Q&A: Questions Regarding Anselm's Ontological Argument
Questions Regarding Anselm's Ontological Argument
Question
Hello Rabbi Michi,
I would like to ask about lessons 13–14 (on YouTube) on the topic of faith, regarding Anselm's ontological argument.
Question 1 – Deception
There is something "not quite right" about planting some concept in a person's mind when he does not understand the implications of that concept, and then afterward "informing" him that it includes additional things.
I compare it to a teacher who asks a student whether he is willing to do whatever the teacher tells him, and when the student answers "yes," the teacher says to him, "Jump off the roof." Let us assume that the concept "do whatever the teacher tells him" really does include jumping off the roof as well. Even so, when the student agreed to it, he did not mean that, and if someone asks him why he contradicted himself and did not jump off the roof despite having committed to doing whatever the teacher told him, he would say, "That isn't what I meant." In other words, perhaps from the teacher's perspective that was indeed the intention, and from his point of view the student's refusal to jump off the roof is a contradiction of what he committed himself to do. But from the student's perspective, the meaning of "you will do whatever I tell you" does not include from the outset an instruction to jump off the roof, and therefore from the student's point of view there is no contradiction between the instruction and his refusal to jump.
That is how I understand Anselm's statement: as a kind of trick. "Something than which nothing greater can be conceived" does not, in the "fool's" view, also include the proposition "and it exists both in the mind and in reality." When Anselm writes at the beginning that the fool "understands what he hears," and on the basis of this understanding establishes that this understanding also includes the final understanding that "it exists both in the mind and in reality," that is not correct. In other words, Anselm bases the final necessity of actual belief in God on the fool's initial understanding, and not on the abstract concept itself, which supposedly includes the existence of "something than which nothing greater can be conceived." If so—if everything is based on the fool's initial understanding—then in my opinion, as stated, this is deceptive, because that is not how the fool understood the concept. You might say: but in the fool's mind were the words "something than which nothing greater can be conceived." But we are not dealing with word games here, rather with understanding a concept.
Question 2 – The type of proposition
Why, in order to provide a type of proposition whose understanding obligates one to relate to that proposition as true, does Anselm bring all this intricate argumentation? Seemingly a very simple proposition such as "God truly exists in reality" achieves the same result. After all, the fool understands that proposition, but thinks it is not true. And then one could come and say that the concept "truly" includes within it the understanding that God really does exist in reality, for if He does not truly exist that contradicts the understanding of the concept "God truly exists in reality."
Question 3 – A negative proposition that contradicts the positive proposition.
In the end, Anselm's proof is based on the initial understanding of the concept that is in the fool's mind. Seemingly, the concept "There is no God" ("The fool says in his heart, 'There is no God'")—or for our purposes, the concept "there is no something than which nothing greater can be conceived"—is a concept whose force is no less than that of the concept "there is something than which nothing greater can be conceived." Why should the force produced by one concept override the force of another concept, when these two propositions are equal in their root and strength? In other words, perhaps one could come to the believer and say to him, "There is no something than which nothing greater can be conceived," and then say that understanding this concept includes within it the understanding that in reality too there is no such thing, for if in reality there is "something than which nothing greater can be conceived," that contradicts the concept that "there is no something than which nothing greater can be conceived."
Answer
1. Anything can be presented in a resentful tone as though it involved dishonesty. The concept of perfection is perfectly well understood in itself. True, the proof is surprising in the sense that it derives existence from that concept, but that is the nature of every logical proof. If you expect every conclusion of a logical argument to be accepted by the listener in advance, then you have emptied all logical arguments of content. The comparison to the teacher and the student is ridiculous. Obviously the fool did not mean existence when he agreed to perfection. That is exactly what the proof does, as explained above.
If the fool thinks perfection does not include existence, then let him raise that as an objection and that's it. Why speak here of trickery?! The claim of trickery דווקא teaches that the proof is valid. The fool is supposedly claiming that if he had known that existence is included in perfection, he would not have agreed to accept perfection. But that is nonsense, of course, for several reasons. The main one is that the fool is not supposed to accept the premise that God is perfect. That is a definition, not a premise.
2. Here it seems you missed the whole logic of the argument. The argument is not based on premises but on definitions. The argument you proposed is based on premises that one may simply reject. There are similar objections based on "the existing island," and I addressed them in my book The First Being.
3. What you described here are claims, not concepts or definitions. Again you are confusing the two, and thereby missing the whole point of Anselm's argument (and not Ansen). He proceeds from definitions, not from premises.
Discussion on Answer
I still don't see a question here. Even someone who does not accept some premise of an argument will not accept its conclusion and will be mistaken. Someone who does not understand the meaning of "there is the most perfect thing that can be conceived" indeed will not be persuaded by the proof. But there is no such person. Every reasonable person understands this concept. Someone who does not understand it is a fool, and is not essentially different from someone who does not understand any premise of any other argument.
I did not understand your question at the end. In his argument he is speaking about someone who understands the concept, not someone who understands some proposition.
Indeed, when I reflect on the matter, I see my mistake.
My mistake lay in the fact that I compared someone who had never heard of Anselm's definition and therefore does not believe in God—about whom Anselm would not claim that by force of his ontological proof it is shown that this person thinks something mistaken (unlike a "regular" proof: when someone does not accept my premise, I hold that he is mistaken in not accepting my correct premise and therefore also reaches an erroneous conclusion). Anselm would only claim that the moment this person hears his definition, he will be required to relate to it as true in reality. I compared such a person also to a person who has heard the definition, but does not agree with the premise that a "true perfection" must also exist in reality. In that case, Anselm indeed has an argument with him about the premise and the conclusion.
I don't know whether you understood the point of my mistake, but in any case, thank you very much!
Regarding the second matter, I wasn't asking, but trying to verify that I understood correctly the somewhat amusing result: that a person who hears and understands from his teacher the sentence "There does not exist, and cannot exist, something than which nothing greater can be conceived" would in fact have to accept—according to Anselm—the existence of God (because of the distinction between the premise "there is / there is not" and the definition).
Indeed, that's correct. It's like a person who hears from his teacher that the principle of causality means that a certain event has no cause: if he understands the principle of causality, he understands that the teacher was mistaken and that the event does have a cause.
I think I did not explain my question properly.
What I mean is this: as you emphasized several times during the lessons (13–14), the ontological proof is not about the world but about the human being. That is, the proof does not prove that there is "something than which nothing greater can be conceived"; rather, the proof shows that every person who understands the above definition must relate to it as true in reality. Perhaps one could say that the ontological proof is about the subject and not the object. I mean: the proof does not establish the existence of the object, but rather proves to the subject that he must relate to the object / understand the object as existing in reality.
Following from that (that the proof is directed toward the subject), the existence of the proof also depends on the subject. That is, without an understanding subject, the proof does not exist at all. I mean: not only is the ontological proof about the subject and not the object, but moreover, the existence of the proof vis-à-vis the subject depends on the subject's understanding of the definition. This is unlike an objective proof, which does not at all depend on the existence of any subject. The premise that all human beings are mortal, and the premise that Socrates is a human being and therefore mortal, do not depend on any subject's understanding, and even if all human beings were to become complete fools, Socrates would still be mortal. By contrast, in the ontological proof, if all human beings were to become complete fools incapable of understanding the definition "something than which nothing greater can be conceived," then the proof would in practice be irrelevant, since the proof establishes that a subject who understood the definition must accept it as true in reality. But if there is no subject capable of understanding the definition, then by definition he is also not logically required to relate to it as true in reality.
If we continue along this line, we can say something further: according to Anselm there could be two brilliant professors, one of whom heard (and understood) the definition ("something than which nothing greater can be conceived") and one of whom did not. The professor who heard it is logically required to relate to it as true in reality, while the professor who did not hear it is not required—and logically speaking does not need—to relate to it as true in reality, even according to Anselm. All this, as stated, because the whole proof begins from the subject's understanding and is not a proof about the object.
If all this is correct so far, then we learn that unlike other logical proofs, where even if the other side does not accept my premises and claims, I am entitled to claim that the other side is mistaken, with regard to the ontological proof, if the other side did not understand the definition (for whatever reason), Anselm has no claim against him, and Anselm would not say that the other side is mistaken about anything. That is because the logical mechanism of Anselm's proof begins to "operate" only in someone who understood the definition and has the definition in his head.
Now—and here comes my question—if the other side, the "fool," claims that he understood the concept "something than which nothing greater can be conceived" as something that does not include that thing's existing in actual reality, how can Anselm come and tell him that the definition does indeed include relating to that being as actually real.
As said above, if Anselm's proof were objective and independent of anyone's understanding, then I would accept the proof, because why should I care how the fool understood the definition? The definition is what it is. But when the entire existence of the proof depends on the fool's understanding, then it is measured by the fool's degree of understanding, and if the fool did not understand the definition that way, the proof ought to be nullified. For I judge him as one who did not understand the definition at all, regarding whom Anselm would concede that he is not logically required to relate to this definition as one realized in reality.
To sum up: A. Anselm's proof is directed toward the subject. B. The existence of Anselm's proof depends on the subject's understanding. C. Therefore, the subject's understanding of the definition in a way different from Anselm's understanding is, as far as the existence of the proof is concerned, equivalent to not understanding the definition at all.
I hope my question is now understandable. I would be glad for a response.
I got it, and it became clearer to me. Thank you.
Following up on point 2, after understanding this point, something interesting and amusing comes out that I had not noticed before. According to the ontological proof, someone who understands the sentence "There does not exist, and cannot exist, something than which nothing greater can be conceived" would actually be required to relate to the concept as one realized in reality, since the words "does not exist and cannot exist" are a premise, while the words "something than which nothing greater can be conceived" are a definition.
Did I understand correctly?