Q&A: Tasting Non-Kosher Food Without Intending Pleasure
Tasting Non-Kosher Food Without Intending Pleasure
Question
Hello Rabbi,
Recently an article was published about a chef named Michal Ansky who, as part of her cooking show, has to taste (and spit out) non-kosher foods in order to judge the contestants, without intending to derive pleasure from them. She claimed that rabbis permitted this for her, and in the attached article there is a rabbi who argues that there is no possible basis for permitting it. I wanted to ask: why wouldn’t we say here what we hold in accordance with Rava, that when it is possible and one does not intend, it is permitted? All the more so in a case where it is impossible and one does not intend, as in her case? In other words, she tastes the foods not in order to enjoy their taste, but in order to evaluate the contestant’s level of cooking. Regarding the prohibition of eating: although there is an opinion that one is liable for the pleasure of his throat, is it not possible to say that a prohibition of eating and a prohibition of deriving benefit have the same implication? That is, just as possible-and-unintended is permitted with regard to a prohibition of benefit, so too possible-and-unintended should be permitted with regard to a prohibition of eating?
Best regards
Answer
This requires some thought, but off the top of my head I’ll write a few comments on what you said.
First, tasting in order to evaluate quality is tasting for pleasure. The pleasure determines the quality. So this is indeed considered intentional.
Second, why is this considered a case of “impossible”? After all, she is not doing something else with the prohibition merely incidental to it (like going somewhere and on the way smelling idolatrous incense). Here she is directly engaging in the prohibited act itself.
If so, this is a case of possible and intentional, which is prohibited according to everyone.
All of this assumes that there is a prohibition in deriving benefit from the taste. You assumed that this is “pleasure of the throat,” but I’m not sure that deriving pleasure from taste when one spits it out is called pleasure of the throat. Especially since some halakhic decisors hold that only pleasure of the intestines is prohibited. Therefore, in prohibitions of deriving benefit it is certainly forbidden (such as meat cooked with milk and orlah), but in prohibitions of eating (such as pork) there is definitely room for discussion.
While writing, I thought that with eating and sexual relations, we hold that one who is unwittingly involved with forbidden fats or forbidden sexual relations is liable, because he derived pleasure. True, that is said regarding one who is merely occupied with the act unintentionally, but seemingly the same should apply to one who does not intend. According to this, pleasure that comes to a person against his will would not be eating or sexual relations, but other kinds of pleasure. However, I don’t recall anyone who applied this to a case of lack of intent. And Tosafot in Pesachim there (25b) brings sexual intercourse on the Sabbath as an example for that Talmudic passage, and this requires further analysis.
Regarding your connection to Rabbi Abbahu, that every prohibition of eating implies a prohibition of benefit, you are assuming Maimonides’ interpretation that eating is a particular example of benefit. But from other medieval authorities (Rishonim) it seems otherwise (such as Tosafot in Pesachim in that passage), namely that these are two different prohibitions.
Discussion on Answer
Following up on this answer, you wrote above, “In prohibitions of deriving benefit it is certainly forbidden (such as meat cooked with milk and orlah).” I wanted to ask about that: is there room to take into account the view that atypical benefit is permitted? In other words, the normal way of deriving benefit from prohibitions of benefit such as meat and milk or orlah is by eating them, whereas when one only chews and spits them out, this is a fundamental change from the normal way of deriving benefit from them, and therefore it should be permitted.
I don’t think so. Here it is in the normal manner of deriving benefit, except that she is doing only the first part of the process. “Atypical” means a change in the manner of eating or in the food itself (very hot, and the like).
Rivash, responsum 288, concluded that it is rabbinically prohibited, lest one come to swallow it.
https://www.sefaria.org.il/Teshuvot_HaRivash.288.2?lang=he&with=all&lang2=he