Q&A: The Law of a Extortionist
The Law of an Extortionist
Question
Hello Rabbi,
Regarding an extortionist today, we were unsure in the yeshiva whether his status is like that of a robber by Torah law or only by rabbinic law. Tosafot argued that his status is like that of a robber only by rabbinic law, but there is a lot of evidence against this, and logically too it seems to me that an extortionist has the status of a robber by Torah law. Is that correct in your opinion? In addition, if someone extorted secretly and secretly gave money to the owner, does he have to pay double?
Best regards,
Answer
Tosafot on Bava Kamma 62 writes that an extortionist violates “You shall not covet,” which is a Torah prohibition (though apparently he does not receive lashes, and this has already been discussed). However, from the standpoint of robbery, this is only rabbinic robbery, since at the end of the day he does pay. If a person robbed and then returned money, the positive commandment severs the prohibition. So if he robs from the outset with the intention of paying, it is reasonable that he does not violate Torah-level robbery.
One must distinguish between a moral intuition that sees this as a wrongful act and the question whether it is included in the prohibition of robbery. The moral intuition is expressed in “You shall not covet,” but that does not mean there is robbery here, that is, that he falls under the legal category of a robber.
Someone who extorts secretly is not a thief, and there is no reason he should pay double. What would he pay? He already paid.
Discussion on Answer
It’s not quite so simple. But on the plain level, he has severed the prohibition. It is no worse than his ability to transfer ownership of the stolen item or to damage it and then pay money.
I just thought that according to this, it comes out that any robber can sever the prohibition by returning money, even if the stolen item is still intact, because one could say, “It is no worse than his ability to transfer ownership of the stolen item or to damage it.” Then the ordinance enacted for penitents becomes difficult: why is such an enactment needed, if in any case the robber can return money and exempt himself? Perhaps one could answer that ideally one should fulfill the commandment of returning the theft by returning the stolen item itself, and if he returned money, he fulfilled it only after the fact. The ordinance for penitents comes to allow returning money from the outset.
Indeed. That is how it seems to me.
Regarding the severing of the prohibition by a positive commandment here: if the stolen object is still intact, he is obligated to return “the stolen item that he stole,” and not its monetary value. If he did not do that, then to the best of my knowledge he has not fulfilled the positive commandment.