Q&A: One in Doubt About Norms in Practical Jewish Law
One in Doubt About Norms in Practical Jewish Law
Question
With God's help,
Hello Rabbi,
I wanted to ask: if a person is in doubt about the very matter of belief—for example, in the Torah, or in the existence of a certain value, say not stealing, whether it is objective or relative, etc.—assuming that no such value contradicts another value (for example, Amalek and morality), what is the most balanced way to decide whether it is worthwhile for me to uphold those values or not?
As I understand it, there are a few perspectives here:
1) From the pragmatist calculation side (something like Pascal's wager): is the risk I'm taking worth it relative to the benefit? For example, a commandment like putting on tefillin, which would earn me reward for an infinite amount of time, etc.—especially since it is also a very easy act with almost no loss other than the time it takes to put them on. Or wearing tzitzit. As opposed to commandments that are very hard to carry out and require a great deal of energy. And all the more so regarding a fully religious lifestyle, which already changes one's whole life, even if each individual commandment is, in itself, very easy—on the level of even the strap of a shoe.
2) From a purely normative angle: seemingly, insofar as we think there is a possibility of a value that motivates me to act, and a second possibility which is the absence of value, then as I understand it, even if I am in doubt regarding the value, that is still the proper thing to do. Because the side of absence of value does not, by its nature, motivate anything, whereas the side of value motivates in an absolute way. If so, should we always go "stringent" even in a case of doubt about the very values themselves?
What does the Rabbi think is the right way to decide in all these doubts? Since there is no certainty about anything, how many percent does one need to believe in order for it to be rational to observe, etc.?
I seem to remember that many questions on this issue have come up here over time, but I don't recall there ever being a systematic answer other than the claim that expected profit is not the same as the expectation value of profit, and therefore Pascal is mistaken. But of course, in a situation where someone has a doubt with real weight, that is not precise. I am, of course, asking from the standpoint of expected gain, etc. Or usually the answer was that each person should weigh it for himself and remember that there is no certainty about anything, etc. But I don't recall a systematic treatment of the issue, and I'd be glad to discover that I'm mistaken.
Answer
I don't know how to give a systematic treatment. Each person makes his own calculation according to his understanding. If you are acting to maximize expected gain, then you have to calculate it according to your assumptions and act accordingly. So what are you asking me?
You need to decide what you think the probabilities are for each thing, whether in your view the reason to uphold such a value is only maximizing gain, and what the expected gain is. After you decide all of these, you should do the calculation and reach a decision. Good luck.
Discussion on Answer
I'll say again that I don't understand the question. Clearly there is no mathematical calculation here. You need to estimate the expected gain, assuming that from your perspective what determines things is expected gain. I have nothing to say about it any more concretely than that.
Okay,
So let me ask differently 🙂 In the Rabbi's view, what are the determining considerations? Aside from the fact that observing the Torah is not suffering or difficulty for him at all, and that he also enjoys it. After all, no one is more aware than you that this is not certain. And in the period when the Rabbi had difficulty with Torah observance, somewhere around the period before Netivot Olam.
B. What do you think about what I said—that insofar as this is the only value, we would have to go by the Torah by virtue of choosing and not a world of picking.
There are no determining considerations. There is one central consideration: that one is obligated to do it, and also that it is probably true to do so (though that is for reasons I don't know). If one does it in order to gain something, then each person should make his own calculation about what he gains and how much it is worth to him.
I didn't understand the choosing issue.
But that itself is the doubt: whether one is in fact obligated to do it.
The question is being asked with respect to a person who is unsure whether the Torah is true—say at 5%, or 20%, or 50%, or 70%.
What are the considerations that the Rabbi thinks are correct for him to use in forming a practical decision about how to act in actual Jewish law?
I don't know what I should add to what I wrote. In my opinion one is obligated to observe the Torah regardless of the benefit I will derive from it. On the question of whether you agree that there is such an obligation or not, and on the question of whether the Torah is true or not, you need to form your own position. If that is not enough in your eyes to obligate you, then you probably won't observe. If you are looking for quantitative numbers, you won't get far.
That's it. I've exhausted the matter.
You don't have to be a great genius to understand that these things are almost impossible to quantify in percentages… What I meant was that a person may think that the Torah is more likely true than not, that from his point of view both sides sound quite plausible, or that he gives it a possible but relatively small chance. And the question is what the right way is to decide between those possibilities…
As far as I know, the Rabbi goes on at length about the fact that this is not about certainty but about probability, and that is also how he tends to answer in many responsa. So the continuation of your remarks isn't clear to me.
I understand that there are two possible ways of approaching this: one from the side of expected gain, and the other from the side of truth.
There, seemingly, if we understand that insofar as this value (for example, the Torah) is true, there is an obligation upon us to act accordingly, then even if it is very implausible that the Torah is true, it may still be that we are obligated to observe it, when it is the only value that can create normative obligations, no? After all, that would allow for choosing alone within an entire reality of picking.
In any case, how does one calculate expected gain? For example, if a person thinks the Torah is true at 40%, but doesn't know whether every detail in it is true, because for example he might give the reality of the World to Come 50%, which is higher than the possibility of the Torah. (Following morality + soul, for example, in a Kantian approach, and that there is no reason to assume that parents created the soul, and all kinds of other arguments for the World to Come that make it the more plausible option—near-death experiences, etc. etc.).
On the other hand, he could argue that the Torah doesn't contradict that, and that all those people who describe the World to Come are only in the category of people raised in captivity or gentiles, etc., but if he doesn't keep commandments for which punishment is known, he will be punished.
But on the other hand, he could hold, according to your view as far as I know, that you are in doubt whether punishment in the World to Come exists, and that this is only meant to deter us in this world. If so, then even on the side that the Torah is true, we may still have rescue mechanisms. (On the other hand, neither the clear tradition nor most of the Hebrew Bible really imply that.) And similarly, if there is no World to Come at all, then everything is simply in the category of absence.
So how can expected gain be calculated? And tell me: what percentage does the Rabbi think is enough to obligate a completely religious lifestyle?
Does the Rabbi see any point at all in keeping some of the easier commandments and leaving the hard ones aside? For example, would it be advisable to tell a secular person who sees a fairly remote chance that the Torah is true to study the Book of Commandments and intend to do things for their own sake before he happens to do them anyway—for example, paying a hired laborer's wages, "you shall give him his wages on that day," honoring parents, etc. etc.? Or is this in the category of someone who rejects even one commandment and is rebelling?
I just don't recall the Rabbi ever going into these things too much here. If you have, I'd be glad for a reference so I can see more tightly argued ways of calculating this 🙂
Not long ago there was some journalist who claimed that he observes only the easy parts of the Torah (and is careful about the materials, if I remember correctly), because of the possibility that the Torah is true, but not much beyond that.