Q&A: Reasoning in Understanding the Talmud
Reasoning in Understanding the Talmud
Question
With God’s help,
Hello Rabbi,
Sometimes in the Talmud we come across laws where it isn’t clear to us why they are the way they are; for example, indirect causation in damages is exempt. I’ve seen that the Rabbi usually writes that there are two planes in the world: the moral plane and the religious plane, and they are parallel planes that can also conflict.
So I wanted to ask: after the Rabbi’s comments, aren’t we throwing out the baby with the bathwater and in practice losing any ability to explain the Torah’s commandments and the Talmudic give-and-take? And instead of trying to understand the reason for the commandment, are we left only with trying to understand the parameters of the commandment?
For example, when we have before us the law that an ox with a prior history of goring pays full damages (and not only from the value of its own body), a law that is very reasonable, even there can we not argue that behind it there is a logical-moral reason, but only a religious reason?
Answer
I’ll strengthen your question. A large portion of these laws have no source in Scripture (like indirect causation in damages, migo, the force of a claim, and so on). The Sages introduced them through reasoning, so it is clear that there is reasoning in the background—except that it is not reasoning of social order or morality, but legal reasoning. See the appendix to the booklet on migo on the site (the appendix on legal reasoning).
Therefore, it is possible to understand the parameters of the Jewish law even if it is not moral or intended for social order. However, this understanding is conditioned on familiarity with the tradition and halakhic thinking. The fact is that someone who is fluent in this mode of thinking does succeed in understanding the laws in question. True, he will not be able to explain his understanding in terms of morality or social order (and therefore sometimes when you ask him whether he understands, he will stammer and not know how to explain himself, either to himself or to you), but the feeling of ease that accompanies understanding exists for him too. My claim to him is that there is no need to look for such an explanation, because the explanation is probably different, and then he can remain comfortable with his legal intuition.