Q&A: Interpretive Restrictions
Interpretive Restrictions
Question
To Rabbi Michael Abraham
Questions regarding interpretive restrictions
I apologize, but it is much easier to write in English
I gave a shiur this past week on the first Mishnah in the third chapter of Bava Kamma 27a-b. In the shiur I discussed the problem of interpretive restrictions and your answer together with Menachem Fisch (whose answer is the opposite of yours)
Below is a summary of the topic / passage with my questions:
Mishnah: If someone puts an obstacle in the public domain and a pedestrian either gets hurt or breaks the obstacle, the one who put it in the public domain is responsible and the pedestrian doesn’t pay even if he damaged the article.
Talmud: The pedestrian should be the guilty party since he should have looked out
QUESTION #1: The question on the Mishnah is not the usual one of a contradiction with another source, but simply that the Talmud disagrees with the halakhic ruling of the Mishnah. What happened to the rule that Amoraim don’t disagree with a Mishnah? (see question 3)
The Talmud then presents 3 interpretive restrictions to answer the question
#1 Rav – The Mishnah is talking about a case where the person filled the entire public domain, and so the pedestrian had no choice
#2 Shmuel – The Mishnah is talking about nighttime, when the pedestrian couldn’t see
#3 Rabbi Yochanan – The pedestrian came from a corner and so couldn’t see the obstacle
QUESTION #2 – The first interpretive restriction is a fairly standard one, and the answer that the Mishnah describes a Platonic state is possible. However, the other two answers merely state that in the Mishnah, instead of two possibilities, there is only one choice, since the pedestrian was not at fault. In this case I would ask: obvious? There is no lesson in a Platonic state where there are not two sides. The whole point is to decide who is guilty when both sides are at fault. Hence, I don’t understand the answer of a Platonic discussion for the last two interpretive restrictions
The Talmud then presents a fourth interpretive restriction
#4 Rab Abba to Rav Ashi in the name of Rabbi Ulla: The Mishnah is to be taken literally, that the one who puts the obstacle in the public domain is guilty. The pedestrian is not guilty because most pedestrians don’t look where they are walking (as noted in the shiur, they are looking at their smartwatch)
QUESTION #3 – According to the answer for interpretive restrictions, that the Talmud had a tradition here, the last answer disagrees totally with the earlier interpretive restrictions and takes the Mishnah as is.
Note that the three interpretive restrictions are given by first-generation Amoraim — Rav, Shmuel, Rabbi Yochanan — while the opinion that rejects the interpretive restrictions is from the last generation, that of Rav Ashi. Now the Mishnah is dealing with the real world and not a Platonic universe. This seems to be a very fundamental disagreement on the use of interpretive restrictions.
Interestingly, the Shulchan Arukh (Choshen Mishpat 412) rules like all 4 answers. Basically, the Shulchan Arukh rules like the fourth answer, that the one who puts the obstacle in the public domain is guilty. However, if he had permission to put the articles in the public domain, he doesn’t pay for damages. However, if one of the three interpretive restrictions happened, then he doesn’t have to pay.
Thus, even though the fourth answer rejects the interpretive restrictions and we rule like the fourth answer, nevertheless the Shulchan Arukh accepts the 3 interpretive restrictions for the case that the obstacle was placed in the public domain with permission.
All the best
Answer
It may be easier (for you) to write in English, but it is less easy (for me) to read English. 🙂
1. The difficulty is not based on pure reasoning alone. It is clear that if a person is responsible for his own damage, the damager is exempt from paying. This is agreed to even by the Tannaim (for example in the topic of “one who stumbles is negligent”), and this can also be seen from the exemption for tooth and foot in the public domain, where the medieval authorities (Rishonim) explained (the Rif, Maimonides, and the Rosh at the beginning of the tractate) that this is because he has permission to walk there, and the injured party should have been careful. So in my opinion the difficulty here is indeed a regular difficulty, and the Amoraim are not disputing the Mishnah. Beyond that, even if the difficulty were based on reasoning, still, if one finds a solution that explains the Mishnah, there is no dispute with the Mishnah here. Only if no solution is found are the Amoraim supposed to bend and accept the ruling of the Mishnah. Here they found a solution (through interpretive restrictions). So in any case there is no dispute of the Amoraim with the Mishnah.
2. Here I did not understand the question. After all, if these interpretive restrictions seem “obvious” to you, then that is a difficulty on the Talmud regardless of my theory about interpretive restrictions. The Talmud does not ask “isn’t this obvious?”, so clearly in its view this is not a simple law and there is some novelty here. The Platonic situation is a world in which neither side is at fault, and the question is who bears responsibility.
3. Where did you see a claim that an interpretive restriction is rooted in tradition? I did not write any such thing, nor do I think so. On the contrary, if there were a tradition, there would be no need for difficulties and interpretive restrictions in any topic / passage. They would simply have had to present the interpretive restriction alongside the Mishnah, and that would be that.