I have a friend who suggested that a synagogue tallit is like a borrowed tallit and therefore exempt from tzitzit and automatically from tekhelet as well. But then I saw an online responsum that says this:
“One who borrows a tallit from the synagogue must recite a blessing whether he is serving as cantor or going up to the Torah. For a synagogue tallit is intended so that whoever wears it, it is considered his; and it is also brought that a communal tallit is regarded like a jointly owned tallit in which each person has a share.”
And her friend said about this that even so, it would be possible for me to declare my share in the communal tallit ownerless, and then it goes back to being a borrowed tallit that is exempt from tzitzit.
What do you think about that?

Seemingly, since with this tallit one cannot, according to Jewish law, be compelled to put tekhelet on it, because it is not fully yours, it is no worse than the period when people did not know what tekhelet was and nevertheless wore white, because white is better than nothing.
It would seem that when there is compulsion regarding tekhelet (factual compulsion, and all the more so halakhic compulsion), it is preferable to fulfill the white without tekhelet than not to wear the tallit at all.

For some reason, more replies on this question are missing here. I cited halakhic authorities who learned from the Mishnah that tekhelet does not prevent the white that one should wrap oneself in white alone when there is no tekhelet, and I wrote that this does not seem correct to me.

As for Roni’s reasoning,
it is probably the reasoning of those authorities. It does not seem right to me, for several reasons:
A. I can ask to have tekhelet put on it (why would they refuse?).
B. And if you say that right now it is not in my hands, because it takes time to attach tekhelet, what would be the law regarding my own tallit without tekhelet, before I have put it on? Is that also considered sufficient compulsion?
C. I do not think that a conditional commandment (the white, since tzitzit is conditional on wearing a four-cornered garment) justifies neglecting a positive commandment (tekhelet), even if the neglect is under compulsion. All the more so because for that very reason it is doubtful whether this counts as compulsion at all. You are not compelled, because you could simply have chosen not to wear a tallit and then you would not have become obligated in tzitzit at all. You are doing it only in order to gain the commandment of the white. So that is not compulsion. Don’t do it, and you won’t be compelled.
D. Another formulation of point C: one positive commandment (the white) does not override another positive commandment (tekhelet). Passive omission is preferable.
I already mentioned (in the portions that for some reason were omitted) that many major halakhic authorities do not agree with this. But that is my view.

As for Oren’s reasoning,
that may perhaps work if you declare it ownerless. As for the blessing, apparently one should still recite it, because even if it is not yours, it is designated for anyone who wants to wear it, even if he is not its owner.
But I am not sure declaring it ownerless helps here. The tallit belongs to everyone in the congregation who uses it. If you are part of the congregation, you are an owner whether you like it or not. I do not think you can declare your share in communal property ownerless as long as you remain part of the congregation, because this is not like ordinary partners. And if you leave the congregation, then it is not clear that you are praying with a quorum. And there is something of a proof for this from the topic in Bava Batra 43 regarding a Torah scroll that was stolen: there are no witnesses who can testify about it, because everyone is a litigant. The Talmud says two people should leave the congregation so they can testify. Why didn’t it say that they should declare their share ownerless? Seemingly because declaring it ownerless does not help so long as you remain part of the congregation. See Shulchan Arukh, Choshen Mishpat 7:12 and the commentaries there. It seems the authorities there do not suffice with the judge declaring his share in the book ownerless; actual withdrawal is required. True, there it is a matter of personal interest in the case, and perhaps mere use is enough for them to be considered interested parties, unlike our case. Still, that seems to me to be the simple meaning of the passage there, and also the logic.

Beyond that, it is not clear to me what is gained by declaring it ownerless. If you do that, then you are not fulfilling the commandment of tzitzit, so what is the point of doing all this in the first place? Just don’t wrap yourself in it, and that’s it.

And regarding the topic of the stolen Torah scroll, of course there is room to connect this to the two answers of Rabbi Yosef Migash there: whether their disqualification to judge is because they are litigants, or because they are interested parties suspected of lying. Suspicion of lying depends not דווקא on ownership but on benefit, so obviously declaring it ownerless alone would not help; actual withdrawal would be required. But disqualification as a litigant applies only to monetary ownership, and for that, seemingly, declaring it ownerless would have been enough.

What is gained by declaring it ownerless is that on the one hand it would allow me to wrap myself in the tallit and thereby avoid an argument with the rabbi/gabbai (who expects people to wrap themselves in a tallit when they go up to the Torah at Sabbath mincha), and on the other hand it saves me from neglecting the positive commandment of tekhelet.

If it is only a question of avoiding an argument, then in my opinion you may wrap yourself in it as it is and rely on the opinions of the halakhic authorities who hold that way. But you can declare it ownerless too (although it is doubtful whether that helps, as above).

Regarding the above points:
A. Of course, if they are willing, then good — that is not what I was discussing. But as is well known, there are quite a few who oppose putting on tekhelet for various reasons. And if the synagogue rabbi instructs not to put on tekhelet, they will not put on tekhelet.
B. As is well known, one of the medieval authorities says that even if one’s tallit became invalid on the Sabbath, he may continue wrapping himself in it, because there is no prohibition against wearing a four-cornered garment without tzitzit; rather, there is a commandment to tie the fringes, and on the Sabbath it is forbidden to tie. The mouth that said to tie also said not to tie on the Sabbath. According to this approach, it may even be possible to say that if most of the partners object to putting on white strings, he would be exempt, because it is forbidden to tie against the owners’ wishes. And it would seem that the rule of compelling performance of commandments does not apply here — and all the more so regarding tekhelet.
C. But even according to the view of the medieval authorities that a tallit whose fringes were severed on the Sabbath is forbidden to wear, it is hard to say this regarding tekhelet. For if so, why did everyone wear white when tekhelet was unavailable, or when it was available but there was a government decree against using tekhelet? (That decree is not like a time of religious persecution, since it was not directed against the religion.) Even if failing to wear tekhelet involves neglect of a positive commandment — and that indeed seems to be the law — “tekhelet does not prevent the white” implies that white without tekhelet is preferable to nothing when it is impossible; and the practical difference is in cases where the only options are white or nothing, in which case white alone should be preferred.

B. Yes, that is well known, but in my humble opinion it is a very puzzling view, and I would not build on it. Beyond that, even according to that approach there is a clear distinction between the cases. On the Sabbath, tying is intrinsically forbidden, and that is not comparable to a situation where there is only a technical problem with tying. Because on the Sabbath there is an essential problem, and the Torah obviously knows there are Sabbath days, it is clear that the Torah itself never obligated tying on the Sabbath in the first place. That is very hard to say in our situations, which the Torah need not at all have considered or addressed.
And regarding the white strings, that is really untenable, because when people oppose Torah law, that does not permit anything. Especially when the whole point of the leniency is to avoid a dispute with those very people themselves (see the previous messages).
C. Indeed, I have always wondered why people wore white when there was no tekhelet. And there is the well-known hint of the Vilna Gaon from the word “throughout their generations,” that the Torah itself hinted there would be generations without tekhelet — and according to that, of course there is no difficulty. But on the plain level, it seems to me that this was a rabbinic enactment/custom so that the law of the commandment of tzitzit would not be forgotten.
As for “tekhelet does not prevent the white,” there is no necessity to say that it is preferable to wear white rather than nothing. As I wrote, it is a correct rule that if one put on white he has fulfilled the white, even though he neglected tekhelet. And this is not comparable to tefillin, of course, because there these are two separate commandments, and if one does not put on one of them he is indeed neglecting a positive commandment, but there is no reason not to put on the other. But here there is the option of not wearing a four-cornered garment at all and thereby being exempt from both commandments.

With Heaven’s help, 27 Kislev 5779

It is obvious that even according to the halakhic authorities who accept the identification of tekhelet with the “blunt-thorn murex,” tekhelet does not prevent the white. And in a place where the tallit belongs to the public, one cannot put tekhelet on it; all the more so for someone called up to the Torah, who is obligated to go up quickly so as not to impose on the congregation, and cannot attach tekhelet within a few short seconds. And the Holy One, blessed be He, does not come with unfair demands upon His creatures.

In any case, there is a simple suggestion. Since a borrowed tallit is exempt from tzitzit, and people fulfill the requirement with a synagogue tallit because presumably it is transferred to the person called up as a “gift on condition of return,” the one called up has a simple solution: not to intend to acquire the tallit as a gift on condition of return. This solution also avoids additional problems that exist with a communal tallit — who knows when it was last checked. Problems that are avoided by someone who does not intend to acquire the congregation’s tallit.

Best regards,
Shatz Levinger

With Heaven’s help, 27 Kislev 5779

Rabbi Daniel Sharshavsky (“Tekhelet Is Similar to the Throne of Glory,” on the Asif website) analyzes the story of the student who was saved from sin at the last moment by virtue of the four tzitzit that slapped him in the face, saying: “Our God commanded us only one commandment, and its name is tzitzit, and concerning it it is written twice: ‘I am the Lord your God’ — I am He who will exact punishment, and I am He who will pay reward. Now they appeared to me like four witnesses” (Menachot 44).

And the writer explains this on the basis of Rabbi Meir’s statement: “Why is tekhelet different from all other colors? Because tekhelet resembles the sea, and the sea resembles the sky, and the sky resembles the Throne of Glory” (Menachot 43). Wrapping oneself in tzitzit expresses God’s rule over all the “corners of the earth,” from the sea to the sky and up to the Throne of Glory.

“A person who wraps himself recognizes that the entire world stands before the Holy One, blessed be He, and points toward Him. In light of this, the words ‘they appeared to me like four witnesses’ are a specification of the experience of the four corners, which testify to the presence of the Master of the Universe… The term ‘four witnesses’ indicates that there really are eyes watching, but these are not eyes of flesh and blood; rather, they are the eyes of the Divine Presence observing the person from the four directions of the heavens that surround him.”

Best regards,
Shatz Levinger

If it is forbidden to wear a tallit without tekhelet, what does it mean that tekhelet does not prevent the white?

That someone who did not put on tekhelet has indeed neglected the positive commandment of tekhelet, but has still fulfilled the commandment of the white strings. Like someone who did not put on the head tefillin — that does not prevent the arm tefillin (the same Mishnah in Menachot). Does that mean it is permitted to put on only the arm tefillin?