Q&A: The Woman’s Consent in Kiddushin
The Woman’s Consent in Kiddushin
Question
Hello Rabbi,
While studying tractate Kiddushin, we ran into a difficult question. The Talmud lists two cases where we couldn’t understand the reasoning of the Sages:
A. A dog chased after a woman, and she asks him to save her life. In the middle of all the chaos and pressure, the man says that if he saves her she will become betrothed to him—if she says “yes,” the Talmud is uncertain: perhaps she transferred herself to him.
An even harder case:
B. If he coerced her and betrothed her—by Torah law she is betrothed, and only the Rabbis annulled the betrothal.
Seemingly, if you try to look at the situation in the past, you can understand it somewhat: women really were very dependent on husbands in every existential sense, and so there is room for uncertainty about the matter. But if something like this happens today, then the overwhelming majority of women would certainly say “yes” only as lip service!! So how should we judge such a case?
C. In situations like these, can the judges believe the woman as if she were two witnesses?
Thanks in advance
Answer
I don’t see any difference at all between the past and today. In such a situation, the woman is dependent on the man to save her, and the question is whether her commitment under those circumstances is valid or not. What does that have to do with the general question of a woman’s dependence on a man? This is the question of “he coerced her and she became betrothed,” just like “he coerced him and he sold.”
I didn’t understand the question about believing the woman as if she were two witnesses. This is not a question of credibility but of a principled determination: when a person undertakes an obligation while under coercion, is that commitment really binding or not?
Discussion on Answer
A-B. I’ll say again that there is no connection at all. The question is whether a woman in distress who agrees to betrothal is agreeing seriously or not. It has nothing to do with the general issue of a woman’s dependence on a man.
C. Because in the case of “he coerced her and betrothed her,” it is not in exchange for something else.
D. This is not a question of credibility as a witness, but of a litigant claiming something (a claim of prior protest/disclaimer). There is no discussion here of her credibility or of a factual question, but rather a normative question regarding the halakhic status of acquiescence under pressure.
Rabbi, this is not exactly a purely normative question, because they are apparently trying to clarify what her actual intent was: was she really willing to become betrothed in order to be saved, or can we assess that everything she said was only lip service?
After all, if before the incident she were to say in front of two witnesses that she did not intend to become betrothed, we certainly would not say that she agreed. In other words, when dealing with these questions the Talmud is trying to get at that person’s “psychology”—whether what she said was only lip service.
And the Talmud’s wording is also, “she resolved and transferred herself to him,” which implies that this is a question of assessing intent: whether the woman truly agrees in her heart in that manner.
[And therefore, if we can assess that in a very sweeping way a woman is not willing to become betrothed in such a case—there is no reason she should be betrothed, since we would then have a principled assessment that it isn’t serious.
It is similar to another case where a man stole an object from a woman in the marketplace and then betroths her with that object—only if there had been prior matchmaking are we concerned about betrothal, but ordinarily the assessment is that she said “yes” only as lip service in order to take back the stolen item!]
She is certainly willing to become betrothed in order that they save her. Do you think she is willing to die in order not to become betrothed to him? The question is whether such willingness is indeed considered real willingness.
If so, then what is the other side of the Talmud’s uncertainty—that she is not betrothed because he is obligated to save her?
After all, even if there is the commandment “do not stand idly by your neighbor’s blood,” at the end of the day if he does not fulfill this commandment she would certainly agree to become betrothed as long as she doesn’t die—so what is the Talmud’s doubt?
From here it would seem proven that we are looking for something “more” than mere lip service under total coercion—some sort of will beyond the simple desire to be saved.
I’ll repeat for the fourth time: the Talmud’s doubt is whether such acquiescence counts as acquiescence. This is a normative question, not a factual one.
Can one infer from this something about the Torah’s view of the institution of marriage? That if Jewish law sees such marriages as a legitimate legal framework (and by Torah law even in a case of complete coercion), then this follows from a conception that what we have here is essentially just a monetary agreement, with no regard for the parties or for substantive considerations.
Jewish law sees kiddushin as a contract like any other contract. The content of the contract is unique, just as every contract has its own unique content. True, there are also limitations on this particular contract (one who betroths on condition that there be no obligation of sustenance, clothing, and conjugal rights; incest prohibitions; and the like). Therefore the effect of kiddushin is the making of a contract, and it depends on the agreement of the parties.
Good evening, Rabbi,
A. If a woman’s situation without a man is difficult and almost impossible to manage, then she is much more ready to compromise easily (for example, marrying a despicable man or a leper).
B. Seemingly, nowadays, when a woman has greater independence, the presumption should increase that when she said “yes” it was only lip service in order to save herself! It seems to me a simple argument: if someone is pressuring me and I need urgent rescue, it’s very likely that I’ll say yes just to fool him.
C. Why was the Talmud uncertain in the case of the dog, but not uncertain in the case where he coerced her and betrothed her?
D. What I meant by credibility as if she were two witnesses was this: could it be that the Talmud’s doubt exists in principle, but because of the woman’s testimony saying explicitly that she had no intention at all of marrying him and only meant to get herself out of the situation—perhaps she could be believed on that point.