Q&A: Anselm’s Proof
Anselm’s Proof
Question
Hello, Rabbi,
I have several questions about what you wrote in the booklet on the ontological proof.
A. In chapter 5, “Defining the concept of God” —
you mentioned there that all basic definitions come from the eyes of the intellect, and that the believer draws the concept of God from the “eyes of his intellect” (and this is indeed what you mentioned in Truly and Stably), from which it follows that one can argue about definitions (there, p. 89). That is, one can claim that the definition Anselm gave is not suited to the concept of God, etc., as long as—and you do not deny this—your understandings hold.
Meaning, if I do not accept Anselm’s definition of the concept of God, I can also refuse to accept his conclusion on the grounds that he begged the question. In other words, definitions and axioms are by no means an arbitrary procedure; if they fit our intuitive conceptions then they are correct, and if not, then not.
On the other hand, you later mentioned there that there are concepts that have a sharp and good definition but do not exist in reality itself (like a unicorn or a fairy with three wings, etc.). That is, concepts can be defined even without understanding and vision through the ‘eyes of the intellect,’ and nevertheless they seem to have validity for everyone else.
So even if Anselm is begging the question, it still follows from your words that his argument has validity… otherwise it is not clear how one can define concepts that do not exist in reality. After all, we have no intuitive understanding of such things!?!
B. In chapter 7, “The body of the argument” (“The fool understands what he hears”) —
moreover, you mentioned Anselm’s appeal to the fool, and you wrote that Anselm’s claim (“something than which nothing greater can be conceived,” etc.) —
addresses two types of people: (1. the fool who denies the believer.)
2. one who denies Anselm’s definition — I will quote your words there: “2. This definition is self-evident. It is composed of simple terms and concepts, and the claim that there is something unclear here is not honest. It is not reasonable to claim this…. (and therefore) it is possible that this proof may persuade even agnostics or opponents of the non-positivist kind. It is addressed to anyone who understands the definition proposed above.”
That is, here you explicitly mentioned that the mere fact that Anselm’s definition is coherent is enough for even someone who does not accept his definition of the concept of God, or at least has doubts about it, nevertheless to accept it.
So what you say here really needs explanation!! Either the proof can persuade even someone who does not accept the definition, or it cannot. Either one can define without intuition, or one cannot.
C. In the chapter on Gaunilo’s challenge from the existing lost island, chapter 18,
you mentioned Gaunilo’s question, but nowhere did you accuse him of begging the question and inventing an unrelated definition. You only tried to find a contradiction in his definition (a contingent entity, etc.).
That is, once again one sees from your words that you view the ontological proof as addressing even someone to whom the proposed concept is foreign. (The greatest island, etc.) After all, Gaunilo too does not see with the ‘eyes of his intellect’ the greatest island. The proof is that he brings it as an objection, not as a proof!
D. In one of the refutations of the greatest island (p. 67) you mentioned that if we assume it is indeed possible for such an island to exist, then in the end God is greater than it, and therefore it cannot exist (unless it itself is God),
and therefore I came to propose a new refutation of Anselm based on the initial understanding that it is enough to present a definition that is coherent.
Let us assume X — the most wicked and perfect being that can be conceived. Since something that necessarily exists is greater than something that does not exist, etc., it is thereby proven that it necessarily exists. (Here all your objections that you mentioned regarding the island no longer apply — the island’s infinitude in relation to God does not exist, since X is no longer from the class of islands but rather, if anything, from the class of “gods,” and there is also no reason to assume it is a contingent entity — it is not a physical body, and so on; all the objections mentioned there do not apply to X.)
And consequently, once X necessarily exists, then God is no longer the most perfect being. After all, one very basic perfection of God is that He is omnipotent, but once there is another being that is omnipotent, God is no longer omnipotent. (In the sense that two kings do not share one crown.)
Likewise God would have to be limited by X in some dimension and manner (I am somewhat doubtful about this objection), and therefore God would no longer be perfect.
From this it is proven that there cannot be a perfect God. And consequently, if God is not perfect then there is a contradiction to His definition. Therefore Anselm’s entire proof is not valid regarding God or any other deity (for there will always be some other perfect thing that will ‘crush’ it), and it collapses completely.
Answer
Hello,
A. One can argue about the definition, but that does not bring down the argument. If you adopt Anselm’s definition, even just for the sake of discussion, you will arrive at the conclusion that it is instantiated in reality. That is his argument. What would bring down the argument is only if there is a contradiction in the definition or if it is empty of content—not merely that you do not see it. The eyes of the intellect are only a motivation in this context. They are not needed in order to make the argument. They merely direct you to a place that will be fruitful.
I do not see a problem with our understanding concepts that do not exist in reality. Understanding is not only the result of observation, certainly not direct observation. Generalizations and analogies can also yield understanding.
B. See the previous section.
C. Indeed. See section A.
D. See a parallel discussion that took place here not long ago with Yedidya (and I was already worn out by it. Maybe that was you?).
Discussion on Answer
A. What I meant was that in Truly and Stably on page 89 you explicitly wrote that it is not so:
“Definitions and axioms are not arbitrary, and one can certainly speak about them in terms of right and wrong, or truth and falsehood. If they fit our intuitive conceptions they are correct, and if not—then not.” The definition you gave there as an example is convexity, etc.
By contrast, yes, you are completely contradicting yourself and claiming that a definition cannot be judged in terms of right and wrong. Only propositions can be judged that way.
I already explained that there is no contradiction at all. I’ll repeat it again.
When you propose a definition for some concept, it certainly can be judged in terms of right and wrong. The question is whether it fits the intuitive concept that it defines or not. I discussed this at length in the series here on poetry, and in my opinion it is very worthwhile to read it there.
But in Anselm’s argument he is not proposing a definition for discussion, but as a starting point for an argument. Suppose there is a concept X that is defined in such-and-such a way. Now he asks you: do you understand the definition? (Note well—not agree, but understand.) If so, let us analyze it and see that one can derive from it that the concept it defines is instantiated in reality. That’s all. In such a case there is no significance to the discussion of whether the definition fits the intuitive concept of God or not. Even if it does not—I have proven to you here the existence of another concept. As far as I’m concerned, call it the Universe of Release and not God.
Okay thanks. So according to what you are saying, it follows that one cannot dispute the definitions here. And there you tried to say that the definition’s purpose is only to match the basic understanding.
If so, the question comes back again. You wrote in the booklet on p. 60: “Necessary existence is a better candidate to function as a predicate. Even if existence as such is not a predicate of the substance, necessary existence does seem to be a predicate. After all, the existence follows from the definition of the substance, and therefore it really is its predicate (one of its properties).”
If so, let us *define* the Universe of Release as the most wicked being one can think of, and one that necessarily exists.
Let us ask whether this definition is clear and understandable. Yes.
From here it is proven that it necessarily exists. After all, that is a definitional property, and not a claim about the world.
True, the Rabbi wrote in one of the responses that this is a claim and not a definition, like “perfect.” But here it comes out that it really is a definitional property.
I mean, you wrote that a definition includes only characteristics and not claims. And also that it is enough for a definition to have the power to distinguish the defined object from other things.
If so, “necessary existence” (as opposed to plain “existence”) is among the greatest characteristics there can be. There is an enormous practical difference between a being that necessarily exists and one that does not… and necessary existence is a predicate as you mentioned (as opposed to ordinary existence, where that can be doubted), so therefore there is no problem in assuming that such a definition could exist.
And consequently, if so, one can infer from the definition that characterizes the ‘Universe of Release’—an especially wicked being, strong and omnipotent and omniscient, etc. etc., and necessary existence—that it indeed exists in reality. Q.E.D.
But it seems from your words that this is not so. I would be glad to know why. Why is necessary existence not a definition but a claim?
P.S. It seems from what Steinitz says in Scientific Logical Missile that necessary existence really is a definition. (Only with contingent beings is there a problem in assuming this, but that is not our topic here.)
?
D. Indeed. You wrote there “without undertaking a vow,” so I said no—without annulling vows and oaths—because nothing good will come of it.
A, B, C okay, thanks! If so, then I completely did not understand the proof. Because in chapter 6 of Truly and Stably it definitely sounds not like that at all. And analogy and the like are, in your view, the eyes of the intellect.
E. In Descartes’ proof (which you did not really mention much) — where he argues that God is the most perfect being — how is perfection measured according to his view? Between the idea of a being and the idea of an existing being? Like Anselm.
Or between the idea of a being and a being that exists in reality.
F. For some reason it seems that you claim that the assumption that necessary existence is part of perfection seems weak to you. If possible, may I know why?