Q&A: Commandments Out of Doubt? Relying on One’s Conclusions?
Commandments Out of Doubt? Relying on One’s Conclusions?
Question
Hello and blessings,
Yesterday I sent a comment on the article about labels and discussions, and since this touches me very deeply [namely, that I am confused about how I can rely on my own conclusions in matters of faith, when perhaps I am the one who is mistaken and others are right; after all, the questions I have are known to other intelligent people, and they think this does not necessarily imply that there is an error here], I would like to hear your response to the issue.
Likewise, I wanted to clarify whether there is any value at all to commandments a person performs when he is doubtful in his faith [and does them out of doubt, and in the spirit of Pascal’s wager, which for some reason you do not like], since Maimonides wrote that one who does not believe [plainly speaking—with full conviction in his heart] has no share in the World to Come.
Answer
I answered there. As for the way you formulate it here: you ask how you can rely on it, but in that very question you are again leaving the decision in your own hands (whether to rely on it is itself your decision). You have no choice but to decide for yourself. See what I wrote there.
A person who is doubtful in his faith has to make decisions. If in the end he decides that, from his perspective, this is true, then he has commandments. If he decides that the doubt is too significant, then he has no commandments. If he has no clear decision, then there is room to perform commandments conditionally out of doubt (by the way, there are views among the halakhic decisors that a condition is not effective for commandments at all, like the condition of the Avnei Nezer regarding the afikoman on the Passover Seder night).
I do not know whether Maimonides requires absolute belief, but even if he does, that makes no sense. A person cannot have absolute certainty. Therefore I argue that it is enough that the belief is sufficient, from his perspective, for him to decide that he believes.
I do not like Pascal’s wager because it is nonsense. This has nothing to do with liking. See my book God Plays Dice.
Discussion on Answer
Pascal’s wager is foolish because it deals with a person for whom the probability that there is a God and that one must keep the commandments is small. His claim is that the expected payoff is positive, and therefore even if the probability is small one should still keep the commandments. That is a probabilistically mistaken argument, as I explained there.
If the probability is fifty-fifty, then this is not Pascal’s wager but rather performing a commandment out of doubt, and about that I wrote what I wrote above.
As for Maimonides’ view, I suggest you ask him. I do not know what his opinion is about doubters, even though you wrote something in his name. I am not familiar with it (and it does not really interest me).
Thank you. I responded there and will wait for your further reply.
I saw your remarks in the book, but due to my limited understanding I did not grasp your argument—I agree that a very remote chance, even if the payoff is large, will not motivate a person to act, but a chance that is not remote, where the gain is enormous, is certainly something a person should take into account. And that is mainly what drives me to remain at least “in doubt”—so that it does not turn out after death that I was mistaken in my conclusion and that I’m done for.
By the way, according to Maimonides, were the Israelites in the wilderness heretics? After all, in Moses’ time many doubted the truth of his words, and Aaron and Miriam also denied his superiority over them [unless that principle was only introduced later].