Q&A: Religiosity Under Uncertainty
Religiosity Under Uncertainty
Question
With God's help
Hello Rabbi,
I wanted to consult with you about how correct it is to accept the religious framework when one is in a state of doubt about faith.
Since we have certainty about nothing, not even about the deliverances of the senses, if we nevertheless try to quantify doubt about faith on a numerical scale, it seems to me that there are three possibilities:
A. A person who believes at between 0% and 50%; B. A person who believes exactly 50%; C. A person who believes between 50% and 100%.
So my question is: to what extent is it right for each type of person to accept the religious framework? Since the religious framework is very demanding and rigid, is it right for someone who believes close to 50% in the truth of religion to enslave himself and accept upon himself the yoke of the commandments? And what is right for someone who believes, say, 70%?
Maybe he should accept only 50% of the religion? Maybe observe only the easy commandments and not the hard ones? And so on. Maybe observe everything, but still not be the most pious person in the world, rather be a bit lax, etc. etc… to be lenient in cases of rabbinic-level doubt, according to the leniencies of Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel, etc.
It sounds like this is really not a simple decision, and on the other hand, a gamble on either side carries harsh consequences for the other side as well (for example, if the religion is 30% true, that person is going to get hit hard….)
Sorry for all the mess in such a simple question, but I couldn't express myself any better.
I would be glad to know whether the Rabbi knows of a rational way to gamble in this game, and how much.
Thank you.
N.
Answer
I don't think the 50% boundary is essential here. In that sense Pascal is right that the expected gain and loss plays a role here. For example, you don't take a 50% chance of a very great risk.
But it seems to me that here the consideration is not only one of cost and loss, but of truth. The importance of doing what is true is similar to cost or loss. Assuming this is the truth and you did not act accordingly—you acted wrongly. If this is not the truth and you did act accordingly—not terrible. Not in the sense of cost, but in the sense of proper and correct conduct.
Either way, I don't think there is any probabilistic criterion here, or any other such criterion. A person has to decide for himself how much plausibility he needs in order to commit to a system. It is true that with difficult commandments or with a very high cost (such as leaving a non-Jew to die on the Sabbath, according to those views that say that is what should be done—I disagree), there is room not to obey if the certainty is low.
Discussion on Answer
No. I don't have a formula. But the fact that there is no formula or percentages does not mean that this is an arbitrary decision. Most of our decisions are not quantified in percentages or in a formally stated logical argument, and still I would not regard them as arbitrary.
There is no connection at all to the naturalistic fallacy. The "truth" of religion is not a fact but a judgment. We are not talking about factual truth but about commitment and proper conduct.
It's true that the fact there are no percentages doesn't mean it's an arbitrary decision, but doing something without a starting assumption really does sound like a very arbitrary decision… so I would be glad to know why the fact that we have a certain probability that something is true leads us to conclude that we ought to follow it. (It doesn't feel like an axiom to me.)
I didn't understand the end of your comment. Doesn't the "truth" of religion yield conclusions on the factual plane, such as whether the revelation at Mount Sinai happened or not? If so, then we're talking about a fact. And only the event itself creates for us a normative understanding.
—
But if so, I will now ask a completely opposite question: doesn't every normative doubt, when there is no opposing norm against it, obligate us to follow it?
For example, in a hypothetical situation where from his perspective there is a 30% chance that the revelation at Mount Sinai occurred, and all the remaining 70% are empty in terms of norms, in the way of atheism and nihilism—wouldn't the default then be automatically to listen to the 30% of faith? After all, the very assumption that given some event I have a reason to follow its value-significance is connected to the naturalistic fallacy. So here too, even if there is a slight tilt toward the religious side, then automatically it would be proper to follow it, when I have no other norm opposing it.
Although here one could seemingly say that this itself is the question—whether such a norm exists or not—I don't think that's right, because if we had certainty that the revelation at Mount Sinai happened, then our acceptance of the claim that we need to follow it would reveal that we already have the religious norm, and the only question is what it is. So in a case where there is no other claim, then with respect to any doubt one should follow it.
I don't know what needs explaining here. If I feel (= understand) that something is true, then for me it is true until proven otherwise. You want an explanation of why that is true, and then you can again ask why one should believe that explanation.
I didn't understand anything from what you wrote afterward.
Following your answer, I think my question wasn't understood, so I'll ask it again in a different style.
The Rabbi certainly agrees that in order for a person to accept upon himself the yoke of the commandments (the normative-religious dimension), he needs a positive reason why to observe them.
The reason is of course the claim that God brought about the revelation at Mount Sinai (evidence on the factual plane), and therefore one must listen to Him (an intuition on the normative plane).
Since the probability that the revelation at Mount Sinai happened (and with it the normative obligation) is not certain at all, but is let's say 50%, the question arises: how much certainty is needed in order to move from the factual plane to accepting the commandments?
One can say there are three possibilities here: A. This is an arbitrary decision. B. This is an axiomatic decision. C. It is based on a combination of prior assumptions and considerations of prudence.
Since I think the only option that correctly reflects reality is C, I would be glad to know whether the Rabbi has an answer that identifies exactly which assumptions are hidden in C (and remember that our knowledge regarding the event is not certain at all)…
———–
Now let's continue and analyze option C.
If we understand that the plane with which option C deals is a process of inference that is "correct" and "objective," then if we have a normative consideration to act in a certain way and we have no opposite consideration against it, it is proper to act accordingly.
And therefore, if we think that the chance that God commanded us commandments is 0.01%, and we have no opposing consideration at the normative level, aside from the claim of doubt that 99.9% He did not command—but that claim of doubt is empty on the normative plane (because it does not say that one ought to refrain from religion).
We have no reason not to accept the 0.01%. Because we are not dealing here with an opposing consideration on the normative plane.
I think I understood well and answered what I had to say about it. There is no formula, and I don't know how to give you quantitative measures. If you don't believe, then don't observe.
So I didn't understand—what does that mean in practice? 🙂
For example, on a personal level I think Judaism is indeed a reasonable option overall. Is it certain? I really, really don't think so. Even though I have no way to quantify my understanding on a numerical axis.
How am I supposed to act in this gamble?
I agree that if I bet on Judaism I'm betting on several additional planes besides the World to Come: on the significance at the ontological level of our existence, on the values that guide us at the level of normative action, and on our future as hope. (If I remember correctly, these are Professor Rosenberg's words.)
But still, doesn't the Rabbi have some magic formula for how to choose the right action?
Truth be told, on a personal level religion doesn't really bother me at all; it feels much fuller to me than the empty wagon, even though I assume that in terms of purely material pleasures the secular approach is more "fun"/"pleasant"—but since I'm so used to living without them, I don't feel any lack with respect to them at all…
But still, could it be that I'm stuck in the naturalistic fallacy? That I think that because I give X percent to the truth of religion, that is a sign that one *ought* to observe what religion says? If so, maybe my very assumption that the Rabbi can answer the question shows that I secretly believe in the validity of norms for choosing probabilities, or else it's just an arbitrary decision if one cannot connect the percentage to what ought to be done…