Question

Hello Rabbi Michi,
I saw that you write that ideas are an ontological entity and not a fictitious concept:
"If an object were nothing but a bundle of properties, then there would be nothing to prevent us from creating an entity out of any collection of properties whatsoever.[7] Thus, for example, the greenness of the jade stone on so-and-so’s finger, together with the squareness of the table beside me and the airiness of the cumulonimbus clouds above us, would also be a legitimate entity. Why not? Because there is no object that possesses all these properties. They belong to different objects. But if an object is nothing but a collection of properties, then one cannot say this. The conclusion is that an object is not a collection of properties. There is a collection of properties that characterizes it." — quotation from Column 22.
That is, if we define a collection of properties as what creates the entity, what prevents us from creating infinitely many entities out of every possible collection of properties?
The question is: why should we define every collection of properties as an entity? After all, not every collection of properties fits the Kantian categories that underlie thought, and the categories are what create objectification. In other words, why assume that the ideas are what create the linkage, rather than assuming that there are a priori categories that are the cause of objects?
In addition, I’d be glad to hear what you think about the relations between phenomena and noumena—if you accept the Kantian theory at all, because I saw that you express reservations about it (appendix to God Plays Dice). So what do you accept? That there is some coordinating factor between thought and cognition, and each time we grasp a bit more of the thing-in-itself?
I’d appreciate more detail, thank you very much 🙂