Q&A: Rabbinic-level leniency in a case of doubt about faith
Rabbinic-level leniency in a case of doubt about faith
Question
Hi Michi,
Following your view that uncertainty in matters of faith should be factored into Judaism as a consideration in deciding whether to be stringent or lenient, I would like to ask further and go a step further: in a situation of the above doubt, should rabbinic prohibitions also be permitted because of the rule that “in a rabbinic-level doubt, one rules leniently”?
Thanks, and wishing you a good week and a good month.
Answer
You could also ask about a Torah-level doubt, where one should be lenient because it is always a double doubt.
That is not plausible, for several reasons. Here are two. First, this is not an evenly balanced doubt, and that rule applies only to an evenly balanced doubt. Second, this is an internal halakhic rule, whereas this doubt concerns the question of whether one is obligated to Jewish law at all.
Discussion on Answer
This doubt is on the level of your personal situation, not on the level of Jewish law. Therefore you are the one who has to decide whether such a doubt is enough to establish commitment to the system or not. If you decide it is not, then of course you will exempt yourself. But if you are committed, then the rules of the system are that in a rabbinic-level doubt one is lenient, but not with something that is certainly rabbinic. In other words, this rule applies only to a doubt within the system. After all, Jewish law itself is supposed to take into account the fact that the person observing it is not certain—because there is certainty about nothing—and nevertheless it said that there are rabbinic laws and they are binding, and that only in a case of doubt does one rule leniently. And that with a Torah-level doubt one is stringent, and only with a double doubt is one lenient.
I also did not claim that I would not follow the halakhic instruction because that is what Jewish law tells me to do because I am in doubt. That is my decision, not a halakhic ruling.
In short, this is just unnecessary pilpul.
I think I was not understood.
I am not talking about uncertainty like everything in life (the senses, etc.), but about a far more critical level, say 50-50. The rationale behind leniency in a rabbinic-level doubt is that Jewish law does not obligate in situations of doubt—the force of the obligation is weak and does not hold under uncertainty—and therefore Jewish law too would acknowledge that if I am in a state of doubt, I am not obligated.
You were understood perfectly well, and I answered.
Thank you for the answer, but still: 1. I am asking in a case where I do in fact think this is at least an evenly balanced doubt.
2. So what? I am arguing that even according to the logic of Jewish law there is no reason to obligate me. The rule in question is based on reasoning and logic—a rabbinic obligation is weak and falls away in a case of doubt, so why should that not apply here as well?