Question

Hello Rabbi,
I wanted to ask about a question I heard: since we have no direct way to reach the object itself, only its appearances, then even if we see a large number of an object's properties revealed before us, that still does not mean that when we look again at such-and-such properties we are in fact looking at the same object. So, seemingly, according to the questioner we are condemned to skepticism.
If so, I thought to answer that although we can indeed imagine another object with similar properties, if we observe something then according to Bayes' formula it is preferable to claim that it is the same object we already know. Even though this admittedly relies on Occam's razor and on defaulting to the familiar in order to argue that the probability of its being something else is significantly lower than its being the familiar object.
In any case, I wanted to ask whether, in your understanding, according to the thesis of the mind's eye we also categorize the object in order to deal with this question, or whether it is a calculation like the one I made using certain vague assumptions such as Occam's razor?