is not the result of intercourse.
But according to everyone, a mamzer also results from intercourse done unintentionally or under coercion.

MY, perhaps one should distinguish between someone acting unintentionally or under coercion and an atheist, for whom the intercourse is not even forbidden.

A.H., that is an invented distinction with no evidence whatsoever.
And it is clear Jewish law that an apostate Jew who has relations with a Jewish woman—the offspring is a mamzer.
And if someone under complete coercion, who is not commanded at all in that situation (since there is command only where there is choice), renders the offspring a mamzer, then all the more so an atheist, who at least has a choice between good and evil (and one cannot evade moral obligation by adopting values that serve base urges. Every person can choose between good and evil. Even someone who shuts his eyes to seeing good and evil can, and is obligated to, open his eyes).
And even from the standpoint of violating the Torah’s commandment (even if it were not a moral command binding on every person)—an atheist who sins because of negligence in his inquiry, which denied him the opportunity to recognize the truth (this is true of close to one hundred percent of people), already bears an aspect of culpability, for he sins against the natural command that binds every person: strive for truth with all your strength, live a worthy life, do not be negligent in recognizing the right course of action (this is a command that the Holy One, blessed be He, implanted even in one who does not recognize Him).

MY, I do not think the a fortiori argument from an apostate to an atheist is correct. An apostate is not under coercion. On the contrary, in the eyes of the Sages and the halakhic decisors he is wicked by choice. An apostate nowadays is really just like an atheist. Moreover, both the apostate and the atheist have choice. Are they not human beings? The question is which of them can actualize it (the atheist sees no basis for choosing the commandment, and therefore this does not apply to him—not because he has no choice).
It should only be noted here from the words of Maharik, who distinguishes between a woman who committed adultery by mistake regarding the prohibition and adultery out of a factual mistake. The basis of the reasoning is that when the mistake is about the prohibition, there is still a betrayal of the husband (a desire to harm the marital relationship).

And what about all of chapter 10 in tractate Yevamot, which is full of cases of mistake and even more than that, and nobody thinks to be lenient regarding the prohibition to the husband, or regarding mamzerim? It’s hard to say that an atheist nowadays is under greater coercion than they were.

That is exactly what I wrote. I only added that if someone is indeed trying to argue that intercourse by an atheist is not forbidden intercourse at all, then it is different from coercion. My suggestion is that an atheist who desecrated the Sabbath is not merely under coercion; there is no transgression here at all. He does not belong to the realm of commandments. Even if he puts on tefillin (with the Chabad people in the marketplace), he has not fulfilled a commandment, and a practical consequence is that if he later repents, he would have to put them on again.

Someone who has no side from which to choose the commandment has no choice. Because in order to choose there has to be some side at all (a point of choice), and he is therefore close to being coerced.

But:
1. I did not make an a fortiori argument from an apostate but from someone under coercion (in complete coercion, and she too was coerced, where the law is that nevertheless the offspring is a mamzer. Even though he and she are certainly not commanded at all, since the matter is not in their hands).
2. It is not true that the atheist has no side of choice. First, most mamzerim are born from an act forbidden even under normative moral law, and that is a category relevant to atheists too. Second, he (and she) can choose to inquire further, and inquire well, and not suffice with what he was taught or what his initial inquiry produced. If he were to inquire well, he might change his mind, and when he is negligent in inquiry there is an element of sin in that, since he has the choice to invest in searching for truth (that too is a command that exists for every person), and had he done so, perhaps he would have recognized the truth and avoided the adultery.

Maharik’s distinction is only regarding prohibiting her to the husband and the adulterer, not regarding mamzer status. Isn’t that so?

Hello Rabbi, I did not really understand your conclusion: according to the view that a mamzer is only someone who comes from forbidden intercourse (and pregnancy in a bath does not produce a mamzer), does an atheist who has relations with a forbidden relative produce a mamzer?

The words of Maharik, as I understand it, are not really relevant here, as MY said. He refers to the fact that the adulterous woman becomes forbidden to her husband because she betrayed him and committed a trespass against him (and here too there is already discussion when it was done with his consent). But the law of mamzer is not a result of betrayal of the husband.

As for the claim that this is in any case a moral problem (MY’s claim), because a person can understand it on his own, and therefore there is criminality here—this is not always so nowadays. It could happen today that a Jewish couple becomes “enlightened” and concludes that the taboo on polygamy is the entrenchment of instincts that evolution implanted in humanity, and then together—the husband and his wife—they agree to an ‘open marriage.’

It is possible that the husband and wife will join a cult or a new religion in which polygamy is practiced—with consent. So such behavior does not necessarily contradict moral instincts today.

Why should an atheist be treated more leniently than someone under coercion? Is he a cat that isn’t obligated in commandments? Fine, one could argue that he is coerced in his beliefs, but where did this law come from that anyone can claim an “atheist plea” and exempt himself from punishments by a religious court, and of course also from double payment, because his theft has no significance—he doesn’t believe in it? (And one cannot argue that there is a moral problem here, because morality too has no validity without God [at least according to the view of the local master]. And even if we claim that morality obligates regardless, the atheist will argue that he is coerced in his beliefs to think there is no morality.)

Indeed, I did not notice that you had moved from an apostate to someone under coercion. But even regarding coercion one can discuss whether he is treated more leniently than an atheist. I am not at all sure of that. The transgressions of someone under coercion are transgressions, except that he is exempt from punishment. The transgressions of the atheist are not transgressions. And this is not because he is a cat. He is obligated in commandments, but he has no possibility of fulfilling his obligation. See my article on causing a secular Jew to stumble into a transgression.
An atheist has choice, but to the best of my judgment he has no real side from which to make use of it. Religion and Jewish law seem bizarre to him. Just as you do not investigate whether the rituals of the Comanche tribe might have something to them.
I already wrote at the outset what my position is—that there is mamzer status here. Why do I need to repeat it?

Maharik’s distinction was cited in my words only as an additional reasoning to strengthen the claim that the child is a mamzer, since someone under coercion and someone who sinned unintentionally regarding the prohibition are considered as betraying the husband, and then even if one ties mamzer status to the prohibition or to betrayal of the husband, there is still mamzer status here.
Indeed, he does not speak about mamzer status but about prohibition to the husband, just as nobody else speaks about a child born from a married woman not being a mamzer under any circumstances (where there was intercourse). I cited his words in order to use his reasoning as stated above.

Even if the atheist has no possibility of fulfilling his obligation, how is he different from an ordinary coerced person? He too has no possibility of fulfilling his obligation.

In that sense there is no difference. Neither of them can fulfill his obligation. What I wrote was only in response to the claim above that an atheist is not a cat and obviously is obligated. To that I wrote that he is indeed obligated, but cannot fulfill his obligation.
As for the difference from someone under coercion, my claim is that a coerced person is a believer who belongs to the framework of commandments and transgressions, and therefore his actions are judged in those terms. Within that framework, if he was under coercion he is exempt from punishment, but his act may still perhaps be seen as a transgressive act (and as is known, many have disputed this). But an atheist is not in that framework at all. Even if he performs the commandment, it has no value as a commandment, and in my opinion the same applies to transgressions; therefore he is removed from the categories of fulfilling and violating Jewish law (even though he is obligated in it, since he was commanded, as above). From this it follows that even if he is under coercion, that does not give his act the status of a transgressive act, for it is not reasonable that coercion should make the act into a transgression if even without coercion it is not a transgression. Consider that carefully.

According to this, can there also be an atheist regarding a specific commandment? Say, I don’t think one has to put on tefillin. Even if I put them on, does it have no significance because I don’t believe in it and have no ability to fulfill the commandment?

And if an atheist repents, that is a sign that he did in fact belong to this framework (otherwise where did it suddenly come from?). So when he put on tefillin with Chabad beforehand, did that in fact have the status of a commandment?

Are there people who disagree with the Rabbi, and what are their arguments?

And if there aren’t, then why do people keep threatening us with the scarecrow of a state run by Jewish law?

Actually, what follows from your words is that with positive commandments your claim is fairly agreed upon, while with prohibitions (transgressions) your claim is novel and one may assume that quite a few would disagree with it.

With God’s help, Monday of the weekly portion “And it came to pass when Pharaoh let the people go,” 5778

A strong proof to exempt an atheist from commandments may be brought from the words of Pharaoh, who says: “I do not know the Lord, and moreover I will not send Israel” — it is thus explained that whoever does not know the Lord is exempt from fulfilling His commandments!

With blessings,
Tut-Vanilla-Samson, priest of On

A.H., it’s hard for me to imagine such a person, but perhaps. As for repentance—I did not understand.

Y.D., many disagree (see the responses in the next issue of Tzohar). In practice I have not met anyone who agrees. On the other hand, I also have not met anyone with a logical argument for his position.
What does all this have to do with a state run by Jewish law? Do you mean the fear that they will punish everyone? But that comes from secular people. What do they understand about Jewish law?

“An atheist has choice, but to the best of my judgment he has no real side from which to make use of it. Religion and Jewish law seem bizarre to him. Just as you do not investigate whether the rituals of the Comanche tribe might have something to them.” —
— Clearly, the side of choosing Torah and commandments lies far beyond his point of choice.
But there is a first step that does touch him, for example inquiry into the reality of the Creator.
And even someone who is not in a place where that is a live possibility for him still has some opening for inquiry into whether there is something beyond, whether there is something morally binding, etc., etc.
Someone who is negligent in the first step (and that is an aspect of culpability) also bears responsibility for the whole chain of potential subsequent steps (of course, at every stage and every step a person can deviate from the right direction, but a person can also not deviate).
How great is the responsibility? That is not something we can judge, but that there is a side of choice relevant to him—absolutely.

“The transgressions of someone under coercion are transgressions, except that he is exempt from punishment” — clearly this is not only exemption from punishment, but rather that he is not commanded at all in this situation, because commandment and transgression exist only if there is the ability to choose otherwise.

As for repentance—you wrote in one of the earlier comments that a practical consequence is that if an atheist puts on tefillin with Chabad and then repents, he would need to put them on again. But according to your conception that an atheist is completely disconnected and has no connection to commandments at all—how can he repent in the first place? Doesn’t that somewhat undermine the assumptions? If he repents, that is a sign that he was not a true atheist, and in that case he was indeed obligated in commandments, so when he put them on with Chabad he did fulfill his obligation.

MY, there is no point in hairsplitting here. The question is whether a reasonable person in his situation would bother to check or not. That’s all. And if we cannot assess that, then who can? Human beings determine Jewish law.
What is clear to you is not clear to me.

A.H., even if you are right, implicit beliefs still have no significance. As long as he himself thinks he is not a believer, he does not belong to the realm of commandments and transgressions.

Haredim also believe in a state run by Jewish law. Just two days ago I heard a traditionally observant woman describe how she left a neighborhood that was becoming Haredi after a Haredi child cursed her when she took her daughter on the Sabbath to the emergency clinic with a fever of 40 degrees Celsius.
This basic lack of respect stems from the Haredi belief that they can impose their faith on others in a state run by Jewish law. In the meantime, until that happens, they make do with persecuting their neighbors in every neighborhood they move into. The secular mistrust was honestly earned by the Haredim. The Haredim, for their part, hope that a state run by Jewish law will avenge all the insults they suffered from secular people (and they do not think about the damage this would do to science, education, and reason, on which life in the State of Israel is based).

Presenting the Rabbi’s argument in the public sphere would clarify the nonsense in this approach. If commandments or transgressions have no significance in the absence of belief, then there is also no room for religious coercion by the state or by neighbors. Thugs who throw stones at whoever they don’t like are thugs even if they are dressed in a suit and hat.

In my opinion there is room for shutting down transportation on the Sabbath, as happens on Yom Kippur, if most of the population returns to observance—but for civic reasons. Likewise there is room to prevent commerce on the Sabbath, including by fines equal to the revenue of the chain, but again for civic reasons (rest for all workers, and the like). But the scarecrow of a state run by Jewish law needs to be removed, and the sooner the better. The more the Rabbi’s view becomes accepted, the more reasonable life in the State of Israel will become.

Y.D., you are conflating punishment with coercion. Even if a given person is under coercion, there is still room to coerce him for reasons of social and public order, bad influence, and the like.
Beyond that, since my approach is not agreed upon, the secular fear remains in place. But don’t worry: as long as they do not adopt reasonable positions, we will not get any real influence. There is a God in heaven. (Modeled on Menachem Begin’s phrase: “There are judges in Jerusalem.”)

Rabbi, when it says that one may coerce compliance with positive commandments, is that said only about someone who admits that he believes in it but lacks the strength or something like that?

And if not, then what? Do you mean coercion of someone who does not believe? Of course there is no point in coercing him, since even if he performs it, he has not fulfilled his obligation. Moreover, such a person is not coerced even regarding a bill of divorce or an offering (the rule “we coerce him until he says, ‘I want to’” does not apply there).

“…And if we cannot assess that, then who can? Human beings determine Jewish law” — who can know how guilty a person is for his negligence? Only the One who examines the kidneys and the heart. (This is not a halakhic question. But certainly—in my opinion—there is some responsibility.)
“What is clear to you is not clear to me” — I do not know what you mean by “what is clear to you” — what is clear to me is that someone who was negligent in striving to recognize the proper way of life is certainly guilty to some extent in his negligence. To you it is clear that he is not guilty of that.
Fine, so we have sharpened the point of disagreement between us. Apparently the root of the disagreement is that in your view, the obligation to think and investigate with all one’s strength what is the proper and worthy way to live is not a binding natural command, whereas in my view it is.

It is hard for me to continue a discussion with gaps like these.

Not true. Every court examines how guilty a person is in his negligence and what his criminal intentions are. And so too a religious court examines intentions in a contract and in a criminal act. The fact that judges can make mistakes does not mean that it is beyond their ability.

We have not sharpened it. I did not write that the negligent person is not guilty. What is clear to me is that if a reasonable person in his situation would not think that some path had any substance to it, he would not bother to examine it. In such a situation there is no demand of him to do so either, because that is not negligence. Just as you do not investigate Indian beliefs because on the face of it they seem absurd to you. So is that negligence in your opinion, or not?