Thank you.
My response is between the lines:
Hello,
I hope and assume they are managing just fine there without me (all the more so considering they managed with me ? ).
Seriously—if there isn’t a really good reason (political, say), I think the Torah world would gain if you returned to participate in the discussions.

As for your question, I’ll answer on two levels:
1. Even if one cannot give up one’s life on the basis of such an outlook, that does not change the fact that a person cannot be convinced of anything with absolute certainty. At most, you could argue that such a person is in a bind. Moreover, I would claim that no person is certain of anything unless he does not understand his own limitations. Even if he has a feeling of certainty, he is mistaken about that, and if he gives up his life merely because of that feeling of certainty, he is simply making a mistake. I once wrote a post explaining that although Hasid Yaavetz (during the period of the Expulsion from Spain) praised the common folk who gave up their lives and did not convert, unlike Torah scholars who found leniencies for themselves, I am against idealizing ignorance and boorishness. If wisdom creates problems, then one should deal with the problems, not try to be stupid.
I have no problem at all with that claim, but if you’re not sure—then be religious only up to a certain point. Be religious for yourself; don’t do anything that affects the people around you in the name of something you’re not really “closed on.” And as far as I’m concerned, that person with a “feeling of certainty” is indeed mistaken, but I can understand his self-sacrifice more (given his mistake) than someone who gives up his life on the basis of probability.

2. I do not agree that only certainty can justify self-sacrifice. I do not think a soldier in the army who gives up his life is absolutely certain that he is right (and if he is—then again he is naïve). A person who understands that these are his limitations, and that his truth is never certain, functions within that uncertainty. If something seems highly probable to me, I am prepared to give up my life for it. The same applies to the law of a pursuer: when you see Reuven chasing Shimon, you cannot know with absolute certainty that this is indeed the situation and that there is no part of the situation hidden from your eyes. And yet you still have to make decisions.
What does it mean to “function within uncertainty”? Then function in a limited way, as befits uncertainty! Make decisions, but if possible let those decisions be qualified and lacking far-reaching consequences.

In other words, there are two possibilities here: A. He is a pursuer and I must kill him. B. He is not a pursuer and it is forbidden to kill him. Option A has a 90% chance, and the second a 10% chance. Why decide that the blood of the pursuer is redder than that of the pursued? After all, if you save the pursuer because of the doubt, you are thereby taking a 90% risk that the pursued person will die. The same is true of any moral dilemma involving self-sacrifice. For example, idolatry or forbidden sexual relations, for which I must give up my life. Again, there are two possibilities, and in each there is a clash between two very important values, and therefore the more probable possibility is the proper basis for decision even when there is no certainty.
I wouldn’t say “the more probable,” but rather: as long as you’re not sure—passive omission is preferable. You can’t take active initiative when you’re not sure of the justice of your path (maybe the trolley problem belongs here).

To be sure, this is only on the theoretical level: even if I have no certainty, I can still advocate an obligation to give up one’s life or to kill. Of course, on the practical level, a person who is aware that there is certainty about nothing will have a harder time actually realizing his values. But that is only a practical problem, and it must be dealt with on its own. Which brings us back to point 1 (that truth is not dependent on the problems it creates).
I agree that truth does not depend on the problems, but this is a problem that can be solved in a way that fits the truth: “passive omission” as a postmodern way of life in an age of doubt.
This reminds me of claims that were made after Rabin’s assassination, when people turned to the religious public and said: you see where religious faith leads. To that I replied to the critics: do you expect me to abandon my faith because of that? The fact is that I believe, and if that creates a problem of extremism, then that problem must be addressed. But problems and consequentialist considerations do not determine truth (I recoil from philosophical pragmatism that subordinates the true to the useful and to the desired outcome).
I agree. Though when someone openly announces what is truth and what is pragmatism, I’m willing to accept it.

Hello,

As for the forum, I didn’t resign—they made me leave (right before Yom Kippur, in that manner). Though I did not fulfill in myself “he too would withdraw and weep,” because of an offense to the Chief Rabbinate and my refusal to comply with the demand that I apologize (in my opinion, they should apologize to the public for their very existence and for their functioning). I completely understand the considerations and bear no grudge at all, but I do not agree with them.

I’ll now respond briefly to your comments.
It seems to me that the root of all your comments is your disagreement with me about making decisions under conditions of uncertainty. You argue that passive omission is preferable. Precisely because of that claim, I explained my position through the example of the pursuer and what surrounds it. I’ll now try to elaborate more.
A. In my humble opinion, you are making the same mistake as the postmodernists (whom you mentioned), who identify uncertainty with doubt. In Jewish law, doubt is only an even doubt—50-50. If the doubt is uneven, that is not called doubt, and we follow the majority (and some say that this counts as actual certainty, but this is not the place to elaborate). The rule “doubt cannot override certainty” is also stated about situations of doubt, not situations of uncertainty. Even when there are two witnesses, we do not have absolute certainty, and no one would think not to extract money or remove something from its established status. (In matters of prohibition, this is done even on the basis of one witness according to most opinions, though some disagree and hold that removing something from its established status is like matters of sexual prohibition and monetary law, where two are required.) True, with respect to majority, Rav and Shmuel disagree whether one may extract money on that basis, but that too is not relevant to us. The issue there is not “passive omission is preferable” but removing from someone in possession. (In the case of goats that ate peeled barley, they would certainly extract on the basis of majority.) Moreover, in the opinion of many medieval and later authorities, money is in fact extracted on the basis of majority as a matter of Jewish law (as is proven from following the majority in a religious court in monetary cases, as Tosafot on Sanhedrin 3 writes), and “the majority are for plowing” is a special case where we do not follow the majority (R. Shimon Shkop’s reasoning is that there is not really a true majority there. And that seems plainly correct to me logically).

B. I tried to illustrate the matter with the law of the pursuer: would you say there too, because of some slight doubt, that passive omission is preferable, and allow the pursuer to kill the pursued? My claim is that in every case of dilemma there is a clash between two important values (for if it were certain, even you would agree that it would override saving a life). Thus, for example, giving up one’s life rather than transgressing the prohibition of idolatry or forbidden sexual relations involves a clash between the value of life and the prohibition of sexual immorality or idolatry. Therefore, the same consideration that exists in the law of the pursuer exists there as well. Admittedly, there is room for the consideration that my action requires a positive reason—that is the source of the reasoning behind “passive omission is preferable”—and therefore a significant majority is needed in order to act, but certainly not certainty.
Therefore I will definitely also do things that affect those around me if I believe that justice is on my side.

C. I asked you according to your own position: if you have a slight doubt, would you then not kill the pursuer? Or not give up your life in the army? Or would you worship idols? Do you think “passive omission is preferable” applies there? If so, then how exactly do you yourself explain what you asked me? I assume you agree that it is impossible for a person to have full certainty about anything.
In short, you have not clarified what you are proposing as an alternative to my view: that there is a possibility of certainty? Or do you really think it proper to practice passive omission in all these dilemmas?

D. As for the trolley problem, one has to distinguish between several different cases. First, that is not a case of doubt about reality but of certainty, only that one must decide between two options. In other words: it is a legal doubt, not a factual doubt. One must also distinguish between a situation in which in any case I am performing an action, and a dilemma between action and inaction. And even regarding a dilemma between action and inaction, many would tell you that logically there is no difference, and what matters is the minimal price. In Jewish law that is probably not correct (though I am not completely sure of that, and this is not the place to elaborate), but you are asking me a meta-halakhic question—how I should relate to Jewish law—not an intra-halakhic one. There, reason determines, not Jewish law.

E. And finally, I will repeat again that all these considerations make no difference at all to the question of how you can be sure. Therefore I do not understand what difference it makes that you can understand the self-sacrifice of the innocent person who, in his error, is sure of his path and gives up his life or kills. I understand him too, and he is still foolish. I also understand the idol worshiper who believes in his path—so should I worship idols too? In short, in section C I asked: what alternative are you proposing?

By the way, even in Jewish law, in capital cases we follow the majority. Thus, for example, in a religious court judging capital cases, a majority of 12 against 10 is enough. That is a significant doubt, and they do not adopt a policy of passive omission. The same applies to clearing rubble on the Sabbath, and more (he discusses this at length in Sha'arei Yosher at the end of volume 1 and elsewhere—how can monetary matters be treated more stringently than life-and-death matters? Tosafot and the medieval authorities already raised this difficulty).

Hello Rabbi,

Thank you very much for sharpening the distinction between doubt and uncertainty; that is very important.
As for the legal system, in the end a decision has to be made, and therefore one goes by the balance of probabilities or by the majority of opinions; that is acceptable to me.
Public systems are pragmatist by nature and not necessarily committed to absolute truth (even by their own lights).
There is also a grain of truth in this, because the two litigants accept upon themselves this system of considerations—probability. And any stipulation in monetary matters is valid.

And from here to your question: what is my alternative?
Answer: I have none. But you yourself said above a principle that I also received from my teachers: the fact that you have no alternative does not purify the default.
As a philosopher I expect you to do what seems right in your eyes, even if it causes your life to look bad.
You’re not certain? Then don’t take anything from anyone without his consent, don’t kill anyone, be an anemic “pacifist” who acts only in the realm of writing and not in the realm of force.
I am not writing this sarcastically, but seriously—let us be faithful to our intellect.

I apologize for not writing at length; I’m better at speaking than at writing, perhaps unfortunately.

That is exactly why I asked you what your alternative is. What I meant to ask was not how you arrive at certainty, but whether in practice you really think we should not be fully faithful to Jewish law. For even you agree that there is no certainty, and according to your view, lack of certainty requires compromise—which I do not agree with. So either you have an alternative way to reach certainty—which I do not see—or you need to apply to yourself what you asked me.
All the best,