Q&A: Deciding a Doubt
Deciding a Doubt
Question
Peace be upon you
In the past I heard you make the claim that deciding a doubt is not really a decision. Therefore, a rabbi who is uncertain cannot rule in accordance with his uncertainty against someone else who does reach a decision.
This was said regarding a rabbi who is uncertain about a certain topic / passage (for example, regarding the location of the Temple courtyard on the Temple Mount upper platform) and seeks to impose his view against another rabbi for whom there is no doubt and who wants to decide.
Beyond the question of the authority of halakhic ruling in our time, do you have proofs that a ruling of doubt is not a ruling? (Aside from the simple logic of it.)
Answer
I don’t remember saying anything like that. And thinking about it now, I also don’t agree with it, at least not across the board. There is one kind of doubt where I have no position on the question under discussion, and another kind of doubt where I do have a position, but it is a doubtful one. The line is fine, but it exists.
Discussion on Answer
If you are clarifying the topic / passage, you should follow your own conclusion (provided you are competent to do so, that is, skilled in halakhic thinking). If you have no position, act according to the laws of doubt. And if you have a primary rabbi, follow him, whether in his doubt or in his certainty.
See my article here:
I read what you wrote.
The point underlying the whole discussion is authority. And since there is no authority except for the Great Court, or for decisors that were accepted like the Talmud, the power of the early sages and especially the later authorities (Acharonim) lies in their wisdom, not in their authority. And it follows from this that a person bears responsibility to study and decide between the halakhic decisors, and only if he does not know which way the law leans does he decide according to the rules mentioned below.
The Rema ruled like Rashba and not like Maimonides, that in a case where you do not know which way the law leans, you should follow the greater sage whose name is more renowned (and not according to the rules of doubts, as you wrote). But the question is: how do you know who the greater sage is—in this particular topic / passage?
What you wrote about a primary rabbi is unclear to me—what is the basis for that?
If there is a halakhic decisor who does not know how to decide and remains uncertain, while his colleague does decide, in what way is the wisdom of the first superior?
In any case, it seems obvious to me that when we are speaking about authority to decide (as in the Sanhedrin) and not superior wisdom, doubt is not a decision. And it is impossible that a rebellious elder would be liable for defying the doubt of the Great Court.
I do not accept the precedent-based approach that one should follow the greater halakhic decisor, so the question of how to identify him does not trouble me. And even when I have no position of my own, we are still dealing with the laws of doubt.
The advantage in the first one’s wisdom is that he understands that there are two evenly balanced sides. I already explained the difference between the two kinds of doubts.
Obviously, the law of a rebellious elder does not apply to a doubtful ruling. That is not what I was talking about.
But you yourself wrote, “if you have a primary rabbi, follow him”—where does that come from?
Following the greater sage emerges from the Talmudic passage in Avodah Zarah 7a. I understand that you hold like Maimonides. But in my view it makes sense that in a case where I cannot decide, I should benefit from the wisdom of someone who did succeed in reaching a decision here. All the more so in the case of someone who has not studied, where it is better to follow the greater authority, since there is a greater chance that he arrived at the truth, rather than going like a blind man in the dark as though this were simply a doubt.
If you do not know how to decide and you have appointed a rabbi for yourself, then he has authority over you because you accepted him upon yourself. Therefore, follow him.
It seems to me we’ve exhausted this. All the best.
So maybe this can be approached from another direction:
In my understanding, nowadays the halakhic rulings of sages do not have authority by virtue of "do not deviate," but rather by virtue of their wisdom and expertise (that since they are more expert than I am, they are more likely to arrive at the truth). (Though according to Sefer HaChinukh, one could understand that following sages by virtue of their wisdom is itself included under the Torah-level "do not deviate.") And this is what Rashba wrote: that the medieval authorities (Rishonim) were more expert, and therefore one should not disagree with them.
However, a person is first obligated to clarify the law for himself, such as which of the sages to rule like, and only when he does not know which way he leans does Maimonides say that a Torah-level doubt is ruled stringently, etc. (Laws of Rebels 1)
And it stands to reason that one follows whoever is expert in that particular matter, and one should not set in stone that one always follows one rabbi permanently.
If so, when there is one rabbi who is uncertain, and one rabbi for whom the law is definite and who is not uncertain—would it not be preferable to follow the one who is certain?
What do you think?