The problems created by the fact of the evolution of language need to be dealt with, not solved by magical fixes like “it’s essential” or Platonism.
A false claim, in my view, is when a person means something specific and attributes to it things it does not have. For example, “A human being can jump 100 meters high” would be a false claim when we are talking about what both I and the claimant call a human being. Of course, the claimant can say, “The human being I am talking about can jump 100 meters high,” and thereby avoid being called “mistaken.” But again, language is the tool human beings use to communicate with one another. If a person starts attributing to words things that people do not agree to, but only he agrees to, then he is not speaking a language.
Information about the world, in my view, is when we discover new things and give them names. For example, there is a phenomenon in which objects with mass are attracted to one another in proportion to the product of the masses of the two attracted bodies. Let us call this phenomenon “gravitation.”
The more things we discover in the world and give them names so that we can talk about them, the more we can make use of the things we discover and talk about for our own benefit and for the technological development of humanity.
An interesting phenomenon could be seen in the ancient American continent. The Indians remained undeveloped for years. They had a primitive language (there was a word for the numeral “one” and for the numeral “two,” and that was it. Beyond the quantity of 2 they simply said “many”) unlike the Aztecs, who had a more developed language and a more advanced civilization.
I see a direct connection between these things.

Here you are repeating what I said. According to what you are now saying, the claim that ravens are black is also a claim and not a definition: what is currently known as a raven is black in color. So there you have it—you have rejected the “analytic solution.”
Parenthetically, I do not think you are right about the Indians. There are one-two-many tribes in South America (like the Pirahã in Brazil, even to this day) and, if I remember correctly, also in East Asia. But as far as I know, this was not true of all the Indians. I discussed this in an interesting thread on Batzur Here Think:
http://www.bhol.co.il/forums/topic.asp?topic_id=1083983&forum_id=1364

I do not think you and I are saying the same thing. From my perspective, treating the sentence “All ravens are black” as a claim that tries to say something new about the world and could turn out to be wrong is a foolish way of looking at it, because raven is first and foremost a word that comes to describe black birds. When there is something we will call a “white raven” (a genetic mutation that somehow comes into being), we will not use the word “raven” to describe it, but rather we will call it a “white raven” (we created a new concept to point to a new object discovered in reality). Obviously, everything we call just a “raven” (without some special addition) will be black in color [as in the analytic approach].
Another difference between my view and yours is how we obtain information about the world. According to you, we make claims about the world and thus accumulate information. According to me, obtaining information about the world consists in discovering new phenomena and giving them new names, nothing more. Words and concepts that we use to point to things already known to us cannot add information we do not already have.

You are saying exactly the same thing as I am, except that specifically regarding the claim that ravens are black, you argue that this is a definition and not a claim. Even if you are right (and in my opinion you are not), that does not change the logical point illustrated here. At most, you are arguing that the example is not a good one.
Why do I think you are mistaken even here? Because you assume that the information that they are black is part of their definition, and I do not know why you assume that. In any case, the person who makes the claim that ravens are black does not think so, and you need to analyze it according to his view. It seems to me that you are simply speaking after the information has already accumulated that ravens are indeed black and that this has become part of the definition of raven. This example deals with people who are at the stage before that. But as I said, all this is unnecessary hair-splitting; the logical point is completely clear.
Did I claim that we accumulate information by making claims? Where did you see that nonsense in what I said? What I write is that claims contain information about the world, not that they constitute a means of accumulating it (not claims that I make. Claims that I hear—sometimes yes).

I assume that the information that they are black is part of their definition—because that is how the word ravens was created: by pointing at black birds. It has nothing to do with “after accumulating knowledge.”
I completely lost you… those people who are “before the accumulation of knowledge about ravens”—what are they talking about? According to your view, they are saying, “There is such a thing as a raven, now let us discover what it is”—so:
A. Who told them there is such a thing as a raven? “They understand it intuitively”? The word deck did not exist before there were ships. Human beings do not “intuitively understand that decks exist.” There is no reason why it should be permitted to say such a thing regarding the word “raven.”
B. Why are they using precisely the sounds that form the word “raven”? After all, they do not know what it is, so let them use the word Jigglypuff or some other amusing sound to describe the thing they are going to discover.

C. What is the meaning of the statement “There is such a thing as a raven” before bothering to find out what it is?

The word ravens was created by pointing to birds 20 cm tall, so is that also part of their definition? The question is whether the color of the ravens you saw characterizes all ravens. The claim that all ravens are black says that it does, and therefore this is a meaningful claim. If you create the word horse by pointing to brown horses, does the brown color become part of the meaning of the word horse? Or if the horses you saw were in Kansas, does being in Kansas become part of the meaning of the word horse?
A term can be known to us through some of its characteristics, and further investigation can make us aware of additional characteristics of it (or of which of them are essential and which accidental). In science too, we know space and time and the electromagnetic field, and over time discover more and more of their characteristics, and sometimes abandon characteristics we thought they had.
These really are very simple matters, and so it seems to me that we are already drifting into empty hair-splitting.

Their size is indeed an important part of the thing to which the word points. An exact size is not required. One can definitely say that the word “raven” points to “a black bird between 10 and 30 cm tall.” And it is clear to both you and me that the moment there is a huge black bird a meter tall that looks like a raven, we will not call it a raven but a “giant raven” (a new concept). If there were only brown horses in the world, which you called “horse,” and suddenly you discovered a “horse” that was white in color, you would call it a “white horse” (a new concept). Space/location is not part of a phenomenon for purposes of word creation by human beings. The same phenomenon can occur in several different locations. If there is no difference in the phenomenon that can be pointed to, no new word will be created to describe the phenomenon in a different location. The concept of spacetime was invented when we discovered that we do not understand space very well. Now the word space indeed serves to point to something different from the thing it pointed to a few decades ago (when people thought space was filled with “ether”)—that is, it is the same “sound,” but not exactly the same “meaning.” Of course, when there is a very significant change in our understanding of the thing we are pointing to, then a new word will already be created. (If in the past “demons” was the word used to point to the cause of the phenomenon of milk souring, today people use the word “bacteria.”)
These things really are very simple.

And regarding the sentence “A term can be known to us through some of its characteristics”—that is exactly what I am saying. I am only arguing that “black” is part of its characteristics. Why are your characteristics more legitimate to be called characteristics than the characteristic “black”?

Correction* That is not exactly what I am saying. I am saying that words are a tool for describing a phenomenon (with whatever characteristics) in reality. So to a large extent the word is the characteristics themselves. And a term cannot be known to us through only some of its characteristics—a term is the characteristics we know about. But the question still stands: why, according to your view, is the characteristic “black” not legitimate to be called one of the characteristics (and then the sentence “Ravens are black in color” is equivalent to the sentence “The black thing is black in color”)? And regarding the other characteristics (X and Y) that you do attribute to the word “raven”—would the sentence “All ravens have X and Y” be a sentence making a claim about the world?!

As I said, I have lost you. It seems to me that I explained my position היטב. So, with your pardon, I will stop here.