Question

Hello Rabbi,
Regarding be killed rather than transgress in theft according to Rashi’s view in the passage about saving oneself with another person’s property in Bava Kamma 60b, the commentators ask against Rashi from the well-known rule: “For all transgressions in the Torah, if a person is told: transgress and do not be killed — he should transgress and not be killed, except for idolatry, forbidden sexual relations, and bloodshed.” I was thinking that perhaps one could answer that we do not derive from general rules, even where an exception is stated. And other transgressions seem to testify to this as well, such as publicly humiliating someone, even a shoelace in a time of religious persecution, and public desecration of God’s name. In addition, there are sources that disagree with this rule:
Jerusalem Talmud, Avodah Zarah, chapter 2, halakha 2
“For we learned there: once most of it has emerged, we do not touch him, etc. We are concerned lest he die, and one life is not set aside for another life. This is not only in a case where he said to him, ‘Kill so-and-so,’ but even if he said to him, ‘Rob so-and-so.’ A gentile against a gentile; a gentile against an Israelite — liable; an Israelite against a gentile — exempt.”
Babylonian Talmud, Pesachim 25a
Rabbi Yaakov said in the name of Rabbi Yochanan: “One may be healed through anything, except through the wood of an Asherah tree.” What are the circumstances? If there is danger, then even wood of an Asherah tree should also be permitted! And if there is no danger, then even all the other prohibitions in the Torah should not be permitted either! — Actually, there is danger, and even so, wood of an Asherah tree is not permitted. For it was taught: Rabbi Eliezer says: If ‘with all your soul’ is stated, why is ‘with all your might’ stated? And if ‘with all your might’ is stated, why is ‘with all your soul’ stated? Rather, it teaches you that if there is a person whose body is dearer to him than his money — therefore it says ‘with all your soul’; and if there is a person whose money is dearer to him than his body — therefore it says ‘with all your might.’
Regarding that last source in Pesachim, Rabbi Eliezer compares money to life in that both must be sacrificed totally in certain situations for the sake of the Holy One, blessed be He. From that similarity, one might perhaps infer that with regard to be killed rather than transgress as well, there is a similarity between the two areas. (The law of be killed rather than transgress in forbidden sexual relations is also learned from a comparison to bloodshed.)
In addition, in Bava Kamma 119a: Rabbi Yochanan said, “Anyone who robs his fellow of even the value of a perutah is considered as though he took his life from him.” And Maimonides and the Shulchan Arukh cited this as Jewish law.
On the other hand, in Ketubot 19a there is a rejected initial assumption in the Talmud:
“But why in cases of compulsion? Rav Chisda said: Rabbi Meir holds that witnesses who were told, ‘Sign falsely or be killed’ — should be killed and not sign falsely. Rava said to him: Now, if they came before us to ask what to do, we would say to them: Go sign and do not be killed, as the master said: Nothing stands before saving a life except idolatry, forbidden sexual relations, and bloodshed alone. So now that they signed, should we say to them: Why did you sign? Rather, Rabbi Meir’s reason is as Rav Huna said in the name of Rav, for Rav Huna said in the name of Rav: If one admits to a document that he wrote it, it does not require validation.”
Seemingly, from here it appears that the rule that all transgressions are transgress rather than be killed except for the three severe ones is a rule to which one cannot answer, “we do not derive from general rules, even where an exception is stated,” since the Talmud did not give that answer here. In addition, according to your view that falsehood is a kind of theft because it includes deception, one could seemingly infer that just as falsehood is not in the category of be killed rather than transgress, so too theft is not. Or perhaps one could distinguish between theft and falsehood, because in falsehood there is no action, or because it is lighter.
From logic, it seems to me that one should not distinguish between falsehood and theft, and where the falsehood harms another person, it too should be in the category of be killed rather than transgress (like Rabbi Meir’s opinion in the initial assumption that was rejected).
I thought of another possibility to resolve all these contradictions by distinguishing between a halakhic prohibition and a Torah-based prohibition. That is, from the standpoint of Jewish law, it is permitted to rob another person in a situation of danger to life, but from the standpoint of Torah values it is forbidden by logic — just as killing another person in a life-threatening situation is forbidden by logic, and just as robbing a gentile is forbidden by logic but not halakhically.
What do you think of this approach?