Q&A: Kant and Idealism
Kant and Idealism
Question
Hello Rabbi,
1. I read that Kant argued that despite our inability to know the world as it is in itself, he still held that the world in itself exists.
Is there a good reason for that? Why, on his view, not say just as well that there are 2 worlds in themselves?
Is it correct to say that Kant is ultimately an idealist?
2. Are there good arguments against idealism? Or is it just a matter of “where you stand”?
3. What is the “price” and the philosophical implications of idealism? When I consider whether I am an idealist or not, what am I giving up if I say yes?
4. You too accept Kant’s distinction between phenomena and noumena and argue that the world in itself may not be exactly as it appears to our eyes (for example, it may have no colors).
On the other hand, I assume that you claim that the laws of logic, the laws of mathematics, concepts like space and time, the principle of causality and induction, and so on, do correspond to the way the world behaves.
Is my assumption correct?
And if so, do you have a criterion for examining what is a statement about cognition and what is a statement about the world?
Thank you,
Natan
Answer
- This is Zeitlin’s attack on Kant. His claim is that the distinction between phenomena and noumena is itself within the phenomenal realm. But in my humble opinion there isn’t much to that, because Kant did not speak about an inability to know the world as it is in itself, but rather about the fact that any knowledge of it is colored by the colors of our cognition. Things in themselves have no color and no shape (in the sense in which we define it, like a square or a triangle), and so on. But that there is something that produces the picture in my cognition is simple common sense.
- No. And there are no good arguments in its favor either.
- I don’t know.
- See 1.
Discussion on Answer
Color or shape is not something necessary in and of itself. There is no problem at all in saying that the thing itself has no color, or has a different color, while I see it as this color. But the laws of logic are not of that status. 2+3=5 in and of itself, and therefore it is certainly true in the world as well. This is not really a factual claim at all, but a logical relation between concepts.
For a similar reason I once wrote here that the Holy One, blessed be He, is bound by the laws of logic even if not by the laws of physics. Because these are not really “laws” in the usual sense (of something imposed on reality). This is reality itself. Just as God’s nature is not imposed on Him. It is He Himself.
See for example here:
https://mikyab.net/%D7%A9%D7%95%D7%AA/%D7%9B%D7%A4%D7%99%D7%A4%D7%95%D7%AA-%D7%A9%D7%9C-%D7%94%D7%A7%D7%91%D7%94-%D7%9C%D7%97%D7%95%D7%A7%D7%99-%D7%94%D7%9C%D7%95%D7%92%D7%99%D7%A7%D7%94/
And here:
https://mikyab.net/%D7%A9%D7%95%D7%AA/%D7%90%D7%9C%D7%95%D7%94%D7%99%D7%9D-%D7%9E%D7%9B%D7%95%D7%A4%D7%A3/
And there are others.
1. What is meant by “necessary in and of itself”?
2. Why is this not a factual claim? Isn’t saying “this is how the world behaves” a factual claim?
Even if these are relations between concepts, the statement is that these relations express the behavior of the world.
3. What about causality? It is not necessary in the way logic is, since one can think in non-causal terms (as you noted in “Two Carts”).
Is causality a statement about cognition or about the world? And if it is about the world, then what is the essential difference between colors and causality (when I encounter both of these phenomena in my thinking)?
1. What’s unclear? Tautological.
2. The claim 2+3=5 is also a factual claim, but it cannot be refuted. Obviously the world behaves that way, but not because it has one particular character rather than another. Any world of any character would behave that way. Therefore this is an a priori determination and not an empirical one, and as such it characterizes the factual world as well.
3. Causality is not a particular color but a claim about a mechanism. Color is not a mechanism but a description/picture of a mechanism. Causality is an idea and not a picture, and therefore when you claim that there is causality in the world, it is like claiming that there is an electromagnetic wave in the world, which is certainly true. And not like claiming that this object is red. Colors are a projection of the electromagnetic wave in our cognition, but the wave itself is a phenomenon in the world and not something subjective.
Regarding question 2,
Kant addresses this in the Critique and argues that by reflecting on cognition itself one can see cognition of being as it is in itself. Just as Descartes argues for the existence of spirit on the basis of self-awareness, so too, aside from the spirit’s awareness of itself, it is aware of being as it is in itself. See there at length.
Correction: regarding question 1.
Rabbi Michi still keeps imagining that his laws of logic apply to the world while at the very same time continuing to say contradictory things about our ability to know the world. Which overall fits perfectly from the standpoint of contradiction.
4. I didn’t fully grasp your point.
Are you claiming that the world in itself does not behave according to the laws of logic, mathematics, and causality? (Similar to the colors you spoke about in your answer to 1.)
And if so, what is the difference between logic and colors?
(Sorry for the repetition. I’m trying to clarify the question.)