Q&A: Several Questions
Several Questions
Question
Hello Rabbi,
How are you? I have several questions, if I may.
1. I don’t really understand what exactly “one who says it is permitted” means, or more precisely, how according to Abaye and Rav Hisda in tractate Makkot this is considered close to coercion?
2. What is the definition today of listening to the voice of the sages? Is it still “according to all that they instruct you,” or does that apply only to the Sanhedrin, and today there is a different kind of authority? And if so, what is it?
3. Someone once explained that liability to karet is the result of a certain transgression, where the very act causes the Jew to be cut off from his “living singular soul.” (Even if this is a tenuous connection, it is the difference between a Jew and a non-Jew.) What I want to ask is: if so, how does karet work with Passover and circumcision? There, after all, I didn’t do anything, so how does the karet take effect? In addition, are we today exempt from the karet of Passover because “the Merciful One exempts one who is under coercion”?
4. In the entire tractate Uktzin there is only one Mishnah that mentions the word “uktzin,” and in the whole tractate there is not even one more mention of it, and the tractate itself deals with the laws of protective coverings, handles, attachment for impurity, and so on.
So I don’t understand why it was given the name tractate Uktzin, since this seems not even like a marginal topic within the tractate’s laws (most kinds of protective coverings are not necessarily uktzin, and not even the whole tractate deals with this).
5. I have a friend who asked me: “Why are we happy on Simchat Torah over finishing the Torah?” He argues that most people, or at least yeshiva students, hardly deal with the Written Torah at all, don’t study it deeply or toil over it, and it just passes them by, even with the practice of reading the weekly portion twice and the Aramaic translation once. So how can we rejoice over that? (A parable: someone who didn’t study a tractate but participates in his friend’s celebration for completing it—the one who should rejoice is the one who finished it, but although the friend does receive reward, why is he so happy?) And another friend asked me why we are so happy at the dedication of a Torah scroll. The one obligated in the commandment is the one who should rejoice; we come to accompany the Torah scroll, but what is the reason for such great joy on our part if it is only his commandment?
6. At the beginning of chapter three in Uktzin it says that any food does not require intention, only preparation, in order to become susceptible to impurity, and Kehati cites Maimonides as saying that this applies even if it is fit for eating only by a non-Jew, such as orlah or forbidden mixtures in a vineyard. I don’t understand how that works, because things from which benefit is forbidden are as though they do not exist for us (at least from a halakhic perspective), so how can the laws of impurity and purity apply to them?
7. Abraham our forefather conducted himself with the trait of kindness in a special way—he slaughtered three cattle for three people and baked for them an amount which, by my calculation, comes to 36 liters of flour alone! That is, a tremendous quantity of pastries and bread. Should we learn from Scripture that every mode of conduct written there is correct for us as well, and therefore one should learn something concrete from Abraham our forefather, for example? Or is not everything written about the patriarchs relevant for us, but rather only gives general direction, without an expectation of implementing things literally (that is, sometimes yes and sometimes no, depending on the matter)?
Answer
Hello Y.,
I’m fine, thank God.
1. This is a serious Talmudic topic, and there are many contradictions in it, especially in Maimonides’ view. It’s hard to go into detail here. But as to your actual question, in my opinion this really is coercion. The main difficulty is why this is not actual coercion but only close to it. After all, if he thinks the thing is permitted, then from his point of view it is permitted. (We are not speaking about someone who is lying; this really is what he thinks.) So why is he not completely coerced? The answer given is that he should have learned and did not learn, and therefore there is an element of unwitting error here. But in the case of a child taken captive among non-Jews, it may be that even this does not apply, and he is considered fully coerced.
2. The Sefer HaChinuch writes that this applies to the sages of every generation, but his words are puzzling and baseless. Simply speaking, it applies only to the Sanhedrin, and today there is no formal authority (to obey someone simply because he is a rabbi), but rather substantive authority (meaning: someone who is a greater Torah scholar is presumably more likely to arrive at the truth, and so it is worthwhile to heed him).
3. The issue of the nature of karet is not explained anywhere, and the medieval authorities dispute it. Therefore it is difficult to relate to the vague concepts you mentioned. But even if I assume what you wrote, I do not see why inaction could not prevent connection. Perhaps bringing the Passover offering and circumcision create a connection, and refraining from them causes there to be no connection, in which case there is no need to sever anything. The prohibitions sever an existing connection (for one who did perform the Passover offering and circumcision).
Indeed, nowadays there is an exemption due to coercion, and perhaps even a full exemption. It is no worse than someone who was on a distant road or ritually impure and is exempt from the Passover offering.
4. I don’t know. It might be worth checking Maimonides’ commentary there. Maybe in Kehati.
5. The assumption is that the Oral Torah is the study of the Written Torah. As Rabbenu Tam wrote, the Babylonian Talmud is a blend of the Written Torah and the Oral Torah, and therefore we are exempt from studying the Written Torah separately.
6. I didn’t understand the question. If it is fit for a non-Jew to eat, then it falls under the category of food. How do you know that only a Jew’s food counts as food?
7. It seems to me we discussed this once. Abraham represents a theoretical type of kindness. Kindness means deviating from rules and acting without rules. The expression of this is the exaggerations described regarding Abraham. Obviously an ordinary person should not act this way. This only sets the direction. On the contrary, for an ordinary person this would involve needless waste, and it would not be proper to do so.
Discussion on Answer
As I wrote, the definition of food does not necessarily depend on this or that person. If it is food, then it is food for everyone. Something similar appears in the case of one who betroths a woman with a date that is not worth a perutah here—the betrothal is of doubtful validity, lest it be worth a perutah in Media. But here it is not worth a perutah, so why should she be betrothed here? Because if it is worth money somewhere, then it has the status of money and one can effect betrothal with it.
As for the definition that something from which benefit is forbidden is considered as though it does not exist—I do not know where you got that from. There is a rule that “its measure is considered crushed,” but that applies only to things that must be burned, and only to something that requires a specific measure. See, for example, Maimonides, chapter 17 of the laws of Sabbath regarding a side-post made from asherah wood, and the note of the Maggid Mishneh there.
Regarding the carcass of a kosher bird, that requires checking. I would only note that it should not be compared to any other impurity, because there there is a special novelty of impurity of the gullet. That is not ordinary impurity.
Hello Rabbi,
Thank you very much.
Regarding the question of things from which benefit is forbidden: it is true that for a non-Jew, orlah is food, but a non-Jew is not included in the whole area of impurity and purity, so I didn’t understand: if orlah is forbidden for benefit to a Jew and from my perspective it is “as if nonexistent” in a halakhic sense, then why should it become impure and render other foods impure? After all, in the case of the carcass of a kosher bird, in order for it to contract impurity and impart impurity one must intend it as food for a non-Jew, whereas with orlah it sounds like this happens automatically?