Q&A: Several Questions
Several Questions
Question
Hello Rabbi,
How are you?
I wanted to ask a few questions.
1. When there is a dispute between Amoraim and at the end it says, “It was taught in accordance with Rabbi Yohanan” (for example), and they do not raise a conclusive refutation against the other opinion, is that because this baraita does not have enough standing to serve as a refutation, but only as support?
2. What is the straightforward meaning in tractate Niddah of “the daughters of Israel took upon themselves to sit [as impure] even for a drop of blood the size of a mustard seed”? Wasn’t this a decision of the Sages?
3. I saw an explanation for why one thread of mixed wool and linen is not nullified—for example, if one wool thread got lost in a linen garment, why is there no nullification by majority? The explanation was that in matters of prohibition and permission there is nullification by majority, but when both species are themselves permitted and only their mixture is forbidden, there is no nullification by majority. What is the explanation for that—that דווקא because both are permitted there is no nullification by majority?
4. I saw various explanations and wanted to ask your opinion: is evil merely the absence of good? And is darkness the absence of light, or even a reality unto itself?
5. Regarding your article on love of God: I haven’t yet had time to study it properly, but since for a long time I’ve been hearing about two main approaches to this commandment—the intellectual one and the emotional one—I wanted to ask whether I understand the intellectual approach correctly: that the main way to arrive at love of God is through Torah study. If so, how are women supposed to fulfill the commandment of love of God?
6. I wrote this question on a page and now I can’t find it, so I’m asking approximately: I saw in Yoreh De’ah a dispute among later authorities regarding the law of stains, and one decisor wrote to be lenient משום a double doubt, while the other disagreed because it is “from one category” (the category of niddah blood), and therefore it is one doubt and not two. Someone tried to explain to me that there is such a thing as not saying double doubt when it is from one category, but only when it is from two categories, and I wanted to ask whether you could briefly explain what that means.
Thank you very much.
Answer
Hello Y.,
I’m doing very well, thank God. I hope you are too.
1. Indeed. Even ending with “it remains difficult” does not really end the debate. The authors of the methodological rules wrote that when a Talmudic passage ends with “difficult,” it is still possible to rule in accordance with the opinion against which the difficulty was raised.
2. It was a custom of the women that received the approval of the Sages.
3. Because it is one kind with its own kind, and when there is no difference there is no nullification. The law of nullification was introduced when there are two different things. As I recall, this reasoning appears in the Ritva and Tosafot HaRosh on Bava Metzia 6a, and in Rabbi Gustman’s lectures there. Beyond that, there is also a reasoning that when the mixture itself is exactly what was prohibited, there is nothing to nullify. When the Torah prohibited the mixture, it was saying that there should be no nullification. Though one can discuss nullification in the case of meat and milk.
4. Simply speaking, darkness is the absence of light. Add light to darkness and you get light (not weak light; there is no offsetting here). This is unlike cold and heat, where a mixture yields something lukewarm. So the relation between cold and heat is like the relation between 1 and minus 1, while light and darkness is like 1 and 0. As for evil and good, these are not objects, so the discussion is not very well defined. In general, it seems there is a difference between a person who does not do good and a person who does evil, like the difference between failing to perform a positive commandment and violating a prohibition.
5. I don’t know which article you mean. Women can also study Torah (and should as well). But I don’t think that only through study can one arrive at love of God. Study is a value in itself, and not merely a means for the commandment of loving God. See what I said here:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oAFe4p7SDrw
6. This is a novel idea written by several medieval authorities (Rishonim), for example Tosafot on Ketubot 9a. If the two doubts are equivalent in terms of their halakhic significance, then even if they arise from different factual circumstances, the matter is not considered a double doubt. For example: a man betrothed a girl when she was three years old and married her when she came of age, and after the marriage it became clear that she was not a virgin. Now, it is possible that she had relations when she was a minor and is therefore not forbidden to her husband; but even if she had relations when she was an adult, it is possible that it was under coercion. Tosafot there determines that such a case is not considered a “double doubt,” because the two possibilities are equal in essence, since the seduction of a minor is also considered coercion, and in practice there is only one doubt: whether the intercourse took place by coercion or willingly.
Discussion on Answer
Hello Y.,
First of all, why in the world would I be upset? Why would I be upset about your preferences in shidduchim? Second, even if I were upset, so what? You’re supposed to do what you think. Much success.
As for your questions:
1. I didn’t understand the question. A Mishnah that does not hit upon the truth is not necessarily something that is not Torah. Even an aspect that was not ruled as Jewish law is Torah, especially since sometimes the halakhic ruling does not reflect truth but some other consideration (as in your section 2). There is no doubt that the Talmud and Jewish law are full of errors, in the way of human beings. So what? Does that mean they are not Torah? I’m attaching three articles that touch on this:
כל היכא דאמרינן 'בו ביום' ההוא יומא הוה – יום מכריע אחד בהשתלשלותה של תושבע"פ
2. There are many considerations in halakhic ruling, and not all of them are considerations of truth or not-truth. For example, concern for the dignity of the court, as is explicit in the Talmud in several places. So for example (see the second article I linked above), in Eruvin 13 they did not rule like Rabbi Meir because his colleagues could not get to the depth of his reasoning. Meaning, he was wiser than they were, and if they disagreed with him they probably did not understand him. And still they did not rule like him. I explained this by saying that there is a value of autonomy that overrides the value of truth. The same appears in the homilies of Ran (if I remember correctly, Homily 11), who discusses the question of why a sage qualified to issue rulings must obey the Great Court if he knows they are mistaken. After all, he will suffer spiritual harm because of the transgression he commits. And he answers that not obeying the court also brings spiritual harm. The same applies here. Preserving the honor of the Sages and other side considerations are also considerations of halakhic value, just like the main Jewish law under discussion. Therefore they too are taken into account in ruling.
Hello Rabbi,
I have a few questions about Kabbalah.
1. Two different people, each studying Kabbalah by a different method—one in which contraction is not literal, and the other in which it is literal—both gave me the same analogy: that there is a sun and there is dirt on the window (or that we have sunglasses).
At first glance this sounds like it’s not literal, so it’s a bit difficult for me regarding the person who learns that it is literal and still brought this analogy, especially since the other side also brought it. What do you think?
2. Is the question whether evil is only the absence of good or a creature unto itself dependent on the dispute there?
3. I read that there was a great kabbalist named Rabbi Emanuel Hai Ricchi who wrote that it cannot be that contraction is not literal, because the entire material world is certainly not God. But from what I checked, no one claims that.
Even one who says that contraction is not literal— is that correct?
Hello,
1. The claim that contraction is not literal is obvious nonsense. It means that everything is divinity and nothing exists. So then what is everything that I see and experience? An illusion? Whose illusion is it (after all, I don’t really exist, so the illusion isn’t mine)? These are just empty words.
2. I don’t understand this question. In my opinion these are meaningless words. What is the difference between the options? There is no such thing as evil in the sense of some metaphysical entity, only evil and good actions, or good and evil people (according to their actions). Evil is a category, not an entity.
3. Rabbi Emanuel Hai Ricchi (not Shiriki). See section 1. Hasidism holds that contraction is not literal, and it is commonly thought that this is the dispute between them and the Mitnagdim. I’m attaching a letter from the Lubavitcher Rebbe on this topic:
https://drive.google.com/open?id=1u06O9nWOR04sU05YP8IoDt1ZQPv0-mpH
Hello Rabbi,
How are you? I have a few questions please.
1. What is the logic of writing in the Mishnah an anonymous opinion and then a dispute, and vice versa, instead of simply writing straight out the Mishnah that in Rabbi’s view is correct? Also, someone told me that since in a case of an anonymous opinion followed by a dispute the Jewish law is not like the anonymous opinion, then Rabbi cannot possibly first give an anonymous ruling like the Sages and then write a dispute between the Sages and an individual Tanna, because then it would imply that the Jewish law follows that individual against the Sages, and that cannot be. Is that correct?
2. How would you define the concept of halakhic truth? Seemingly there are several parameters for determining the Jewish law, and not all of them are the aspiration to cleave to truth itself, as in the example of the Mishnah in tractate Niddah where Rabbi ruled like Rabbi Yehoshua and not like Rabbi Eliezer during his lifetime, and ruled that way during his death as well. So if that is correct, then if Jewish law does not specifically aspire to truth itself, what does it aspire to? (I hope I explained myself well.)
3. Someone asked me what the logic of verbal analogy is. That is, he is trying out of curiosity to understand the meta-halakhic logic of the matter. Do you happen to have an article or a brief explanation of this?
4. Even after everything I’ve learned, I still can’t understand the “contradiction” between the heavenly voice in the disputes of the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel, and the heavenly voice in the case of Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Eliezer with the Oven of Akhnai. How is it that one time they take it into account and it determines Jewish law for generations, and another time they do not take it into account at all?
5. Someone claimed to me that in Leshem it says that at first the sefirot were created and then they became divinity, and he understands from this that the author of Leshem learns that contraction is not literal. Is that true? (I know you learned the book Leshem and that you think contraction is literal, so this sounded strange to me.)
6. Do you think there is a contradiction between the two sayings, “One who comes to purify himself, they say to him: wait,” and “Open for Me an opening like the eye of a needle and I will open for you an opening wide as a hall”? At first glance it seems contradictory, because if it is enough to open a small opening, why do they immediately stop me, and sometimes there are even obstacles in order to test how serious a person is?
Hello Y.,
1. The Mishnah in Eduyot asks why opinions not accepted as Jewish law were included in the Mishnah, and answers that this is so that we will know the source of opinions we may encounter. Beyond that, it seems there is a reason for this because even opinions not accepted as Jewish law contain truth, and it is worthwhile to study them as well. I did not understand the question at the end of the section.
2. There are further criteria in halakhic ruling besides truth. For example, what the Sages think. Thus, in Eruvin we find that his colleagues did not rule like Rabbi Meir because they could not get to the depth of his reasoning. If he was so great, then presumably the truth was with him. So why didn’t they rule like him even without understanding? Because their own reasoning was different, and there is value in doing what your own reasoning tells you even if it is not the truth. See my article here:
Hello Rabbi,
How are you?
I have a few questions please.
I spoke with a religious person who strongly believes in the theory of evolution, and he made several claims. I wanted to ask what you think about them.
1. He said that Darwin was not a heretic, or that he did not have such a motivation as people say about him, but the opposite—that in his book, seven times, he writes that he is trying to explain how the Holy One, blessed be He, created and made the world. Is that true?
2. He argued based on the model of Tiferet Yisrael that in the past we were reincarnated inside the dinosaurs, and what science discovered is true and proven from the midrashim of the Sages and the Zohar and the writings of Rabbi Isaac Luria, and that the world has existed for billions of years, and once there was a world of dinosaurs and our souls were reincarnated in them, and afterward God destroyed that world and created a new world in which we now exist, etc. This is based on Tiferet Yisrael’s explanation of the midrash that God created and destroyed worlds, in light of the scientific discoveries of his time. What do you think?
3. He also said that anyone who wants to claim that God put dinosaur bones in the ground as a test of faith, so that a generation would come in which heresy would grow stronger and there would be things that contradict faith—and that God intentionally put the dinosaur bones there to test us—makes the Holy One, blessed be He, into a liar, God forbid, and also understands the world as belonging to the Other Side and disconnects it from God. What do you think?
4. I searched and I can’t manage to find an email you sent me on the topic of love of God. I only remember that you referred me to an article you wrote about it and about Maimonides, and as I recall you were precise there that this is an intellectual commandment and engagement in Torah, and there were comments from people on the site (I remember one such comment) that this is not what Maimonides implies, but rather that he implies it is a commandment of emotion and not of intellect, and you argued about Maimonides. I understood from you then that this is an intellectual commandment, and in one of the last emails you wrote me it sounded like you do not think that, so I would be glad to understand briefly how you understand the commandment of love of God. Also, although you hold that women should study Torah, one who understands the commandment of love of God as intellectual rather than emotional—do you think that necessarily clashes with the fact that women are exempt from Torah study (at least until recently) and hardly study at all, so how would they fulfill the commandment? Is that proof that perhaps it really is an emotional commandment that does not depend on intellect? Or in another formulation: how did Maimonides understand the obligation and way of fulfilling the commandment of love of God in his generation, with everything he thought about women? (This question is especially important to me because I started writing a column in a Sabbath bulletin here in Ma’alot that deals with this commandment—that is, I was asked to write a column for several Sabbaths for the bulletin on the commandment of love of God, so I would be very grateful for your help.)
In conclusion, I wanted a small piece of advice please. I’m getting various matchmaking suggestions with women of various ages, from 32 to 40 (which is around my age). In terms of the obligation of effort to find a spouse with whom one can have children, is there a certain age that you think it is worth limiting it to?
Thank you very much.
1. I’m not sufficiently familiar. Indeed Darwin was religious at the beginning, but I do not know what his views were at the end. Why is that important? The question is what the truth is, not what Darwin thought.
2. This is a problematic explanation. Science today shows that there was life tens and hundreds of thousands of years ago—and in our world, not in other worlds that were destroyed.
3. The excuse that the Holy One, blessed be He, planted the bones does not seem convincing to me, but I do not think the conclusion is that this makes the Holy One, blessed be He, into a liar. He also created plagues and evil—so is He wicked? He also tested Abraham our father, so why can’t these tests happen as well?
4. I’m attaching the article on emotions in Jewish law:
https://drive.google.com/open?id=1UqgalPwakD2p8pHrwkev_ArXsy-p3E5T
It’s worth consulting experts regarding fertility age. Of course it varies from woman to woman, and it’s best to ask the women themselves what their plans are and whether they have limitations. Obviously younger is better, but that is not the only consideration in finding a spouse.
Hello Rabbi,
Thank you very much.
I’m doing very well. After 9 months in which I worked, thank God I’ve gone back to learning in kollel with an excellent study partner, and I hope with God’s help that this will continue for many more years (both the learning and the study partner). I started going out for matchmaking dates (until now I had avoided it because I wanted to finish paying the ketubah to my ex-wife, and also I was very uncomfortable going out on shidduch dates while I was working—please don’t be upset, but it’s important to me to marry again someone for whom Torah is important), but meanwhile nothing serious has come of it.
I wanted to ask 2 more questions that I forgot yesterday.
1. The question is based on several assumptions that I think I understand in your worldview, so either that’s where my mistake is, or there’s really a question here, and I’d be glad for an answer.
You wrote to me that there is such a thing as “archiving of knowledge” (in an article by Rabbi Hutner), and you also wrote to me in your article about reinterpretations that every Mishnah is a certain statement with an objective, true character from some higher world. Now—there are Mishnayot in which there is a dispute between Tannaim regarding the measure of a garment, three by three fingerbreadths of purple wool found in the trash, whether it can become impure or not, and Rabbi Shimon disagrees and says that it is certainly impure, and that this measure was only stated with regard to returning a lost item. I’ve run into Mishnayot like this several times, and they seem to indicate that the “true Jewish law” about whether something is “considered lost” is at issue—whether in the context of impurity or returning a lost item—and the Tannaim disagreed about it. Now, I understand that surely one of them is mistaken and only one is right, meaning there is a Mishnah here that is unnecessary once the truth becomes clear. So how can it be that every Mishnah expresses a spiritual idea from a higher world if it didn’t really need to be there?
2. There is an interesting Mishnah in tractate Niddah where Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Eliezer dispute whether four women are treated as having impurity only from the present time onward, or only a virgin; and it says there that all the days of Rabbi Eliezer’s life they ruled the Jewish law like Rabbi Yehoshua, and only after his death did they go back to ruling like Rabbi Eliezer—because during his lifetime they were afraid that perhaps people would rule like him in other matters too, and they would not be able to protest because of Rabbi Eliezer’s honor. I don’t understand how that can be if you think that this is how the Jewish law is supposed to be—how can such a consideration enter into halakhic ruling?
Thank you